Information and Control: Inventing the Communications Revolution in Post-War Britain by Ward, JW
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Information and Control: Inventing the 
Communications Revolution in Post-War Britain 
 
Jacob William Ward 
UCL 
PhD History of Science and Technology 
2 
 
 
I, Jacob William Ward, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated 
in the thesis. 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis undertakes the first history of the post-war British telephone system, and 
addresses it through the lens of both actors’ and analysts’ emphases on the importance of 
‘information’ and ‘control’. I explore both through a range of chapters on organisational 
history, laboratories, telephone exchanges, transmission technologies, futurology, 
transatlantic communications, and privatisation. The ideal of an ‘information network’ or 
an ‘information age’ is present to varying extents in all these chapters, as are deployments 
of different forms of control. The most pervasive, and controversial, form of control 
throughout this history is computer control, but I show that other forms of control, 
including environmental, spatial, and temporal, are all also important. I make three 
arguments: first, that the technological characteristics of the telephone system meant that 
its liberalisation and privatisation were much more ambiguous for competition and 
monopoly than expected; second, that information has been more important to the 
telephone system as an ideal to strive for, rather than the telephone system’s contribution 
to creating an apparent information age; third, that control is a more useful concept than 
information for analysing the history of the telephone system, but more work is needed 
to study the discursive significance of ‘control’ itself.  
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1 Introduction 
Subjects and Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On October 31st, 1967, James Merriman, the Engineer-in-Chief for the British telephone 
system, delivered a speech to the Institution of Electrical Engineers (IEE) in which he 
argued that ‘the concepts of information and control are fundamental to any 
telecommunications system’.1 These concepts have both become prominent over the 
twentieth century, in popular and scholarly accounts of an ‘information age’, ‘information 
society’, and ‘information revolution’, widespread applications and ownership of 
‘information (and communication) technology’, wartime emphases on ‘command and 
control’ and ‘control systems’, the disciplinary emergence of ‘control engineering’ and 
‘control theory’, and scholarly accounts of a ‘control revolution’ or a ‘control society’. 
And yet, as Merriman points out, these concepts have also been linked as ‘twin concepts’: 
for example, Information and Control was the name given to a cybernetics and 
information theory journal founded in 1958.2 Information and control have, together and 
separately, accrued rhetorical – and perhaps practical – significance, and 
telecommunication networks have been cast as fundamental to this significance. 
 The history of the British telephone system is not just one of information and 
control, but also public and private. The successful privatisation of the state-owned 
telecom monopoly, British Telecom (BT), in 1984 was a key plank of Margaret 
Thatcher’s industrial policy, which emphasised information and communication 
technology’s (ICT) market power, as well as a pivotal moment in the privatisation 
movement, which gathered pace both in Britain and abroad after BT’s successful sale – 
                                                 
1 J.H.H. Merriman, ‘Men, Circuits and Systems in Telecommunications’, The Post Office Electrical 
Engineers’ Journal 60, no. 4 (1968): 250. 
2 Merriman, 249; Ronald R. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2015), 183. 
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the largest stock flotation the world had seen. BT had itself only been created three years 
earlier, in 1981: the British telephone system had been, from 1912, a state monopoly 
operated by the Post Office (colloquially, the ‘GPO’, for General Post Office) as a branch 
of government, a Civil Service department, until 1969, when the Post Office was 
separated out from the Civil Service and turned into a nationalised corporation. In 1981, 
the telephone and postal businesses were separated: posts remained with the Post Office, 
whilst telecommunications was transferred to a new corporation, British Telecom (BT). 
The government simultaneously terminated the state’s telecommunications monopoly 
and opened the sector to competition; a private competitor, Mercury, was set up to 
compete with BT. A history of the post-war British telephone system is thus central to 
two important changes in twentieth-century Britain: the rise of the so-called ‘information 
age’ and the enacting of neoliberalism. 
 Whilst there are various histories which address the post-war British telephone 
system – broader Post Office histories, histories of telecoms regulation, labour histories, 
and histories of technological aspects of the system3 – there are none which directly 
address the relationship between the sociotechnical characteristics of the telephone 
system and its privatisation, nor how ‘information and control’ came to be so apparently 
central to its engineering management. This thesis thus focusses on how the post-war 
technological history of the telephone system intersected with its privatisation in 1984 
and became central to Thatcherist information technology policy, paying particular 
attention to the themes of ‘information’ and ‘control’. 
 I undertake this through various chapters, which I shall briefly outline here and 
explain in more detail later in this introductory chapter. In the next chapter, I explore the 
histories of ‘information’ and ‘control’, as relevant to telecommunications engineering 
and management, and undertake a critical review of information and control theorists, 
noting how this thesis draws positively from their work and how it might help inform or 
critique their conclusions. The subsequent chapters represent my primary historical 
                                                 
3 Duncan Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post: The Authorized History of the Royal Mail (London: 
Penguin, 2012); Mark Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications: National Institutions, Convergence, 
and Change in Britain and France (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Frank Bealey, 
The Post Office Engineering Union: The History of the Post Office Engineers, 1870-1970 (London: 
Bachman & Turner, 1976); D.G. Tucker, ‘The Early Development of the British Underground Trunk 
Telephone Network’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society 49, no. 1 (1977): 57–74; James Foreman-
Peck, ‘The Development and Diffusion of Telephone Technology in Britain, 1900–1940’, Transactions of 
the Newcomen Society 63, no. 1 (1991): 165–79; Graeme J. Milne, ‘British Business and the Telephone, 
1878–1911’, Business History 49, no. 2 (2007): 163–85; Peter Scott, ‘Still a Niche Communications 
Medium: The Diffusion and Uses of the Telephone System in Interwar Britain’, Business History 53, no. 
6 (2011): 801–20. 
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research, and I start with an organisational history of the telephone system up to the 
creation of BT, which provides a background history for the thesis. The next several 
chapters are organised by scale, starting with local history and working up to international 
history, to explore how the broader changes studied by this thesis were worked out at 
various levels. 
First is a history of the Post Office and BT’s research and development centre, 
which is important because it became part of a quintessential 1980s ‘information age’ 
development – an IT park – and so studies the cultural and organisational dynamics 
behind that formation. Second, I explore the history of the computerisation of the British 
telephone network, specifically telephone exchange computerisation – a programme 
which originated Merriman’s ‘information and control’ speech and so is central to the 
growth of both concepts in engineering management’s thought. I then explore how an 
information discourse proliferated through the development of new transmission 
technologies and intersected with BT’s privatisation and move to competition. In the next 
chapter, I study the telephone business’s Long Range Planning Department, a futures 
research group which was key to both sustaining visions of an information age and, 
through computer modelling, enacting notions of computer control. I then move to the 
international scale, exploring the history of transatlantic communications projects which 
the Post Office and BT participated in, identifying how these projects produced the idea 
of an ‘information age’ which enabled instantaneous, dematerialised communications. 
I then move onto study the history of BT’s privatisation in more detail, exploring 
the extents to which the Thatcher government’s emphases on denationalisation and 
popular capitalism, on the one hand, and information technology’s market power, on the 
other, informed and were shaped by BT’s privatisation. Finally, I conclude by reflecting 
on what this thesis has demonstrated about the roles of ‘information’ and ‘control’ within 
the British telecommunications system and more broadly. 
However, before I move onto more fully introducing these chapters and their 
evidential bases, I shall first explain the methods I use to write this history. In the next 
section ‘Methods’, I highlight influential works from business history and the history of 
technology, and explain methodological steps I have taken to provide a more complete 
history of information and control. In the following, and final, section, ‘Subjects’, I 
outline each chapter’s subject of inquiry and the evidential sources from which I draw to 
sustain that inquiry. 
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Methods 
 
The British telephone network can be approached as both a technological system of 
information and control, and as a large business, moving from public to private. I thus 
draw on approaches from business history and the history of technology for this thesis. In 
this section I first spend some time covering classic approaches from both fields, and then 
turn my attention to alternative approaches and methods which address some of the classic 
approaches’ limitations. 
 The landmark work in business history is Alfred Chandler Jr.’s The Visible Hand.4 
Chandler argues that the invisible hand of the laissez-faire nineteenth century free market 
was displaced by the visible hand of corporate management. In his history of nineteenth 
and early-twentieth-century American business, which influenced Beniger’s account of 
the same period, Chandler outlines how the expanding scale of production, distribution 
and retail, partly enabled by revolutions in transportation and communication 
technologies (the railway and the telegraph), necessitated a novel organisational form – 
the decentralised, hierarchical managerial corporation – to co-ordinate commodity flows. 
Chandler argues that the top and middle managers, as the social group tying spatially 
extensive units into the corporation’s larger hierarchical structure and co-ordinating these 
commodity flows, replaced the invisible hand of the market.5 Chandler’s work has been 
criticised as technologically determinist and for its implicit support of corporate 
business’s control over the market, but, despite this, Chandler does insightfully show the 
relationship between corporate form and technology.6 
 Louis Galambos locates Chandler’s work within a broader ‘organisational 
synthesis’ in American history which, from the 1960s, took the organisation as the 
primary subject for exploring historical change.7 Like Chandler, Galambos points to the 
increasing functional specialisation inside and between organisations, the centralisation 
of authority, and the development of managerial hierarchies, which argues served two 
organisational functions: control over the organisation’s social, political, and economic 
                                                 
4 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
5 Chandler Jr., 1–4. 
6 Louis Galambos, ‘Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the 
Organizational Synthesis’, The Business History Review 57, no. 4 (1983): 473; David A. Hounshell, 
‘Hughesian History of Technology and Chandlerian Business History: Parallels, Departures, and Critics’, 
History and Technology 12, no. 3 (1995): 210. 
7 Galambos, ‘Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization’, 472–74; Louis Galambos, ‘The 
Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History’, The Business History Review 44, no. 3 
(1970): 279–90. 
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environment, and the promotion of technological and organisational innovation.8 
Galambos has also reframed the organisational synthesis for the information age, arguing 
that bureaucratic institutions still predominate, but he locates his analysis within as 
Castellsian framing of society, viewing information technology as the ‘new innovative 
force powering capitalism’ and arguing that the stabilising institutions of the pre-1970s 
have been remade into the nimble, creative, ‘transformative’ institutions of the 
information age.9 I think Galambos’s useful point here is to emphasise the still dominant 
role of the organisation, particularly the bureaucratic business organisation, in 
contemporary society but, as I will show in critiques of information age theories in the 
next chapter, it is difficult to substantiate the existence of a novel information age. 
 I turn now to the history of technology, and to Thomas Hughes’ concept of 
technological systems, which he developed in his history of electrical power networks in 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century USA, Britain, and Germany.10 Hughes 
divides the development of technological systems into several phases: first, invention and 
development; second, technology transfer; third, system growth, characterised by 
attention to the ‘reverse salients’ of critical problems lagging behind overall systems 
development; fourth, technological momentum – as historically contingent decisions are 
taken in system design and development, the system gains momentum, meaning it is 
harder to reverse or resist those decisions taken in system design.11 It is important to note 
that Hughes conceived of technological systems, despite their name, as essentially 
sociotechnical in character: they are not just composed of physical, technological 
artefacts, but also social components such as organisations, engineers, and legislation. 
There is some similarity here to James Beniger’s systems of control, which I explore in 
more detail in the next chapter, but Hughes does a far better job of providing a model of 
technological change which sees technology and society as mutually shaping, thus 
avoiding the pitfalls of technological determinism. Whilst I do not take an explicitly 
Hughesian framework in this thesis, his influence is still present in the way I pay attention 
                                                 
8 Galambos, ‘The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History’, 280; Galambos, 
‘Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization’, 492–93. 
9 Louis Galambos, ‘Recasting the Organizational Synthesis: Structure and Process in the Twentieth and 
Twenty-First Centuries’, The Business History Review 79, no. 1 (2005): 35–38. 
10 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore; 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
11 Hughes, 14–17; Thomas P. Hughes, ‘The Evolution of Large Technological Systems’, in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1987), 51–
82. 
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to the different stages of the technological system, from research and development to the 
management of mature systems, as well as socio-political context. 
 The Hughesian approach has similar limitations to the Chandlerian approach, 
which has previously been noted by David Hounshell, who points out that both look at 
the inter-relations between organisational form and technological change, and both 
effectively take a meso-level approach – Chandler, the business corporation; Hughes, the 
technological system.12 It is along these lines that this thesis can address these limitations. 
 I will first start with the macro-scale given this chapter’s attention to macro 
theories. Hughes’ Networks of Power only very basically engages with the entanglement 
of power networks and broader societal transitions, uncritically using the concept of a 
second industrial revolution to delineate Chicago and Berlin, centres of this supposed 
revolution, from London, which was apparently ignored. As apparent revolutions of 
information and control are central to this thesis, I look to other approaches in history of 
technology which critically engage with the entanglement of technology and macro-scale 
transitions beyond the ‘system’ approach. 
Paul Edwards addresses technology and the macro through analysing the 
interlinkage of technological infrastructures with modernity.13 Edwards suggests that 
meso-scale technology studies, such as sociotechnical studies of telephone systems, 
reinforce the modernist settlement by implicitly casting these infrastructures as 
compressing time and space, and so producing modernity.14 However, micro-scale 
studies, Edwards points out, such as Claude Fischer’s social history of telephony, 
complicate this view, showing the ways in which users engage with technology outside 
of the modernist subject/alienation viewpoint.15 Finally, on the macro-scale, Edwards 
turns to Beniger’s macro-account of the control revolution as an example which, although 
problematic, fleshes out the modernist conception of technology by linking together 
infrastructural change on a broader historical scale.16 Edwards suggests that it is not that 
these different standpoints are mutually exclusive but rather, to reconcile them, these 
scales need to be ‘mutually oriented’, by looking not just at small groups on the one hand 
                                                 
12 Hounshell, ‘Hughesian History of Technology and Chandlerian Business History’. 
13 Paul N. Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, in Modernity and Technology, ed. Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew 
Feenberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 185–224. 
14 Edwards, 198–201, 221. 
15 Edwards, 202, 222; Claude S. Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). 
16 Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, 204–7; James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and 
Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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and large institutions on the other, but the relationship between them. The example 
Edwards gives is the small communities and networks of engineers which developed 
ARPANET, the US military’s internet precursor, and the relationship these communities 
had with their large military sponsors; each group’s goals were shaped by their 
experiences of different scalar dynamics, but through mutual orientation, a more 
comprehensive history of ARPANET can be written.17 
 Another example linking micro-scale technology studies with macro-scale 
transitions is Paul Rosen’s history of mountain bike development, which puts the ‘social 
construction of technology’ school (SCOT) in dialogue with Harvey’s analysis of 
postmodernity and flexible accumulation.18 Rosen analyses the mountain bike, a non-
stable technological artefact undergoing constant revisions and rebranding, as a classic 
example of the flexibly-produced, highly-branded and aestheticized product of flexible 
accumulation. Rosen argues that social constructivist approaches, with their focus on 
relevant social groups of users, do not have a sufficiently detailed understanding of how 
society produces these group’s social features, and thus the social features of technology; 
for example, Rosen argues that Pinch and Bijker’s famous article on the development of 
the safety bicycle under-elaborates women and elderly men as relevant social groups, 
noting that ‘we are told nothing about the social make-ups of these groups, how large a 
proportion of them were cyclists, from which social classes they came, and so on’.19 
Rosen’s point is not that SCOT is unable to explain why elderly men and women 
would support certain features of bicycle design – low wheels and air tyres met the safety 
concerns of both groups – but that SCOT does not situate these groups within broader 
societal contexts and so is unable to explain why these groups, from those classes, at that 
particular time, in that particular manner, articulated those pressures. Without this 
context, Pinch and Bijker are unable to link the technological features of the safety bicycle 
with broader features of late nineteenth century Britain. Rosen corrects this by situating 
the relevant social groups to mountain bike design – off-trail mountain bikers and urban 
users – within a vision of postmodernity; thus off-trail mountain bikers are located within 
                                                 
17 Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, 213–20. 
18 P. Rosen, ‘The Social Construction of Mountain Bikes: Technology and Postmodernity in the Cycle 
Industry’, Social Studies of Science 23, no. 3 (1993): 479–513. 
19 Rosen, 483; Trevor Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or 
How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’, in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1987), 17–
50. 
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the demodernising impulse of postmodernity, the desire to get away from the time-space 
compression of urban life, whilst urban users turned to the mountain bike as a way of 
dealing with potholed cities crumbling from state under-investment, and so Rosen casts 
the urban mountain biker as equally crucial to the postmodern urban landscape as 
architecture itself.20 
 Whilst Rosen and Edwards both show ways of integrating the macro-scale into 
technology studies, there remains the issue of writing the micro-scale into a history of the 
telephone system. I address this in several ways: throughout this thesis, I use detailed 
examination of low-level technical documents, meetings, and conferences to uncover 
critical moments where the micro and meso were mutually oriented; however, the ways I 
want to focus on here, for their important methodological dimensions, are oral history and 
local history, which I primarily use in Chapter Four. The Chandlerian and Hughesian 
approaches, in their attention to the meso, and as an unavoidable product of historical 
distance, neglect the voices of those who experienced the managerial strategies of the 
business corporation, or the increasing momentum of the technological system. Oral 
history is one way of giving a voice to those who are ignored or under-represented, 
particularly in the experiences of communities where unwritten rules and dynamics play 
important roles.21 
An extension of this community focus is to combine oral history with local 
history: Valerie Yow points out that focussing on a particular group within a particular 
locality allows a glimpse of the local impacts of national or global pressures.22 Combining 
these approaches – oral history as a voice for the under-represented, and local history as 
fresh insight into broader transitions – I undertake a local history of the telephone 
system’s R&D labs. I explore its local history partly through the oral histories of two 
groups: those who worked in the laboratories, and those who lived around the research 
centre. Local history is here particularly important because the telephone system’s 
research centre, as I expand on in the third chapter, is a significant spatial construct – a 
fixed place dedicated to collapsing space – and so is a place one would expect to be 
heavily implicated in broader information age or postmodern experiences of time-space. 
It is thus necessary not just to capture the stories of those who worked in the research 
centre, but also those who were exposed to it through their lived experience. 
                                                 
20 Rosen, ‘The Social Construction of Mountain Bikes’, 497–501. 
21 Paul Thompson, ‘“The Voice of the Past” Extract’, in The Oral History Reader, ed. Robert Perks and 
Alistair Thomson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide 
for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press, 2005), 12. 
22 Yow, Recording Oral History, 188–89. 
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 There are also ways to further flesh out the meso, and so I also use two approaches 
which provide neglected but useful perspectives for conceptualising the history of 
information and control: visual sources and environmental history. 
 In sections of this thesis, I explore how advertising and imagery, used to sell 
technologies and tie them into certain discourses, is an important part of understanding 
the construction of the information discourse. The visual culture of advertising is useful 
because of its ubiquity and because it taps into discourses in ways which purely textual 
evidence cannot.23 Ludmilla Jordanova warns of the dangers in uncritically using 
advertising as a visual source: adverts can become associated with things to which they 
have no intrinsic connection, and can become over-familiar to the point that they are 
difficult to fully unpack.24 Audience is also a problematic issue: seeing advertising as 
‘messaging’ can be misleading, implying that adverts are always clearly transmitted, and 
so it is better to read adverts as revealing the culture and goals of those responsible for 
them, rather than those receiving them.25 
That said, it is not necessarily crucial to handle advertising as a wholly different 
type of source. Mica Nava points out the dangers of treating advertising as a monolithic 
example of corporate hegemonic control over consumption, and in this sense I think 
Roland Marchand’s history of corporate publicity and advertising is useful.26 Marchand 
treats advertising probably more homogenously than Nava would like – Nava sees adverts 
as part of a broader heterogenous grouping of cultural visual forms27 – but I think 
Marchand’s approach, which treats advertising as a defensive, rather than offensive, 
strategy for early-twentieth-century US corporate giants, avoids the implication of 
corporate hegemony. These corporations, criticised as too large for the social good, 
underwent a crisis of moral and social legitimacy, and so Marchand situates advertising 
within a broad range of initiatives – fairs, factory visits, showcases, etc. – intended to 
create a ‘corporate soul’. Marchand’s wide use of different source types raises another 
issue with advertising: Malcolm Barnard points out the dangers in treating advertising as 
unique, arguing that all forms of information are intended to influence behaviour, and so 
                                                 
23 Ludmilla Jordanova, The Look of the Past: Visual and Material Evidence in Historical Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2. 
24 Jordanova, 21–22. 
25 Jordanova, 168. 
26 Mica Nava, ‘Framing Advertising: Cultural Analysis and the Incrimination of Visual Texts’, in Buy 
This Book: Studies in Advertising and Consumption, ed. Mica Nava et al. (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 35–36; Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations 
and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 
27 Nava, ‘Framing Advertising: Cultural Analysis and the Incrimination of Visual Texts’, 45. 
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argues that adverts are not unique nor somehow inherently morally questionable.28 So, 
whilst it is important to bear in mind the distinctive features of the visual culture of 
advertising which Jordanova points out, it is also important to not treat advertising as an 
exceptional manifestation of corporate culture, or control over consumption, just because 
it is ‘advertising’. 
A further approach, somewhat neglected in business history and history of 
technology, and far more neglected in accounts of the information age, is environmental 
history. Environmental history and history of technology have had substantial links built 
between them since Jeffrey Stine and Joel Tarr’s landmark essay on technology and 
environment, but business history has neglected this area more.29 Christine Meisner 
Rosen has repeatedly called for business history to pay more attention to the 
environmental dimensions of corporate activity, and there are now signs of change.30 
However, I think the more significant point is the place of the environment in accounts 
of the ‘information age’. As I will explore in the next chapter, the information age is all 
too often presented as dematerialised and invisible and so, whilst environmental history 
is not this thesis’ focus, I do address the environmental history of transatlantic 
communications in Chapter Seven and so signpost it here as another dimension in which 
I write this history of information and control in the British telephone system. 
I wish to conclude this section by noting that it is by now apparent that I deploy a 
variety of methodologies through this thesis: archival research, oral history, cultural 
theory. An additional resource I draw on is science fiction literature, which, as I shall 
show in Chapters Seven and Nine, telecommunications management and politicians 
deployed to explicate the political and technological changes which Britain and the 
telephone system were going through. I focus on these uses because, as the science fiction 
theorist Darko Suvin argues, science fiction is a genre which is used to confront normative 
systems with new, unfamiliar rules: paying attention to how and when it is invoked thus 
                                                 
28 Malcolm Barnard, ‘Advertising: The Rhetorical Imperative’, in Visual Culture, ed. Chris Jenks 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 36. 
29 Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr, ‘At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the Environment’, 
Technology and Culture 39, no. 4 (1998): 601–40. 
30 Christine Meisner Rosen, ‘Industrial Ecology and the Greening of Business History’, Business and 
Economic History 26, no. 1 (1997): 123–37; Christine Meisner Rosen and Christopher C. Sellers, ‘The 
Nature of the Firm: Towards an Ecocultural History of Business’, The Business History Review 73, no. 4 
(1999): 577–600; Christine Meisner Rosen, ‘The Business-Environment Connection’, Environmental 
History 10, no. 1 (2005): 77–79; Hartmut Berghoff and Adam Rome, eds., Green Capitalism?: Business 
and the Environment in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 
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provides rich insight into the motivations of those invoking it.31 This variety of methods 
provides a complementary approach to the scalar organisation of this thesis: just as 
exploring information, control, and privatisation from the local to the international shows 
how these changes occurred in different ways at different levels, exploring these changes 
beyond archival research shows how these changes were effected and resonated in ways 
beyond the textual record of historical decisions. A particular concern of this thesis is 
how the idea of an ‘information age’ became entangled with the rise of neoliberal political 
economy in Britain: to do so, it is thus necessary to study how the aesthetic of the 
‘information age’ has been constructed, why it was constructed, and how it differs from 
reality. This necessitates not only delving into the archival record, but also people’s 
memories and, through science fiction and the visuals of advertising, cultural change. 
A final point I would like to make is that, whilst the British telecommunications 
system, both as part of the Post Office and BT, is central to this thesis, there are certain 
key actors (such as Merriman) whom I focus on to avoid anthropomorphising the Post 
Office and BT as autonomous decision-making entities. Some of the methods I outline 
above, such as advertising studies, read source material as emblematic of broader 
organisational attitudes, and risk conflating attitude with agency. I will briefly outline 
these key actors and decision-makers here, before outlining the broader importance of 
keeping these actors in mind. The key politicians include: Ernest Marples, Postmaster-
General from 1957-9, who pushed through the construction of the Post Office Tower and 
large-scale automation; Tony Benn, Postmaster-General from 1964-66 and Secretary of 
State for Industry from 1974-75, who was a strong advocate of both Post Office 
reorganisation in the 1960s and industrial democracy in the 1970s; Margaret Thatcher, 
who of course oversaw both the liberalisation and privatisation of BT, as well as 
championing information technology; Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Industry from 
1981-83, who first formally proposed privatising BT to the Cabinet, and tied BT’s 
privatisation to the economic importance of information technology; and Kenneth Baker, 
Minister for Information Technology from 1981-85, who played a key role in embedding 
BT’s privatisation within information technology policy and discourse. 
The key managers and engineers are: Tommy Flowers, whose wartime work at 
Bletchley Park influenced early electronic switching development; Gordon Radley, 
Director of Research during World War II and later Director-General, who was a key 
supporter of Flowers’ research and also initiated the relocation of the Post Office research 
                                                 
31 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre, ed. 
Gerry Canavan (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), 15–27. 
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station; James Merriman, who, as Engineer-in-Chief, established the core driving 
principles for development of the British telephone network; William Ryland, Chief 
Executive, and then Chairman, of the Post Office from 1969-77, who was a key advocate 
of further separation of the telephone service from the Post Office and the state, and also 
defended the Post Office’s computer modelling activity in Whitehall; J.S. Whyte, 
Merriman’s successor, who also oversaw the establishment of the Long Range Planning 
Department; Roy Harris, Flower’s successor in overseeing telephone exchange 
development, who implemented many of Merriman’s principles and was also one of the 
key figures introducing information theory into the Post Office; and David Probert, 
Director of Strategic Modelling in the Business Planning and Strategy Department, a key 
developer of modelling in the business in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
By focusing on these key managerial, engineering, and political figures, I will 
analyse and align their views and decisions, and so uncover the trends and philosophies 
guiding the telephone system, rather than read the system itself as an actor. In this sense, 
I follow Hughes’ approach to the history of technological systems, where the system is 
the subject, but the historical decisions of key actors – managers, engineers, politicians – 
are crucial to showing the system as sociotechnical. 
 
Subjects 
 
Interrogating the construction of the ‘information age’ and the shifting forms of control – 
particularly those implicated in the change from public to private, and with the advent of 
computerisation – in the British telephone system is this thesis’ goal, and, as mentioned 
above, I conduct this on various scales. In this section, I shall provide further detail on 
each chapter, including their evidential bases. 
 In Chapter Three, ‘The Telephone Service: A History of Control’, I deliver a 
historical overview of the British telephone service, starting with the telephone network’s 
nineteenth century origination in competing private local and regional systems, 
addressing the state’s 1912 monopolisation of the telephone network, and then more 
thoroughly exploring the service’s history after World War II. I frame the history in terms 
of external and internal control, relating weakening external control of the telephone 
business, starting in 1955 with the separation of Post Office finances from the Treasury, 
to strengthening internal managerial control over labour, computerisation, and customers. 
I also situate the liberalisation of the state monopoly and eventual privatisation of BT in 
1981 and 1984 in a longer history of weakening state control, complicating the traditional 
20 
 
narrative of privatisation as a significant rupture. The evidential basis for this chapter 
primarily draws from board records and annual reports from the British Postal Museum 
and Archive and BT Archives, and Treasury records from the National Archives. 
 In Chapter Four, ‘The Door to Tomorrow? Research Centres, Science Parks, and 
New Villages’, I undertake an oral and local history of the Post Office’s research centre, 
which I use to interrogate information age and postmodern conceptions of spatiality and 
temporality. I look at the transformation of the Post Office and BT’s research centre into 
a science park and the construction of an ‘instant village’, built in a postmodern, 
historically evocative, traditional style, known as neo-Vernacular, around the research 
centre. I show that British Telecom publicity, land developers, and architects constructed 
Martlesham Heath, the location of this science park and village, as a place – a 
crystallisation of time and space – through active efforts to evoke the past: for the village, 
through its neo-Vernacular architecture, and for the science park, through repeated 
attempts to compare its activity to World War II military research and science ‘boffins’. 
I thus argue that to see Martlesham Heath as a place purely characterised by the 
compression of space, as a telecommunications research lab and in the clustering of high-
tech firms in a science park, and time, in the rapid construction of an ‘instant village’, is 
to overlook the significance of permanence and historicity to the construction of these 
places. The evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from research and 
development records from BT Archives and oral histories with BT research staff and 
Martlesham Heath residents. 
 In Chapter Five, ‘The Universal Machine: Integrating Computers and 
Communications’, I examine the computerisation and digitalisation of the telephone 
network. I situate the development of a failed 1950s electronic telephone exchange known 
as Highgate Wood within ‘defiant modernism’ and return to James Merriman’s 
philosophy of ‘information and control’. I argue that two approaches to computing 
influenced this philosophy: the British ‘government machine’, and cybernetics. I then 
outline how computer modelling negotiated industrial disputes in telephone exchange 
computerisation, before moving on to explore the incorporation of the government 
machine and cybernetics into two projects: System X, an ‘evolutionary’ telephone 
exchange, and the Integrated Services Digital Network, a new digital standard for 
transmitting telephone and data signals simultaneously. Overall, this chapter addresses 
how computerisation and digitalisation shaped and were shaped by information and 
mechanisation discourses in the telephone system, and influenced new techniques for 
machine control. The evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from network 
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planning records from BT Archives and Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
records from the National Archives. 
 In Chapter Six, ‘The Information Highway: Metaphors and Vision in the 
Telecommunications Network’, I explore two dimensions of the history of transmission 
technologies, from the construction of London’s Post Office Tower to the roll-out of 
optical fibre. First, I explore the metaphors used for these technologies, from the Post 
Office Tower as a ‘lighthouse’ to the growing prominence of the ‘information highway’ 
in the development of the millimetric waveguide and optical fibre. Second, I follow on 
from the previous chapter by exploring how the Post Office’s continuing interest in an 
integrated network, capable of transmitting voice, data, and video, led to repeated 
attempts to secure a monopoly on cable TV provision in the UK. I also explore the 
influence that the finance industry had on the telephone system by examining the 
relationship between the Post Office and a Bank of England and City of London group, 
the City Telecommunications Committee, demonstrating the influence this had on the 
growing prioritisation of the City of London by the Post Office and BT at the end of the 
1970s and into the 1980s. The evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from 
network planning and telecommunications publicity records from BT Archives, the City 
Telecommunications Committee Records from the Bank of England Archives, and 
official government publications on cable television and optical fibre. 
 In Chapter Seven, ‘The Machine Starts: Invention, Prediction, and Surveillance in 
Telephone Futurology’, I explore the history of the Post Office’s Long Range Planning 
Department, a futurology department for the telephone system’s engineering and research 
functions. This chapter continues themes from the previous two by relating 
telecommunications futurology to various visions of computer control in the telephone 
system, and I argue that computer modelling of the future paved the way for various forms 
of computer surveillance in the telephone network. I show that the department’s early 
imaginative approach to the future was related to concerns about machine control and 
argue that, in response the financial and fuel crises of the early 1970s, the department 
developed more sophisticated approaches to the future, including corporate computer 
modelling, as a way of managing uncertainty. Computer modelling was interpreted as a 
form of future surveillance, and helped senior management in British Telecom negotiate 
liberalisation and privatisation by providing a model for how customers might be 
surveilled and predicted in a competitive telecommunications environment. The 
evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from the records of the Long Range 
Planning Department from BT Archives. 
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In Chapter Eight, ‘The Single World System: Transatlantic Communications from 
the Cold War to the Information Age’, I undertake an environmental and cultural history 
of transatlantic telecommunications. I explore the development of transatlantic submarine 
telephone cables by the Post Office/BT in the UK and AT&T in the USA, and the creation 
of a global communications satellite system, INTELSAT, to answer two questions: first, 
what were the envirotechnical strategies taken to secure submarine cables and 
communication satellites in the hazardous environments of the sea-floor and outer space? 
Second, how did communication satellites come to be the primary symbol of an 
instantaneous, dematerialised, international communications for the information age? I 
show that a variety of protective strategies were taken to protect cables and satellites in 
their hazardous environments, and that these environments became a conquered territory 
as part of a 1950s and 1960s Cold War rhetoric; however, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
satellites were increasingly presented by INTELSAT and the USA, its majority 
stakeholder, as dematerialised and environmentally transcendent compared to European-
supported submarine cables. I argue that this image subsequently became the basis for the 
communications satellite as one of the chief icons of the information age and supported 
the notion of international communications as global, instantaneous, and dematerialised. 
The evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from AT&T advertising records from 
the National Museum of American History Archives Center, INTELSAT records from 
the National Air and Space Museum Archives Center and George Washington University 
Special Collections, and international telecommunications records from BT Archives. 
 In Chapter Nine, ‘The London Ideology: Constructing the Information and 
Privatisation Movements’, I explore the history of BT’s privatisation as an episode of 
policy-making and organisational change. I draw together the approaches to privatisation 
and information technology by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government with BT’s 
negotiations of privatisation to argue that BT’s privatisation was not only significant for 
neoliberalism, but also for the nascent information discourse. I show the ways in which 
privatisation shaped BT, but, more importantly, the ways in which BT shaped 
privatisation as a wider movement, and argue that privatisation came at a unique moment 
in which it could tap into both the information and neoliberal discourses, fusing the two 
and thus playing an important role in intertwining the information age and neoliberalism. 
The evidential basis for this chapter primarily draws from cabinet and Prime Ministerial 
records from the National Archives, and board and publicity records from BT Archives. 
 In Chapter Ten, my concluding chapter, I draw together these different scales and 
subjects to reflect on the micro, meso, and macro-histories of information and control in 
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the British telephone system, drawing attention to historical trends. I also explore how 
this history, in different ways, might inform histories of the ‘information age’ and 
alternative histories of control, and identify areas of interest for further inquiry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this introductory chapter, I have outlined the subject of this thesis and the methods used 
to undertake this study. I have outlined the diverse methods used, and justified them as 
serving a broader historical goal of understanding how the telecommunication system’s 
role in the rise of an apparent ‘information age’ became entangled with the privatisation 
of BT. I have given an overview of the subject for each chapter, explained how these 
subjects intersect with ‘information and control’, and demonstrated the evidential basis 
for each chapter. However, before I move onto these historical studies, it is first necessary 
to review in more detail what is meant by ‘information’ and ‘control’, and how they 
became so important to both telecommunications management and many social theorists. 
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2 Critical Review of Literature 
Information and Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information and control were fundamental to the British telecommunications system in 
1967, according to its Engineer-in-Chief, and in the previous chapter I set out the methods 
and case-studies I will use to study the telephone system as a site of information and 
control. In the first chapter, I also alluded to the fact that ‘information’ and ‘control’ have 
both had broader resonances in the twentieth century beyond the Post Office and British 
Telecom, amongst engineers, managers, politicians, and social theorists. It is thus 
necessary, before undertaking histories of information and control in the British telephone 
system, to understand where these terms came from, what they have meant to different 
people, and how they have been theorised in relation to social, political, and technological 
change. In this chapter, I review the literatures of ‘information’ and ‘control’ to 
understand these histories, explore their relevance and limitations for this thesis’ subjects, 
and explain their positive contributions to my analysis. I start first with ‘Information’, 
then move onto ‘Control’, before concluding.  
 
Information 
 
The first point to make is that the information discourse has been culturally constructed. 
Ronald Kline had explored its construction through a history of two inter-related fields – 
cybernetics and information theory – which were created in the wake of World War II.1 
In 1948, Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon simultaneously published theories of 
information as the amount of order or disorder in messages, inspired by their wartime 
work on anti-aircraft control systems and cryptography respectively.2 Wiener also linked 
information with control: the input-output feedback loops used to control automatic anti-
                                                 
1 Kline, The Cybernetics Moment. 
2 Kline, 9–36. 
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aircraft emplacements’ target acquisition became the basis for cybernetics as the study of 
information, feedback, and control, and this novel science captured the public and 
scholarly imagination in the 1950s and 1960s.3 
 However, information theory overtook cybernetics, which declined for several 
reasons: its extensive use and ambiguous definitions led to its disciplinary fragmentation; 
the problematic connotations of its wide use in the Soviet Union; and its association with 
counter-culture figures such as Gregory Bateson and Stewart Brand.4 Meanwhile, the 
‘information bandwagon’ meant that ‘information’ was used broadly within academia, 
but also by management scientists and business groups as ‘information technology’, 
referring to managerial technologies and techniques, and by social theorists such as 
Marshall McLuhan and Daniel Bell, who popularised the ‘information society’ label.5 By 
the 1980s, the notion of an ‘information age’ was firmly established, having completed 
its journey from its post-war origins in cybernetics and information theory. 
 Kline’s work is especially useful in this thesis for two reasons: first, it shows how 
the idea of an ‘information age’ was constructed, and second, Kline also shows how 
cybernetics established an engineering definition of ‘control’ with roots in anti-aircraft 
communication loops. These insights are particularly relevant in Chapters Five, where I 
explore the influence of cybernetics and information theory on telecom engineers, and 
Seven, where I explore the influence of the growing information discourse of the 1970s 
on the Post Office’s Long Range Planning Department. However, there are two areas 
which do not receive his full attention: first, its construction outside the USA; second, 
information’s popularisation in the engineering imagination. Communication networks 
are the primary medium for transmitting information, and yet the processes which 
redefined these systems as information networks are not addressed. Here, I will begin to 
address the first issue, exploring the information discourse in Britain, but this thesis will 
address both issues. 
 There is unfortunately no history of a British information discourse, although 
Kline does not completely neglect the UK, highlighting the importance of English 
information theorists in popularising broader definitions of information theory, and 
drawing attention to Margaret Thatcher’s promotion of information technologies as a 
globally significant moment for the information discourse.6 However, there are several 
                                                 
3 Kline, 68–102, 135–51. 
4 Kline, 179–201. 
5 Kline, 102–34, 202–28. 
6 Kline, 104–12, 203. 
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histories which address aspects of information technology’s development and 
interpretation in Britain. Tom Lean, on the popularisation of home computing, highlights 
government efforts in the late 1970s to popularise microelectronics, which he suggests 
were in response to public fears about a ‘microelectronic future’, where clerical and 
manufacturing work would be lost to IT.7 
 James Sumner describes computing in post-war Britain as transitioning from 
‘defiance to compliance’.8 Sumner draws on Robert Bud and the Science Museum’s 
concept of ‘defiant modernism’, developed for the museum’s Making the Modern World 
gallery, which describes British technological triumphalism in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
exemplified by projects such as Comet, the first civilian jet airliner, Bluebird, the speed 
record-setting land and water vehicles, and Calder Hall, the first commercial nuclear 
power station.9 Sumner argues that the British computing industry and policy-making in 
the 1950s similarly had a national exceptionalist fixation on unique and distinctive 
hardware but, as the 1960s progressed, this was displaced by compliance with 
international computing systems, weakening national exceptionalist rhetoric. However, 
Sumner also points to the Thatcher government’s IT rhetoric, which focussed on 
regenerating post-industrial regions with IT and microelectronic entrepreneurialism, as a 
potential revival of ‘defiance’. 
 Jon Agar takes a different approach to Lean and Sumner, exploring computing 
within government, and within a longer history of governmental clerical mechanisation.10 
Agar uses ‘discreet modernism’ to describe government mechanisers’ deliberate 
obscuring of mechanisation and computerisation, which avoided the problematic 
representation of government as automatable, rather than run by well-educated 
‘generalist’ Civil Servants.11 Like Lean and Sumner, Agar points to a transition in the 
1970s and 1980s, interlinking the rise of the personal computer, growing public demands 
for transparent government, and the rise of Thatcherism and neoliberalism, as together 
responsible for the ‘hollowing out’ of the state: distributed, networked, individualist 
personal computing, combined with a public appetite for transparency, and a political 
                                                 
7 Tom Lean, Electronic Dreams: How 1980s Britain Learned to Love the Computer (London: 
Bloomsbury Sigma, 2016), 91–94. 
8 James Sumner, ‘Defiance to Compliance: Visions of the Computer in Postwar Britain’, History and 
Technology 30, no. 4 (2014): 309–33. 
9 Robert Bud, ‘Penicillin and the New Elizabethans’, The British Journal for the History of Science 31, 
no. 3 (1998): 305–333. 
10 Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2003). 
11 Agar, 424–30. 
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ideology favouring small government, formed an ideal model for the small state.12 Agar’s 
work is particularly relevant because the British telephone system was, until 1969, a 
government department, and I argue in this thesis, particularly in Chapter Four, that the 
telephone system’s philosophy of information and control was heavily influenced by 
British governmental computing culture. Indeed, James Merriman, the Engineer-in-Chief 
whose quotes open this thesis, also features in Agar’s history, when Merriman lead the 
Treasury’s Office Mechanisation Branch within their Organisation & Methods Division 
(O&M) in the 1950s.13 
 The work of Lean, Sumner and Agar on computerisation and information 
technologies is indispensable in understanding the changing cultures of computing in 
Britain: Lean’s work on the popularity of microtechnology and computers in the late 
1970s and early 1980s is important in Chapter Nine, where I explore the Conservative 
party’s championing of information technology; Sumner’s analysis of ‘defiance’ and 
‘compliance’ is also relevant to my exploration of Thatcherist information technology 
policy, as well as providing useful insight into the Post Office’s exploration of 
digitalisation and its crossover with international standard-setting, which I address in 
Chapter Five. Finally, as mentioned above, Agar’s work on the ‘government machine’ is 
crucial to understanding the discourse of ‘information and control’, the origins of which 
I address in Chapter Five. 
However, one area these scholars do not address, which Kline explores in the 
American context, is the popularisation of ‘information age’ theories in Britain. Here, I 
explore one of the earliest and most influential information age theories – Daniel Bell’s 
post-industrial society – not because of its analytical value, but because of its popularity: 
I show in Chapter Seven that Bell’s theory influenced telephone system engineers’ visions 
of the future. Bell, in his 1973 book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, argued that 
society was moving to a post-industrial form, characterised by technological 
rationalisation and maximisation of industrial output, a corresponding decline in 
industrial workforce, and the expansion of the services sector, which he characterised as 
informational.14 Bell’s work has been criticised as teleological, deterministic, and 
                                                 
12 Agar, 367–90; for further evidence of this transition, also see Helen Margetts, Information Technology 
in Government: Britain and America (London: Routledge, 1999). 
13 Agar, The Government Machine, 309. 
14 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973). 
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misleading;15 however, it was nevertheless influential, particularly on telephone system 
engineers and managers, and so Bell’s insights are worth bearing in mind for one of the 
significant developments I outline in this thesis, particularly in Chapter Seven – the 
growing emphasis on information services in the telephone system. 
 Perhaps the most widely-read contemporary information age theory is Manuel 
Castells’ Information Age trilogy, which outlines the rise of the ‘network society’.16 
Castells argues that capitalism has been restructured to an informational mode of 
development, where information generates the surplus which capitalism distributes.17 
Castells argues that information has had far-reaching consequences for its own production 
and distribution, reshaping the global economy, business organisations and networks, 
work patterns, culture, and space and time. Castells rightly devotes a huge part of his 
work to how informational capitalism has been worked out not just in the West, but all 
over the world, as well as considering the consequences of the ‘network society’ for social 
and cultural identity.18 
However, here I specifically want to explore Castells’ conception of information 
and communication technologies.19 Whilst Castells disavows technological determinism, 
it is clear that he locates informational capitalism’s source in the ‘information technology 
revolution’ of the 1970s. Castells claims that technology only ‘embodies the capacity for 
society to transform itself’,20 but his defence would be easier to believe if he did not spend 
only a single section of a single chapter of his trilogy outlining a superficial linear history 
of IT. For Castells, informational capitalism is defined by ICT’s ‘networking logic’, 
which imparts a dangerous teleology: society is apparently transformed by the implacable 
drive of the networking logic, which itself seems to have spontaneously formed into 
existence.21 As has been pointed out elsewhere, this conceptualisation of information and 
communication technologies – the prime movers for his networking logic – is seriously 
                                                 
15 Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), 43, 50, 53; 
Jonathan Gershuny and Ian Miles, The New Service Economy: The Transformation of Employment in 
Industrial Societies (New York: Praeger, 1983). 
16 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed., The Information Age: Economy, Society 
and Culture, Vol. 1 (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 2nd 
ed., The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 2 (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); 
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3 (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 
17 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 13–21. 
18 Castells, The Power of Identity; Castells, End of Millennium. 
19 This is primarily outlined in Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 38–62. 
20 Castells, 7. 
21 Castells, 70, 500. 
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under-developed.22 Castells’ positive contributions should not be overlooked, however, 
and, in particular, his insights into the spatial dimensions of the ‘information society’: 
whilst I disagree with Castells’ assertions of a novel information age, he is one of the 
leading scholars in recognising distinctive spatial configurations of information 
technology, such as science parks and IT parks. Castells’ conceptualisation of spatiality 
in these places, which I address in more detail in Chapter Four, is particularly important 
to my analysis of the Post Office and BT’s R&D centre in the same chapter. 
The final information theorist I will address is Herbert Schiller, who Frank 
Webster calls the ‘most helpful yet underrated scholar of the Information Age’.23 Schiller, 
like Castells, has a huge corpus devoted to information and its effects, such as the 
projection of US power, increasing class inequality, and the growth of consumer 
capitalism.24 However, here I will explore Schiller’s analysis of ICT development and 
privatisation. Schiller attributes privatisation, which he broadly construes as the public 
sector’s decline and the private sector’s corresponding expansion, to information and 
communication technologies, which he argues rose to prominence due to the economic 
crises of the 1970s.25 Schiller argues that Western nations turned to ICTs as a new market 
and industry to gain a competitive edge during economic crisis; this in turn aided the 
expansion of corporate power and subsequent privatisation movements: ICTs became 
both the layer through which international business flowed and the commodity which was 
traded. This doubled significance of information to business strengthened the private 
sector over the public, and so privatisation ensued. 
Schiller’s work is not flawless: as Webster points out, Schiller implicitly views 
capitalism and ICTs as inherently flawed, without due consideration to ICTs’ potential 
benefits.26 Furthermore, the role of government, as both ICT developer and user, is under-
developed in relation to his attention to corporate capitalism; as Schiller’s son, Dan 
Schiller, points out, the nation-state and government have played an important role here, 
even if private capital has subsequently dominated the sector.27 This last point is 
                                                 
22 Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 132; Jan Van Dijk, ‘The One-Dimensional Network 
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23 Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 195. 
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particularly important given the major role that state ownership and government plays in 
the history of the British telephone system. However, overall, Schiller has been a 
particularly helpful analyst in developing my understanding of why, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, information technology became so important to Western governments, and 
why these governments saw deregulation and privatisation as policies aiding the 
development of information technology – in this respect, Schiller has greatly informed 
the historical context for this thesis, and particularly Chapter Nine, which deals with the 
privatisation of BT. 
Many of my above analyses have been greatly aided by the insights of Frank 
Webster, whose critiques point to other helpful ways of theorising information.28 Webster 
rejects information age theories, often on the grounds of technological determinism, and 
instead theorises ‘business civilisation’: the ascendancy of private over public supply and 
ownership, increasing commodification and market criteria, and competition prioritised 
over regulation.29 Webster is explicitly influenced by Schiller’s interlinking of 
information and corporate capitalism, and exemplifies business civilisation by devoting 
a significant part of his Theories of the Information Society to the privatisation of BT, the 
liberalisation of the state monopoly, and the creation of BT’s competitor, Mercury.30 
Webster points out, like Schiller, the predominance of business interests in pressuring the 
government to liberalise BT’s monopoly, in the creation of Mercury (it was financed by 
Barclays, British Petroleum, and Cable & Wireless), and in BT and Mercury’s 
prioritisation of business telecommunication services over residential users. Webster also 
argues that informational developments must be more fully accounted for in terms of 
historical antecedents and continuities and so establishes a need, which this thesis 
addresses, for more rigorous historical research into the causes and effects of information 
and communication technologies. 
 
Control 
 
There is no history of the cultural significance of ‘control’, although it has not been 
entirely neglected: Kline sees wartime control systems and engineering as integral to 
cybernetics and information theory, and Thomas Hughes draws attention to ‘control’ as 
part of a growing ‘language of systems’ in the 1920s, rising from the electrical 
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engineering of power networks.31 As I will show, during the 1970s and 1980s there was 
also significant scholarly attention to the problem of ‘control’. In this section, I will focus 
on various theories of control, how they relate to information, and how they might inform 
a history of information and control in the British telephone system. I will also address 
two other twentieth-century transitions which touch on control: neoliberalism and 
postmodernity. 
 Frank Webster, with Kevin Robins, points to planning and control as two forces 
more fundamental than information to contemporary society.32 They define planning as 
social management and administration, and control as authoritative activities such as 
surveillance; but both are mutually reinforcing: social planning and administration 
requires surveillance, and, conversely, surveillance reinforces administrative power.33 
They view ICTs as important to planning and control, such as the ways satellites, cables, 
and computers are used to co-ordinate mass production, distribution and consumption, 
which they call the ‘growth of the programmed market’.34 However, Webster and Robins 
situate this in a longer history originating in the early-twentieth-century scientific 
management of Frederick Winslow Taylor, arguing that Taylorism’s reliance on planning 
and control became a model for society itself, extending out from the factory and into 
distribution and consumption, culture and politics.35 Webster and Robins’ account is not 
wholly satisfying, implying that the development of information and communication 
technologies followed the Taylorist logic of planning and control, without detailing these 
developments. Nevertheless, their account is useful in demonstrating the non-
revolutionary importance of information technologies, in drawing attention to a longer 
history of control, and in paying attention to organisational and bureaucratic context.36 
This intersection of managerial and technological interpretations of information and 
control is at the core of this thesis, and so their attention to Taylor has helped clarify how 
managerial forms of control have intersected with technological systems: this is 
particularly relevant to Chapter Five, where I explore the intersection of a British mode 
of civil administration (Agar’s ‘government machine’) with Post Office engineers’ 
understandings of cybernetics and information theory. 
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 However, given their attention to managerial thought, it is odd that Webster and 
Robins mention Taylor but not Henri Fayol, the French management theorist who 
established ‘control’ as a keyword for management in business and industry in the early 
twentieth century. Fayol, who began his career as an intern in the Commentry coal mine 
in 1860, rising to managing director of the Commentry-Fourchambault Company by 1888 
and trading the company back into profit, first publicly spoke of his theories of 
management in 1900 and 1908, and published his seminal work, Adminstration 
Industrielle et Générale, in 1916.37 In it, Fayol outlined five elements of management: 
planning, the long-term forecasting of productive capacity; organising, the medium-term 
arranging of productive capacity; command, the generation of productive operations; 
coordination, the short-term synchronisation of productive resources; and finally, control, 
the verification that activities conform with defined plans and corresponding 
adjustment.38 In this vision of control, then, is a process somewhat similar to the feedback 
loops of control present in cybernetics: the monitoring of outputs used as an information 
loop to feed back into and adjust inputs. Differences nevertheless remain – Fayol does 
not prioritise the feedback loops which are so central to cybernetics: for cybernetics, 
feedback-control is central, whereas for Fayol, it is only one of five central elements of 
management. 
 I raise Fayol because whilst cybernetics, with its engineering origins, appears of 
primary relevance to engineering conceptions of control within the telephone system, it 
is important to note the influence that management theory may have had: Merriman and 
other senior engineers were, after all, as much managers as they were engineers. The 
importance of management theory on influencing corporate ends and the dynamics of 
capitalism have been stressed by several scholars. Rakesh Khurana, in his history of 
American business schools, emphasises that not only does managerial education shape 
individuals who progress to significant positions within important institutions, but 
education and management shape one another, producing complex sets of interacting 
norms which ultimately define corporate goals.39 More ambitiously, Luc Boltanski and 
Eve Chiapello have taken managerial discourse as central to the shifts in late twentieth 
century capitalism, arguing that managerial thought’s normative and prescriptive tone 
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was important to systematising managerial practice and rules of behaviour in a way 
conducive to the expansion of capitalism.40 Recognising the influence of managerial 
theory on telecom engineers is thus important to identifying not only how the telephone 
system’s corporate goals were set, but also its role in Britain’s political economy. 
 Taylorist management theory was not the only influence on Webster and Robins’ 
concepts of planning and control: they also partially derive their conceptualisations from 
Anthony Giddens’ attention to control and information in the modern state. Giddens 
identifies two types of control: allocative control, exerted through the asymmetric 
allocation of material resources, means of production and produced goods (and so 
analogous to Webster and Robbins’ ‘planning’), and authoritative control, exerted 
through informational and organisational activities, such as surveillance, which co-
ordinate subjects (the basis for Webster and Robins’ ‘control’).41 Giddens argues that 
these forms of control have been fundamental to the emergence of the modern nation-
state, which is defined by the increased organisation and mediation of control through 
four major institutions: surveillance, capitalist enterprise, industrial production, and the 
state’s monopoly on violence through policing and the military.42  
Information and communication, especially technologies thereof, are thus 
important as control and surveillance are not possible without information, and so 
Giddens notes that ‘all states have been “information societies”, since the generation of 
state power presumes reflexively monitored system reproduction, involving the 
regularized gathering, storage, and control of information applied to administrative 
ends’.43 Telecommunication is an important demarcator for Giddens, as since the 
nineteenth-century invention of the telegraph, the state has had access to instant 
communication and control; Giddens thus argues that ‘the state has been electronic longer 
than imagined’.44 Giddens’ insights serve valuable roles in this thesis: in addition to 
Kline’s analysis of the cultural construction of the information age, Giddens shows the 
ways in which the state and society have been informational prior to the mid-twentieth 
century. Giddens also demonstrates the importance of information to the control functions 
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of the state, and so has motivated my attention to how the telephone system’s surveillance 
apparatus was reinterpreted during privatisation, which I explore in Chapter Seven. 
 The micro-scale of workplace control is apparent for Webster and Robins and for 
Giddens, and so I now turn to Deleuze’s ‘society of control’, which argues that control is 
being electronically built into society from the bottom up, and is displacing Foucault’s 
disciplinary society.45 Foucault’s disciplinary society, of spaces of bodily self-control, 
such as barracks, hospitals, and prisons, is being displaced by the spatially extensive, 
continuous control and influence of subjects by information and communication 
technologies; where Foucault’s society is full of rigid ‘molds’, the extensive, fluid, 
electronic control seen in, for example, electronic travel cards, creates a society of 
‘modulation’.46 Foucault and Deleuze’s perspectives are useful for their attention to the 
smaller scales: society here is not a product of macro-scale forces, such as capital, but 
instead produced through the micro-accumulations of power originating with personal 
bodily discipline, and, in the society of control, electronic monitoring and modulation. 
 However, both views are not without their issues: Foucault and Deleuze, the latter 
particularly, are empirically shallow, and as Giddens notes, Foucault’s archetypal 
disciplinary spaces, the prison and the barracks, were closed, totalising, spaces, in contrast 
to the open schools and workplaces experienced by most people.47 Giddens argues that 
Foucault’s most compelling insight is the rise of new administrative, disciplinary 
techniques, such as the employer’s file on its employee, an informational administrative 
mode of surveillance.48 It is here where I think Foucault’s insights (and Deleuze’s) lend 
themselves to an analysis of control in Britain’s telephone system: control should not just 
be conceived of as something exerted outwardly by managers and engineers, via the 
telephone system, on users and the nation at large, but also an internal micro-scale 
phenomenon which refers not just to the control of the system, but how the system and 
its organisation – the Post Office and British Telecom – sought to control its employees. 
These insights have been particularly helpful in drawing my attention to new, 
computerised forms of monitoring and influencing staff within the telephone business, 
which I address in terms of electronic databanks in Chapters Three and Nine, and in terms 
of computer modelling in Chapter Seven. 
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 A theory of control with some similarities and stark differences to Deleuze is Seb 
Franklin’s argument that control, mediated through digital technologies, forms the 
episteme of late capitalism.49 Similarly to Deleuze, and drawing from cybernetics, which 
he argues has informed the current digital condition, Franklin argues that digital control 
technologies render individuals as programmable objects of inputs and outputs. However, 
Franklin differs from Deleuze in also addressing the macro-scales of control, and argues 
that digital technologies have materially and metaphorically produced this condition by 
providing the basis for control as a system of capitalism which purely exploits and 
dispossesses human life. Crucially, this system also obscures itself by emphasising 
information flows – the ‘information economy’ – and so de-emphasising capitalist control 
over the human inputs and outputs to these flows. Franklin is particularly insightful in 
two regards: first, in his attention to digitalisation over information, which is an angle I 
develop throughout this thesis; second, in drawing attention to the information economy’s 
obfuscation of materiality, which is another subject I address, particularly in Chapter 
Eight’s exploration of transatlantic communications networks and their environments. 
However, there are two critiques I wish to make: the first applies to many of these 
theories of control, and that is Franklin’s inattention to control’s longer discursive history. 
As I raised in this section’s introduction, Hughes points out that control was part of a 
growing language of systems since at least the 1920s, and so to name control as purely 
the episteme of late capitalism neglects this history. Second is Franklin’s generalisation 
of digitality, which draws in a sweeping array of technologies. In doing so, Franklin 
misses out on the technical specificities of digitalisation and their socially-constructed, 
contradictory interplay with control. This thesis does not entirely oppose Franklin’s 
arguments, which are insightful, but specifies, complicates, and historicises digitalisation 
in ways which Franklin does not. 
 A final theorisation of control I want to address, before I move onto control in 
neoliberalism and postmodernity, is James Beniger’s ‘control revolution’.50 Beniger, like 
Webster and Robins, argues that, counter to a late-twentieth-century information 
revolution, the real revolution occurred in the late nineteenth century. Beniger argues that 
mass production of the nineteenth century’s long industrial revolution generated crises in 
distribution and consumption, which in turn created pressures for the development of new 
technologies of control, defined as ‘purposive influence toward a predetermined goal’.51 
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Technology here is broadly construed, ranging from new transportation and 
communication technologies to facilitate distribution, to new financial technologies to 
facilitate international trade, to advertising, broadcasting and market research as 
techniques for exerting ‘weak’ control over consumption.52 In Beniger’s view, Taylorism 
was part of a broader orientation to controlling commodity chains – production, 
distribution, retail, and consumption.53 This is more convincing than Webster and Robin’s 
account, in which Taylorism is cast as the model for modern society, but is seemingly 
also unique among the multiple solutions used to coordinate mass production. 
 However, Beniger’s weakness, in contrast to Webster and Robins, is his 
technological determinism and the circular reasoning this leads him to. Beniger’s control 
revolution is a technological response to crises in over-production which were themselves 
generated by technology; hence, technology begets technology and in doing so, reshapes 
society. Beniger’s spectacular, flawed, defence is that this in fact reflects a biological 
drive towards control which has existed in life since its origins in the protein soup of 
prehistory, thus supplanting technological determinism with biological determinism.54 A 
more charitable reading is that Beniger’s industrial systems of control are sociotechnical, 
composed of both technological and human inputs and outputs. Whilst perhaps still overly 
reductive, this reads technological systems similarly to Thomas Hughes’ ‘sociotechnical 
systems’, which I addressed in the previous chapter.55 Beniger’s account is also, of all the 
above, perhaps the most comprehensive historical account of techniques of control 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and his orientation towards the 
commodity chain of production, distribution, communication and consumption resembles 
Webster’s attention to ‘business civilisation’ and the ‘programmed market’, and Giddens’ 
attention to surveillance and capitalist enterprise. In terms of this thesis, Beniger’s 
primary influence has been in highlighting how seemingly disparate industrial activities 
– such as marketing and telecommunications – can be aligned into single systems with 
guiding philosophies, which has helped me conceptualise how the marketing and 
development of telecommunications can be oriented to similar ends. However, I modify 
Beniger’s decentred and somewhat actorless analysis by following Hughes’ influence in 
recognising that such systems are composed by the actions and beliefs of key actors. 
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 I will now turn to other analyses of twentieth century transitions which implicitly 
deal with control: neoliberalism and postmodernity.  Neoliberalism is a novel political 
economy which took hold in the West in the 1970s and 1980s, variously defined as: a 
political economy prioritising individual entrepreneurial freedom using an institutional 
framework of free trade, free markets, and strong private property rights;56 a free market 
political economy of taxation structures favouring capital accumulation over income 
redistribution, industrial policies minimising state presence (through deregulation or 
privatisation), and reduced welfare spending;57 and the promotion of free markets, 
individual responsibility, and global homogeneity.58 The simple summarisation is that the 
state prioritises the market as the most effective way of allocating resources and 
maximising the social good, in contrast to the strong state presence which preceded 
neoliberalism. Whilst interpretations of the exact causal mechanisms behind 
neoliberalism’s rise also vary, the broad commonality is that various crises in the world 
financial system – the OPEC oil embargo and energy crisis, periods of inflation and 
stagflation, the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement – created an 
opportunity for a new political economy to establish itself.59 The point I want to make is 
that neoliberalism can also be framed as a new political economy of control, shifting 
allocative control of resources and social good from the state to the market. 
 Both Britain and information and communication technologies have been heavily 
implicated in the rise of neoliberalism, adding further interest to a history of the British 
telephone system. David Harvey has argued that information and communication 
technologies are privileged in neoliberalism because they facilitate increased speed and 
volume of market transactions, and have created new industries to capitalise on, both of 
which prioritise the market.60 In Britain, the rise of neoliberalism has been situated within 
the transition from a ‘post-war consensus’, characterised by a strong welfare state, mixed 
economy, and trade union consultation, to the rise of Thatcherism, a British flavour of 
neoliberalism enacted through council house sales, monetarist fiscal policy, and the 
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privatisation of British Telecom.61 This last act is thus a convergence of the importance 
of Britain and ICTs for the rise of neoliberalism, as the privatisation of BT has been cast 
as both the starter gun for a worldwide privatisation movement and a policy episode 
which refocussed Thatcherism and neoliberalism into a moral imperative.62 The British 
telephone system, both as a landmark privatisation and in how ICTs are implicated in the 
neoliberal political economy, is thus clearly historically significant to neoliberalism as a 
new political economy of control. 
 The rise of neoliberalism has been situated within theories relating changing 
forms of capitalism to broader societal changes, conceptualised by some as modernity 
and others as postmodernity. As with many of the concepts covered thus far, there are 
varying definitions of modernity: Zygmunt Bauman calls modernity the ‘production of 
order’;63 David Harvey defines it as human emancipation through rationality and 
rationalisation, particularly of time and space;64 Giddens sees modernity as institutionally 
characterised by surveillance, capitalism, industrialism and militarism, and 
epistemologically founded upon the reflexivity of social thought and action.65 As with 
neoliberalism, these varying formulations all touch on forms of control and so transitions 
in modernity can also be conceptualised in terms of control. For example, Giddens 
identifies modernity’s increasing reflexivity, its accelerating, chronic revising of social 
practices, as responsible for late modernity’s unstable and mutable character.66 Bauman, 
in contrast, differentiates modernity as the search for order from ‘liquid modernity’, a 
condition of instability and insecurity.67 Other accounts addressing transitions in 
capitalism and modernity in terms of organisation and control include Peter Wagner’s 
‘organized modernity’ and Scott Lash and John Urry’s ‘disorganized capitalism’.68 
However, here I wish to particularly focus on David Harvey’s account of postmodernity 
and capitalism given the ways it touches on communication technologies. 
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 Harvey argues that postmodernity is not a schism with modernity, but rather a 
shift in some practices – cultural, social, economic, political – in response to a change in 
the management of capitalism.69 Harvey draws on the regulation school approach to 
capitalism, articulated by a broad collective of Marxian analysts such as Michel Aglietta, 
Robert Boyer, and Alain Lipietz, which conceptualises capital accumulation in terms of 
how it is stabilised, and identifies different ‘regimes’ of accumulation, which are 
associated with ‘modes of social and political regulation’.70 The transition from one 
regime to another thus means changes in the modes of social and political regulation, and 
the significant change for Harvey is the transition from a Fordist-Keynesian mode of 
accumulation, characterised by a power balance between organised labour, large 
corporate capital and mass production, and the nation-state, to flexible accumulation, 
characterised by flexible production and the increasing use of pliable credit and financial 
instruments to regulate capital.71 It is important to recognise that this change is not as 
hegemonic as Harvey or the regulation school presents: Michael Piore, Charles Sabel, 
Jonathan Zeitlin and Philip Scranton have all argued for greater recognition of the 
historical importance of flexible, small units of production, such as the family firm, to the 
American economy.72 However, where Harvey differs from these accounts is that, even 
if this transition is over-stated, his attention is on how flexible accumulation, even as an 
ideal, produces time-space compression. The condition of postmodernity is produced by 
the experiences of this compression.73 
 It is here that Harvey implicates information and communication technologies in 
the shift from Fordist-Keynesian to flexible accumulation and from modernity to 
postmodernity. ICTs like communication satellites are crucial for the time-space 
compression required to facilitate flexible co-ordination of production and capital flows, 
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as well as in cultural and social experiences of compressed time and space, such as the 
rise of the mass media and international TV broadcasting.74 This results in the aesthetic 
condition of postmodernity – postmodernism – which connotes ephemerality, 
instantaneity, and volatility.75 Harvey’s point is that whilst postmodernity has the 
appearance of chaos, this is a surface manifestation of a transition in the control of 
capitalism and the new information and communication technologies which facilitate that 
transition in control. 
 Harvey is unabashedly Marxist in seeing capitalism as prime mover, and whilst 
he mostly manages to avoid the technological determinism of historical materialism, his 
role for technology is fairly simplistic. However, Harvey’s account is still useful for 
further adding to the changing dimensions of control which draw on information and 
communication technologies, and because of its attention to cultural and aesthetic 
responses to technological time-space compression within modernity and postmodernity, 
which aids a historical study of these technologies not just as they were developed, but 
also as they were formulated aesthetically and culturally. Harvey here has been useful to 
understanding how technological change has been presented with respect to the Post 
Office and BT’s own corporate identity, which I explore in detail in Chapter Four. 
 I have raised these theories of control not to choose a specific analytical 
framework, but to make two points about the importance of control in a history of the 
telephone system. The first is that communications systems are implicated in all these 
theories, but not entirely satisfactorily; technological change is subordinated to broader 
needs – co-ordinating commodity chains, flexible accumulation, state control – whilst not 
actually explored to identify how those needs informed technological development and 
use. The second is the theories which explicitly deal with control all overlook the 
rhetorical significance of ‘control’ as a concept; this thesis aims to understand why 
‘control’ was so explicitly important to the telephone engineers and managers, and yet 
none of these theories provide tools for analysing that rhetorical significance, or, indeed, 
why these theorists themselves see ‘control’ as so fundamental. A history of the British 
telephone system is thus important for both fleshing out the role of information and 
communication technologies in shifting patterns of control, and for more fully 
understanding the importance of ‘control’ itself. 
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Conclusion 
 
What then can be said about ‘information’ and ‘control’? In this chapter, I have reviewed 
literature on both subjects, and the key historical findings have been information and 
control’s engineering and managerial lineages from cybernetics and Fayol. Information 
became a frame for describing how all forms of communication could be unified into one 
category, launched from the popularity of information theory, and in the 1970s and 1980s 
information technology in Britain entered the popular and policy-making lexicon, whilst 
also shifting from compliant standard-setting to a potentially defiant industrial policy 
regime. Control can be seen in both the cybernetic sense of input-output feedback loops, 
and the Fayolian sense of monitoring corporate and industrial outputs to feed into other 
managerial activities, including planning, organising, commanding, and so on. 
 However, I have also shown how a range of scholars have diversely interpreted 
information and control. For Bell, information comes as part of the transition to a service-
based post-industrial society, whilst for Castells, information underpins a new, networked 
regime of capitalism, and for Schiller, information was the focal point for the neoliberal 
response of the 1980s to the crisis economies of the 1970s. Webster and Robins offer a 
Giddens-esque interpretation of Taylorist control, whilst for Giddens himself, control 
refers to both modes of allocating resources and exercising authority; Beniger goes further 
to view control as constitutive of society itself. Deleuze sees control as a networked, 
modulating, micro-scale phenomenon produced by electronics and information 
technologies, whilst Franklin views control as the cybernetisation of late capitalism 
through digital technologies. For Harvey, control is one way to describe the tensions 
between modernism and postmodernism as a reflection of transitions in capitalist control. 
 These accounts all inform my analysis, but they can range from teleological to 
inattentive when explaining the dynamics behind the development of modern 
telecommunications, which is near omnipresent in these theories. A deeper inspection of 
these developments is thus needed. 
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3 The Telephone Business 
A History of Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A history of information and control in Britain’s telephone system cannot proceed without 
first addressing the historical organisation of that system. In this chapter, I outline the 
history of the telephone business from the first use of telephones in Britain, through the 
state’s monopolisation of telephony, and the end of this monopoly in 1981 with the 
creation of BT and liberalisation of telecommunications. I do not address the history of 
BT’s privatisation in this chapter: it is significant enough to merit its own chapter 
(Chapter Eight) and moreover, draws together threads from throughout this thesis. The 
history of BT’s privatisation would thus be a poor introduction, but makes an excellent 
conclusion, and so is left for the end. 
Instead, with this chapter, I focus on one of this thesis’ core themes – control – 
and analyse the multiple types of control which surface in the history of the telephone 
business. Control in this chapter is broadly divided into two forms – external and internal 
– but some care is needed with this morphology. External control is taken as the 
organisational status and financial controls of the telephone business as set out by 
government, whilst internal control refers to the strategies operated by management 
within the telephone business and over the technological system. As I shall show, there 
are multiple registers within these forms as well: a history of external control ranges from 
smaller-scale policy initiatives, such as experiments in industrial democracy, to a more 
systemic loosening of external control, tied to crises and shifts in the management of 
nationalised industries. Likewise, a history of internal control shows differentiation in 
both target and technique: telephone managers and engineers devised strategies for 
controlling customers and employees, and the techniques deployed to do so ranged from 
managerial reorganisation and rationalisation to mechanical and computerised systems of 
monitoring and evaluation. 
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 This chapter also builds from prior histories of the Post Office and telephone 
business. The most comprehensive history of the British telephone business is D.C. Pitt’s 
The Telecommunications Function of the British Post Office, an application of 
organisational theory to a case study of the telephone business.1 Pitt’s work has been 
influential in highlighting the tensions between external political control of the telephone 
business and its internal structure, but it also has its limitations. Published in 1980, it only 
addresses the history of the telephone business up until its corporatisation in 1969, and so 
does not explore the consequences of corporatisation, the experiences of the 1970s, or 
liberalisation and privatisation in the 1980s. Moreover, Pitt’s goal is to highlight the 
importance of key individuals – who were often ministers rather than managers – in 
organisational change, rather than broader technological and other contextual factors, 
which means he often overlooks the internal processes of technological and managerial 
change which influenced the history of the telephone business. 
Other useful histories are the authorised history of the Post Office by Duncan 
Campbell-Smith, who, unlike his predecessor Martin Daunton, does include the telephone 
business up until its separation from the Post Office in 1981; Mark Thatcher’s (no relation 
to the former Prime Minister) international comparison of the political management of 
the telephone businesses in Britain and France; and Kenneth Lipartito’s analysis of 
Americanisation in the telephone business.2 However, a common issue throughout these 
histories is externalist lines of argumentation, which focus on the controls exercised by 
government and quantitative measures of performance, and neglect the internal dynamics 
of structure and mechanisms of control operated by the telephone business. My primary 
purpose here is to establish an organisational history of control which the remainder of 
the thesis builds from, but in my attention to the business’s internal dynamics of control, 
also flesh out a history neglected by these prior accounts. 
 
Monopolisation and Incrementalism 
 
The history of the telephone business up to 1955 shows a business that, once monopolised 
by the state, was subservient to external governmental control. I divide this into two broad 
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periods: nineteenth and early twentieth-century debates about whether the state should 
own Britain’s nascent telephone system, and the early to mid-twentieth century, 
characterised by tensions between the government’s external control and the Post Office’s 
internal control of the business. 
 The early history of the Post Office and telecommunications lies not with 
telephones, but with telegraphs. The first telegraph company in Britain was the Electric 
Telegraph Company, formed in 1845, and by 1861 it was head of a cartel of five telegraph 
companies. Public dissatisfaction with these companies’ price-fixing agreements had 
swelled since the mid-1850s, which spurred calls for the nationalisation of the telegraph 
system, and an 1865 price hike by the cartel further incentivised nationalisation. 
Subsequently, the Telegraph Act of 1869 gave the Post Office an indefinite monopoly on 
all electrically-carried communications, which would have consequences down the line 
for the growth of telephony from the 1870s, and so the Post Office became the sole carrier 
of telegraphy in Britain, operating a nationwide infrastructure.3 
 In 1877, however, the Post Office declined to set up a telephone business after 
receiving a demonstration from Thomas Edison; the Post Office’s Engineer-in-Chief, 
William Preece, believed that the telephone would only have limited use.4 Several 
regional private telephone companies were set up, including the Telephone Company 
Limited, a subsidiary of the Bell system, and Edison’s own Edison Telephone Company 
of London, which eventually repeated the patterns of telegraphy and cartelised under 
pressures to avoid duplication of network plant and satisfy the public demand for a 
nationwide network.5 This threatened any future telephone business the Post Office might 
want to operate, and so in 1880 the High Court found in the Post Office’s favour that the 
1869 Telegraph Act extended to telephony.6 However, the Treasury, which controlled 
Post Office spending, refused to authorise the Post Office’s expansion into telephony, 
partly motivated by telegraph protectionism.7 Campbell-Smith characterises this period 
as the ‘restrictionists’ in the Treasury set against the ‘expansionists’ in the Post Office.8 
 A middle way for telephone expansion operated for the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. Telephone companies were given licenses to operate by the Post 
Office, which also took over the construction of a publicly-owned telephone exchange 
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system. The privately-owned networks had been, up to this point, local, and so in 1884 
the Trunk Wire Agreement allowed the private development of trunk wires between main 
cities, forming the basis for a national telephone network.9 In 1889, the various private 
telephone companies began to amalgamate, and by 1894 a private monopoly, the National 
Telephone Company, had been formed.10 Alongside that, however, there had also been 
further moves, in response to public demand for inter-city trunk calling and the realisation 
that the telephone system may constitute a natural monopoly, to give the Post Office 
greater control over the telephone system, and so the 1892 Telegraph Act had required 
the NTC to sell all trunk wires in the UK to the Post Office in the public interest.11 
 In 1899, a fascinating and under-studied experiment with the British telephone 
system began: municipalisation. Under municipalisation, local authorities were permitted 
to apply for telephone licenses, and many did so. Most returned to the main Post Office-
operated network with time, but one municipal network – Kingston upon Hull, operated 
by the Hull Corporation – did not. The Hull telephone system is the only telephone system 
outside of Britain’s main network, and lasts to this day. Today, it is operated by KCOM 
Group, formerly known as Kingston Communications, and the company maintains a 
virtual monopoly over the Hull area as it is uneconomical for BT to build its own de novo 
infrastructure. The Hull telephone system is outside of the scope of my thesis, but as 
Britain’s only successful experiment with municipal telephony, it surely deserves greater 
historical attention than that which has been given here or elsewhere. 
 Despite the Post Office’s takeover of trunk lines in 1892, public dissatisfaction 
with NTC’s private monopoly remained. In 1901, the Post Office agreed a deal with NTC 
to purchase its London assets in 1911, taking over the country’s largest regional network, 
and in 1905, a Select Committee inquiry recommended that the state support the Post 
Office’s purchase of the remainder of the British telephone system in 1912.12 Thus, by 
1912, the Post Office had an effective public monopoly on British telephone service, and 
it would shortly buy out the remaining municipal systems, with the exception of Hull.13 
For the remaining first half of the twentieth century, the administration of the telephone 
business would be characterised by friction between Post Office ‘expansionist’ advocates 
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of greater telephonic freedom and central government – particularly Treasury – 
‘restrictionists’. 
 The mediocre performance of the telephone business in the early years of Post 
Office ownership stimulated review into both internal and external control mechanisms. 
This performance was not chiefly the Post Office’s fault, as it had inherited a system 
saddled with years of under-investment: the first ‘Strowger’ automatic telephone 
exchange (i.e. not requiring a human operator) was not installed until 1912, in Epsom, 24 
years after its invention in the USA.14 The losses of the telephone business, partly 
influenced by World War I, plunged the entire Post Office into the red in 1919-20, and 
despite the return of pre-war growth rates, incentivised further review into the Post 
Office.15 In 1920, the Coates Committee, investigating pricing, focussed its attention 
internally, arguing that the Post Office needed a more commercial structure, whilst the 
Cecil Committee of 1921-22 focussed on the external status of the telephone business, 
recommending that it should be separated from the Post Office altogether.16 Internally, 
the Engineer-in-Chief, A.J. O’Meara, had also called for internal restructuring, arguing 
that a high-level board overseeing two separate postal and telephone boards would be 
more effective. None of these recommendations were taken up, although separate 
directorships were created for posts and telephones, and so O’Meara resigned in 1921.17 
 Criticisms of the telephone business increased throughout the 1920s and into the 
1930s. Treasury spending controls had a significant influence, slowing both the rural 
development of the telephone system and the total number of exchanges built across the 
1920s.18 The Liberal party’s campaign for the 1929 general election included liberating 
the telephone business from state control, whilst two ‘gamekeepers turned poacher’, as 
Pitt puts it, the former Postmaster-General Clement Attlee and Roundell Palmer, the 
Viscount Wolmer and former Assistant Postmaster-General, also added their voices to 
calls for the Post Office to become more business-like and less restrained by the Treasury 
– although neither, unlike the Liberals, advocated separating out the telephone service 
from government altogether, either as a public or private corporation.19 
 In 1932 the Bridgeman Inquiry into the Post Office was thus set up, and it focussed 
on both the internal and external dimensions of control over the telephone system. 
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Internally, Bridgeman recommended the replacement of the Post Office Secretariat by a 
board of senior men, including those with engineering expertise, to enhance the flexibility 
of internal control, whilst externally, it recommended the loosening of Treasury control 
over the GPO.20 The exact nature of this new relationship was remitted to a joint Post 
Office/Treasury committee, which determined that the Post Office would make a fixed 
annual payment of £10.75m to the Treasury and the excess would be saved in the Post 
Office Net Surplus Fund for the Post Office to spend.21 These reforms, as both Campbell-
Smith and Pitt note, were gradualist rather than fundamental,22 and as Pitt points out, they 
did little to halt debate about exogenous Treasury control: the £10.75m annual payment 
meant that it was very difficult for the Post Office to save up any surplus whatsoever and 
so the ‘Gordian knot’ of the Treasury-Post Office relationship remained intact.23 
 The next significant period for the telephone business, World War II and its 
aftermath, meant a tightening of external controls. For the war effort, the Treasury 
suspended the Bridgeman funding arrangement and, after the war was over, refused to 
revert to the Bridgeman arrangements. A Parliamentary Committee endorsed this position 
in 1950, concluding that Britain’s strained economic conditions meant that a return to the 
surplus fund was not possible.24 The post-war nationalisations undertaken by Labour had 
also excluded the Post Office: Clement Attlee, now the Prime Minister, had opposed 
transforming the Post Office into a public utility corporation before the war, favouring an 
‘administrative agency’ run by a fixed-term manager instead, and, as both Pitt and 
Campbell-Smith note, was far more interested after the war in bringing industry closer to 
Whitehall, rather than distancing it.25 Pitt also points out that the war had shown the 
strategic importance of telecommunications, and so added another incentive to keep the 
Post Office under tighter control. This was highlighted by the 1952 Post Office and 
Telegraph Money Bill, which prioritised trunk spending over local exchange and 
customer equipment to ensure resilient connections between strategically important urban 
centres.26 However, this pattern of greater external control from 1939 would change – 
fractionally – in 1955, and establish a new trend in the dynamics of internal and external 
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control in the Post Office which would imbricate commercialism, managerialism, and 
technology. 
 
Mechanisation and Corporatisation 
 
In the previous section, I gave a brief descriptive overview of the history of the telephone 
business from the 1870s to the mid-1950s. In the following sections, which cover the 
period directly addressed by this thesis, I make a more detailed analysis of the dynamics 
of external and internal control which shaped the business. In this section, which 
addresses the period from 1955 up to the Post Office’s corporatisation in 1969, I 
particularly focus on mechanisation and managerialism. Here, I refer to mechanisation in 
two senses: the mechanisation of the telephone network, but also, through new 
technological and managerial techniques, the mechanisation of internal control, which, as 
I show in this section and throughout this thesis, were intimately connected. 
 In 1955, a new arrangement between the Post Office and Treasury was arranged, 
motivated by the feeble performance of the telephone business. By 1955, there was a 
waiting list of 380,000 people for telephone service, and 40,000 of those had been waiting 
for over three years; half a million new applications were expected in 1955-56 alone.27 
This motivated the first substantial post-war review of the Post Office’s relationship with 
government, and led a Home Affairs subcommittee to conclude that a ‘comprehensive 
overhaul of Post Office finance was necessary’.28 The new arrangement, a five-year trial, 
would return to a setup similar to Bridgeman, where the Post Office would pay a fixed 
sum of £5m per year to the Treasury, excess profit would spill over into a General Reserve 
Fund, and the Post Office would manage its finances independently. This scheme was 
also motivated by the additional investment need for a new technique of mechanisation 
in the trunk telephone system: Subscriber Trunk Dialling (STD), a system which enabled 
telephone service subscribers to directly call people through the trunk network, rather 
than require an operator to connect them.29 
 I accord STD special significance not just because it motivated the telephone 
business’s greater freedom in 1955, but also because of how it surfaced the Post Office’s 
attitudes to machine control and control of its employees and customers. Queen Elizabeth 
II inaugurated STD on December 1st, 1958, by placing Britain’s first automatic trunk call 
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to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh in a televised ceremony in Bristol. STD was made 
possible, as proclaimed in Movietone and Pathé newsreels, newspapers, and the Post 
Office’s own automation reports, by GRACE, the ‘robot telephone operator’ and 
‘electronic brain’.30 GRACE was in fact not a robot, but a register-translater: a device 
which registers the numbers dialled and translates them into a form recognisable by the 
mechanical switches in the telephone exchange. 
 GRACE surfaced both the broad popularity of ‘robots’ and the concurrent 
‘automation scares’ which pervaded Britain at the time. Kline has drawn attention to the 
popularity of robots in the 1950s, and so it is unsurprising that the Post Office labelled 
GRACE the ‘robot telephone operator’ and the ‘brain’ of the telephone system, but I 
would like to draw further attention to GRACE’s intersection with fears about 
automation.31 The immediate post-war decades for Britain were a time of automation 
scares, primarily in the motor industry – the Daily Herald called a Standard Motors strike 
the ‘men against robots strike’, whilst The Daily Telegraph suggested the nefarious hand 
of Communist Party agitators.32 There were competing narratives about automation – 
Leon Bagrit, Chairman of Elliot Automation, delivered the BBC Reith Lectures in 1964 
on the possibilities of the ‘Age of Automation’ and Harold Wilson, in his famous 1963 
‘white heat’ speech, promised to harness automation for the national good – but the 
broader tone was, as Alan Booth describes, that ‘automation was synonymous with 
redundancy and worker resistance’, whilst David Edgerton describes the ‘visions of jobs 
disappearing into factories without humans’.33 Automation was also a fear outside Britain 
– David Noble has described post-war American concerns about the ‘Automatic Factory’ 
and ‘Machines Without Men’ and Jacob Hamblin has shown how UNESCO perceived 
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even the problem of atomic energy through the lens of automation.34 It is thus possible 
that the Post Office humanised GRACE, which would displace trunk telephone operators 
from their jobs, as a ‘robot’ and ‘brain’ to mitigate these fears; the Post Office 
acknowledged that exchange automation would decrease operator numbers by half by 
1970.35 
 These concerns fed into a 1959 Post Office report, Telephone Service and the 
Customer, which interlinked mechanisation with control over customers and telephone 
operators. Ernest Marples, the Postmaster-General, announced the report, based on a 
study of customer service in AT&T’s long-distance telephone service, in the House of 
Commons with the statement, ‘In this age of mechanisation, we must never forget the 
importance of human personal service’.36 The report addressed strategies used to provide 
customers with quality service in a system where contact with human operators was 
diminishing, and three key outputs came from the study: first, remaining operators were 
permitted to speak more informally, conveying a more pleasant and helpful tone; second, 
the telephone business embarked upon market research, undertaking methodical and 
regular surveys of public opinion; finally, the business trialled new facilities – premium 
telephones, such as the ‘Trimphone’, kiosks, and coin boxes – with customer-friendly 
aesthetics.37 The report was also prefaced with eight maxims for the telephone business: 
1. For any great enterprise objectives must be clearly stated and widely 
understood. 
2. The aim and purpose of the telephone service is not only to serve but to please 
the customer. Everything must be subordinated and surrendered to that aim. 
3. Scientific advances are making possible the most sweeping and radical 
changes in telephone history. These match the electronic age in which we 
live. Much will always remain to be done but technically our course is 
charted for years ahead. 
4. Scientific progress by itself is not enough. What really counts is the spirit of 
the men and women behind the machines. Machines must be servants not 
masters. 
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5. Our telephone service must be a personal service to meet the customers’ 
wishes. We must study their wishes all the time; we must then satisfy them 
by a service which is courteous, pleasing and speedy. 
6. To that and all our thinking, training, procedures, and organisations will be 
directed – in every department at every level. And we must act boldly. We 
must not be paralysed by precedent or inhibited by fear of error. If we try and 
fail, we shall be forgiven. If we do not try, we shall be condemned – and 
rightly so. 
7. But success will elude us unless we are a united, determined and dedicated 
team with management and staff moving in harmony. 
8. Finally, we must never forget we are a monopoly. We do not face the 
challenge of competition. We must not fail them. Let our purpose be to give 
the finest and most courteous service in the world. And let it be seen that we 
have this daily sense of purpose.38 
This was a remarkably explicit formulation of the telephone business’s self-definition, 
produced in the short-term as a response to increasing automation, but also against a 
backdrop of greater freedom from government control. These maxims thus juxtapose the 
Post Office’s external status – the eighth maxim’s comment on monopoly – with the new 
strategies of studying customers – maxims five and six – and with an affirmation of the 
telephone business’s control over machines – the fourth maxim. One statement from the 
fourth maxim – ‘Machines must be servants not masters’ – is particularly revealing, as it 
implies that operators, then being displaced by the machines, were also servants, whilst 
also surfacing the automation fears of the period. 
  Telephone Service and the Customer is important because it shows, as machine 
control accelerated with the Post Office’s greater freedom, the telephone business’s 
twofold response: first, to counterbalance mechanisation by permitting operators to speak 
more informally, demonstrating greater human freedom to the public; second, to enhance 
its strategies of ‘weak’ control over customers through marketing surveys and premium, 
fashionable, apparatus such as the Trimphone. There is an apparent contradiction here 
between the Post Office’s claim that it had ‘subordinated and surrendered itself’ to the 
customer and my assertion that these strategies constituted a form of ‘weak’ control. Here, 
I draw on Beniger’s characterisation of ‘weak’ control as a form of influence over 
consumption, and argue that, whilst, there was undoubtedly a move to meet public desires 
for human service and consumer choice, it should not be forgotten that the Post Office 
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still had a monopoly over these customers, and moved to capitalise on customer desires 
by embarking on market research.39 These techniques were not a way of putting the 
customer in control, but rather served a dual purpose of mitigating public fears about 
machine control and increasing consumer investment – emotionally and financially – in 
the telephone system. 
The adoption of new managerial techniques in the telephone business continued 
into the 1960s, and can be contextualised against a broader managerialist ethos in British 
government. A useful example here, deployed by Pitt also, is the 1961 Plowden Report, 
which addressed Britain’s rising public expenditure by, in part, recommending the greater 
use of managerial techniques.40 The report has since established a reputation for 
establishing a managerial revolution in government.41 However, this has since been 
critiqued on grounds of novelty and success: Agar points out that computerised systems 
for management and expenditure planning were in place in the Treasury several years 
prior to the report (as, indeed, the report both noted and praised), whilst Rodney Lowe 
criticises Plowden’s success by drawing attention to the rapid escalation of public 
expenditure in its wake and noting that the Fulton Committee, which reported on public 
expenditure seven years after Plowden, also aimed at stimulating managerialism in the 
Civil Service.42 However, whilst Plowden may be neither especially novel nor successful, 
it nevertheless represents a managerial spirit of the time and interlinks this spirit with the 
government’s loosening control over public spending, which proves relevant for the 
telephone business. 
The telephone business was well-acquainted with the public expenditure concerns 
which had motivated Plowden: in 1957, Britain’s balance of payments crisis and the 
government’s stop-go economic policy cut public sector investment, reducing the 
telephone business’s ability to finance investment and affecting the system’s 
performance. As a result, the 1959 Conservative manifesto pledged to separate the Post 
Office’s finances from the Treasury, and so in 1961, after re-election, the five-year trial 
period from 1955 was formalised with the 1961 Post Office Act, formally reviving a 
surplus trading fund for the Post Office and allowing the organisation to balance its own 
books. Alongside these changes to external control, a technocratic managerialism took 
                                                 
39 Beniger, The Control Revolution, 386–89. 
40 Pitt, The Telecommunications Function in the British Post Office, 137–38. 
41 Trevor Smith, The Politics of the Corporate Economy (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company, 1979), 
147; G.K. Fry, The Administrative ‘Revolution’ in Whitehall (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 35. 
42 Agar, The Government Machine, 330–31; Rodney Lowe, ‘Milestone or Millstone? The 1959–1961 
Plowden Committee and Its Impact on British Welfare Policy’, The Historical Journal 40, no. 2 (1997): 
463–491. 
53 
 
hold internally. As Plowden had suggested, management techniques such as ‘accountable 
management’ and ‘management by objectives’ were imported from the private sector,43 
and computerisation was also strengthened: in 1957, the Post Office had opened its first 
computer centre, London Electronic Agency for Pay and Statistics, or LEAPS, with the 
promise that ‘the drudgery and, by modern standards, inefficiency of many dull, repetitive 
clerical routes will be swept away by the “electronic office”’ in the Post Office’s 
pioneering computerisation of business efficiency.44 In 1965, LEAPS was followed by a 
second London computer centre in Charles House, Kensington, which the Post Office 
Magazine heralded as ‘The Post Office Enters the Computer Age’, and computerised the 
preparation of customers’ statements and bills.45 Underscoring this, the Charles House 
Computer Centre featured in a Post Office publicity poster series entitled ‘Progress’ 
(Figure 3.1).46 The new relationship with the Treasury was thus accompanied by new 
techniques of control featuring – as with STD – the deployment of computerisation. 
However, continuing events and critiques throughout the 1960s highlighted that 
the 1961 Act had neither loosened external controls as much as promised, nor had the 
telephone business improved correspondingly. Successive Treasury capital restrictions in 
1962 and 1963 had limited the Post Office’s capital borrowing,47 causing Campbell-Smith 
to characterise the 1961 Act as less a landmark and more a ‘modest milestone’ in the Post 
Office’s quest for freedom from the Treasury.48 The National Economic Development 
Council (‘Neddy’), set up by the Conservatives in 1962 to reverse Britain’s poor 
economic performance, attempted to rectify this by announcing in 1963 a near £900m 
five-year spending plan for the telephone service.49 However, in 1966, Harold Wilson’s  
‘July measures’ followed, which, amongst other measures taken to avoid devaluation of 
the pound, cut government spending, reducing the telephone business’s 1967-68 
investment programme by £11.5m.50 The sluggish demand for telephone service during 
these restrictions (see Figure 3.2) motivated critiques of the telephone business’s 
performance from a range of sources. The 1968 report, Britain’s Economic Prospects, by 
the American think tank the Brookings Institution was sharply critical of the 1961 Act, 
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which, by enabling the Post Office to raise tariffs, had unintentionally reduced telephone 
service demand, whilst various newspaper op-eds demanded greater freedom and a more 
commercial attitude for the Post Office.51 
 Numerous committees and reports into the Post Office thus formed during the 
1960s to review its external status and internal structure, and Tony Benn’s arrival as 
Postmaster-General in October 1964, after Labour entered government, gave them further 
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Figure 3.1 'Progress': the Kensington Computer Centre, 1965. Courtesy of BT Archives. 
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impetus. Benn’s tenure as a young, modernising, Postmaster-General is well-covered by 
Campbell-Smith,52 and here it will suffice to say that one of Benn’s top priorities was 
transferring the Post Office out of the Civil Service and into a public corporation (the 
‘break’) and extricating the telephone business out into a separate public corporation (the 
‘split’). In March 1965, Benn argued to Wilson that Post Office reform was ‘a necessary 
act of modernisation’ which would permit the telephone business to become more 
entrepreneurial, more dynamic, and collaborate with the private sector more effectively.53 
The performance of the Post Office and Benn’s entry as Postmaster-General triggered a 
series of reports: two Joint Working Parties made up of Treasury, Post Office and Cabinet 
officials, an NEDC subcommittee (‘Little Neddy’), an inquiry by the Select Committee 
for the Nationalised Industries, and a review of the Post Office undertaken by the 
American management consultants, McKinsey. 
 Due to Benn’s advocacy, the first Joint Working Party was set up, chaired by the 
Treasury. The working party’s report was ostensibly investigatory in nature, making no 
recommendations, and yet still surfaced friction between the Post Office and Treasury. 
                                                 
52 Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post, 438–69. 
53 ‘Annex A: Copy of a Minute from the Postmaster General to the Prime Minister. Organisation of the 
Post Office’ 2 March 1965, PREM 13/1063, TNA. 
Figure 3.2. Slumps in telephone demand after the 1962-63 capital restrictions, the 1966 July 
Measures, the 1973-75 recession, and the early 1980s recession. Sources: ‘Post Office/BT 
Annual Reports and Accounts’, 1958-1984, TCB 10/TCC 11/TCD 12/TCE 13, BT Archives. 
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One Treasury official compared the Post Office’s attitudes to that of ‘a Colonial 
nationalist movement anxious to get rid of the shackles of imperialist rule!’.54 The 
working party’s final report arrived in late July 1965 and was inconclusive, but mainly –
and perhaps unsurprisingly, given the Treasury’s chairmanship – drew attention to the 
disadvantages of corporatisation and suggested that the Post Office was akin to a 
nationalised industry in all aspects except formal status already.55 James Callaghan, then 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was more explicit with his distaste for the notion, 
expressing to Wilson his ‘doubt whether there is much profit in pursuing the matter just 
now’.56 However, Benn countered with a historical treatise to Wilson, covering much of 
the background outlined above, which Benn called ‘a hundred years of argument for 
reform’.57 Wilson thus agreed to set up a second committee to review the structure of the 
Post Office, effectively siding with Benn and agreeing that the Post Office would be 
reformed. The task of the second Joint Working Party was to frame the nature of 
reorganisation, and it concluded that the key question for the government was the ‘split’ 
– whether the Post Office would become one or two separate organisations.58 
 A ‘Little Neddy’, a National Economic Development Council subcommittee of 
cabinet ministers, also considered the ‘split’. The committee studied Benn’s arguments 
and the working parties’ reports, and by February 1966 concluded that the Post Office 
should become a nationalised industry and public corporation, with one board supervising 
both the postal and telephone businesses; it was recommended that businesses should be 
separated at executive level, so that they would effectively function independently from 
one another.59 The announcement of these conclusions was delayed by the general 
election in March 1966 and Benn’s replacement as Postmaster-General by Edward Short 
in June 1966 (Benn moved to take over the Ministry of Technology), which effectively 
halted Benn’s ambitions for the full separation of the postal and telephone businesses. 
Short moved to announce the corporatisation quickly, leaving the question of internal 
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structure for later, and so it was announced on August 3rd, 1966, that the Post Office 
would become a nationalised industry.60 
 The internal organisation of the Post Office was thus a key subject for two further 
reviews of the Post Office which took place during the 1960s, both of which, in different 
ways, surface the role of technology and managerialism in the structure of the subsequent 
Post Office corporation. The first review, by the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries (SCNI), commenced after the announcement that the Post Office would be 
corporatized and so is particularly interesting for how the review focussed its attention on 
the Post Office’s internal structure. The committee noted in February 1967, in its final 
report, that their position would guide the Post Office’s future organisation, and so re-
iterated the possible structures: first, a federal structure with semi-autonomous regional 
boards, comparable to gas and electricity in Britain and the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies of the USA’s Bell System; second, a semi-split, with a top policy co-
ordinating board with separate statutory executives for Posts and Telecoms, largely 
autonomous from one another; finally, and favoured by the committee, was a recreation 
of the Post Office in its then current form, but as a corporation, maintaining central 
support services.61 Here, the telephone business’s perceived capacity for technological 
progress undermined the opportunity for an internal split: the Post Office’s Research 
Station at Dollis Hill, which the two services shared and forms the focus of the next 
chapter, was considered by the select committee as ‘the greatest drawback’ for an internal 
cleavage of the postal and telephone services.62 The two ostensibly shared the research 
station, although nearly all staff were focussed on telecommunications research, with a 
small group working on postal mechanisation.63 The committee, however, had ‘serious 
doubts whether the postal service, by itself, could maintain an active and imaginative 
research organisation’, and expressed its hope that a common research organisation would 
cross-fertilise technical thinking between the businesses.64 The external status of the 
telephone business had thus been undermined by the perceived effectiveness of its 
internal structures for technological development. 
                                                 
60 Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post, 470. 
61 ‘House of Commons. Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries. Meeting at Post Office Research Station, Dollis Hill’ 12 July 1966, 202–5, POST 122/10345, 
BPMA. 
62 ‘First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: The Post Office. Volume 1: Report 
and Proceedings of the Committee’ (London: HMSO, 1967), 205. 
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 The final report I address, the McKinsey review, was, like the SCNI review, 
internally oriented, and made a series of recommendations to increase the independence 
of the postal and telephone businesses, and to enhance the telephone business’s control 
over Engineering and Research. Ronald German, the Post Office’s Director-General, had 
initially hired McKinsey in 1965 to review the postal business’s organisation and 
management, but, as Campbell-Smith notes, McKinsey was quickly embraced by Benn 
as a potential ally in the fight for the ‘split’.65 The presence of McKinsey is also indicative 
of this period’s managerialist spirit: Christopher McKenna notes that McKinsey’s 
reputation underwent rapid growth in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, highlighting 
The Times journalist who wrote in 1969, ‘Ask anyone to name a management consultant 
and chances are, if he is British, that the answer will be “McKinsey”’.66 McKinsey made 
several significant recommendations geared at increasing the independence of the 
telephone and postal businesses, and enhancing the telephone business’s technology 
machinery: first, McKinsey, once the split was abandoned, supported the semi-split – the 
maximal possible separation of the two businesses within the same corporation; second, 
it recommended that the Engineering Department, a shared service between the postal 
and telephone businesses, should be abolished, along with the position of Engineer-in-
Chief, and instead engineering functions should be split; finally, it also recommended that 
the Research Department should be moved into the telephone business, rather than exist 
as a shared service.67 
The formal plans for the Post Office’s corporatisation were announced in March 
1967 and blended the recommendations of these reviews.68 The government approved the 
break, as proposed by the second Joint Working Party and ‘Little Neddy’, but rejected the 
split or semi-split, as had been advocated by Benn and McKinsey, after the SCNI’s 
argument that central functions, like research, strengthened the case for keeping the postal 
and telephone businesses together. The board, however, followed McKinsey’s 
recommendations in other ways: whilst the semi-split did not happen, separate Managing 
Directors were appointed for the postal and telephone businesses; the Engineering 
Department and position of Engineer-in-Chief was abolished; and the telephone business 
took over Research. Formal, separate headquarters were set up for the postal and 
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telephone businesses, whilst a Central Headquarters remained to house the businesses’ 
central support functions. These structural changes, as shown in Figures 3.3 to 3.5, are 
perhaps also suggestive of McKinsey’s further influence: pre-corporatisation, the Post 
Office had an extremely flat structure, whereas post-corporatisation, the organisational 
structure much more closely resembles the hierarchical organograms of the Chandlerian 
corporation. Chandler’s point is that this structure developed as a way of controlling the 
market, and whilst the Post Office remained a monopoly, I would suggest that McKinsey, 
the archetypal American management consultants of the 1960s, perhaps acted as ‘market-
by-proxy’, applying its experiences of the American managerial corporation to the Post 
Office, and so influencing the eventual structure of the new Post Office corporation. The 
Post Office Corporation, formally vested on October 1st, 1969, was thus a hybrid, where 
external influences had prevented the full independence and separation of the postal and 
telephone businesses, and yet maintained its monopoly, whilst its internal re-structuring 
enhanced and reflected the growing managerial control within the telephone business. 
 
Corporatisation to Liberalisation 
 
After the corporatisation of the Post Office, management introduced new managerial 
methods and rationalised existing techniques; however, whilst these internal control 
strategies developed, continuing problems for Britain and the telephone business 
throughout the 1970s show that the external performance and control of the state remained 
an issue. In this section I will first address the managerial tools developed during and after 
corporatisation, and then outline the external pressures and constraints on the telephone 
business through the 1970s, called a ‘dismal decade’ by Campbell-Smith,69 and which 
culminated in the separation of the postal and telephone businesses and liberalisation of 
the telecommunications monopoly in 1981. 
 The corporatisation of the Post Office stimulated new departments, tools, and 
techniques for enhancing managerial control in the telephone business over both 
customers and employees. Market research was formally reorganised into the 
Telecommunications Marketing Department, and with this reorganisation came a 
renewed focus on market research which carried from corporatisation in the late 1960s 
throughout the 1970s.70 Merriman set up a Management Services Department, which he 
described as harnessing ‘technological opportunity’ and ‘scientific man-management’ to 
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increase productivity. For example, the department used work measurement studies and 
statistical and computer-aided analyses, such as Monte Carlo simulations, to produce 
work-flows of engineers’ days to improve staffing arrangements.71 I return to Merriman’s 
Management Services Department in more detail in Chapter Five, where I relate 
management mechanisation to telephone switching development, but here it serves to 
show how the changing external status and reorganisation of the Post Office was an 
opportunity for strengthening internal managerial control. Indeed, Pitt points out that 
these techniques and others, such as management-by-objectives, caused the General 
Secretary of the Post Office Engineering Union, Charles Smith, to later lament the 
‘paradox of consequences’ of corporatisation, in which the growing independence of the 
telephone business had resulted in the decreased independence of engineering staff, such 
as through the gradual abandonment of the Whitley Council joint management-staff side 
negotiation mechanism of the Civil Service.72 
 However, whilst corporatisation gave opportunities for managerial reform, it also 
did not prevent external regulation and critique. The press particularly criticised the 
telephone business for delays in replacing outdated telephone exchanges, which did 
fractionally slow in the wake of the July Measures (see Figure 3.6), but which was also a 
product of fraught relations with manufacturers, which I address in greater detail in 
Chapter Five.73 This was exacerbated by financial objectives, restrictions on Post Office 
borrowing, and pricing policies: the government’s financial objectives had necessitated 
increases in postal and telephone charges, but, as inflation spiralled in the early 1970s, 
the Post Office had to contend with high wages and voluntary price restraints set by the 
Confederation of British Industry.74 This was formalised by the Heath government’s 
Prices Commission, which caused the Post Office to enter the red for several years, and 
continued under the Wilson government after 1974. Furthermore, the terms of 
corporatisation meant that Post Office borrowing still required Ministerial and Treasury 
approval;75 the inability of the Post Office to finance its expenditure internally, due to 
price restraints, meant that it either had to borrow more or reduce expenditure. As Mark 
Thatcher points out, this resulted in the Treasury using the Post Office as an instrument 
of macro-economic management, reducing its expenditure by £150m; there were further 
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73 ‘How the Post Office Got Its Lines Crossed’, The Observer, 4 June 1972. 
74 ‘Post Office Report and Accounts’ 1971, TCC 11/2, BTA; ‘Post Office Report and Accounts’ 1972, 
TCC 11/3, BTA. 
75 Reorganisation of the Post Office. 
64 
 
expenditure reductions in 1975-76 as telephone demand decreased following the 1973-
75 recession, and another decrease from 1979 to 1980 following the Winter of Discontent 
(see Figure 3.7 for the telephone business’s expenditure, inflation adjusted, throughout 
the 1970s, and refer to Figure 3.2 for the influence of economic activity on telephone 
demand).76 The postal side’s issues also compounded problems for the telephone 
business: Peter Sutton has outlined the negative consequences of the 1971 anti-
mechanisation postal strike, Britain’s first national postal strike, on the public perception 
of the Post Office, although Sutton points out that in the aftermath of the strike, postal 
mechanisation was pursued more co-operatively than the reputation of trade union 
militancy would have most believe.77 
 Under these pressures, a new review into the Post Office was announced in 1975: 
the Carter Committee, chaired by Charles Carter, the founding Vice Chancellor of 
Lancaster University. The selection of Carter and the terms of the committee highlight 
the negotiations which affected the scope of the review: Wilson, assuaging the Union of 
                                                 
76 Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications, 123–24. 
77 Peter Sutton, ‘Technological Change and Industrial Relations in the British Postal Service, 1969-1975’ 
(PhD diss., King’s College London, 2013). 
Figure 3.6. Automatic local exchanges in the UK, 1957-1981. The rates begins to slow after the 
July measures and continues into the 1970s recession. The dip at the end of the 1970s represents 
the decommissioning of old automatic exchanges faster than they could be replaced. Sources: 
‘Post Office/BT Annual Reports and Accounts’, TCB 10/TCC 11/TCD 12/TCE 13, BT Archives. 
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Postal Workers after fraught mechanisation negotiations, had assured the union at its 1974 
conference that there would be no chance of splitting the poorly-performing postal service 
from its subsidising partner, the telephone business.78 On the other hand, William Ryland, 
the Post Office chairman, was openly calling for the split and lobbying the Post Office 
board for support.79 The board agreed with Ryland, viewing the telephone business’s 
development towards media and data transmission as sufficiently novel that it merited 
independent management. Carter, who had some previous experience working in the Post 
Office’s regional administration, was chosen as an educated outsider, and Ryland 
negotiated terms of reference for the review that had scope to include the recommendation 
for a split.80 A second SCNI report gave additional impetus to these terms in 1975, 
recommending that the split be given further consideration by another review 
committee.81 The Carter Committee reported its conclusions two years later, in July 1977, 
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Figure 3.7. The effect of 1970s fiscal restraint on the telephone business's capital expenditure. 
Sources: ‘Post Office/BT Annual Reports and Accounts’, TCB 10/TCC 11/TCD 12/TCE 13, BT 
Archives. 
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and its core recommendation was that, given the poor performance of the corporation, the 
postal and telephone businesses should be split.82 
 However, despite Carter’s recommendations, there was one last clash between 
external governmental and internal managerial control which delayed the split: the 
industrial democracy experiment. Parliament had approved this experiment whilst the 
Carter review was still underway, and involved increasing the size of the Post Office 
board from seven management members to nineteen, adding seven trade union members 
and five external members from industry.83 Benn had advocated industrial democracy 
since he had taken over the Department for Trade and Industry in 1974, and successfully 
got Callaghan’s and the Post Office’s approval in 1977: the experiment started that year, 
and so in 1978 the Callaghan government vetoed the Post Office split to continue the 
industrial democracy experiment.84 The experiment ended in 1979 when Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservatives replaced the Labour government. James Prior, the Employment 
Secretary, had initially been reluctant to end the experiment, wary of upsetting the Trades 
Union Congress, but under pressure and threat of resignation from the Post Office’s 
Chairman, William Barlow, who had been appointed in 1977 under the assumption that 
he would be overseeing the split and taking over the telephone business, meant that in 
1979, Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry, announced an end to the 
experiment.85 
 The opinions on industrial democracy are ambivalent. The press initially reported 
on it as a pioneering experiment, but soon suggested that Post Office management was 
behind the cancellation of the experiment, tired of industrial relations dominating the 
board’s time.86 Britain’s interest in industrial democracy in the late 1970s – which was 
only ever notably implemented in the Post Office and British Steel – has been cast as a 
flirtation that only got as far as it did because of underlying economic issues, and the 
failure to find lasting solutions to those issues.87 An academic report on the experiment, 
by the University of Warwick’s Industrial Relations Research Unit, found that difficulties 
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had arisen from the sheer size of the Post Office organisation, and had been exacerbated 
by conflicting expectations and interests of management and union members: 
Management members in particular claimed to take into account the interests of the 
various groups involved in and with the Corporation. The best means of doing so was 
often seen by managers to be to ensure that those interests had no direct representation at 
key management decision-making points.88 
This quote is an explicit assessment of industrial democracy as an intrusion on internal 
strategies of managerial control, and echoes POEU General Secretary Charles Smith’s 
‘paradox of consequences’ mentioned above. The management board members 
discounted the Warwick report as overly academic and ‘essentially anthropological’, and 
there was a consensus across the board that it had lacked a unity of purpose during the 
experiment.89 In terms of contemporary accounts, Campbell-Smith’s is the only 
significant history, and mainly reports the views of management on the experiment; in 
doing so, Campbell-Smith’s implicit conclusion is that industrial democracy was an 
unworkable waste of time which delayed the split. More historical attention is needed to 
fully assess industrial democracy as a success or failure, but it is nevertheless an episode 
in Post Office history which showcases the friction between external management of the 
Post Office as an instrument of economic and industrial policy and internal managerial 
ambitions to enhance control over the business. 
 The election of the Conservatives in May 1979 laid a foundation for the Post 
Offices’ reorganisation: whilst the party’s manifesto didn’t mention the Post Office or the 
telephone business, it did make commitments to promoting competition and rolling back 
the nationalisation of industry. In September 1979, Keith Joseph announced that the 
postal and telephone businesses would be separated and in his announcement noted that 
the split would be part of a broader review of the telecommunications monopoly, setting 
the stage for liberalisation.90 The split of the telephone business from the Post Office can 
thus not be addressed without also addressing the liberalisation of the telephone 
monopoly, which, as I will show, had a significant influence on the structure of British 
Telecom. 
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 In 1980, Joseph commissioned a report into telecommunications liberalisation by 
Michael Beesley, Professor of Economics at the London Graduate School of Business 
Studies. Beesley was one of the most influential economists on the Thatcher 
government’s liberalisation and privatisation policies. Beesley’s background was in 
transport, undertaking cost-benefit analyses of the M1 and the London Underground’s 
Victoria Line, and he had served as Chief Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Transport 
in the 1960s.91 However, it was in the 1980s and 1990s where he came to the fore, along 
with the economist Stephen Littlechild, as the two published together and separately on 
market reform, liberalisation and privatisation.92 Beesley’s report on telecommunications 
was initially targeted only at value-added network services (VANS): services where a 
third-party would lease lines from the telephone business to provide non-voice services, 
such as data transmission, between clients. Beesley expanded the report to look at leased 
lines, the process whereby competing telephone businesses could lease BT’s lines and 
resale voice telephony to customers, thus fully competing with BT in the telephone 
business. Finally, Beesley also looked at the expansion of competition into transmission 
and switching networks, i.e. liberalising the construction of telephone systems 
themselves, so that businesses would be able to build their own telephone infrastructure 
to compete with BT. 
 Beesley’s conclusions were unabashedly pro-competition, and proved too much, 
too soon, for the Thatcher government. Beesley concluded that there should be no 
restrictions on VANS provisions, that BT should lease circuits to competitors, and that 
competing telephone systems should be established.93 As Mark Thatcher notes, these 
suggestions brought strong opposition from BT, the unions, and even some segments of 
business users, who preferred liberalisation to focus on VANS provision and private 
circuits rather than competing systems for residential customers.94 The government chose 
a compromise: proposals were invited for a single alternative network, which was 
eventually formed in 1981 as Mercury Communications and funded by a consortium of 
Barclays Merchant Bank, BP, and Cable and Wireless. Mercury gained its initial license 
in 1982 to supply leased private circuits and then became a full alternative telephone 
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system in 1984, gaining a license as a public telecommunications operator. However, as 
Frank Webster points out, these market-oriented liberalisation policies meant that 
Mercury was only ever a public telecommunications operator in name. Mercury, unlike 
BT, was not saddled with the responsibilities of a nationwide system, and so targeted 
lucrative business traffic; by 1990, Mercury was earning 30% of total nationwide revenue 
from bulk customers (those with 100 lines or more, i.e. businesses and other 
organisations). Whilst overall, Mercury had little market share – less than 10% – Webster 
argues that its importance lies in showing that liberalisation was less about full system 
competition, and more about the orientation of priorities in telecommunications towards 
business provision.95 
 The intertwining of business-centrism and liberalisation is also evident in the 
restructuring of the telephone business in preparation for the creation of BT, which 
formally took place on October 1st, 1981 (Figure 3.8). Despite Labour’s rejection of the 
Carter Report’s recommendation of the split, management had begun preparation for the 
split in 1979 in anticipation of a Conservative government, and soon after the split was 
announced in 1980, the government renamed the telephone business British Telecom, 
which re-organised itself into a market-oriented structure.96 BT set up a subsidiary 
company, BT Enterprises, to market, supply, and distribute customer equipment such as 
telephones, the supply of which had also been liberalised. The board created a new 
director to oversee ‘Organisation and Business Systems Development’, combining the 
Management Services Department and the telephone business’s futurology unit, the Long 
Range Planning Department, giving them a greater market orientation; MSD was 
subsumed to business systems and LRPD was combined with business planning and 
renamed the Business Planning and Strategy Department. I will show that similar changes  
happened across BT in subsequent chapters: BT created Martlesham Enterprises at its 
research centre to commercialise spin-off (Chapter Four); System X, BT’s new telephone 
exchange, underpinned a new business data services strategy (Chapter Five); the first 
major rollouts of fibre-optic transmission technology prioritised finance in the City of 
London (Chapter Six); management oriented Long Range Planning towards the business 
environment (Chapter Seven); and BT founded BT International to market satellite 
business services (Chapter Eight). BT’s new structure can be considered against 
Chandler’s interpretation of modern corporate structure as a way of securing managerial 
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control over the market.97 BT, formally created on October 1st 1981, was more than a 
publicly-owned telecommunications system: its structure is indicative, yet again, of how 
management used changes in external control to enhance its control over areas of 
uncertainty; where previously these areas had been residential customers and employees, 
they had instead become business customers and the market itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By pointing out the recurrent external controls placed on the telephone business, I do not 
mean to imply that the telephone business would necessarily have performed better with 
more independence. This chapter should not be read as an argument for liberalisation; it 
is intended as an inspection of the dynamic relationship between strategies of external 
and internal control. As I have noted throughout this chapter, the government often 
exercised these external controls in response to broader economic conditions which 
affected all British industries, regardless of nationalisation status. It is likely, for example, 
that telephone demand would have slumped following the July Measures and 1970s 
recession regardless, although it could be argued that these slow periods may have been 
an opportunity for the Post Office to ‘catch up’ with demand by maintaining its rates of 
automatic exchange and telephone service installations, had it not been for the 
government’s economic measures restricting capital investment. Lipartito has suggested 
that higher investment in telephony may have alleviated the turbulence of the 1970s, 
arguing that such investment would have led to widespread accessible communications, 
which may have had direct economic benefits for the nation, or would have enhanced 
quality of life, which in turn may have had productivity benefits.98 Speculative 
counterfactuals aside, it is clear that the performance of the telephone business was 
vulnerable to Britain’s broader economic condition. As William Ashworth has shown, 
the telephone business was one of the better performers amongst the national industries, 
although he also argues that, overall, the nationalised industries received a bad rap, neither 
unprofitable nor particularly profitable, and often paying back more to government than 
they were subsidised, but also lacking the support, oversight and operations to structure 
themselves in ways which generated sufficient internal revenue.99 
                                                 
97 Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand. 
98 Lipartito, ‘Failure to Communicate: British Telecommunications and the American Model’, 178–79. 
99 William Ashworth, The State in Business: 1945 to the Mid-1980s (Basingstoke; London: MacMillan, 
1991), 144–63. 
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Extending this point, I believe this critical reading of external and internal control 
suggests that the changing status of the Post Office often had ambiguous consequences 
for the strategies of control – machine and managerial – oriented towards staff and 
customers. Earlier, I pointed out that previous histories of the telephone business have 
neglected its internal structural dynamics and control mechanisms, and so in this chapter 
I hope to have shown how attention to these features has produced a foundation for further 
analysis of the relationships between information and control. For example, in this chapter 
I have shown that the Post Office increasingly researched and surveyed telephone 
customers, with implications for computerised surveillance which I address more fully in 
Chapter Seven; and that automation rendered many employees unemployed – an outcome 
which recurs in Chapter Five – whilst management subjected those who remained to 
increasingly computerised forms of monitoring and control. This blending of managerial 
and computerised control is a theme which recurs throughout this thesis, and so I have 
aimed here to not only outline an organisational history of the telephone business, but to 
signpost this thesis’ analytical orientation. 
However, as I have pointed out in Chapter Two, information and control have not 
only been mediated through corporate structures, but also through changing experiences 
of time and space. As such, I now turn my attention to the telephone business’s dedicated 
time-space-compression unit – its research laboratory – and explore its local and oral 
histories. 
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4 The Door to Tomorrow? 
Research Centres, Science Parks, and New Villages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above the entrance to BT Labs in Martlesham Heath, Suffolk, is a plaque engraved with 
‘Research is the Door to Tomorrow’. BT Labs is now the centre of a science park, 
Adastral Park but it was not always so: the plaque is a physical token from BT Labs’ 
predecessor, the Post Office Research Station, in Dollis Hill, north-west London. BT Labs 
was formally opened by the Queen in 1975 as the Post Office Research Centre, after 
moving from Dollis Hill. Adastral Park, however, is not Martlesham Heath’s only 
distinctive feature: from 1975, an ‘instant village’, built like ‘an unspoiled traditional 
village’, was also constructed on the heath, in part to provide housing for Post Office 
research staff.1 Martlesham Heath, both in the research centre and the village, thus has 
multiple, contradictory expressions of temporality: the future-facing plaque paying tribute 
to the past, and the ‘traditional’ village built in an instant. These temporal contradictions 
are also caught up with shifting spatial forms: the relocation of the Research Department, 
the construction of a new village, and the development of the science park, a 
quintessential ‘information age’ development. In 1964, Martlesham Heath was not a 
place; now, it is a place with its own sense of space and time. 
The construction of Martlesham Heath raises important questions: how did the 
Research Department transform from a research station in north-west London to a science 
park in Suffolk? How were the new research centre and new village interlinked and 
implicated in the construction of Martlesham Heath as a ‘place’? How were these novel 
spatial forms related to changing temporal expressions? I address this history in several 
sections and develop two intertwined arguments: first, the spatiality of Martlesham Heath 
underwent informatisation, commercialisation, and post-modernisation; second, bound 
                                                 
1 Peter Vallis, ‘Martlesham Heath Village’, ERA, no. 45 (August 1977): 64–68; ‘Redevelopment of 
Martlesham Heath, East Suffolk’ February 1965, TCB 391/1/3/9/1, BTA. 
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up with these spatial transformations, was a contradictory approach to temporality, where 
the historicisation of Martlesham Heath was crucial to its establishment as a new space 
and place. 
In the first section, I explore the relocation of the Research Department from 
Dollis Hill to Martlesham Heath, showing how the Research Department was used by 
central government as instrument of spatial re-ordering, and how this was experienced by 
staff. Next, I analyse the construction of the research centre at Martlesham Heath, linking 
visions for the new site to two contemporaneous spaces – new universities in 1960s 
Britain, and corporate research campuses in post-war USA – and documenting the 
strategies of spatial control used to regulate the laboratory’s environment. I then move on 
to the history of Martlesham Heath new village, and, through the history of its inception, 
development, and experiences of its residents, I show how the village and the research 
centre shaped one another, whilst also showing how its novelty and instantaneity was 
deeply embedded with references to English ‘tradition’. Finally, I address the recent 
history of Martlesham Heath by exploring the creation of Adastral Park, which showcases 
a new spatial strategy for research in the wake of BT’s privatisation, but which has also 
been rooted in novel representations of the place and history of Martlesham Heath. 
 These changes can be situated within broader theories of late-twentieth-century 
time-space transitions, and speak to this thesis’ goal of exploring ‘information’ and 
‘control’ in the telephone system. The transformation of the Post Office Research Centre 
into a science park could easily fit into broader narratives of science parks as novel sites 
of innovation, intimately entwined with the sunrise IT sector of the 1980s and 1990s and 
the information age, whilst the construction of an ‘instant village’ in the 1970s could form 
a perfect case study for the rise of postmodern architecture and town planning. The most 
comprehensive theories in this respect, which also speak to information and control, are 
Giddens’ exploration of time-space and organisation, Castells’ information age 
theorisations of space and time, and Harvey’s analysis of postmodern time-space. 
Giddens argues that organisations control time-space to reproduce themselves. 
The locale is a particularly important place for the organisation because it is the site in 
which the organisation can control its self-reproduction across time and space, by 
defining when and where individuals should be, and through the ends it orients those 
individuals towards. Giddens superimposes historicity as another temporal layer upon 
this: as the locale and organisation accumulates information, in the form of inventories, 
organisational data, life histories, and so on, it is able to use this historical information to 
generate its own history and articulate its own historical discourse, which in turn 
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generates an organisational culture supporting the organisation’s self-reproduction.2 This 
interlinkage of organisational historicity and time-space control within a defined locale is 
a key focus of this chapter, but I also turn to Castells’ and Harvey’s theories of time and 
space, as accounts of information age and postmodern transitions in spatiality and 
temporality respectively. 
Castells differentiates ‘spaces of flows’ from ‘spaces of places’, and ‘timeless 
time’ from ‘fragmented time’.3 Spaces of flows are the growing structuration of space by 
networking logic and electronic communication – flexible industrial spaces like science 
parks, the networked global economy, and mega-cities – which, as new communication 
technologies and spatial-economic structures enable flexible, instantaneous commerce on 
one hand and more diverse, anachronistic cultural expressions on the other, induces 
timeless time: a binary composition of instantaneity and eternity.4 Castells contrasts this 
new order, where space dominates time, to a prior order, where spaces of places – locales 
with self-contained form, function and meaning – are formed because of the 
fragmentations of time that existed before the network society – for example, the clock-
time of industrial capitalism makes the factory a ‘place’.5 
 Castells owes much here to Harvey, whose analysis of time and space under 
postmodernity I turn to now. Harvey argues that postmodernism is an aesthetic response 
to the time-space compression produced by capitalism, characterised by spatial and 
temporal emphases on disruption and instantaneity respectively. Harvey argues that 
disruption and instantaneity are contradictorily coped with through the construction of 
place-identity through retrogressive temporal expressions, such as historical evocation in 
architecture and the growing prominence of heritage organisations.6 There are similarities 
and differences between Castells and Harvey’s theorisations: both point to the 
compression of time and space, and the acceleration of flows (Castells emphasises 
electronic flows, and Harvey capital flows); however, they differ on the subject of place. 
Castells sees ‘place’ as self-contained locales, which he implies are in decline relative to 
the space of flows, whereas Harvey instead sees the new aestheticisation of place – spaces 
of Being – as a response to the growing ephemerality and fragmentation of time made 
possible by capitalism. 
                                                 
2 Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, 153–65. 
3 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 407–99. 
4 Castells, 440–48, 464–65, 493. 
5 Castells, 494–99. 
6 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 217, 85–87. 
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Giddens’, Castells’ and Harvey’s theorisations will be useful in understanding the 
history of Martlesham Heath as a place, although as I will show, they also have their 
limitations. I now explore the beginning of that history: the relocation of the Post Office’s 
Research Department from Dollis Hill to Martlesham Heath. 
 
Relocation and Dispersal 
 
The motivations for relocating Dollis Hill were twofold: by the close of the 1950s, more 
space was needed for the overpopulated research station, and the suburbanisation of 
London had brought issues of electrical interference. By 1958, 1,200 staff were located 
on a site built for 800, and studies projected that, by 1974, numbers would increase to 
almost 2,000.7 Staff who worked at Dollis Hill remember the site’s congestion: Chris 
Wheddon, who joined Dollis Hill as an apprentice in 1959, and went on to become Deputy 
Director of Research, remembers that ‘it was fairly evident to most people at Dollis Hill 
that it was getting more and more cramped’,8 and Ray Hooper, who started at the Post 
Office as an apprentice in 1964, recalled that ‘the Dollis Hill site was quite limited in 
many ways and it was in London, it was limited because they were trying to expand’.9 
Allen Snow, who worked in submarine cable testing, contrasted the limitations of space 
at Dollis Hill with the benefits of space at Martlesham Heath: ‘We went from a little 30-
tonne testing machine at Dollis Hill to a 100-tonne test machine with a 500 metre pull 
capability … moving to Martlesham really expanded out what the research labs could do, 
we ran out of space at Dollis Hill’.10 
Dollis Hill was also no longer free from electrical and vibratory interference.11 
Since its founding, north-west London had suburbanised and railways had expanded. 
Dollis Hill had been founded in largely rural environs, and although it was sited close to 
the Metropolitan railway, it was apparently distant enough to avoid interference.12 
However, by the 1950s, the population of the surrounding area reached around 316,000, 
from c. 140,000 in 1906, and from the mid-1930s the Bakerloo line began to run more 
services through the area, taking over for the Metropolitan line’s congested Stanmore 
                                                 
7 ‘Feasibility of Existing Site’ 1963, TH/FB/528, BTA; ‘Dollis Hill: Estimated Growth R. Branch 1964-
74’ 1964, TH/FB/362, BTA. 
8 Chris Wheddon, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 4 August 2016. 
9 Ray Hooper, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 15 July 2016. 
10 Allen Snow, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 14 July 2016. 
11 ‘Dispersal of Post Office Research Station’ 30 April 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
12 A thesis on Dollis Hill’s early years is currently underway: Alice Haigh, ‘The Origins and Early Years 
of the P.O. Research Station at Dollis Hill, 1908-38’ (PhD diss., University of Leeds, in progress). 
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branch.13 As Figure 4.1 shows, between 1914 and 1936, Dollis Hill turned from rural 
farmland into suburban London.14 Gordon Radley, the Post Office’s Director-General, 
decided to relocate the station in 1958, and set three requirements for a new location: first, 
that it should be close enough to maintain good contact with the rest of the Engineering 
                                                 
13 M.C. Barres-Baker, ‘A Brief History of the London Borough of Brent’, Brent Museum and Archive 
Occasional Publications, no. 5 (2007). 
14 Middlesex XI.14 (Includes: Willesden), 1:2500 (Southampton: Ordnance Survey, 1914), 
http://maps.nls.uk/view/103657949; Middlesex XI.14 (Includes: Willesden), 1:2500 (Southampton: 
Ordnance Survey, 1938), http://maps.nls.uk/view/103657946. 
 
Figure 4.1. Dollis Hill in 1914 and 1936. The red box shows, in the top map, the planned site 
for the research station in 1914 – the same year its purchase was originally authorised – and, in 
the bottom map, its actual site, surrounded by suburban London, in 1936. Reproduced with the 
permission of the National Library of Scotland. 
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Department, especially Development, in London; second, that it should be within easy 
access of towns with residential facilities and good day-schools; third, that there should 
be a technical college nearby for further education for staff.15 Each of these requirements 
– the boundaries between research and development, the relationship with housing 
developments, and the links between research and higher education – all play important 
roles in understanding the place that Martlesham Heath became. 
The Post Office General Directorate’s first choice was the Harlow new town.16 
Harlow did not pan out, but its selection is suggestive of the Post Office’s search 
philosophy. Harlow was one of the first wave of new towns approved after World War 
II, which became vehicles for visions of a modern, reconstructed Britain. As was noted 
at the time in the Architects’ Journal, Harlow was one of the foremost examples of novel 
town design concepts, which included the ‘neighbourhood unit’, a concept popularised 
by the American planner Clarence Perry in the 1920s and 1930s, and later used at 
Martlesham Heath, where residential neighbourhood units were isolated from arterial 
traffic routes to engender community spirit.17 Other electronics companies also relocated 
to Harlow: A.C. Cossor, later acquired in 1961 by the American defence contractor 
Raytheon, in 1958, and Standard Telecommunication Laboratories (STL), the UK-based 
research centre for the Standard Telephone & Cable (STC) and its parent company, 
International Telephone & Telegraph (IT&T), in 1959. Harlow clearly held some appeal 
for industrial R&D, and so it may have been on the Post Office’s radar as a potential 
cluster of electronics and telecommunications expertise, for this reason. However, Dollis 
Hill staff rejected Harlow, claiming that it lacked adequate housing and education, and 
that alternatives had not been explored.18 From this latter complaint, I would suggest that 
the staff objected to a lack of consultation, which is supported by the creation of a joint 
management-staff relocation working party in 1962. However, I raise Harlow to point out 
that, from the beginning, the relocation and construction of a new research centre was, 
for the Post Office, bound up with the co-location of corporate research and 
contemporaneous visions for a ‘new’ Britain. 
The search for a new site became further entangled with central government 
initiatives to more evenly develop employment opportunities around Britain. In 1963, the 
                                                 
15 ‘Dispersal: Post Office Research Station, Dollis Hill’ 16 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
16 ‘Conclusions (60) 11: General Directorate Meeting’ 27 June 1960, POST 72/1083, BPMA. 
17 Mark Llewellyn, ‘Producing and Experiencing Harlow: Neighbourhood Units and Narratives of New 
Town Life 1947–53’, Planning Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2004): 155–74; D.R. Childs, ‘Harlow’, Architects’ 
Journal, no. 116 (1952): 196. 
18 ‘Dispersal: Post Office Research Station, Dollis Hill, 16 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA’. 
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Flemming Report on ‘Dispersal of Government Work’ was produced to identify Civil 
Service departments suitable for relocation to outside London.19 Dollis Hill’s relocation 
was identified as a prime candidate, forcing the Post Office to commit to a site outside 
London; a relocation memorandum produced after the report noted that dispersal’s goal 
of relieving regional unemployment ‘was a secondary consideration which has recently 
assumed perhaps more importance’.20 Relocation could thus be summarised as inadequate 
space and electrical interference drove the move away from Dollis Hill, whilst dispersal 
drove the move away from London. 
By July 1963 the Joint Working Party had come up with a shortlist; Hastings, 
Sussex, was at the top, using the same criteria as established in 1958: towns with a good 
supply of housing, a good number of schools, and a technical college for further 
education. However, where previously there had been a requirement to remain close to 
Engineering and Development, this had now been relaxed to regions up to two hours’ 
commute from London, bringing the move more closely in line with dispersal.21 Hastings 
Council proved very welcoming, informally confirming to the Post Office that they would 
cancel a planned aerodrome development to provide space for the station and prevent 
disturbances from aircraft – although, in a display of faith in the British aerospace 
industry, one council member asked if there would still be scope for vertical take-off craft 
to have a small section of land.22 
However, the Hastings plan was stalled by the leaked plans for the Ministry of 
Public Buildings and Works (MPBW) to disperse some of its offices there. This caused 
irritation at the Post Office as the MPBW had been aware of the Post Office’s plans, but 
Post Office management were still keen to secure Hastings so as not to lose face with the 
staff.23 However, this attitude changed once the MPBW officially announced its move in 
January 1964 and were subsequently, in the words of Postmaster-General Reginald 
Bevins, ‘roasted’ in the House of Commons by MPs from Scotland, the North-East and 
the South-West.24 Dispersal, as a programme designed to alleviate unemployment, had 
not been created for the affluent South-East, and so relocating the Research Department 
                                                 
19 ‘Dispersal of Government Work’ 1963, MAF 229/22, TNA. 
20 ‘Postmaster General: Dispersal: Dollis Hill Research Station’ 1 May 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
21 Reginald Bevins to John Boyd-Carpenter, ‘Draft: Dispersal of Post Office Research Station’, April 
1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
22 D.J. Kinder to C.H. Coates, ‘Dollis Hill Research Station’, 5 February 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA; N.P. 
Lester to G.H. Metson, ‘Post Office Research Department’, 12 February 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
23 ‘Postmaster General: Dispersal: Dollis Hill Research Station’ 6 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
24 ‘HC Deb: Ministry (Staff)’ 28 January 1964, Vol 688 c34W, Hansard; ‘HC Deb: Government Offices 
(Dispersal)’ 29 January 1964, Vol 677 cc486-506, Hansard; ‘Note by J.R. Bevins, Postmaster General’ 
1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
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to Hastings appeared politically untenable. This was particularly worrying for the Post 
Office as other shortlisted sites were losing viability: the Christchurch and Poole sites 
were on difficult terrain, Ipswich was becoming ‘restive’ as the landowners, Bradford 
Property Trust, were keen to start a residential development (the soon-to-be Martlesham 
Heath new village), and Folkestone looked uncertain after the somewhat premature 
announcement that it would be the site for the British end of the Channel Tunnel.25 
The Post Office was also courted by MPs from the North and Scotland. Jeremy 
Bray, MP for Middlesbrough West, advocated Middlesbrough to the Post Office, whilst 
a delegation of Scottish MPs made an impassioned case for Scotland, pointing out that 
the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research had a site in East Kilbride, Ferranti 
a site in Edinburgh and National Cash Register a site in Dundee.26 Tam Dalyell, MP for 
West Lothian, even formulated research agendas, suggesting that Scotland would be an 
ideal location to research masers. The Scottish delegation and Bray were largely given 
the same answers: that the Research Station needed to be closer to the Engineering 
Department; tactfully, neither Bray nor the Scots were told what was confessed in private: 
that the Post Office could not keep staff if research moved northwards, nor did it believe 
new staff could be recruited if research was in the ‘less attractive’ North-East.27 
Instead, the Joint Working Party turned its attention to Ipswich, third on the list, 
after discarding Christchurch because of the site’s terrain issues, mentioned above, and 
because there were already two government research establishments there – the Military 
Engineering Experimental Establishment and the Signals Research and Development 
Establishment – and so again dispersal over-rode any other considerations.28 Ipswich was 
suitable because a large site had been found on Martlesham Heath, four miles east of 
Ipswich, which had previously been used by the RAF and USAF during World War II, 
and as an experimental aviation site before and after the war. Furthermore, Ipswich had 
been earmarked as part of a South-East development study for major expansion, thus 
alleviating staff concerns about housing availability.29 Finally, the new University of 
Essex, established in Colchester in 1963 as part of seven ‘plateglass’ new universities – 
East Anglia, Essex, Kent, Lancaster, Sussex, Warwick and York – fulfilled far and above 
                                                 
25 G.H. Metson to D.J. Kinder, ‘East Suffolk County Council’, 7 February 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA; T.B. 
Oxenbury to G.H. Metson, ‘Projected Move from London’, 4 February 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
26 ‘Deputy Director General: Dispersal: Dollis Hill Research Station’ 16 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA; 
‘Notes of a Meeting Held at the House of Commons’ 19 December 1962, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
27 ‘Dispersal of Dollis Hill Research Station’ 18 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
28 ‘Dispersal of Dollis Hill Research Station, 18 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA’. 
29 ‘The South-East Study’ 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA. 
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the Post Office’s hopes to forge links with a local technical college.30 Staff approval was 
secured in June 1964 and the move formally announced to the House of Commons in 
July.31 Two of these motivations – the development of the Ipswich area and the new 
University of Essex – were particularly influential on the research station’s subsequent 
development, but before that, I will explore the memories of staff on the relocation 
decision. 
These memories speak to two different subjects: first, the apparently collaborative 
nature of the selection process, and second, the experiences of life at Dollis Hill in contrast 
to Martlesham Heath. Despite the adoption of a more collaborative process for selecting 
the new site, many former staff recall a more hierarchical presentation of the move. Ray 
Hooper says that ‘I wouldn’t say it was particularly presented, I don’t remember it being 
presented in any form to us, it was mentioned in various things’,32 whilst Dennis Wheeler, 
who started at Dollis Hill in 1967, recalls the move remaining opaque even after its formal 
announcement: ‘There were rumours, there was talk about a possible move to 
Martlesham, I don’t think it was anything more than that’.33 Colin Whitlum, who started 
at Dollis Hill as an apprentice in the 1960s, remembers that ‘it wasn’t really talked about 
very much, it was just a case of this, well this is where we were going, and you can get 
on the coach and go and have a look around, other than that, find a house!’.34 Chris 
Wheddon remembers that ‘it was felt that Martlesham was the choice made by the powers 
that be before we actually went through the process of choosing, you know, there was 
discussion amongst the troops that, “It was a done deal, wasn’t it?”’.35 
The hierarchy at Dollis Hill features in many recollections of the research station. 
One recurring story was of the Dollis Hill car park, where Major Staff had red parking 
passes and Minor Staff had green. Jeanette Higgins, who worked in the Research 
Department’s clerical division, and was thus ‘Major Staff’, remembers that ‘you had to 
stick to your own [car parking spaces]’,36 but Dennis Wheeler, on the other hand, recalls 
with frustration that Major Staff would often take Minor Staff’s spaces: ‘greens could 
only park in greens, but reds could park in reds or greens, so we would arrive on the dot 
of quarter to eight, ten to eight, drive into the research station, all the green places had 
                                                 
30 ‘Dispersal of Dollis Hill Research Station, 18 March 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA’. 
31 ‘Note to Director General from A.H. Mumford’ 22 June 1964, TH/FB/528, BTA; ‘HC Deb: Research 
Centre, Dollis Hill’ 28 July 1964, Vol 699 cc234-5W, Hansard. 
32 Hooper, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
33 Dennis Wheeler, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 15 June 2016. 
34 Colin Whitlum, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 15 July 2016. 
35 Wheddon, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
36 Jeanette Higgins, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 14 July 2016. 
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gone ‘cause there were a lot of red car park tickets in there’ and that ‘prompted me to 
want to get promoted more than anything else, that was such a frustration. I wanted a red 
park pass!’.37 Chris Wheddon also recalled Dollis Hill’s hierarchy: ‘it was very interesting 
in those days because there was a, sort of, hierarchy … almost like army structure … 
when I became … senior staff … my now new colleagues that used to be my bosses had 
great difficulty in calling me Chris! They still called me Wheddon’.38 
Despite this, staff also have fond memories of Dollis Hill and some believe that 
Martlesham Heath was never able to recapture Dollis Hill’s community spirit. Allen 
Snow remembers that ‘we had a lot of social clubs in at Dollis Hill … they were 
transferred and that was a great social thing, for all these clubs and sports, but alas 
membership dropped’,39 and Colin Whitlum remembers similarly: ‘they tried very hard 
to regain the social side because that was the key to Dollis Hill, fantastic social side, 
pantomimes at Christmas, dances, you know, people would always be eating or drinking 
… it was a really nice atmosphere. When we moved to Martlesham we had nothing like 
that, you know, the social club hardly existed’.40 I will cover staff memories of life at 
Martlesham Heath in more detail in the next section, but I specifically raise these 
comparisons to Dollis Hill here because they highlight issues of community and identity 
which were core issues for the development of Martlesham Heath as a place. 
 
Industrial Versailles Meets the New Universities 
 
The envisioning and construction of the new research centre were influenced by two 
different types of post-war research site: the new universities in Britain and corporate 
research laboratories from the USA. In planning the new site, the Post Office forged 
explicit links with the new University of Essex whilst also making implicit references to 
the new universities programme. Press releases announced the Post Office’s hopes for a 
‘university character’, which was ‘of a clean and quiet nature and in appearance might 
resemble a university area with mainly low buildings set in landscaped areas’.41 This 
vision can be contextualised against the high-profile new universities programme, which 
established several universities (Sussex, Warwick, Kent, York, Essex, Bath, and 
                                                 
37 Wheeler, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
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40 Whitlum, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
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Lancaster) during the 1960s, which became known as the ‘plateglass universities’.42 
Stefan Muthesius’ history of the plateglass universities outlines how they were designed 
as a defence of modernism, another welfare state public project in step with the social 
architecture of public housing and new towns like Harlow.43 Bearing striking similarity 
to the Post Office’s vision for Martlesham Heath, many of the early new universities – 
Sussex, Warwick, Kent, and York – were built on landscaped park-like campuses, 
composed of low-profile buildings of metal, glass, and concrete. These universities were 
launched amidst a fervour which Muthesius describes as, ‘the country as a whole was told 
to appreciate the general social importance of that institution’.44 The Post Office’s 
invocations of ‘university character’ and aesthetic visions of low-profile buildings on a 
landscaped campus suggest an imitation of these new, socially important institutions; this 
echoes the Post Office’s earlier selection of Harlow, an extension of a desire to align with 
the state’s centralised, modern, utopian projects for a ‘new’ Britain. 
 The University of Essex and later plateglass universities took on a more 
‘integrated urban’ form compared to their predecessors,45 but it was with Essex, the 
closest new university to Martlesham Heath (and closest university in general), that strong 
ties were forged. The University of Essex was perhaps the most high-profile of all the 
new universities – according to Muthesius, ‘none of Britain’s postwar universities was 
launched with such enthusiasm’46 – and the Post Office was quick to establish links. In 
1967 a Chair in Telecommunications Systems was set up with a grant from the Post 
Office, as was a Lecturer in Telecommunications Systems.47 Research grants followed – 
£30,000 was donated in 1971 to research video telephony – as did collaborative MScs 
and PhDs.48 An MSc in Telecommunications was set up by the Research Department, and 
senior engineers were employed as lecturers, which more junior engineers on the Post 
Office were given time to attend. Chris Wheddon, one such student, remembers that ‘I 
went to university to do a Master’s course at Essex, an MSc, because the technology was 
about lasers, it was about advanced digital techniques … the lecturers then in the Faculty 
                                                 
42 Michael Beloff, The Plateglass Universities (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968). 
43 Stefan Muthesius, The Post-War University: Utopianist Campus and College (New Haven; London: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 104–5. 
44 Muthesius, 107. 
45 Muthesius, 138. 
46 Muthesius, 149. 
47 ‘University of Essex: Chair in Telecommunication Systems’, The Observer, 15 January 1967; 
‘University of Essex: Electronic Engineering’, The Guardian, 22 December 1967. 
48 ‘Phone Foresight’, The Guardian, 7 October 1971; ‘University of Essex/Post Office Research Centre. 
SRC Case Studentship: Optical Communications’, The Guardian, 29 May 1979. 
84 
 
of Electronic, or Digital Engineering, were very good. J.J. O’Reilly was one of those that 
was, excellent lecturer and very well-known’.49 
 The new universities were not the only influence; the Post Office also took cues 
from American corporate laboratory design. In 1964, representatives from the Post Office 
and the MPBW (who would provide architectural services for the new research centre) 
visited laboratories across the USA, including Bell Labs, the Radio Corporation of 
America’s laboratory, Hughes Research Lab, Fairchild Semiconductor’s R&D Labs, and 
the Stanford Research Institute.50 Some features which the British delegation found most 
noteworthy – artificial lighting and air conditioning – were also those which later surfaced 
tensions between management and staff in the construction and working conditions of the 
research centre. The other significant American feature which the Post Office would 
emulate was flexible portioning, so that rooms could be reconfigured as needed. Air 
conditioning was seen as essential for controlling atmospheric conditions for delicate 
electronics work, whilst artificial lighting would allow more compact building design, as 
rooms could be housed within the inner structure without windows. The Post Office report 
on the trip amusingly described this as ‘Americans have no objection to working in rooms 
without natural light’.51 
Of all the visits made, the most influential were the laboratories designed for Bell 
Labs and IBM by the Finnish neo-futurist architect Eero Saarinen. Scott Knowles and 
Stuart Leslie’s history of Saarinen’s work on IBM, Bell Labs and for General Motors 
shows that, paralleling the Post Office’s references to new universities, Saarinen’s 
research centres for GM – which was called a ‘Versailles of Industry’ by Life magazine 
due to its palatial grandeur – IBM, and Bell also emulated the isolated campuses of post-
war universities.52 Knowles and Leslie argue that, in doing so, these corporate 
laboratories, as with post-war US university campuses, embodied the linear model of 
research, where vast centres of basic research were put to work generating scientific 
knowledge, which would later be used for technological development. It is easy therefore 
to see why the Post Office identified with Saarinen’s Bell and IBM sites, given its similar 
infatuation with the university campus. This insight is particularly important to bear in 
mind as I consider below how relocation became entangled with the shifting organisation 
of research and development within the Post Office. 
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 The construction of the Martlesham Heath research centre implemented these 
influences; the exterior and landscaping was conceptually similar to the new universities 
and the interior design prioritised US-style flexibility, air conditioning, and lighting. The 
main design features were established in 1967 with the MPBW, who provided 
architectural and design services to meet the Post Office’s schedule of requirements.53 
The main decisions which shaped the building were the extensive use of air conditioning 
and staff resistance to plans for low lighting, which resulted in more natural light being 
used in exterior rooms with windows. In a reminder of Cold War concerns – and the cost-
benefit analysis thereof – it was also agreed that a fall-out shelter would not be needed on 
site. The research centre’s eventual form was three main buildings: a seven-floor lab 
block, a three-floor administration building, and a single-storey building to accommodate 
mechanical engineering, a drawing office, a workshop, and storage; two towers – a radio 
tower and water tower – were also constructed. 54 The towers, which served as the primary 
lift shafts, were sited on diagonally opposite sides of the main lab block to encourage 
circulation in between. A similar priority can be seen with the installation of movable 
partitions to encourage ‘flexibility’ in research.55 There was a separate acoustics complex 
for the research centre, which contained two anechoic chambers, a reverberant room, and 
a microphone calibration room. Acoustic isolation was achieved throughout the complex 
by using double-walled construction and mounting the inner rooms on acoustic 
mountings.56 
There were plans to create a campus atmosphere through landscaping: a lagoon 
was pursued, partly as a landscape feature and partly as a resource for fire engines, but 
was eventually discarded as not cost-effective.57 The lagoon is suggestive again of both 
the landscaped campuses of the plateglass universities and the US corporate campuses: 
York and Essex had pools and lakes, and all the new universities campuses were 
landscaped to varying extents to create ‘park’ atmospheres, whilst Saarinen’s Bell Labs 
campus in Holmdel, New Jersey, also had a large lagoon.58 Unfortunately, there is no 
                                                 
53 ‘GPO/MPBW Meeting: Move of the Research Station’ 7 August 1967, TCB 391/2/2, BTA. 
54 C.F. Floyd, ‘The Design of Martlesham Research Centre: Part 1 - Basic Design Requirements and 
Design of Buildings’, The Post Office Electrical Engineers’ Journal 69, no. 3 (1976): 146–53; C.F. 
Floyd, ‘The Design of Martlesham Research Centre: Part 2 - Services Provided’, The Post Office 
Electrical Engineers’ Journal 69, no. 4 (1977): 258–64. 
55 Floyd, ‘The Design of Martlesham Research Centre: Part 1 - Basic Design Requirements and Design of 
Buildings’, 147. 
56 Floyd, ‘The Design of Martlesham Research Centre: Part 2 - Services Provided’, 263–64. 
57 ‘Buildings and Welfare Department Meeting: Martlesham Heath Research Centre’ 1966, TCB 391/2/6, 
BTA. 
58 Muthesius, The Post-War University, 107–74; Knowles and Leslie, ‘Industrial Versailles’, 26. 
86 
 
remaining evidence of the aesthetic decisions taken in the exterior design and shape of 
the research centre buildings; the impression given therefore is that form followed 
function. The broad conclusion that I take from the research centre’s construction is that, 
internally, it recreated US corporate labs through air conditioning and flexible 
partitioning, whilst the goal with the landscaped, low-profile exterior appearance was to 
evoke the new university campus atmosphere. This latter point could be read as merely 
another imitation of the Saarinen design archetype but I would argue that, given the Post 
Office’s explicit references to a ‘university atmosphere’ and the links it forged with the 
University of Essex, it was rather an evocation of the modernist welfare state’s 
programmes of social architecture and institution-building. 
The first staff arrived on Martlesham Heath in 1968: a small project team were 
housed in temporary huts and worked on waveguides (see Chapter Six for more on the 
waveguide project); the research centre finally opened in 1975 after construction delays 
because the contractor, Mitchell Construction, went bankrupt, but was completed after it 
was bought out by Tarmac. Nevertheless, the protracted move and the use of various 
alternative sites – temporary huts and rented offices in nearby towns – featured in many 
staff’s memories of Martlesham Heath’s early years. Allen Snow remembers the 
difficulties of the back-and-forth between Dollis Hill and Martlesham Heath: 
I moved up here as one of the third or fourth person at Martlesham … then I got a 
promotion and went back to Dollis Hill … I stayed down there for a few years but 
travelled up because my wife was up here … so I used to travel up at least once during 
the week and I wore the car out.59 
Allen also remembered being housed in a temporary ‘igloo’ on the site, followed by a 
‘huge wooden shed’ which was nicknamed ‘Fort Apache’ because it resembled an ‘old 
western type fort’.60 Allen and Colin Whitlum both had to work at various temporary 
offices in the East Suffolk region as the research centre was built up; Allen worked at ‘a 
drawing office, as a satellite out of Martlesham, although Martlesham was being occupied 
were down here still, so yeah, it wasn’t too much of an issue’,61 whilst Colin remembers 
that these ‘outstations in Ipswich’ continued after construction and some staff ‘didn’t 
move back onto the Heath’.62 The back-and-forth between Dollis Hill and Martlesham 
Heath also featured in Ray Hooper and Chris Wheddon’s memories. Chris remembered 
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going back-and-forth to London as ‘the biggest problem … but that was a novelty going 
on the train, the train wasn’t too bad’.63 Ray remembers the distance causing difficulties 
for his research, which had suffered from ‘a coordination problem’ when his team were 
split across Dollis Hill and Martlesham Heath: 
Worst memory? … I think it was the period when we were separated at Dollis Hill and 
the group at Martlesham, because I think it did actually create some divisions between 
people.64 
Similarly, the completed building also drew ambivalent recollections. Sheila 
O’Brien, who moved to Martlesham Heath in 1979 from the National Physical 
Laboratory, recalls: 
I didn’t like it to start with … the ceilings were really high and then you had a false floor 
where we would run things, so that made, I never liked any of the rooms in the main lab 
block. … I was lucky enough to get moved over to B10 … a prefabricated building that 
was built before the main lab block … it’s interesting that a scruffy old timber framed 
building should be cosy, but it was. I still preferred it to the new building.65 
Sheila also mentioned the air conditioning’s influence on the main lab block’s 
unpleasantness, remembering that ‘I was always cold, even in the summer, so I just didn’t 
like the working environment in the main block’.66 Colin also disliked the main building, 
particularly its uniformity: 
…most people were in this massive building four or five floors high, very long, very big, 
all the same, when you walked in it was absolutely the same, in every part of it was the 
same, so if you didn’t know which floor you were on, the only way you could tell by the 
colour of the carpet.67 
However, not all memories were negative. Allen Snow, also mentioning the air-
conditioning, appreciated the purpose-built labs at Martlesham Heath, which he viewed 
as enhancing control over research: 
…they moved out on a grander scale, purpose-built air-conditioned labs, everything was 
purpose-built and designed, which was great … the workshops were fully manned and 
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equipped, a lot of the labs were set up as things really moved on there, and it gave, not 
only did it give the Post Office a great opportunity to develop with an open site and 
control everything.68 
Ray Hooper concurred, finding that as his research program on optical fibre expanded, 
the additional space at Martlesham Heath proved valuable: 
…suddenly the whole program, because it just grew and grew and expanded and 
expanded, and I think being at the Martlesham site was a real boost because I couldn’t 
imagine that at Dollis Hill that expansion you would have had to had, it wouldn’t have 
been able to take it.69 
 The Research Department was also implicated in changing formulations of R&D 
in the Post Office during this period. I drew comparisons earlier between the design of 
Martlesham Heath and American corporate laboratories, which Knowles and Leslie cast 
as embodiments of the linear model, focussing on basic research and feeding into 
advanced research and development. Paradoxically, however, the move to Martlesham 
Heath was accompanied by a new emphasis on ‘development’, which was bound up with 
the Post Office’s corporatisation in 1969. Prior to corporatisation, research and 
development were separate branches within the Engineering Department. They were on 
the same tier of the organisational hierarchy, but an implicit stratification could perhaps 
be seen: in 1946, a combined Research and Development Subcommittee was set up, but 
was chaired by the Controller of Research.70 However, after corporatisation, the 
Engineering Department was dissolved, and the telecommunications side of the Post 
Office set up the Development Division, of which the Research Department and 
Development Departments became sub-units. 
These changes in status can be contextualised against Benoît Godin’s conceptual 
histories of ‘research’ and ‘development’. Godin, with Désirée Schauz, argues that 
‘research’ has gone through several identity shifts in the twentieth century: first, ‘basic’ 
research thrived in the interwar period, when research was an organised, holistic activity 
across academia, industry and government, organised by institutions into a systematic 
laboratory-based practice; second, ‘research and development’ gained prominence after 
World War II, popularised by the US Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
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founded in 1941 for the war effort, and followed by further integration of research into 
industrial ‘development’, which referred to the application of research as a means of 
evolving industry; third, ‘technological innovation’ was popularised in the 1960s and 
after, whilst ‘research’ was marginalised, and instead emphasis was placed upon the 
application of the results of research, rather than research itself.71 Godin has also analysed 
the addition of ‘development’ to form ‘R&D’, arguing that three factors contributed to 
this combination: organisational, analytical, and political.72 First, there was a greater 
organisational differentiation of research from development from the mid-twentieth 
century; second, R&D became a useful category for statistical analyses and study of the 
innovation process; finally, prestige was derived from combining research and 
development to show off gross R&D expenditure, whilst, contradictorily, these sums were 
also used as evidence to demonstrate the meagre funding research got in comparison to 
development by post-war advocates of basic research. 
It would be simplistic to view the belated popularity of ‘development’ in the Post 
Office, coming decades after its mid-century vogue in the USA, through a stereotyped 
declinist view of British science playing catch-up to American trends. Instead, I would 
argue that the new emphasis on development and R&D was tied to two changes: first, the 
corporatisation of the Post Office in 1969; second, the relocation of the research centre to 
Martlesham Heath. First, as mentioned, Development Division was set up after 
corporatisation, with the Research Department and Telecommunications Development 
Department as its two main sub-units; giving ‘Development’ greater status was thus a 
way of reflecting the new organisational structure. Second, I would suggest that ‘R&D’ 
allowed greater collectivisation of geographically dispersed departments. Previously, 
Research Branch and Development Branch had both been located in London; after 
corporatisation, relocation was in full swing, and by the mid-1970s, various departments 
of Development Division were split across London and the ‘East Anglia Complex’, 
composed of Ipswich and Cambridge, which partly housed the Long Range Planning 
Department, a department I explore in Chapter Six.73 As some staff raised in their oral 
histories, dispersal brought problems, and so ‘R&D’ might not just have been an 
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opportunity for a new corporate organisational definition of research, but also a way of 
collectivising spatially dispersed departments. 
Spatial dislocation of research created the need and opportunity for identity 
formation; hence the articulations of university atmosphere, the use of US corporate 
laboratory design, and the growing prominence of development. This complicates 
narratives of large corporate research campuses’ emphasis on basic research and as 
reifications of the linear model. Whilst I think corporate campuses’ influence was 
important for Martlesham Heath, so were the new universities, as was the broader context 
of corporate reorganisation. However, the research centre’s identity was not only the 
important part of Martlesham Heath’s place-identity: in 1975, construction of a new 
village began adjacent to the Post Office Research Centre. 
 
The Instant Traditional Village 
 
The relocation of the Research Department to Martlesham Heath created a need for 
housing. In 1964, Ipswich had been identified as a potential major development area by 
a government study of the South-East. The owners of the Martlesham Heath site, Bradford 
Property Trust, which had sold a section of their land to the Post Office for the new 
research centre, also had its own plans for a residential development. These plans became 
intertwined with the Post Office Research Centre, and, as I showed the importance of 
architecture, design and landscape to the identity of the research centre in the above 
section, so I will too for the new village in this section. 
 The initial development plans for Martlesham Heath were produced in 1965 for 
the Bradford Property Trust by the architectural firm Clifford Culpin.74 The proposed 
development was for 10,000 people and the relocation of the Research Department took 
a prominent place in the report as it created an immediate need for housing; the proposed 
town was planned around the research site, which ‘would allow the GPO to be related to 
the heart of the town’.75 The report also pointed to the Post Office’s emphasis on 
university character as a ‘splendid basis on which to build a new community’ and 
suggested leaving room for the development of light industries in keeping with the 
‘university background’.76 The role of technology in developing the Suffolk region also 
featured: the layout of the proposed development had been designed with the 
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incorporation of future transport systems in mind – a monorail station in Martlesham 
Heath was specifically touted as a potential development.77 An exclusive, communal 
atmosphere was also envisioned: as the land was entirely owned by Bradford Property 
Trust, the opportunity existed to use ‘the best forms of social and architectural planning 
in order to relate the needs of the individuals to those of the community’, which would 
be achieved through the formation of a community trust to safeguard the development.78 
Landscaping, as with the research centre, was also planned to create and preserve this 
unique atmosphere: tree planting and earth mounding, whilst used to ‘maintain and 
enhance existing views’, would also be used to ‘screen certain development’ around the 
village.79 There was thus an emerging contradiction, where the research centre and 
proposed industrial development formed major components to the plan, and yet the 
community vision was best served by screening those spaces. 
 However, central government did not pursue the South-East expansion proposals 
for Ipswich, delaying the new village as East Suffolk County Council had to decide 
between approving the de novo Martlesham Heath development or expanding Kesgrave, 
an existing village slightly further east.80 This exacerbated research staff’s concerns about 
housing, and indeed housing searches feature heavily in staff memories. Colin Whitlum 
remembers that ‘house prices were shooting up, the interest rates were something like 
fifteen percent, half a percent today, fifteen percent then, I mean it was phenomenal’, 
whilst Jeanette Higgins and her husband had to go to extreme lengths to secure a property 
during a period of intense gazumping: 
There was a lot of gazumping going on, there were so few houses, that as soon as they 
went on the market they were sold, so it caused huge problems for everyone … then we 
noticed that actually outside the estate agents’ office there was a queue forming already 
because there was so many houses … so having decided that, yes, we like it … we went 
back home to Kirton and he packed up everything he needed to camp for a week or more 
until they actually went on sale, he went back … and he went and camped for however 
long it took.81 
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The absence of amenities in Suffolk had already put some research staff off. Allen 
recalled how some colleagues complained that ‘There’s no theatres, there’s no cinemas’, 
whilst Chris also remembered similar questions asked at the time: ‘Oh yeah, well how 
often do you go to the pictures? … How often do you go to the theatre and so on?’.82 
Colin noted that the move was too much for some of his colleagues and their families: 
Some didn’t like it because they moved into the country and they were stuck out, they 
thought it was a wonderful life, but they were stuck out in the wilds and found that 
difficult. Families split up and people went back, others didn’t like the working 
environment at Martlesham and they went back, and of course as I explained to you 
before a lot of people didn’t come up, didn’t move up, so we split and we lost a lot of 
people.83 
However, there were also positive memories as staff remembered the support 
offered by the Post Office in terms of temporary accommodation and assistance for the 
move, as well as the opportunities for upsizing by moving out of London. Chris Wheddon 
remembers that the ‘terms for moving were very generous’, ‘in terms of financial support 
and other support mechanisms’,84 whilst Colin Whitlum recalled that the Post Office ‘had 
houses that they put people up in and rented’.85 Allen Snow and Thomas O’Brien both 
recalled how the move had enabled them to buy larger houses that ‘you would never have 
done that in the outskirts of London’86 and that ‘I never dreamed that I would ever own a 
house like that’.87 
The delays to the Martlesham Heath village development also meant that the 
Research Department’s Move Committee made visits to East Suffolk County Council to 
lobby the County Planning Officer to choose Martlesham Heath over the Kesgrave 
expansion and to accelerate the decision-making process.88 The new village was thus 
finally approved in December 1972 and construction started in 1974. However, between 
the initial development plan and the construction of Martlesham Heath, the vision had 
changed substantially. 
 The new village embodied new design ideals which had not been mentioned in 
the 1964 plan: Martlesham Heath was, on the one hand, a ‘traditional village’, and on the 
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other hand, an ‘instant village’ or a ‘new village’.89 The new aim was to create a ‘twentieth 
century village’ which reflected the design traditions of the region by using Suffolk 
vernacular, whilst also appearing to have developed organically over time: 
A variety of materials have been employed, both traditional and modern, and deliberate 
changes in scale, street pattern and rooflines have been featured to try to create the 
appearance of organic growth that is so evident in many villages in the county.90 
The lead architect for Martlesham Heath, Christopher Parker, described the village as a 
‘revolt against convention’ – specifically, the highly planned post-war housing of new 
towns which he argued had failed ‘through its insistence on control and careful avoidance 
of any design function’.91 Parker chose the village concept instead, using an ‘incoherent’ 
architecture that would also emulate actual villages. The ‘instant village’ concept spoke 
to the goal of putting ‘as much village character into the design as possible’, whilst also 
using contemporary building techniques to accelerate construction.92 Parker also achieved 
the traditional village concept through broader planning and landscaping: there was a 
central village green and a cluster of commercial units on the green for a village store, 
pub, and so on.93 However, there were also some continuities with the earlier plans: the 
neighbourhood unit concept, with its origins in interwar US town planning, was kept. 
Parker organised the new village into various ‘hamlets’, which were all built off the 
village’s arterial loop road; however, despite this conceptual lineage from American 
interwar planning and post-war new towns like Harlow, the ‘hamlets’ also served the 
village’s chaotic aesthetic choices, as each hamlet was built along distinctive and varied 
design concepts, whilst still broadly adhering to the traditional English aesthetic and using 
the Suffolk vernacular.94 
 This aesthetic was also achieved through what might be termed ‘technological 
detailing’: the contradictory application of various techniques to limit the intrusion of 
technology into the traditional village aesthetic. Bidwells, the site developer, used earth 
mounding and tree planting to exclude road noise and screen the research centre, which 
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was described in various features on Martlesham Heath as a ‘huge concrete toadstool of 
a research centre’ giving a ‘totally unbalanced impact’ to the new village.95 Residents, 
through a householders’ association set up by Bradford Property Trust, had to sign 
covenants banning them from putting up TV aerials and parking caravans in the village; 
TV reception was instead received through an underground cable carrying a television 
signal from an aerial atop the research centre’s radio tower.96 A block of flats in the village 
centre had ‘their parking courts discreetly positioned to avoid the visual intrusion of the 
car’.97 
 These design choices can be situated within the postmodernist movement. The 
emphasis on vernacular and regional style is a feature of postmodern architecture; Charles 
Jencks describes the neo-Vernacular movement of 1970s postmodernism as ‘the style to 
fall back on when there were no other clear directions’ in Britain.98 Martlesham Heath 
can also be compared to other developments which have aimed to capture the traditional 
English aesthetic: it was compared favourably to a similar development in Essex, 
Woodham Ferrers, which had been criticised as a ‘pastiche’,99 and there are undoubtedly 
similarities with the eminent postmodern architect Leon Krier’s development, 
Poundbury, built under the influence of Prince Charles in Dorset, which also has a 
revivalist aesthetic, and has alternately been called ‘radical’ and a ‘cottagey slum’.100 
These attempts to engineer a sense of history and tradition in brand-new developments 
fits in with a distinctive feature of postmodernism which Harvey identifies, in the turn to 
the stability of past as a response to the acceleration of time. A review of Martlesham 
Heath in the Royal Institute of British Architects’ Journal articulated that ‘the perceived 
stability of the vernacular idiom in housing design is an understandable reaction to a 
rapidly changing world’.101 This contradictory combination of ‘incoherence’ and 
‘stability’ in Martlesham Heath captures the essential tensions of postmodernism, well-
put by a 1983 Chartered Surveyor Weekly feature on Martlesham Heath titled ‘Controlled 
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chaos proves a winner’.102 Herein lies a crucial point that can be made about the new 
village and its relationship with the research centre. Superficially, the village represented 
incoherence, but this aesthetic required various strategies of control, some of which drew 
on the research centre, to effect the appearance of organic evolution and natural 
integration into the Suffolk region: organisational, in the formation of a householders’ 
association; spatial, in the neighbourhood units/hamlets concept; architectural, in the 
controlled production of incoherence; environmental, in the landscaped screening of the 
research centre; and technological, in the use of the research centre for TV reception. 
 Residents often raised the village’s aesthetic values. Andrew Sellon, a retired 
Police Officer who claimed to be the village’s ‘oldest living resident’, remembered liking 
the staged development of the hamlets: 
…the two or three different clumps that they had started on, and each one was different, 
and I thought yes this had something to it, I liked it.103 
Andrew Johnson, a retired road planner for East Suffolk County Council, highlighted the 
regional style and contrasted the village with the planned town of Milton Keynes: 
…the architects to their credit and indeed the planning authority to their credit, I think 
have driven a good variety of properties rather than having picked up a house and put it 
at Milton Keynes or wherever you want sort of thing! … it shows a real willingness to 
experiment … the use of local architects as well which I think was nice as well you, get 
a Suffolk-feel if you like, the various designs, different pitches on the roof, different 
colours everywhere.104 
Beverley Johnson, married to Andrew, who worked for various firms involved in the 
development, also praised the ‘mix of houses’ and ‘wonderful village green’ compared to 
‘your typical new housing estate, built pretty uniformly’.105 Jeanette Higgins, who lived 
on Martlesham Heath as well as working at the research centre, recalls that she ‘did like 
this idea of it being a village’, naming the village green, church, pub, community hall and 
Scouts’ Nissen hut as some of the ‘so many things I would associate with a village’.106 
Thomas O’Brien, married to Sheila O’Brien, who also worked at the research centre and 
lived in the village, thought the village ideal ‘was a good concept, a good idea’, but noted 
                                                 
102 Aldous, ‘Controlled Chaos Proves a Winner’. 
103 Sellon, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
104 Andrew Johnson, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 14 July 2016. 
105 Beverley Johnson, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath, interview by Jacob Ward, 14 July 2016. 
106 Higgins, Oral Histories of Martlesham Heath. 
96 
 
that it had died off recently, ‘I’m a bit disappointed they don’t still use the word, I think 
they should still use the word Martlesham Heath village’.107 
 However, several residents recognised the deeply artificial nature of the ‘village’. 
Andrew Sellon believes that ‘one has to call it an estate, such as it is, other people try and 
pretend it’s not’,108 and Andrew Johnson takes a similar view: 
I’ve never really seen it as a new village I must admit … if you consider it to be a village 
in the true Suffolk style then no, it isn’t, and it never will be, because it’s not been 
developed along traditional lines.109 
Beverley agrees, although also recalls having to defend the village from comparisons with 
‘Legoland’: 
If I’m honest, it’s a housing estate, but it’s more than a housing estate … it definitely is a 
community, but it’s not one’s idea of a traditional rural village … people would ask where 
you lived and you would say Martlesham Heath, “…Oh, Legoland”.110 
 Another aspect of the village’s identity which appeared in oral histories was the 
relationship between the village and the research centre, as well as Suffolk Police 
Headquarters, also sited near the village. Andrew and Beverley Johnson both expressed 
irritation with how it was perceived as an extension of the research centre: 
…once people heard you’d moved onto the estate, onto the village … people who you 
got into conversation with in various places, “Oh, you work for BT or the police do you?”, 
“Well no, actually, I don’t”, … it rankled a bit to think that just because you lived on 
Martlesham Heath, to think that you worked for BT.111 
 
…it was kind of like, “Oh you live on Martlesham Heath, you must be very well off and 
you must work for BT”, which wasn’t actually the case … it was kind of thought that it 
was all BT and police officers that were living up here, which wasn’t the case at all.112 
Martlesham Heath’s place-identity as a dialogue between the new village and the research 
centre would continue with the transformation of the research centre into a science park 
after BT’s privatisation. 
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Science Parks and History in the Making 
 
The liberalisation of the telephone monopoly and the privatisation of British Telecom 
affected both the research centre and the new village and, as I will show, were also 
implicated in new historicisations of Martlesham Heath’s place-identity. 
 Liberalisation and privatisation meant that the research centre, renamed BT 
Research Laboratory in 1981, became more oriented towards business markets and 
commercialising research. In 1981, Lazard Bros, the financial advisers, proposed a 
subsidiary called ‘Martlesham Enterprises’ to BT’s board.113 Martlesham Enterprises, 
which was founded in 1982, was set up to sponsor and secure financing for spin-off 
projects emerging from research which were peripheral or irrelevant to the telephone 
network, but still commercially viable.114 The Thatcher government’s emphasis on 
‘sunrise’ IT industries, small enterprise, and innovation, particularly influenced the 
proposal, which was a common strategy in the 1980s and 1990s: BP and ICI founded 
similar subsidiaries called BP Ventures and Marlborough Technical Development 
respectively.115 Another 1980s industrial strategy, interlinked with the IT booster-ism of 
the Thatcher government, was the ‘science park’: special-purpose clusters of industrial 
and academic research centres. Indeed, their early 1980s popularity was significant 
enough that the Financial Times ran a special section on science parks in 1983, and 
referred to Silicon Valley as a prime example, noting that it had evolved from Stanford 
University’s research campus.116 Again, the links between post-war universities and 
research sites inspired new spatial forms, but it would not be until the late 1990s that BT 
drew on the science park concept. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Martlesham Heath became a site for 
collaborative commercialisation of research. BT started open days, called ‘Innovations at 
Martlesham’, to showcase research to bankers and financiers from the City in order to 
garner investors, which Chris Wheddon recalls: 
We wanted to get investment analysts up from London … I enjoyed the look of 
wonderment that came over their faces and confusion, and some of them were sharp lads, 
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very, very sharp, they asked very penetrating questions which we could answer … we 
were showing the people that were, if you like, going to buy BT.117 
BT Labs also began to offer consultancy services where research staff would consult for 
other companies on research and development, which Allen Snow participated in during 
the 1980s: 
…people would ask for expertise, for experts to come out and offer a consultancy service 
and I was on that list, and we would go and go through what they required, or bring them 
in to our facilities and show them what we’ve done … what we had developed over the 
years, could save them months of evaluation or trial and error so we could go straight in 
and help them.118 
 BT also embarked on various collaborative ventures and contractor arrangements 
with companies from across the world, including DuPont, Corning, Mahindra, and 
AT&T, which were a recurring proud memory for those who worked at BT Labs. BT’s 
collaborative venture with DuPont, BT&D, which Ray Hooper worked for, was set up in 
1986 to manufacture optoelectronic components for fibre-optic communications.119 Ray 
Hooper attributed its formation to privatisation, suggesting that collaboration improved 
R&D commercialisation: 
One of the big problems I think with R&D there was, there had been no way to 
commercialise other than go through Plessey or STC or the other guys, there was no direct 
route, it was a bit indirect, so what privatisation made possible was the idea of joint 
ventures, and BT did this a lot back then.120 
BT also set up a joint venture, Tech Mahindra, in 1986 with the Indian conglomerate 
Mahindra & Mahindra to provide technology outsourcing, and this was co-located at BT 
Labs.121 Chris Wheddon, during his time as Director of Systems Engineering at BT in the 
1990s recalls: 
In the end, I had nearly six thousand BT staff, I had a thousand contractors that we had, 
that we, contractors mostly from India, they were from a company called Mahindra, so 
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they were called Mahindrans, and I had staff in, I had about three thousand at 
Martlesham.122 
In 1998, BT formed a $10b joint venture, Concert, with AT&T to provide network 
management services, which Colin Whitlum worked for, remembering that ‘we managed 
networks from across the globe from this one console, it was an amazing feat’ and that 
‘in some cases we pulled some tigers out of hats, really amazing things’.123 In 2000, BT 
also formed a collaborative research partnership with Corning, the American glass 
manufacturer, which acquired BT’s photonics lab as part of the deal.124 
 This spatial co-location of BT’s various partners in and around Martlesham Heath 
was, in 1999, distilled into a new spatial form: Adastral Park, a science park. The 
renaming of BT Labs as Adastral Park was part of BT’s broader aim to turn the site into 
a high-tech hub.125 Adastral sited BT’s technology and research partnerships, mentioned 
above, but also housed subsidiaries and spin-offs, such as Ignite, an e-business and 
communications solutions subsidiary; Napoleon, a joint venture with the private equity 
firm 3i to provide network management software; and Quip!, a web-based international 
phone call provider.126 In 2000, BT set up a technology incubator, Brightstar, extending 
the Martlesham Enterprises concept by taking minority stakes in companies and in turn 
providing on-site accommodation, management services and advice.127 BT also set up the 
East Anglia High Tech Corridor in partnership with Vision Park, Cambridge, and based 
a subsidiary, Internet Designers, which provided internet, IP, and multimedia support 
services to BT, at Vision Park.128 At present, Adastral Park houses a large number of 
companies, including 3M, Cisco, Intel, and Huawei.129 This last company is particularly 
interesting given the criticisms, made in 2013 by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security 
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Committee, of BT’s decision to award critical infrastructure contracts to Huawei, who are 
seen as a possible security risk given rumoured associations with the Chinese 
government; elsewhere, Huawei has been excluded from involvement in Australia’s 
National Broadband Network and is banned from bidding for US government 
contracts.130 
Whilst Adastral Park is a new spatial form for Martlesham Heath, it also clearly 
has historical roots. Adastral Park is often described as a ‘science campus’,131 echoing the 
‘university atmosphere’ of the original Post Office Research Centre. This raises the 
question: how have these new spatial constructs on Martlesham Heath been tied to 
changing temporal expressions? 
 The formation of Adastral Park surfaced a temporalisation process which had 
begun with the Research Department’s relocation and continues to the present: the 
historicisation of Martlesham Heath as an innovative place, and the convergence of place-
identity between the research centre and the new village. In 1967, a Post Office report on 
relocation entitled ‘Martlesham Heath: Home of Experimental Units’ covered the heath’s 
prior history as an aviation experimental unit from World War I.132 In January 1917, the 
Experimental Flying Section of the Royal Flying Corps’ Central Flying School moved to 
Martlesham Heath, and the site remained an experimental aviation site until World War 
II, at which point the RAF used it as a forward base until 1943, when it was loaned to the 
USAF. After World War II, it housed the Bomb Ballistic and Blind Landings Unit until 
1961, when it was put onto care and maintenance status, finally closing in 1964, and the 
land reverted to the Bradford Property Trust. BT reiterated this experimental history in 
1999 when it created Adastral Park: in a loose chronology of the relocation from Dollis 
Hill, BT celebrated 1999 as ‘30 years of BT research’ at Martlesham Heath to inaugurate 
the creation of Adastral Park, but this was positioned within a longer lineage of 
research.133 An internal BT magazine described how RAF pilots had flown ‘research 
missions’ from Martlesham Heath, narrating that ‘in those days, pilots like Sir Douglas 
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Bader could be seen testing the latest Spitfires to destruction’.134 The relocation of the 
Post Office, readers were told, meant that Martlesham Heath ‘once again became a focus 
for leading-edge technologies, with Spitfires being replaced by circular waveguides and 
optical fibres’.135 Tellingly, this publicity celebrated the establishment of Adastral Park 
as ‘history in the making’.136 
 This WWII heritage has become prominent in the historicisation of Martlesham 
Heath. The initial move to Martlesham Heath was, in the thirty-year ‘anniversary’, 
described as an ‘expeditionary force’, and Martlesham Heath’s role in allied bombing 
raids was played up.137 The name ‘Adastral Park’ is itself a deliberate reference to the 
RAF, referencing the force’s motto ‘Per Ardua Ad Astra’, which translates as ‘through 
adversity to the stars’.138 Adastral Park has subsequently become the locus for further 
invocations of WWII heritage as it now also houses the Tommy Flowers Institute, a 
reference to the Research Department’s role in WWII codebreaking at Bletchley Park.139 
I cover this subject in more detail in the next chapter, but for now a brief sketch will 
suffice: in WWII, Post Office Research engineer Tommy Flowers, along with other Dollis 
Hill engineers, played a significant role at the Government Code & Cypher School at 
Bletchley Park, building the codebreaking machine Colossus and working with Alan 
Turing. The opening of the Tommy Flowers Institute at Adastral thus ties the site to 
Bletchley Park’s codebreaking efforts. The institute aims to foster collaboration between 
the ICT industry and academia in the UK; there is an irony here in that, as I argue in the 
next chapter, Flowers, as a working-class engineer with no higher education, felt 
marginalised by his academic Bletchley Park colleagues Alan Turing and Max Newman. 
The Tommy Flowers Institute, with its emphasis on academia, is thus a highly selective 
invocation of the past. 
 The historicisation of innovation at Martlesham Heath continues to the present 
and has converged with the place-identity of the new village. Martlesham Heath village 
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has celebrated 2017 as ‘MH100’, an anniversary of 100 years of innovation on the heath, 
sponsored by, amongst others, BT.140 MH100 was celebrated through a weekend fete 
from 8th-9th July on the village green, by which is a pub called The Douglas Bader, and 
attractions included full-size Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft; vintage military vehicles; 
historical re-enactments, including a Winston Churchill actor and impersonator;  
representatives from the RAF and USAF; WWII songs and jive dancers; and a Battle of 
Britain memorial fly-by.141 The event’s website summarises that ‘The story of 
Martlesham Heath is one of innovation, research and development, initially for aviation 
and more recently for telecommunications and IT. The Martlesham Heath “new village” 
itself was an innovative approach to building new housing’.142 
The telephone business’s research activity, which itself drew on a prior history of 
aviation research to cement its own innovative research identity, has thus hugely shaped 
Martlesham Heath, as a ‘place’, a crystallisation of time and space. Here, the construction 
of place has required the construction of history. This might also be seen in the origination 
of this PhD, along with two others, from a joint Science Museum/BT Archives research 
proposal to investigate Post Office/BT R&D; this proposal took a decidedly place-
oriented approach to the subject, conceiving of R&D as a place – Dollis Hill first, then 
Martlesham Heath – rather than, as I show in this chapter and through this thesis, in 
multiple sites, including Dollis Hill, Martlesham Heath, London, Cambridge, Goonhilly 
Satellite Earth Station, and the Castleton, Backwell, and Banbury Radio Research 
Outstations. The plaque above Dollis Hill and Martlesham Heath’s entrances read 
‘Research is the Door to Tomorrow’, but research at the Post Office and BT has, in many 
ways, also served as a ‘door to yesterday’. 
 The place of history, heritage and tradition in twentieth-century Britain has been 
extensively addressed. Patrick Wright and Raphael Samuel both explore articulations of 
the past in everyday life, and so are helpful in identifying how Martlesham Heath village 
has contributed to the historicisation of place-identity.143 Samuel highlights architecture 
as a feature of everyday experience which can reinforce senses of temporality; thus, he 
casts neo-vernacular architecture, as found at Martlesham Heath, as a ‘dreamscape’ for 
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an old English palette.144 Samuel also draws attention to manifestations of the historicist 
turn in communal everyday life, such as village green revivals, traditional pubs, historical 
performance and re-enactment, all of which featured at Martlesham Heath and MH100.145 
Just because MH100 was a once-off festival does not marginalise it as an example of 
everyday historicisation: as Wright points out, everyday life is not just about the mundane, 
repeated experience of every day, but is also marked by the special occasions which 
feature in everyday life, and these occasions can be particularly powerful enforcers of the 
past.146 David Lowenthal and Robert Hewison have both addressed the historicist turn as 
well, in somewhat more critical terms, but in ways which I think are helpful for 
understanding Martlesham Heath. Both argue that the past is invoked as a response to 
severe change, but if I frame this as ‘upheaval’, it helps to highlight that the gradual turn 
to the past in Martlesham Heath has accompanied various forms of spatial upheaval: the 
research centre’s relocation, the new village’s creation, BT’s privatisation, industrial, 
high-tech co-location, and, as I shall soon show, new, part-time workers as well.147 All 
these upheavals became entangled with invocations of the past. 
 However, it is also clear from staff’s and resident’s experiences that these 
changing time-space expressions were not universal. In 1991, research staff experienced 
BT’s Project Sovereign, a restructuring and cost-cutting effort which also brought new 
flexible working practices to Martlesham Heath.148 Sovereign’s intention was to cut 
10,000 jobs a year through redundancy drives and early release schemes, which featured 
heavily in staff’s memories. Allen Snow remembers it as ‘not a very nice time’ and recalls 
a colleague whose ‘division were told that they had to lose twenty-two people, so that 
head of division went down, found a group with twenty-two people in, went, “Right, I’ll 
close that”, with no regard to business operational needs, so Sovereign did cause a few 
upsets’.149 This story was repeated by Colin Whitlum, who also recalled that Sovereign 
was sold by BT as the ‘kind release package’: 
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…well that “kind release package” turned out to be a Level Five walking in and saying, 
“We’ve got to lose thirty-two people, this section has thirty-two people in it, goodbye”. 
So we had a month to, I had to find another job or leave.150 
Jeanette Higgins remembers that ‘it made me think well, perhaps I haven’t got a job for 
life here’,151 whilst Sheila O’Brien recalls the scheme as a lengthy process: ‘I didn’t know 
much about it except that I was on the receiving end … they offered their early release 
schemes, which went on for years, probably still doing them’.152 Thomas O’Brien also 
took an early release package, which brought its own difficulties: 
…when I was 48, I could see that these offers were coming to an end, retirement at 50, 
so I took it, took it two years early because they were coming to an end, so I always 
expected to just follow on and be a telecoms engineer, but nothing ever came up, you 
know, I reached this age barrier and couldn’t seem to find anywhere, and I ended up 
working for, doing jobs like working in Argos at Christmas and Marks & Spencers at 
Christmas, and I got a job for a while at Nationwide which I wasn’t really being paid a 
lot, I was behind the counter and then I got a job back at BT testing some internet sites, 
that lasted six months, and then later on I managed to get a job at Bayer, testing urine 
analysis machines, and then that was the last, which I won an award, I was pleased about 
so for that, but then nothing ever came up that, and decided, since Sheila was working, 
just to be a house husband really, so been doing bird watching and going out and about, 
looking after the home, looking after the family, helping my son do his degree, I think 
that was my biggest achievement since I left BT, my son was really struggling with his 
software degree, but he got through that, so I was pleased about that.153 
 Many staff, like Thomas, also found themselves back at BT at various points as 
the flexible working practices which Sovereign introduced meant that they were re-hired 
as contractors and consultants. Allen Snow went back as a consultant, as did Colin 
Whitlum, who, after retiring and going on holiday with his wife, returned to ‘a letter 
asking me if I’d go back for 8 weeks’ but then ‘I stayed for 11 and half years in various 
roles in the company’.154 Colin remembered how working as a contractor was 
characterised by other flexible working practices: 
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…what they said to me was, as long as you keep your contract going, wherever you’re 
working, you keep that contract, your name on that contract, you’ll get back every time. 
Soon as you drop off, you won’t get back … so what they did for me, when I wanted to 
on a sabbatical for three months was they gave me a three-month zero hours contract, 
alright? So I love ‘em!155 
Sheila O’Brien, Jeanette Higgins, and Ray Hooper all worked as contractors too: Sheila 
at BT&D, Corning, and Huawei;156 Jeanette at a joint venture between Accenture and BT, 
which she remembers as ‘a lovely way to finish off my working life’;157 and Ray opened 
his own consultancy after contracting for BT: 
So in 1999 … I decided to take voluntary redundancy … I did actually work back at BT 
for a period in various other, much of it was to do with fibre and particularly the challenge 
of fibre to the home, and then more recently then I expanded my kind of work into other 
companies which I did some consultancy, various consultancy jobs, again a lot of it 
around optical fibre communications, particularly in the local network.158 
 The flexible working practices at Adastral Park also influenced Martlesham Heath 
new village. A block of flats was built in the village centre during the 1990s, which 
Beverley Johnson attributes to the contractor culture at BT: 
There were, by then BT were employing a lot of guys and ladies on short term contracts, 
and people were looking for six-month rentals or whatever, and how easy was it just to 
rent a flat across the road and you’re on the doorstep for work … I thought, “Oh I kind 
of wish they hadn’t done that”, but I get why and once they were built I thought, “Well, 
the design is not that bad actually”.159 
Andrew Johnson similarly believes that ‘these days, of course it’s not quite the same, 
because they employ a lot of contract labour and short term contracts’.160 Further 
significant changes may be coming to Martlesham Heath as well; in 2008 and 2009, BT 
submitted planning applications to build 2,000 homes south-east of Adastral Park.161 
Suffolk Council rejected these plans, but another project proposal for 450 homes is 
underway and a group, ‘No Adastral New Town’, with ties to the Martlesham Heath 
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householders’ association, has formed to resist the development.162 Martlesham Heath 
may by now be an established place, but its spatial and temporal transformations are 
evidently still ongoing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I think it is no surprise that a laboratory has been at the centre of so many diverse 
transitions. The mutual significance of laboratory and place has already been thoroughly 
explored: as Cahan and Agar show respectively, the history of the Physikalische-
Technische-Reichsanstalt cannot be told without the history of urbanising early-
twentieth-century Charlottenburg, and the history of Jodrell Bank cannot be told apart 
from the history of suburbanising post-war Manchester.163 However, as I have shown in 
the history of Martlesham Heath’s relationship with governmental strategies of spatial 
restructuring, private postmodern residential developments, and new spatial strategies for 
innovation and enterprise, it is also clear that these histories of laboratories and place 
speak to broader scales of change. The changes in post-war Britain – the Flemming 
Report, the new universities, 1980s ‘sunrise’ IT and enterprise – were crucial in shaping 
the Post Office and BT’s goals and strategies. There is another useful way to consider 
Martlesham Heath’s spatiality here: Harvey points out that, contradictorily, many fixed 
spaces – airports, railways, motorways – result from the societal drive to reduce spatial 
barriers.164 Crucially, these places, as fixings of time and space, can be poorly suited to 
macro-contextual transitions, and hence the forms of spatial restructuring and aesthetic 
movements which accompany these places are particularly valuable in surfacing new 
shapes of society. This chapter adds laboratories to Harvey’s list, and, in showing how 
Martlesham Heath leveraged various trends and transitions, also speaks well to this thesis’ 
organising concepts of information and control. 
 Information as a concept was not explicitly visible in Martlesham Heath, but 
science parks have often been subordinated to broader information age theories, such as 
Peter Hall and Manuel Castells’ account of 21st century ‘technopoles’, or, indeed, 
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Castells’ ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless time’.165 Castells’ analysis clearly resonates with 
phenomena experienced at Martlesham Heath: the contradictory spatial co-location of 
strategic alliances and joint ventures to manage global networks, and the disruptive 
temporality of coercive early retirement packages and instant villages, combined with 
deepening historicity, are classic features of Castells’ space of flows and timeless time. 
However, I think the history of Martlesham Heath also shows how Castells overstates the 
differences between spaces of places and spaces of flows, and between timeless time and 
fragmented time. These spaces and times are much blurrier and less revolutionary than 
Castells suggests: Martlesham Heath is undoubtedly a place, in that clear visions of its 
space, as a new village and science park, and time, as an historically innovative site, have 
become crystallised, and so ‘place’ cannot be so easily disentangled from ‘flow’. 
Moreover, the temporality of ‘timeless time’ seems no less fragmented, between the 
contrasting experiences of traditional Englishness in the new village and the experiences 
of Project Sovereign by research centre staff. 
 The question therefore remains that, if no information revolution occurred in time-
space expressions and experiences at Martlesham Heath, is there any value in the 
‘information’ concept? Following Frank Webster’s call to analyse the ‘informatisation’ 
of historical continuities, I think there has been informatisation on Martlesham Heath.166 
This has taken place both on the research site, in the establishment of ICT-based ventures, 
spin-offs, and incubators to provide consultancy, management, and network services, and 
in the village, from the early visions of a modern, monorailed village and the physical 
lobbying of county planners, to a postmodern new village built on invisible television 
circuits and web-based linkages like MH100.org and noadastralnewtown.com. However, 
it is also apparent that these have been bound up in broader transitions from public 
ownership – of the telephone business and housing developments – to private enterprise, 
and so these linkages have not just been informatised, but commercialised also. 
Control is far more visible on Martlesham Heath, despite the attempts of 
Christopher Parker’s incoherent instant village. Giddens’ conception of time-space and 
the organisation are helpful here: through the systems of time-space control in the 
research centre, from parking spaces to part-time contractors and zero-hours contracts, 
and through the growing generation of historicity since the relocation, the Post Office and 
BT used their research centre to support organisational reproduction. However, Giddens’ 
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attention to the organisational locale also insufficiently captures the spatial extensiveness 
of Martlesham Heath, from the co-location of other organisations in the science park, to 
the ‘controlled chaos’ of Martlesham Heath village. Parker, Clifford Culpin, and the 
Bradford Property Trust extensively planned and controlled this village, and the Post 
Office similarly embedded the research centre within systems of environmental control. 
Both sites also deployed organisational frameworks for control: in the new village, the 
householders’ association and covenants preserved aesthetic control; on the research site, 
Project Sovereign introduced new ways to control working practices. This may explain 
the recurrence of control – although not always explicitly – in oral histories with staff and 
residents. Staff’s and residents’ experiences and memories speak to the shifting identities 
and practices at the research centre, the new village, and Martlesham Heath, and how 
these practices impacted on their own lives. Some residents rankled at the imposition of 
the ‘village’ name on the new development, but many also appreciated the householders’ 
association and covenants. Staff differentiated hierarchical working practices at Dollis 
Hill from Martlesham Heath, but also brought up Project Sovereign, highlighting that, 
whilst relations may have been informatised, and some novel forms of control appeared, 
there are nevertheless important continuities of control which remain. 
Another significant aspect of control which this chapter has addressed is the 
changing strategies of control over R&D and innovation. The corporate laboratory, which 
Michael Aaron Dennis has cast as an expression of the vertical integration of research, 
and which Graeme Gooday has interpreted as a reification of broader industrial attitudes 
to the relationship between research and engineering, is no longer the distinguishing 
feature of Martlesham Heath.167 Adastral Park replaced the corporate lab, and BT began 
to advance R&D strategy through collaborative ventures which are spatially bipolar: in 
one instance, these take place on a ‘science campus’ in Suffolk, and yet in another they 
virtually span the globe. Innovation in this model is not about the linear flow of basic 
research into new technologies, but instead horizontal collaboration on advanced 
development and commercial products. 
Of course, R&D was not the only important object of control for the Post Office 
and British Telecom, and, whilst Martlesham Heath was an important passage-point for 
exerting control over a diverse array of targets, it was not the only register of control 
which the telephone business deployed during this period. As I addressed in the previous 
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chapter, machine control in the telephone network was a pressing issue during the 1950s 
and, as I will address in my next chapter, computerisation in the telephone network 
continued to be an important subject into the 1980s. 
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5 The Universal Machine 
Integrating Computers and Communications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I opened this thesis with James Merriman’s, the Post Office’s Engineer-in-Chief, 
argument that ‘the concepts of information and control are fundamental to any 
telecommunications system’.1 In this chapter, I return to that quote to explore why 
Merriman articulated this vision in that specific manner at that particular time, and situate 
it within the telephone system’s computerisation and digitalisation. This chapter explores 
both the concept of system ‘control’, via computerisation, and the origins of a holistic 
plan for an ‘information’ network. 
 Computer control in telecommunications is heavily entangled with telephone 
exchanges, which became computerised in the post-war period; a brief history of 
telephone exchanges is thus necessary. Telephone exchanges route, or ‘switch’, telephone 
calls from caller to recipient. At first, this traffic was switched by human operators, who 
received a call at the exchange, identified the caller’s destination, and physically 
connected the appropriate telephone circuits using a switchboard. Telephone operators 
were eventually phased out by mechanical exchanges which could automatically switch 
traffic, and then, after World War II, electronic switches entered development. Electronic 
switches were followed by the development of computer-controlled exchanges, where a 
computer would interpret the dialled number and switch the call along the appropriate 
telephone circuits. Two of the Post Office’s biggest post-war projects were electronic and 
computerised exchanges: the first, Highgate Wood, was planned as Britain’s first all-
electronic telephone exchange, but failed, whilst the second, System X, became Britain’s 
first all-digital, fully-computerised telephone exchange, but only after protracted and 
problematic development. 
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However, it would be misleading to see this as evidence of British technological 
failure. As Michael Kay points out on the early history of British exchange development, 
there has persisted a narrative that early British telephony was underdeveloped, but Kay 
shows that this was a complex period that did not involve simple engineering ‘failures’, 
but the interests of multiple stakeholders.2 Likewise, in this chapter, I show that delays to 
exchange development and implementation were not solely due to technical failures 
(although these did occur), but rather due to competing ideas about the future of the 
British telephone system and the interests of various parties within and outside the Post 
Office. Another argument I develop in this chapter is that, beyond exchange 
computerisation, computer modelling was also important in shaping the development of 
British telephone exchanges: one way in which the telephone system exerted computer 
control was by using modelling to identify which exchanges it wanted to rollout across 
the network. Modelling as a form of control is a recurring theme in this thesis, appearing 
in this chapter, the next, and in Chapter Six. 
 I explore these subjects through several sections. In the first section, ‘Tommy 
Flowers, Colossus, and Highgate Wood’, I explore the development of Highgate Wood 
and relate its troubled history to the notion of ‘prestige’, which was a key motivator for 
many of the parties involved in its development. In the second section, ‘Integrating 
Cybernetics and the Government Machine’, I relate Merriman’s philosophy of 
‘information and control’ to two influences: information theory and cybernetics on one 
hand, and Merriman’s background as an influential expert mechaniser in Treasury O&M 
on the other. I argue that these influences, which produced the ‘information and control’ 
discourse, resulted in the belief that the telephone system should not only be fully 
computerised, but fully integrated, by transmitting video and data alongside telephony. 
This was the origin of the telephone network as an integrated information network 
controlled by computers, and I trace these ideas through the remainder of this chapter and 
through following chapters. In the third section, ‘A Model of Discretion’, I explore the 
use of computer modelling to plan network modernisation in the 1970s, and relate the 
Post Office’s model to a government tradition of ‘discreet’ computing. Finally, in the 
fourth section, ‘System X and Integrated Digital Networks’, I explore the reification of 
‘information and control’ in two different systems: System X, an ‘evolutionary’ 
computerised telephone exchange system, and the integrated services digital network, a 
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standard for providing multiple signals – telephony and data – over the 
telecommunications system. I relate these systems, with the creation of BT and 
liberalisation of the monopoly, to changing attitudes to automation, unemployment, and 
BT’s customers. 
 
Tommy Flowers, Colossus, and the Prestige of Highgate Wood 
 
The Post Office’s first electronic exchange, located at Highgate Wood in North London, 
started formal development in 1956 with the formation of the Joint Electronic Research 
Committee (JERC), set up to coordinate research between the GPO and its suppliers – 
Siemens, ATE, Ericsson, GEC, and STC.3 However, to understand Highgate Wood and 
its failure, it is necessary to first explore switching development in the aftermath of World 
War II. 
The predominant form of switching used in the United Kingdom during the first 
half of the twentieth century was the mechanical Strowger telephone exchange, first 
patented in the USA by Almon Strowger in 1889.4 Strowger applied to patent his system 
in the UK in 1892 and 20 years later, in 1912 – the same year the Post Office absorbed 
the NTC – Strowger entered service in the Epsom telephone exchange, becoming a 
mainstay of Post Office automatic switching.5 
However, by the end of WWII, there was a clear need to upgrade Strowger, which 
was large and unreliable. After World War II, a delegation including Tommy Flowers, 
Post Office switching engineer and creator of the World War II codebreaking machine 
Colossus, visited the United States to report on a new version of the Crossbar exchange, 
an electromechanical alternative to Strowger.6 The report found that Crossbar had higher 
accommodation and power requirements, but provided superior service, whilst costing 
fractionally more and having similar maintenance costs; the main disadvantages found 
were its high cost and much higher number of relays compared to Strowger. However, 
the report concluded that Crossbar provided superior service, was more adaptable, and 
could flexibly serve many locations, from small rural switching to metropolitan and trunk 
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switching.7 The mixed conclusions on Crossbar are perhaps indicative of the reported 
conflict between the two lead engineers on the trip – Flowers, who supported moving 
straight to fully electronic development, and Donovan Barron, later an Engineer-in-Chief 
of the Post Office, who advocated Crossbar switching with elements of electronic 
control.8 Flowers won out, persuading the Controller of Research, Gordon Radley, that 
all development should be focussed on designing a fully electronic telephone exchange. 
 Flowers’ position on electronic switching, and his success in convincing Radley, 
originates in Flowers’ pre-war switching research and his wartime work on Colossus, the 
codebreaking machine developed for use at Bletchley Park, the Government Code and 
Cypher School. Rachel Boon has pointed out that Flowers had developed an experimental 
electronic installation by 1934, which was accepted and used on a highly limited basis by 
the Post Office from 1939.9 However, the war interrupted and Flowers was approached 
in 1941 by Radley to undertake work for Bletchley Park, at which point Radley and 
Flowers became the first Dollis Hill engineers initiated into Bletchley Park.10 Flowers’ 
initial work was on a special-purpose electromechanical device for Alan Turing’s 
codebreaking team, but after that project was scrapped, Flowers proposed Colossus, a 
large, electronic machine to process intercepted German messages, which, upon 
completion, was an immediate success, doubling the codebreakers’ output. 
Colossus has been the subject of attempts to cast it as the first electronic 
computer;11 however, I will argue that Colossus is best understood as the product of 
Flowers’ background and interest in electronic telephone exchanges, rather than 
electronic computing. This requires making three arguments: first, that Colossus, a digital 
electronic codebreaking ‘computer’, was seen by Flowers and his staff as more akin to an 
electronic switching device; second, that support for the Highgate Wood electronic 
exchange project was secured through invocations of Flowers’ and Dollis Hill’s wartime 
work with Bletchley Park; third, that Flowers’ feelings about Colossus’ secrecy, and his 
inability to capitalise professionally on Colossus compared to his Bletchley Park 
colleagues Alan Turing and Max Newman, was fundamental to his post-war research. I 
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will suggest that Flowers’ pursuit of electronic switching after the war was an attempt to 
recapture his technical and professional breakthroughs which had remained secret with 
Colossus. 
Flowers and others at Dollis Hill thought of Colossus as more akin to a switching 
system rather than a modern computer. Flowers, in his retrospective explanations of 
Colossus, generally describes the machine in switching terms, rather than computing, 
such as an ‘automatic number processor’, and making direct comparisons between 
Colossus and early electronic switching systems based on their uses of thermionic 
valves.12 Harry Fensom, a Post Office engineer who worked on Flowers’ Colossus team, 
describes that many of the principles informing Colossus came from automatic telephone 
exchanges and switching, such as the use of ‘routiners’, which ran overnight ‘programs’ 
of electrical and logical tests on telephone switches; counters, to record the number of 
telephone dial pulses; logic functions, to detect when calls had been answered; and 
directors, which detected exchange codes in dialled phone numbers and translated them 
into a sequence of exchanges through which to route the call.13 Colossus drew on all these 
principles: it used electronic switches in the form of thermionic valves; its master control, 
which included a counter to identify unique messages, was analogous to a director, and, 
of course, the machine could be configured to run though different routines, or programs, 
based on logical tests. 
Flowers’ pursuit of electronic switching after World War II was strongly backed 
by Radley, who later became Engineer-in-Chief and Director-General of the Post Office, 
and this support can be traced to their Bletchley Park history. When Flowers first 
proposed Colossus to Bletchley Park, it was not received especially well. It was thought 
that it would be too unreliable and that the war would be over before it was ready. 
However, Flowers was granted license to pursue the project independently at Dollis Hill, 
based on, according to Harry Fensom and Jack Copeland, Flowers and Colossus’ 
historian, the ‘complete backing’ of Gordon Radley.14 These accounts are perhaps 
exaggerated, appearing in a volume on Colossus as the world’s first electronic computer, 
but they show that Radley’s support of Highgate Wood has a longer history from his 
support of Flowers and Colossus. This support continued after the war: in justifying 
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Highgate Wood to Ernest Marples, the Postmaster-General, in 1957, Radley linked the 
new electronic exchange to Dollis Hill’s wartime work, also invoking similar research on 
computers to support its viability.15 According to Roy Harris, a member of Flowers’ post-
war switching team, and later the designer of System X, Radley always came down on 
Flowers’ side in decisions on electronic exchange development.16 Radley’s support shows 
how Colossus’ later significance lay not in computing, but in supporting electronic 
exchange development. 
Flowers was particularly bitter about Colossus’ secrecy and his inability to use the 
prestige gained from its creation. Flowers watched on as his Bletchley Park colleagues, 
Alan Turing and Max Newman, built off the principles of electronic code-breaking to 
develop computers, whilst he had ‘no power or opportunity to use the knowledge 
effectively. With no administrative or executive powers, I had to convince others, and 
they would not be convinced. I was one-eyed in the kingdom of the blind’.17 Flowers 
attributed delays on Highgate Wood to his lack of ‘prestige, which knowledge of Colossus 
would amply have provided’.18 Flowers is disingenuous here: as I have already shown, 
his prestige with Gordon Radley was instrumental in earning Radley’s support post-war 
and furthermore, there were many factors contributing to Highgate Wood’s delays, which 
I address below. 
However, it is telling that Flowers highlights prestige as ‘the one thing’ he lacked, 
and which Turing and Newman could build on.19 This had consequences for Flowers’ and 
Turing’s relations after the war, when Turing worked on a computer project, ACE, for 
the National Physical Laboratory (NPL), and commissioned Flowers to undertake 
development work for ACE. ACE, Automatic Computing Engine, would be a stored-
program control (SPC) general-purpose computer used for laboratory calculations, but 
suffered numerous problems in its development, including Turing’s departure from the 
NPL, and lost out as the first SPC digital electronic computer to the ‘Manchester Baby’, 
built at the University of Manchester. Flowers’ sluggish attention had delayed ACE: 
Flowers had told Turing that an early version of ACE would be ready by August or 
September 1946, but in fact neglected the project, saying that his section was ‘too busy 
to do other people’s work’, and instead focussed on updating the oversubscribed post-war 
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telephone network.20 In effect, Flowers neglected Turing’s work on electronic computing 
for his own work on electronic switching; he was not interested in developing a SPC 
general-purpose computer, but instead fixated on repeating a previous feat: developing 
an electronic special-purpose switching machine. 
From 1947, a small team under Flowers worked on developing Highgate Wood’s 
basic principles: pulse amplitude modulation (PAM), which encoded telephone signals as 
pulsed samples, and time-division multiplexing (TDM), which transmitted signals by 
rapidly cycling through pulsed samples; combined, these electronic techniques meant that 
a single telephone circuit could simultaneously carry multiple signals and an electronic 
exchange could switch multiple signals without mechanically moving the circuit.21 
However, development on the Highgate Wood exchange was slow. Assistance 
was solicited from the Post Office’s suppliers, but their concerns about patent exploitation 
meant that in 1952, they turned down a proposal which had been the outcome of lengthy 
discussions with the National Research and Development Corporation, the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury.22 Protracted discussions continued until 
1956, at which point Gordon Radley, by this point Director-General, told the suppliers 
that unless they agreed, the Post Office would choose one of them as its main 
development and manufacturing partner. The suppliers quickly fell into line and on 15th 
May 1956 the Joint Electronic Research Agreement (JERA) was signed by the Post Office 
and its five suppliers, laying out the terms for pooling research, staff, and development 
tasks.23 These protracted negotiations require reappraisal of Flowers’ belief that his lack 
of prestige delayed switching development. In fact, Flowers and his team worked mainly 
undisturbed on switching principles, and it was only during the 1950s that delays, initially 
caused by manufacturer negotiations, began to occur. These tensions between 
collaborative research and competitive procurement were not unique to this period, and 
would continue to shape electronic exchange development in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The motivation of ‘national prestige’ drove the development of Highgate Wood 
in the face of significant issues, which had raised concerns for the Postmaster-General, 
Ernest Marples.24 Since Flowers and Barron’s 1947 visit, Bell Labs had announced 
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development of its own all-electronic exchange. The export prospects of British 
manufacturers also played a role, as exports in the 1950s had suffered under ‘a resurgence 
of national competition and nationalistic considerations [which] have tended to restrict 
the market … The real chance for British manufacturers is to be able to offer electronic 
equipment that is a stage ahead’.25 Radley thus defended Highgate Wood’s development 
to Marples as both an extension of Dollis Hill’s wartime work as a matter of ‘national 
prestige’.26 
The main problem was power. Two months after Radley’s defence of electronic 
switching, power provision estimates had to be adjusted: more power was needed, with 
greater reliability and stability in the current provided, and at higher cost. Lionel Harris, 
the Engineer-in-Chief, and Roy Harris’ father, raised concerns at a 1957 JERC meeting 
and so Don Barron, by this point the Assistant Engineer-in-Chief, suggested that Highgate 
Wood – always intended as an experimental proof-of-concept, and already un-economic 
– should be postponed until a small, economically competitive, practical exchange, could 
be built. Harris dismissed this idea and ‘stressed the prestige value of the installation of a 
complete working system in view of similar projects now being developed abroad’.27 The 
motivation to beat out foreign competitors such as Bell Labs was clear and apparent. 
The urgency of Highgate Wood as a prestige project also fed into additional 
construction work needed for the exchange’s burgeoning power requirements. The 
existing exchange building had to undergo structural alterations, and an additional room 
was needed to accommodate extra batteries. In turn, this meant that greater ventilation 
was required: a fan room of at least 1,600 square foot. The existing exchange building 
had no space for such a room, and so the Post Office requested that the Ministry of Works 
build an entire additional floor on the exchange building to create space for the fan room. 
In order to justify this additional expenditure and hurry the Ministry of Works, a letter 
from the Post Office explained that, ‘It is a matter of national prestige for us to be the first 
to introduce such an exchange … it will be of inestimable value to our export trade to be 
able to be first on the scene with this new development’.28 Despite the earlier 
acknowledgement by the Engineer-in-Chief and his deputy that Highgate Wood was an 
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uneconomic experimental exchange, the Post Office still invoked a relationship between 
research prestige and export prospects. 
‘Prestige’ was a significant and flexible rhetorical device in Highgate Wood’s 
continuing development. Agar’s history of the post-war construction of Jodrell Bank’s 
Mark I Telescope, completed in 1957, highlights the power of ‘prestige’ in mobilising 
various actors in support of construction, including the Royal Astronomical Society 
(RAS), the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), and the astronomers 
themselves.29 Prestige meant different things to these different groups: for the RAS, it 
meant the standing of British science; for the DSIR, it meant a display of British 
prominence; for astronomers, it could be used as a funding invocation. Prestige’s 
interpretative flexibility meant that by invoking it, one had a term which could draw 
together different groups, even if for different reasons. For Highgate Wood, ‘prestige’ 
displays this flexibility in coordinating different groups with different goals: for Flowers, 
‘prestige’ meant recognition for his work on Colossus; for the Engineering Department, 
it meant international recognition; and for the Postmaster-General and other government 
departments, it meant increasing export prospects. This rhetorical use of prestige in 
conjunction with big scientific and technological projects also fits in with the ‘defiant 
modernism’ trend which I introduced in Chapter Two: the Post Office’s aspiration to the 
world’s first electronic telephone exchange fits in well alongside the defiant modernist 
projects of Comet, Bluebird, and Calder Hall.30 
Highgate Wood’s problems meant the project was substantially delayed. The 
exchange entered service in 1962, four years late, and was an abject failure.31 Its 
component failure rate was quite low, but Roy Harris has catalogued how the system 
suffered several intractable faults.32 It carried progressively less traffic over time as pulses 
were not always cleared from connection stores after calls, and so channels continued to 
look busy. The variety of pulsing systems used – subscribers’ lines were pulsed five times 
per second, whilst junctions were pulsed forty times per second – led to interference. In 
1963, research on PAM/TDM exchanges was thus abandoned: economically, the 
equipment required was too expensive, whilst technically, it was clear that PAM would 
continue to produce interference and incompatibility between different pulsed 
frequencies.33 Flowers reportedly could not endure this decision and so resigned from the 
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Post Office in 1964.34 Highgate Wood, however, remained open. National prestige meant 
that it could not simply be closed: ‘Highgate Wood has prestige value … it will be the 
only electronic exchange really connected to the public system in Britain … and has been 
an important feature of the visits of parties from abroad. Arrangements are in hand for a 
visit of continental technical journalists in March [1964]’.35 The experimental Highgate 
Wood, disconnected from the telephone network, thus remained in place as a symbol of 
British prestige. It was eventually removed in 1965. 
 
Integrating Cybernetics and the Government Machine 
 
After PAM/TDM was abandoned, there was only one exchange left under development 
through the JERC agreement: REX, Reed-relay Electronic eXchange, which used small 
metallic ‘reeds’ as cross-points for routing calls, rather than Highgate Wood’s electronic 
logic circuits, and used discrete connecting paths for each call, in contrast to Highgate 
Wood’s shared TDM paths.36 REX entered service in 1966 in Leighton Buzzard, 
providing service for 3,000 subscribers.37 REX became known as TXE1 – Telephone 
eXchange Electronic 1 – and became the basis for the TXE exchange series developed 
and rolled out through the 1960s and 1970s, which was the subject of an onerous 
industrial dispute between the Post Office, STC, GEC, and Plessey revolving around the 
use of computer modelling to plan the modernisation of Britain’s switching network. 
However, before I move onto the TXE dispute, there was another important 
prototype exchange developed during the 1960s: Empress. Highgate Wood’s PAM/TDM 
approach was dropped, but time-division multiplexing was not, and was instead allied to 
digital pulse code modulation (PCM), a way of encoding signals as digital, rather than 
analogue, pulses. PCM had been developed in the 1930s by the British radio engineer 
Alec Reeves whilst employed at IT&T’s Paris research centre, Les Laboratoires Standard. 
Reeves is a fascinating but under-studied figure in British engineering history: alongside 
his development of PCM, he also contributed to radar development before and during 
World War II. Reeves was also a practicing spiritualist, and claimed to maintain contact 
with his ‘friend and adviser’ Michael Faraday, the nineteenth-century electrical scientist, 
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who had died thirty-five years before Reeves’ birth.38 Whilst not my subject here, a 
history of Reeves which reconciles these two worlds would be fascinating.  
For now, however, I continue with Empress. The Empress exchange utilised PCM 
and various forms of multiplexing, including TDM, and was installed near Earl’s Court 
in 1968, making it the world’s first digital electronic exchange.39 However, my focus here 
is not Empress’ technical development, but its role in stimulating Merriman’s 
‘information and control’ speech. 
In 1967, Merriman delivered the speech which opens this thesis and this chapter, 
a speech entitled ‘Men, Circuits and Systems in Telecommunications’, in his inaugural 
address as Chairman of the Electronics Division of the IEE.40 Merriman’s speech 
addressed two developments in the Post Office – the use of computers as management 
tools, and the development of digital telecommunications, proven by Empress – and 
outlined a vision for the future telecommunications network which would inform the 
development of System X, and the re-cast the telephone network as an information 
network. Merriman’s vision was of an evolutionary, autonomous, general-purpose, 
information network, which synthesised ideas from cybernetics, information theory, and 
his background in Treasury O&M. I will demonstrate this through Merriman’s 
juxtaposition of three different subjects: in the first half of his paper, he addresses the use 
of computers and O&M in the Post Office, whilst his second half deals with two distinct 
but related concepts: ‘general-purpose’ networks and ‘evolutionary, self-healing, self-
governing’ networks. 
Merriman opened his address by talking about the interplay between ‘circuits and 
men’, stating that his aim was ‘to show that telecommunications is not only a dialogue 
between sender and receiver; it is a dialogue between user and provider. It is not only 
circuitry; it is man management’, explaining that the Post Office’s ‘greatest problem’ was 
the ‘deployment, use, and, in one sense, control, of manpower’.41 Merriman outlined how 
the Post Office had increased productivity by harnessing ‘technological opportunity’ and 
‘scientific man-management’ to found an O&M department which had undertaken studies 
on work measurement, queuing theory, and statistical control.42 He showed a diagram 
demonstrating how the Post Office’s works service organisation had been conceived of 
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in terms of inputs and outputs of information (Figure 5.1). He also outlined the Post 
Office’s use of computer-aided management techniques, such as Monte Carlo simulations 
to improve work-flows for fault engineers. 
This approach to organisation and management was not novel for Merriman, who 
had undertaken similar work as Head of Office Machines in Treasury O&M from 1956-
60, before returning to the Post Office.43 Agar has outlined how Merriman ran an 
extended program of ‘indoctrination and implementation’ of clerical mechanisation by 
teaching sceptical executive civil servants to see the Civil Service itself as a modern 
machine.44 Important projects undertaken by Treasury O&M included the mechanisation 
of Civil Service payroll and statistics production, and the computerisation of the Ministry 
of Pensions and National Insurance office. Agar argues that Merriman’s success resulted 
from the line drawn between specialist, mechanisable clerical work and generalist, 
executive work. Merriman cast machines as capable replacements for clerical work, and 
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Figure 5.1. The Post Office works service organisation as inputs and outputs of information. 
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computer aids to management as supplementary aids for generalists’ control over 
government. 
Agar argues that this hierarchical division between mechanical specialists and 
executive generalists formed the template for Turing’s universal machine.45 Turing’s 
imaginary device could undertake different types of computation according to 
instructions written within the machine, so the machine could move from function to 
function and, by storing the progress of functions in memory, return to an earlier function; 
this is the basic principle of general-purpose computers with stored-program control, 
where a computer can store the instructions for a program within its own memory, rather 
than having to be programmed by an external operator. Crucially for Agar’s argument, 
Turing describes this in terms of human computers; ‘computer’ had, before its current 
usage, referred to humans who would undertake calculations. Agar argues that in this 
description is inscribed a model of the Civil Service, composed of mechanical clerical 
workers, devoted to specialist functions, and generalists, who could move from office to 
office, satisfied that clerks would know how to undertake their special functions in the 
generalist’s absence. Agar’s argument is important for considering how Turing’s ideas 
played out within the Post Office: Turing’s interest in a general-purpose computer was 
eschewed by Flowers in favour of designing Highgate Wood, a special-purpose electronic 
exchange. However, by Empress, Flowers had left the Post Office and Merriman, the 
Civil Service mechaniser, was Engineer-in-Chief. 
In his speech, Merriman moved seamlessly from discussing Post Office O&M to 
the Post Office’s vision for a general-purpose communication network which would carry 
all forms of information. Superficially, Merriman’s speech had moved between two 
unrelated subjects, and yet for Merriman it made complete sense to talk about these 
subjects together; his Treasury O&M background in the ‘government machine’ framed 
his thinking in terms of specialists and generalists, and so underpinned his vision of a 
general-purpose network. Empress had proved the viability of digital networks, and this 
concerned Merriman: he warned of digital transmission being used as a short-term 
solution in specialist networks, rather than ‘the realisation of … a general-purpose digital 
network’, which would have ‘versatility and open-endedness built in to permit becoming 
a better system in the future’.46 This, he argued, was the opportunity presented by doing 
‘all-digital’ – all forms of information could be digitised, and so a ‘single yet versatile 
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network can freely handle all forms of communication’.47 Merriman portrayed the 
problems of a digital network as special-purpose versus general-purpose, which makes 
sense when juxtaposed with his speech’s first topic of O&M, where problems were also 
framed through the Civil Service hierarchy of specialist and generalist. However, a key 
difference here is Merriman’s plan to mechanise the generalist, which he and other expert 
mechanisers in government had previously been so keen to avoid. Why was Merriman, 
of the O&M tradition, so receptive to the computerised generalist network? The answer 
lies with information theory and cybernetics. 
Information theory and cybernetics, as addressed in Chapter One, were developed 
by Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener. Claude Shannon, at Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, and Nobert Wiener, at MIT, independently developed information theory: 
Shannon published ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’ in 1948 and Wiener his 
book, Cybernetics, which included his information theory, that same year.48 Both Wiener 
and Shannon’s theories of information were remarkably similar, construing information 
as the amount of order or disorder in a selection of messages.49 However, they differed in 
how they defined information: Shannon took a tighter, non-semantic approach, rooted in 
his wartime cryptographic studies of language’s statistical properties;50 Wiener took a 
broader definition, addressing information’s semantic and pragmatic dimensions, i.e. its 
meanings and effect upon recipients. Wiener’s definition was a corollary of cybernetics, 
his theory of communication and control which explained the behaviour of organisms and 
machines in terms of information inputs and outputs, inspired by his wartime work on 
anti-aircraft predictors.51 Wiener made various analogies between animals and machines, 
for example, comparing computers to nervous systems and so cybernetics, in its 
expansive applications to both animals and machines, and in information’s subservience 
to control, had implications for Merriman’s general-purpose philosophy. 
Post Office engineers paid careful attention to Wiener and Shannon’s ideas. In 
1951, Roy Harris and D.L. Overheu, another Dollis Hill engineer, attended a series of 
lectures at Imperial College to learn about information theory from Colin Cherry and 
Denis Gabor, who, along with Donald MacKay at King’s College London, made up the 
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‘English School’ of information theory.52 Harris and Overheu reported on information 
theory to Flowers and subsequently lectured on information theory to Post Office 
engineers; at the end of their lectures, they thanked Colin Cherry for his correspondence 
on ‘information theory and cybernetics’.53 Harris and Overheu ostensibly addressed 
Shannon’s ‘communication theory’, but also referenced Wiener’s Cybernetics and took 
his expansive definition of information, explaining how information theory could be used 
to integrate subjects as diverse as digital computing and neurobiology and treated all 
forms of communications as essentially the same.54 They also applied information theory 
to modulation showed how PCM was less error-prone and delivered higher bandwidth 
than PAM, foreshadowing PAM’s failure with the Highgate Wood project. 
These reports expanded beyond Shannon’s communication theory to reflect on 
the communications, biological, and industrial applications of information theory and 
cybernetics and on an impending ‘second industrial revolution’. Harris and Overheu 
pointed out how the versatility of information theory meant it could be used to assess not 
just the efficiency of transmission systems, but also the efficiency of switching systems 
and even control organisations themselves.55 This was further extended to consider that 
analogies between machines and organisms could be made when feedback loops were 
used: 
Such machines are self-controlling and are given only a general instruction. Self-guiding 
projectiles, anti-aircraft predictors, etc., are examples of such machines. The human body 
is full of such mechanisms which control our temperature, balance, heart rate, etc., and 
there is evidence that conditioned reflexes operate in a similar way with a memory 
incorporated in the mechanism. Similarly the faculty of learning must depend 
considerably on past experience and must use some form of feedback.56 
Inscribed in this quote are two classic examples of information theory applied to 
cybernetics: Wiener’s research on anti-aircraft predictors and the British cybernetician 
W. Ross Ashby’s ‘homeostat’, a device which modelled learning in the human brain by 
representing environmental adaptation through electrical feedback.57 Harris and Overheu 
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concluded by reflecting on Wiener’s prediction of a ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ from 
Cybernetics to hypothesise that ‘human beings, used as sources of judgement, may also 
be replaced by machines’.58 
These interpretations of information theory, which borrowed heavily from Wiener 
and cybernetics, can be considered against information theory’s other definitions. Kline, 
drawing on the observations of information theorist Peter Elias, notes that by the end of 
the 1950s, there were three different definitions of ‘information theory’: the narrowest, 
associated with Shannon, referred purely to his communication theory; the second was a 
broader collation of Shannon and Wiener’s work on analysing communication problems; 
finally, the third, which was particularly associated with the Imperial College information 
theory symposia and the journal Information and Control, was a synonym for 
‘cybernetics’.59 
These broad interpretations can be seen in another Post Office application of 
information theory. In September 1952, Post Office engineers again attended an 
information theory symposium at Imperial, joined by the English School and information 
theorists from the USA, such as Stanford Goldman, Robert Fano and Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel.60 One Post Office engineer, D.L. Richards, presented a paper on the effects of the 
physical properties of a circuit on telephone users’ behaviour, which aligns with Wiener’s 
pragmatic definition of information theory, viewing the communication system as 
composed of human and electrical components. A report on the symposium, delivered to 
Merriman, amongst others, concluded that little of the work described at the symposium 
had ‘direct application to bread-and-butter communications practice’, but suggested that 
information theory’s main benefits may be ‘a fertilizing and catalytic action on the ideas 
of designers and development engineers, plus an understanding of ultimate possibilities 
that will act as a goal’.61 
By the time Merriman was Engineer-in-Chief, cybernetics and information theory 
had indeed had a catalytic effect on the Post Office’s ultimate goal for the telephone 
network: a digital network carrying voice, video and data signals as ‘information’. Both 
features – digitalisation and informatisation – derived from the insights of information 
theory: the former in communication theory proof of digital encoding as more efficient 
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than analogue modulation;62 the latter naturally followed from the former in that, if digital 
transmission was more informationally efficient, and if all forms of communication 
counted as information, then a digital telephone network could be used for much more 
than telephony. This was the ‘general-purpose’ network. 
Another cybernetic characteristic of the general-purpose network was that it 
should be ‘evolutionary’, ‘self-governing’ and ‘self-healing’.63 For Merriman, electronic 
computer control was central to realising this autonomous organic network, 
cybernetically blending organic and mechanical. Computers in the network would receive 
information about traffic flow, determine the optimal route for calls, and control 
switching centres; in doing so the Post Office would create a general-purpose, 
evolutionary, ‘self-governing, self-healing’ system, echoing the earlier 1950s reports on 
information theory and cybernetics, which predicted that the ‘mechanised thinking of 
electronic brains together with self-stabilising servomechanisms’ would allow machines 
‘as sources of judgement’ to automatically manage industrial systems.64 It was in these 
ways, Merriman argued, that ‘information and control’, were ‘fundamental to any 
telecommunication system’.65 
The influence of Henri Fayol can perhaps also be detected on Merriman’s outline 
of a telecommunications system of information and control. As I discussed in Chapter 
Two, Fayol, the turn-of-the-century management theorist, had coined a managerial 
definition of ‘control’, predating cybernetics, as the monitoring of industrial and 
administrative outputs, and using that information to correct industrial processes. There 
are thus certainly similarities between Fayol’s definition of control and Merriman’s use 
of computers for work measurement and plans for computerised monitoring and feedback 
within the telephone network. Whilst there is no evidence of any direct influence of Fayol 
on Merriman or any other managers and engineers in the Post Office, there is a possible 
avenue via Merriman’s background in Treasury O&M and another, British, management 
theorist: Lyndall Urwick. 
Lyndall Urwick was a prominent British management consultant theorist from the 
early-mid twentieth century. Urwick was the first secretary of the Management Research 
Groups established by Seebohm Rowntree in 1926 as a national forum for business 
managers. From 1928, Urwick was Director of the International Management Institute in 
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Geneva, and then in 1934, he founded one of the first management consultancies in 
Britain, Urwick Orr.66 Urwick and Urwick Orr have been cast as leading proponents of 
Taylorism in British management in McKenna’s history of management consultancy, in 
which McKenna describes them as dominating the market for organisational advice in 
Britain with Taylorist views, whilst in the USA, management consultants’ primary 
influence had instead been accounting and engineering practice since the 1930s.67 
However, this overlooks the significant influence Fayol had on Urwick since his early 
career: Urwick’s first publication, ‘Principles of Direction and Control’, which appeared 
in 1928 in the landmark Dictionary of Industrial Administration, was heavily influenced 
by Fayol; Urwick was also responsible for the first English translation of Adminstration 
Industrielle et Générale, and has been described as ‘the main figure responsible for 
bringing Fayol to the attention of the Anglo-Saxon world’.68 
Urwick intersects with this history in the world of Treasury O&M: Urwick joined 
the Treasury in 1940 as an advisor and, from 1941, O&M began contracting in private 
consultancies, including Urwick Orr.69 Merriman was at the Post Office at this time, and 
did not join Treasury O&M until 1956, but it is possible that Urwick’s influence, and his 
advocacy of Fayol, remained; moreover, Urwick, as mentioned by McKenna, was one of 
the most influential management consultants in Britain in the 1950s, and so it is possible 
that his influence came via another avenue, particularly as the most popular translation of 
Fayol, General and Industrial Management, was published in Britain in 1949. Boltanski 
and Chiapello also note Fayol as a lasting influence on managerial thought in the 1960s, 
noting that one of the key managerial dilemmas at this time was how to reconcile the 
Fayolian tenet of centralised command and control whilst also rendering bureaucracies 
more flexible:70 here, there are parallels with Merriman’s ambition of preserving 
information and control in centralised, computerised systems of the Post Office telecom 
monopoly, whilst also using those computers to render the system more flexible. 
However, these influences are speculative and indirect, and it should be noted that 
one direct managerial influence has already been identified: Treasury O&M. As I noted 
in Chapter Two, referring to the work of Boltanski and Chiapello, along with Khurana, 
on the history of management, it is important to identify the influence of managerial 
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theory on Merriman and the Post Office engineers. Treasury O&M, whilst advanced by 
specialist mechanisers within government, was as much a theory of administration and 
bureaucracy as it was a programme of mechanisation; Agar thus argues that Treasury 
O&M was a distinctive British administrative science which, given its significant 
prominence in the large-scale bureaucracy of government, was an expert movement 
comparable to the management sciences of early twentieth century America.71 My point 
here is that, whilst I have done much to show the influence of cybernetics and information 
theory on the Post Office, I am not claiming that an engineering vision of cybernetic 
control became hegemonic, but rather it fused with an administrative mode of thought 
from British government: the bureaucratic theory of the government machine is just as 
important here as the engineering theory of cybernetics. 
This fusion of the government machine and cybernetics, and, more specifically, 
its re-interpretation as a general-purpose, or ‘integrated’ digital network, was also 
possibly tied to Flowers’ departure. In 1963, amidst the failure of Highgate Wood, a 
research report exploring an ‘integrated’ digital telecommunications system, capable of 
transmitting voice and data, was prepared for Flowers.72 The report suggested that a 
specialist data network might be possible or preferable to a general-purpose integrated 
network, which suggests that, under Flowers, the concept of a general-purpose network 
had yet to gain favour. The next year, another exploratory study was undertaken shortly 
before Flowers resigned, and again, the integrated digital network concept received a 
muted reception.73 However, three years later, in 1967, with Flowers gone and Roy Harris 
in charge of switching development, Merriman, now Engineer-in-Chief, ordered a follow-
up study, and this time integration and digitalisation for a general-purpose network 
received a much warmer reception.74 The study’s evidence was primarily economic, and 
doubtless there was a financial basis for this conclusion, but I would suggest that Flowers’ 
commitment to analogue exchange development was perhaps also responsible for these 
rejections of digitalisation, in contrast to the endorsement of digitalisation by the report 
produced under Harris and Merriman. 
Merriman’s vision for a general-purpose, self-governing, self-healing network 
represents the convergence of Treasury O&M, information theory, and cybernetics. 
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Merriman deployed Treasury O&M within the Post Office as a form of management, and 
as a way of framing the problems of digital networks as separate, specialised networks 
versus general-purpose networks. He envisioned a network comparable to Turing’s 
universal machine, and in doing so endorsed a generalist computer-controlled network, 
which breached the Civil Service hierarchy of mechanisable specialist and executive 
generalist. I argue that the influence of information theory and cybernetics resolved this 
tension. Information theory paralleled the general-purpose executives of the government 
machine, showing how information, like generalists, was capable of moving between 
systems and performing many functions, whilst cybernetics interpreted the network as an 
entity that, like a human, was evolutionary, self-healing, and self-governing, explaining 
why Merriman concluded his paper with the assertion that ‘both men and systems become 
self-optimizing’.75 This view – men and systems as together self-optimising – possibly 
represents a step towards resolving automation tensions, which I explored in Chapter 
Three with GRACE, by presenting men and machines as optimising one another. This is 
a thread I will return to at the end of this chapter, as I explore automation, unemployment, 
and System X. 
So far, I have spoken of the general-purpose network solely through Merriman’s 
vision, but I will argue in my final section that System X and the ‘integrated digital 
services network’ were both implementations of the general-purpose evolutionary 
network. However, I will first address the next step of telephone exchange development: 
an industrial dispute over computer modelling of the TXE4 reed-relay exchange, which 
further highlights O&M traditions within the Post Office, particularly the ‘discreet 
modernism’ of computerisation in government. 
 
A Model of Discretion 
 
In 1971, the Post Office published plans to update the telecommunications network with 
the TXE4 reed-relay telephone exchange, jointly developed with STC, which had 
developed from the successful 1966 reed-relay trial at Leighton Buzzard.76 The plan 
aimed to replace all Strowger exchanges by 1990, was subject to final approval by the 
Post Office Board in December 1972, and had been developed through computer 
modelling by the Post Office’s Operational Programming Department, which became the 
subject of a fierce dispute between the Post Office and their manufacturers. The 
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Operational Programming Department was headed by J.S. Whyte, who had previously 
headed the Post Office’s Long Range Planning Department, and so will feature in Chapter 
Seven, and before that had, like Merriman, worked on government computing in Treasury 
O&M. He would go on to replace Merriman as Engineer-in-Chief (known at that point as 
Senior Director, Development, but still colloquially known as the ‘E-in-C’) after 
Merriman’s retirement in 1976.77 
 The Post Office’s use of the model, and Whyte’s management of its availability 
for external review, fits in with a pattern of government computerisation and 
mechanisation which Agar labels ‘discreet modernism’.78 As I covered in Chapter Two, 
Agar argues that, up until the late twentieth century, government mechanisation and 
computerisation was characterised by an opaqueness which allowed the computer to 
thrive within government; the discreet invisibility of the computer meant that expert 
mechaniser movements, like Treasury O&M, were able to negotiate the potentially 
problematic idea of equating Civil Service work with computers by casting government, 
and not the computer, as their object of action. The invisible computer was thus allowed 
to thrive in a supposedly incidental role. However, the Post Office’s confession that it had 
used computer modelling to plan its modernisation strategy breached this discreet 
modernism, and in doing so, modelling became the subject of an industrial dispute where 
questioning the model’s authority became synonymous with questioning the Post Office’s 
authority. 
 On 12th January 1972 a meeting was held between the Post Office, GEC and 
Plessey, regarding GEC and Plessey’s concerns about the Post Office’s modernization 
strategy.79 GEC and Plessey’s concerns were that their jointly-developed electronically-
controlled Crossbar system, known as 5005, was cheaper than TXE4 and more reliable, 
and yet had been rejected for TXE4, a system which had undergone limited experimental 
trials and had mainly been tested by an experimental computer simulation, different from 
the model used for the Post Office’s modernization strategy.80 At the meeting, Arnold 
Weinstock, GEC’s Chairman, argued that ‘computer simulation alone should not be a 
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basis for major investment decisions’.81 Merriman provided the Post Office rebuttal, 
arguing that the TXE4 had been supported by a high degree of computer modelling, and 
that ‘It was not sensible to attempt to produce replicas of the exchange at every stage of 
design development, and computer simulations had therefore been employed instead’.82 
 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), formed in 1969 as the 
Post Office’s regulatory government department after the Post Office left the Civil 
Service, soon became involved. The Post Office informed the MPT that ‘it is becoming 
more and more common in advanced technology to move straight from computer 
simulation to hardware’.83 It is by no means clear that this was the case: whilst, as this 
chapter and later chapters show, the Post Office extensively used simulation, 
experimental hardware was also used, particularly, as I show in the next chapter, in 
waveguide and optical fibre trials. The Post Office also pointed out that Crossbar 5005 
had its own flaws: its physical design meant that maintenance access involved high wear 
to cables and wires, whilst its limited flexibility meant that, beyond a certain point, extra 
lines could only be added by changing customers’ numbers.84 The row between the Post 
Office, GEC, and Plessey soon gathered national attention in The Economist, The 
Financial Times, and The Daily Telegraph.85 Interestingly, and underscoring the discreet 
– up until this point – use of computers, only The Financial Times mentioned modelling, 
identifying the Post Office’s ‘giant computer model of the U.K. telecommunications 
network’, from which Plessey and GEC ‘claim to have been excluded’ as the central point 
of contention.86 
This ‘giant computer model’, used to plan TXE4’s rollout, was the ‘main area of 
doubt’ for both GEC and Plessey.87 GEC questioned the model’s validity and influence 
over decision-making, whilst Dr Willets, Plessey’s Director of Research, announced to 
the Treasury, who had been brought in to review the model, that he considered it a ‘load 
of junk’.88 STC, TXE4’s manufacturer, mobilised in support of the Post Office and its 
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model, internally briefing its directors to respond to press interest with the statement, ‘The 
Post Office have computer capacity and expertise unrivalled either in the Industry or 
perhaps in any private sector of British industry. They have programmed all the factors 
which affect the cost to the British public of its telephone system’.89 
The model itself was known as ALEM 6: ‘A Local Exchange Model 6’.90 The 
model made year-on-year cost calculations by progressively simulating the changing mix 
and cost of switching equipment in the telephone network, according to the strategy it had 
been programmed with. The model had three priorities during simulations: first, that 
exchanges already using modern equipment must be allocated enough equipment of the 
same type to meet forecasted growth; second, that worn-out Strowger was replaced; 
finally, that serviceable Strowger was replaced. Whyte, who had overseen the model’s 
development whilst Head of the Long Range Planning Department, emphasised that it 
was a ‘powerful tool which enables a wide range of exchange replacement strategies to 
be explored on behalf of the decision maker … The model cannot of itself come to 
conclusions or take decisions. It does, however, expose the direct financial consequences 
of any strategy under consideration’.91 I explore Whyte’s tenure and the model’s 
development in Long Range Planning in Chapter Seven, where I further analyse various 
discourses of computer control within the Post Office. 
The controversy over the model was stimulated by the involvement of Ted Heath, 
the Prime Minister, who had met W.D. Morton, a senior GEC engineer, at an event for 
senior managers from the British manufacturing industry.92 Morton complained to Heath 
that the Post Office’s plans were harming GEC’s export prospects, and so Heath wrote to 
John Eden, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, asking him to investigate 
further. Eden reassured Heath that he would have to approve the Post Office’s proposals 
even after the Post Office Board made its decision at the end of 1972 and that the MPT, 
along with the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the Cabinet’s 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), would investigate fully.93 The Post Office’s 
management of these investigations ensured that the judgement of the Post Office became 
a judgement of its model, and vice versa. The result was that the authority of the Post 
Office and the authority of its model become one and the same. 
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Plessey also ordered its own report into the model, commissioning T.S. Barker, 
Senior Research Officer at the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge, to 
investigate the model. However, as Barker could not access the model, he instead 
provided a commentary on the Post Office’s report of the model. His conclusion was that 
it was ‘suitable, but could be substantially improved’.94 Barker highlighted the model’s 
treatment of technical progress as ‘almost non-existent’ and recommended that it should 
be given ‘urgent consideration’. He also regarded the model’s treatment of uncertainty as 
‘inadequate’. The Post Office, however, relied on Barker’s lack of access to the model as 
a counter-argumentative strategy: ‘This report is interesting because the author broadly 
endorses what has been done, although on many items he would not have realised this 
when preparing the Report … by and large it gives strong support to what we have in fact 
done, albeit in some cases unknown to the author’.95 Here, the Post Office relied on the 
model’s discretion as a counter to Barker’s criticisms. The Post Office’s use of modelling 
had been controversial because it breached the governmental tradition of ‘discreet 
modernism’, and so to ensure closure of the controversy, the Post Office fell back on an 
old tradition of discretion, suggesting that Barker’s criticism of the model was in fact an 
unknowing endorsement of the Post Office. Returning the model to an opaque state 
enabled criticism of the model to be reconfigured as trust in the Post Office. 
The Treasury also reviewed the model and, like Plessey, had to do so by analysing 
the Post Office’s report but, unlike Plessey, gave its tacit approval. Steve Littlechild, an 
economist who had joined the Treasury as a part-time consultant, was commissioned to 
review the model. An expert in mathematical programming, Littlechild had previously 
applied linear programming to analyse telephone services in the USA. He thus framed his 
opinion as an analysis of the Post Office’s decision to choose simulation over linear 
programming, and advised the Treasury that simulation was ‘at best a crude technique for 
finding an optimum’ using ‘hit and miss’ repetition to find the best strategy.96 However, 
his overall conclusion was ‘that the Post Office has developed a powerful approach for 
dealing with their investment analysis’ and had ‘no comments’.97 The Treasury passed 
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their report over to the MPT, who interpreted Littlechild’s conclusions as an endorsement 
of the model: ‘Unless we have been seriously misled it seems as if the simulation model 
has achieved what was required of it and that therefore there would be no substantial 
advantage in reformulating the model in programming terms’.98 The interesting point here 
is that the Treasury did not bemoan its lack of access to the model, in contrast to Plessey’s 
report. The Post Office’s discretion thus received tacit approval from the Treasury, as it 
did from the MPT, where the language – ‘unless we have been misled’ – highlights the 
trusted opacity of Post Office computing. 
The newly-formed CPRS analysed the dispute with a broader remit, addressing 
both the modernisation model and the Post Office’s relationship with its suppliers. The 
CPRS, formed in 1970 by Ted Heath, was a government ‘think-tank’ established to help 
the cabinet take a long-term policy view.99 The CPRS thus considered the longer 
relationship between the Post Office and its suppliers, which had been reorganised in 
1968 by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) after the Highgate Wood failure. 
The IRC recommended that the cooperative arrangements of JERC be replaced by an 
‘arm’s length’ arrangement instead, and encouraged greater competition between the 
manufacturers.100 The CPRS thus set out to answer three questions: first, would TXE4 be 
ready by 1975, as the modernisation plan had promised? Second, was the Post Office’s 
economic evaluation correct? Third, was the Post Office’s strategy best for the nation as 
well as best for the Post Office?101 
The CPRS reported that everything appeared on schedule, whilst also agreeing 
with GEC and Plessey that the Post Office’s plan was ‘wildly optimistic’; on the first 
question, it thus hedged its bets by endorsing the Post Office’s computer simulation, 
whilst also recommending that contingency orders of 5005 be prepared. The CPRS’s 
answer to the second question, about the Post Office’s economic evaluation, similarly 
concluded with an endorsement of the Post Office’s model, saying that it seemed 
‘basically sound’, and attributed GEC and Plessey’s recalcitrance to the Post Office’s 
previous secrecy about the model, followed by its sudden publicity.102 Finally, on the 
structure of the telecommunications industry, the CPRS took the view that the ‘pendulum 
has swung too far’ towards competition, and was undermining collaborative research. The 
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CPRS thus recommended that a joint development company be formed by the Post Office 
and its manufacturers, with guaranteed funding from all parties, and guaranteed market 
share for manufacturers at the end of exchange development. 
The CPRS concluded that the Post Office’s modelling approach had been broadly 
correct, and so also recommended that the Post Office should have ultimate design 
authority over new exchanges.103 As with the Plessey Report and the Treasury’s 
investigation, the CPRS, in the absence of the model itself, had to equate the authority of 
the model with the authority of the Post Office. By centralising decision-making with the 
model, and by limiting access to it, the Post Office had created a situation where the CPRS 
could not decide whether it approved of the model, but instead whether it approved of the 
Post Office, and in doing so implicitly supported the centralisation of network decision 
making, such as design authority and purchasing, with the Post Office as well. 
Finally, the MPT, as the Post Office’s Whitehall counterpart also needed 
convincing. William Ryland thus invoked various expertise in support of the model: Sir 
James Lighthill, the renowned physicist and part-time Post Office board member, 
reviewed the model, twice, and gave his support both times. The Post Office also referred 
to similar approaches by Bell of Canada, who had used a similar model, and by AT&T, 
‘who are using a less elaborate model, have acknowledged the greater depth of our 
approach’.104 These comparisons were intended to show the Post Office’s modelling was 
not particularly unique, and this is broadly supported by history. The first industrial uses 
of modelling came before the digital computer, as companies used ‘analogue models’ – 
physical or electrical devices; for example, Vannevar Bush built an ‘AC Network 
Analyzer’, a model of power networks, using resistors, capacitors and inductors, at MIT 
for General Electric in 1930.105 With digital computing, computer modelling and 
simulation was taken up by industry; the oil industry was a widespread adopter, using 
computer modelling throughout the 1960s and 1970s to model geological conditions, 
determine well placement, and cost mineral rights.106 
In the 1960s, modelling also became more reflexive, as organisations sought to 
model not only their environments, but themselves. Various types of models were devised 
to simulate the organisation (I address the Post Office and BT’s use of these corporate 
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models in more detail in Chapter Six), and again, the most spectacular example came 
from the oil industry. Sun Oil’s Corporate Financial Model, developed between 1965-68, 
was touted as the first large-scale model of a corporation, and whilst the model was 
abandoned in 1969 (its lengthy development meant that it become obsolete, especially 
after Sun Oil amalgamed with Sunray DX Oil in 1968), Clarke and Tobias have pointed 
to it as indicative of the growing expansiveness of corporate modelling in the late 
1960s.107 Corporate modelling, as the Post Office argued to the MPT with its examples 
of Bell Canada and AT&T, was thus not extraordinary by the early 1970s, although, as 
the North American examples used above suggest, it remains an open question how 
common this practice was within British industry, and so further historical research is 
needed. 
The MPT review got something which no other group had: access. Two MPT 
economists, H. Christie and D.C. Young, were permitted to visit J.S. Whyte at the Post 
Office.108 Even then, the meeting was carefully screened: Christie and Young were shown 
MICES, Model for Investigating Competing Equipment Strategies, a pared-down version, 
rather than the full model, ALEM 6. The meeting highlighted some of the model’s 
limitations and assumptions. Christie and Young criticised the model’s conception of 
supply and demand, as the model did not simulate any interaction between the two, and 
instead assessed the cost of meeting a given demand set by the Post Office. There was 
also no parameter for capital rationing, so the Post Office had assumed that capital would 
be provided as needed for modernisation, precluding the idea of economic difficulty. 
The absence of capital rationing seems unusual: as I addressed in Chapter Three, 
the Post Office had suffered investment restrictions after the 1966 July measures, and 
from 1973 would also suffer pricing restrictions to counter stagflation; furthermore, there 
were widely-known difficulties with capital rationing on two other British-supported 
projects, Concorde and the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor, during the 1970s.109 However, 
the model’s development had come between the July Measures and the Heath 
government’s 1973 Prices Commission, rather than during these financial downturns and, 
furthermore, it had been developed in the wake of the Post Office’s corporatisation. As I 
have argued in Chapter Three, the Post Office’s corporatisation came amidst a managerial 
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enthusiasm in Whitehall, and given the technocratic enthusiasm of Merriman and 
Whyte’s O&M background, the model’s optimism perhaps reflected the managerialist 
spirit and freedom which corporatisation had afforded the Post Office. 
After the visit, Whyte wrote to Christie emphasising the computer’s lack of 
decision-making ability: 
The model does not in any sense make decisions, it merely calculates the consequences 
of different strategies … ALEM is no more than a calculating machine; the quality of its 
output depends directly on the quality of the inputs and of the assumptions stored in the 
computer and of the logic of the programme itself.110 
Whyte’s emphasis on the model’s mechanical role, contrasted to his implied executive 
decision-making, again demonstrates his O&M background. John Eden was convinced, 
and his full appraisal for the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy gave support to the 
Post Office, citing the numerous other governmental reviews which had also endorsed 
the Post Office.111 
 The use of modelling could be seen here as an early example of the ‘self-
governing, self-healing’ organisation, using computerisation to optimise management as 
well as the network. However, the Post Office made an error by breaching the discreet 
modernist tradition, resulting in a conflict with manufacturers which were not prepared 
to accept computerisation. In this sense then, this use of modelling was a premature, 
realisation of the self-governing, self-healing network. However, through the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Post Office would begin to enact its self-governing, self-healing, 
general-purpose network with the development of System X and an integrated digital 
network. 
 
System X and Integrated Digital Networks 
 
System X and the integrated digital network were two very different technologies pursued 
by the Post Office: the first was a new modular, digital telephone exchange, and the latter 
was a technical standard used to transmit voice and data over the telephone network. 
However, both have a common origin from Merriman’s 1967 speech: System X, through 
its use of computer control, realised the ‘self-healing, self-governing’ network, whilst the 
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integrated digital network, which enabled multiple forms of transmission across the 
network, realised the ‘general-purpose’ network. In this section I will explore the 
development and roll-out of both System X and the integrated digital network. However, 
the integrated digital network was not the only way the Post Office pursued the general-
purpose network, and so part of the next chapter also explores the Post Office and BT’s 
attempts to build general-purpose infrastructures through national cable television and 
optical fibre networks. 
 The ‘integrated services digital network’, or ISDN, is a technical standard for 
simultaneously transmitting voice and data as digital signals from the local exchange to 
the subscribers’ equipment across a single network. ISDN originated within the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in the mid-1970s, which formalised 
ISDN research through its Consultative Committee on International Telephony and 
Telegraphy (CCITT) in 1980. Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) subsequently 
developed an ISDN technical concept 1982, and implemented it in Tokyo in 1984. CCITT 
drafted their first technical recommendations for ISDN that year, based on NTT’s trial, 
and in 1986, technical specifications were finally agreed.112 However, this history 
overlooks the longer interest in integrated digital networks within domestic telephone 
administrations, and how this was related to other data services and networks developed 
by these administrations. 
 As I discussed above, engineers’ interest in ‘integrated digital networks’ dates to 
the early 1960s. In 1965, after Flowers’ departure, Merriman, as Deputy Engineer-in-
Chief, set up a ‘Rationalisation of the Distribution Network Working Party’, which 
concluded in January 1966 that a fully integrated digital network was possible.113 The 
board thus approved a trial for Washington New Town in 1967 as the first step towards a 
‘single all-purpose cable to each home – an integrated network’.114 The Washington trial 
proved highly profitable, and so further experiments were approved, occurring in Irvine, 
Craigavon, and Milton Keynes.115 
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Meanwhile, early research into concepts for System X also started at this time 
with ‘Project ADMITS’. ADMITS – an ‘Adaptable Dispersed Modular Integrated 
Telecommunications System that admits change’ – was proposed by Roy Harris to 
establish the technical basis for Merriman’s evolutionary network.116 ADMITS’ basic 
principles were stored-program control exchanges, integrated digital transmission, 
switching, and signalling, and the use of micro-electronics, rather than reed-relays, for 
switching.117 The project would proceed in tandem with industry, and the main priority 
would be developing a modular digital telephone exchange composed of general 
functional subsystems. This modularity, Harris argued, would enable the evolutionary 
network, as functional components could be competitively developed and procured 
independently over time.118 
The success of these early integrated digital networks, and the approval of Project 
ADMITS, meant that both were formalised: the UK Trunk Task Force (UKTTF) was set 
up within the Post Office’s Long Range Planning Department in 1968 to investigate the 
feasibility of digitalising the trunk telephone network, whilst the Advisory Group on 
Systems Definition (AGSD), headed by Roy Harris, was set up with industry, also in 
1968, to establish the technical specifications for System X and digitalisation.119 Whilst 
these groups were independent, the UKTTF fed into the AGSD’s reports on digitalisation. 
The UKTTF’s mission was to recommend a strategy for trunk network 
development until 1985, with looser recommendations until 2000. Given its institutional 
location in the Long Range Planning Department, where ALEM 6 had been developed, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that the UKTTF also used computer modelling.120 The UKTTF 
modelled traffic across the entire network for three services which the Post Office planned 
to offer: telephony, data, and Viewphone (a prototype video telephone which I explore in 
more detail in Chapter Six). The model simulated the cost, quantity and quality of this 
traffic based on whether transmission, signalling, and switching were analogue or digital; 
the model also simulated different network layouts to find the optimal arrangement of 
principal switching centres for the network’s ‘backbone’.121 The model found that 
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digitalisation would halve equipment costs, and predicted that telephone connections 
would double by the decade’s end, nearly quadruple by 2000, and that total traffic would 
almost quintuple.122 The UKTTF’s report, completed in 1971, thus recommended the 
digitalisation of the entire network.123 
Given the similarities with ALEM 6 – both were used for major network 
decisions, and both were developed in the Long Range Planning Department – it is 
possible to read this as indicative of computer modelling’s power within the Post Office. 
However, the UKTTF model made several assumptions which show its human inputs: it 
assumed a future of widespread videophone use, meaning that the network would need to 
carry video, in addition to voice and data, and assumed this would culminate with 
Viewphone’s transformation into a ‘concept that included facsimile and visual access to 
data banks’.124 The UKTTF’s head, Denis Breary, admitted that ‘a certain amount of 
forecasting of a sociological nature was necessary to establish a likely pattern of demand 
in the latter decades of this century’,125 but this is precisely what is historically interesting: 
the model had to work from the UKTTF’s assumptions, and these included optimistic 
expectations that, by 1980, Viewphone and teleconferencing systems would be in place, 
and that by 2001, digital transmission between all local street-side telephone cabinets and 
local telephone exchanges would have to carry both telephony and Viewphone signals.126 
These assumptions echo Merriman’s vision that the future network would carry 
video. I explore Viewphone’s role in supporting these visions in Chapter Seven, but the 
important point here is that these visions were inputs, rather than outputs, for the 
UKTTF’s model. The UKTTF report was not accepted because of modelling’s strength, 
but because the model and the report reinforced existing Post Office expectations for the 
future. The UKTTF’s report was accepted without objection by the Managing Director’s 
Committee for Telecommunications in November 1972 because it supported the vision 
for an integrated, universal information network.127 
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Meanwhile, the AGSD had also been proceeding with its goals, set by Merriman, 
to define and specify a framework with industry for the evolutionary network and System 
X’s modular components.128 However, it took almost five years for AGSD to submit its 
final report due to difficulties in co-ordinating manufacturers, caused by two events: first, 
the TXE4 dispute had delayed AGSD negotiations by almost a year; second, the Post 
Office’s attempts to admit another manufacturer, TMC, as a System X supplier. In 1972, 
as the TXE4 dispute was winding down, the Post Office moved to bring in Pye/TMC, 
owned by the Dutch electronics manufacturer Philips; the Post Office board believed that 
by establishing a foothold for Philips in Britain, competitive pressures might bear more 
on its domestic partners.129 This exacerbated relations with GEC, STC, and Plessey, all 
of whom refused to admit TMC and to undertake AGSD discussions.130 This resulted in 
delays for over a year, which were resolved by the Post Office’s bringing GEC on board 
by awarding them the contract for System X’s central processor; this broke the deadlock 
and the Post Office were able to insert terms and conditions into the System X contracts 
for the admission of Pye/TMC, subject to Pye/TMC negotiating its contribution with the 
other three firms.131 
 AGSD finally submitted its report in 1972, which laid the framework for a 
modular family of exchanges collectively named ‘System X’.132 These exchanges could 
serve a range of functions within the network, from local to trunk switching, would be 
based on PCM/TDM, and would be composed of various configurations of modular 
subsystems. This concept of System X as a modular family of exchanges for local, trunk, 
and international switching was possibly inspired by IBM’s ‘compatible-family’ concept 
for computers. In the early 1960s, IBM had developed System/360, built on a 
‘compatible-family’ concept, to maintain software compatibility between different 
computers; five computer models were developed for System/360, which was 
aggressively marketed and announced in 1963 in simultaneous press conferences in sixty-
three cities across fourteen countries. System/360 was an enormous success and became 
IBM’s ‘engine of growth’ for the next thirty years.133 The AGSD’s report makes no direct 
mention of IBM or System/360, although given System/360’s popularity and the 
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similarity in both systems’ names, it is possible that System/360 inspired System X; 
indeed, it was the same issue of software compatibility across multiple machines that 
drove the formulation of System X as a modular family. 
 By July 1973, a clear, technically detailed, direction for the development of the 
British telephone network had been established. The combined recommendations of the 
UKTTF and AGSD meant that the network would become an ‘all-purpose digital 
transmission environment’, echoing Merriman’s call for a ‘general-purpose network’, and 
System X would serve as the network’s digital switching system.134 A digital overlay 
network, superimposed on the existing telephone network, would be constructed to avoid 
disrupting existing telephone service, and System X would be organised into ‘Group 
Switching Centres’. The UKTTF’s model planned the overlay network and location of 
these centres, which would centralise traffic, reducing the number of large regional 
exchanges from 370 to 200.135 However, one detail had changed: by 1973, the ITU’s 
CCITT had accepted that future telecommunications networks would be national 
integrated digital networks for telephony and data, and so international discussions began 
on setting ISDN standards.136 This had two consequences: first, that development of 
standards for a combined telephony/data digital network had extended beyond the Post 
Office’s control; second, the CCITT’s research did not encompass using digital networks 
for video transmission. I shall explore the first of these consequences in the remainder of 
this chapter, alongside System X development, whilst I will explore the second in the next 
chapter, where I analyse, amongst other transmission technologies, the Post Office’s 
aborted attempts to set up a national broadband network for cable television, telephony, 
and data. 
 System X development continued to experience disruption during the 1970s. After 
the AGSD was wound up, a new department, the Telecommunications System Strategy 
Department (TSSD), headed by Harris, was created to oversee allocation of System X 
development contracts; this contrasted with the CPRS’s recommendation, discussed in 
the previous section, for a joint System X development company with industry, which 
had been rejected based on the AGSD delays.137  
 However, in 1975, as the Post Office finally prepared to place System X contracts, 
it emerged that subsidiaries of STC and GEC (STC Cables and TCL respectively), which 
                                                 
134 ‘Post Office Management Board Meeting’ 2 July 1973, TCC 15/8, BTA. 
135 ‘Development of the Trunk Network’ June 1973, TCC 55/5/96, BTA. 
136 ‘Development of the Trunk Network, June 1973, TCC 55/5/96, BTA’. 
137 ‘Post Office/Industry Relationships in Telecommunications System Design’ September 1973, TCC 
55/5/131, BTA; Harris, Automatic Switching in the UK, 26–27. 
143 
 
supplied cables to the Post Office, had engaged in a price-fixing cartel.138 The Post Office 
board reacted by ordering an immediate review into the System X contracts and attempted 
to rewrite the contracts, demanding access to all firms’ costs to guard against further 
price-fixing. Plessey and Pye/TMC, having not engaged in any illicit activity, protested, 
and moreover, the development contracts were already cost-investigated; the suppliers 
would not accept further investigation. Fennessy, the Managing Director of 
Telecommunications, persuaded the Board to drop this proviso, by arguing that, because 
System X was modular, and so components were easily interchangeable, contracts could 
be easily interchanged to. If the Post Office wanted to change supplier for a subsystem, 
there already existed ‘accurate yardsticks’, in the form of the previous subsystem, by 
which to measure a contract’s legitimacy.139 System X thus became a model for tendering 
new contracts: just as a new modular subsystem had to be standardised so it could replace 
an old subsystem, so the costs of the new contract would have to be similar enough to the 
old contract for the Post Office board to trust it.140 
 System X contracts were placed by 1976, but by this point, its protracted 
development had attracted political attention. The Carter Committee, previously 
addressed in Chapter Three, was critical of System X’s delays, and recommended that a 
separate department, responsible for liaising with suppliers, should be set up from the 
TSSD, which would continue to specify System X’s technical details.141 A new 
department, the System X Development Department, was created, headed by John 
Martin, who had previously supervised Systems Planning under Harris in TSSD.142 
System X entered the final stretch, and in 1979 it debuted at the International Switching 
Symposium in Geneva. System X debuted domestically in 1980 at the National 
Exhibition Centre, and that year the first System X exchange was installed at Baynard 
House in the City of London, followed by a local exchange in Woodbridge, Suffolk. In 
1981, two more exchanges were installed, and by 1983 a further twenty were planned.143 
Installations picked up after privatisation, and by 1988, nearly 1,300 new exchanges had 
been installed.144 
System X was launched as ‘the complete approach’ to telecommunications, and it 
was in this and other ways in which it embodied Merriman’s general-purpose 
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evolutionary network.145 System X was a ‘total telecommunications system’ with ‘high 
evolutionary potential’, described as a ‘family’ of telephone exchanges which ‘share 
support systems by living together and learning together’.146 This echoes Harris’ and 
AGSD’s ‘family’ concept, but also again cybernetically blurs the machine-organism 
boundary.147 System X was not just one machine, but many, and BT marketed it as part 
of a future, all-digital ‘common network for speech, data, and other services’. The 
network evolution of the 1980s and beyond would create an ‘integrated services digital 
network’ which would provide all telecommunications services.148 However, by the time 
System X had been launched, the ISDN was still some time off, and the Post Office and 
BT had turned their attention to other ways of meeting the growing domestic demand for 
data. 
This domestic demand did not discriminate between data over integrated networks 
or from alternative, specialised, ‘packet-switched’ data networks. Packet-switching, first 
conceptualised by Donald Davies at the NPL in 1965, in contrast to circuit-switched voice 
telephony, does not require a continuous call between subscriber and destination, instead 
dividing data up into discrete ‘packets’ which can be independently routed.149 Circuit-
switching was necessary for telephone calls, and thus also necessary for an integrated 
network, but packet-switching was purpose-built for data transmission, and so was used 
for specialised data networks. In 1971, Merriman thus warned the Post Office board of 
the threat from closed packet-switched data networks as a potential obstruction for the 
Post Office’s goal of ‘universal integrated networks’.150 
However, by 1975 it was increasingly clear that, between the time it would take 
to develop an international ISDN standard, and the growing demand for data services, the 
Post Office would have to develop a specialised packet-switched data network. In 
December 1975, the Post Office opened the Experimental Packet Switched Service, 
‘XPSS’, in London and Manchester.151 Within three months, XPSS was massively 
oversubscribed and so further development of packet-switching proceeded.152 The Post 
Office’s pre-existing commitment to the idea of a circuit-switched integrated digital 
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network meant that there was some desire to wait for both System X and ISDN; however, 
it was also recognised that huge demand meant that there were both economic and 
political pressures to set up a full packet-switched special-purpose data network. The 
Managing Director’s Committee for Telecommunications was particularly concerned that 
the business sector might lobby government to liberalise the monopoly if it didn’t extend 
packet-switched data services, and so began development of a separate packet-switched 
data network.153 
 In 1981, after significant lobbying from business users in the City of London, 
which I explore in more detail in the next chapter, BT (as it had become) finally launched 
its full packet-switched data network, PSS.154 Alongside PSS, BT also launched a range 
of data services called ‘X-Stream Services’. BT explained that that the ‘X’, clearly 
connoting System X, was to signify ‘digital services’, whilst ‘stream’ indicated ‘the flow 
of digital information through the network’.155 X-Stream was initially made up of 
KiloStream and MegaStream, which were low-capacity and high-capacity data services 
provided using rented private networks. Another service, SatStream, which I explore in 
more detail in Chapter Eight, opened in 1984 using satellites.156 PSS was also rebranded 
‘SwitchStream One’ to align with X-Stream marketing, and in 1984, BT finally launched 
an ISDN trial, marketed alternately as ‘Integrated Digital Access’ (IDA) and 
‘SwitchStream Two’, which at long last achieved the business’s goal of providing 
telephony and data over the main circuit-switched telephone network, using System X.157 
 The X-Stream services surfaced BT’s increasing orientation to business 
customers, particularly those in the City of London, after its liberalisation. I explore BT’s 
motivations in more detail in the next chapter through a brief history of the City 
Telecommunications Committee, a technical liaison and lobbying committee organised 
by the Bank of England, but here I will address X-Stream and liberalisation. As I 
addressed in Chapter Three, a key component of the creation of BT was the liberalisation 
of leased line services, whereby third parties could rent lines from BT and provide a range 
of services. X-Stream was BT’s home-grown competitor in this market, and targeted 
business customers, launching with a brochure which depicted a fictitious conversation 
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between BT and a ‘leading edge-business customer’, who was informed that services like 
MegaStream ‘recognises the unique character and needs of the City business 
community’.158 
 BT’s most interesting presentation of digital services came with a 1984 exhibit to 
market IDA, BT’s ISDN trial.159 The exhibit showcased three ‘typical situations’ for 
ISDN: a secretary’s office, an executive’s office, and security surveillance. The 
secretary’s office showcased a telephone, a fax machine, a teletex terminal, and a CCTV 
camera, used in conjunction with the surveillance system. The executive’s office had a 
single terminal and telephone to use for simultaneously accessing a database and placing 
calls. Finally, the security surveillance exhibit showed how a single surveillance officer 
could surveille widespread locations. The hierarchy established by this exhibit is 
important: the executive can access databases and a telephone to communicate with 
customers and employees. The secretary has various networked clerical machines and, 
most significantly, is also watched by a CCTV camera, monitored by the surveillance 
officer. The ISDN, in this exhibit, clearly achieved Merriman’s vision of a general-
purpose network, transmitting voice, data, and video, but also re-inscribed the division 
between generalist executive and mechanical clerical staff, and added a new method, 
CCTV, for the executive to maintain control over their employees. 
 System X also reified visions of computerised, networked control, and had been 
identified early in its development as a way of changing societal attitudes towards 
automation. In 1972, a report from the Long Range Planning Department outlined the 
scope for further automation of operator services, highlighting how an electronic SPC 
exchange, such as System X, could use computerised inputs to transfer work from the 
operator to the customer.160  This would be achieved through an interactive process where 
the caller, in response to computerised verbal commands, would undertake a ‘series of 
simple acts’ – keying or dialling a number, usually a single digit. The sequence of 
numbers, keyed according to the verbal commands of the exchange, would allow the 
caller to use services like directory enquiries. Explicitly highlighting the relations 
between man and machine envisaged in this system, the report emphasised that ‘the 
initiative [is] always firmly with the processor’. However, the report warned that 
increasing automation may ‘precipitate a response of rejection and neo-ludditism … such 
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an attitude by society would severely restrict the managerial freedom of the Business’. 
Such an attitude did not come to pass, and System X were incorporated these functions 
with ‘New Star Services’ – so called because they used the ‘*’ button on the keypad – 
and it was explained to customers that ‘simple codes’ would be used to operate these new 
services, which included call diversion and three-way calling, and that ‘an automatic 
voice guidance system’ would provide ‘step-by-step advice and verification’.161 
 This approach adds another way in which the computer-controlled network 
resembled the government machine of Treasury O&M. Merriman, whilst at the Treasury, 
supported computerisation by comparing the mechanical work ‘programs’ of clerical staff 
to computer programs: both worked along discrete, step-by-step lines, and by drawing 
this parallel, Merriman argued for the replacement of clerical work ‘programs’ with 
computer programs.162 Inversely, with automated operator services, work was passed 
from the processor to the user by directing the user to follow a series of commands; in 
O&M, the clerical program was replaced by the computer program, whilst in the 
telephone network, the computer programmed the user. However, this still demonstrates 
a continuous thread of thinking about both machines and humans as programmable: in 
both Merriman’s championing of office machinery and in System X’s operator services, 
a metaphor was drawn between the work of machines and of people. 
Senior management, across various internal communications and information 
pamphlets, used System X to persuade engineering staff of the benefits of the deskilling, 
reskilling, and job losses associated with automation and BT’s new competitive 
environment. I previously drew attention to GRACE, the ‘robot telephone operator’, and 
the Post Office’s assertion that ‘machines must be servants not masters’.163 Similar fears 
accompanied the rollout of System X, and management issued a similar statement: 
‘Computers are still the servants of people, as they have always been’.164 However, this 
was followed with: ‘Increasingly, however, machines will take over the more mundane 
occupations and release the talents of British Telecom staff for more creative and 
interesting work’. The implication here is clear: jobs were available, for those talented 
and creative enough. Staff were encouraged to acclimate themselves to this new 
environment:  
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A modern system will, of course, require a modern attitude from the people who operate 
it. This will inevitably mean changes in skills and outlook on the part of British Telecom 
staff, but the system offers fair exchange. The up-to-date equipment is more compact, 
lighter and healthier to work with and the new “user-friendly” environment it creates will 
contribute to greater job satisfaction.165 
Again, the implication was clear: if one could change skills and attitude, then the outlook 
was good. This was the ‘fair exchange’ for subjecting oneself to the new ‘modern system’, 
whilst also reaffirming that staff now relied on System X for their job security. System X 
was even cast as a job creator, as internal BT communications claimed that it was ‘usually 
the out-of-date who face unemployment’.166 Liberalisation was also deployed, as System 
X was portrayed as crucial to the company’s competitiveness. Job security, staff were 
informed, would depend on BT’s ability to attract and retain new business, and System X 
was the ‘strongest weapon in our armory as we meet tough commercial competition’.167 
However, it was privately admitted that System X would result in net job losses, with a 
significant decline in manpower forecasted from 1986 onwards.168 
The language of competition was reinforced by tying it to the ‘great evolutionary 
potential’ of System X, which meant it would be an adaptable total telecommunications 
network, would have ‘in-built economies’, and could provide new services to attract 
customers.169 System X’s flexibility and adaptability, conferred upon it by its 
evolutionary potential, were crucial to its competitiveness. System X’s rollout, at a time 
when BT was advancing the general-purpose ISDN, and was undergoing liberalisation 
and privatisation, was a natural peak for the usage of ‘evolutionary’ language: a term 
which encapsulated both the adaptability of System X, the flexibility of the general-
purpose ISDN, and the competition of liberalisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how ‘information and control’ influenced exchange 
development and network digitalisation. I started by exploring the Post Office’s pursuit 
of analogue electronic switching, and showed that ‘prestige’, in numerous ways, played 
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a role in Highgate Wood’s protracted development, which I contextualised against the 
‘defiant modernism’ of 1950s and 1960s Britain. 
With Highgate Wood’s failure and Tommy Flowers’ resignation, a philosophical 
vacuum for network development was created, which was filled by Merriman and Harris’ 
interest in a general-purpose, evolutionary digital network oriented towards the problems 
of ‘information and control’. I showed how these ideas were informed by Harris’ 
encounters with information theory and cybernetics, and Merriman’s history in Treasury 
O&M, and contributed to the pursuit of an integrated digital network and the development 
of an evolutionary, adaptable digital exchange, which combined would create a ‘self-
governing, self-healing’ system where men and machines became ‘self-optimising’. 
 I also explored the influence of the ‘government machine’ on computer modelling, 
which exemplified the ‘discreet modernism’ deployed by Treasury O&M and other loci 
of government mechanisation to obscure the decision-making relationships formed by 
men and machines. I also suggested that, viewed in this light, computer modelling can be 
construed as an instance of the ‘self-governing, self-healing’ network. One of the key 
influences of Treasury O&M on the Post Office was to view the system as a broader 
organisation of man-management and technology. Merriman’s philosophy for a ‘self-
optimising’ network thus applied not just to computerisation within the telephone 
network, but computerisation around the network. 
 Finally, I investigated System X and ISDN through the 1970s and 1980s, showing 
how both suffered protracted developments. System X was completed by the end of the 
1970s, but the growing demand for data meant that ISDN was pre-empted by special-
purpose packet-switched data networks. These networks, along with ISDN’s eventual 
implementation, also show the growing pressures of business customers on the Post 
Office and BT, which were particularly visible in X-Stream and ISDN marketing. 
 Two instances of System X and computer control – new operator services, and 
engineering labour – provide an opportunity to reflect on recurring themes through this 
chapter. Automated operator services can be seen as another example of the Post Office’s 
self-optimising system, programming customers to become more accustomed to 
automation. This also applies to engineering automation: engineers were informed that 
they would have to reskill for System X, but also that System X would improve their 
working environment and create jobs. These are all further instances of self-optimisation: 
engineers would have to optimise themselves to retain employment (even though 
unemployment was forecasted as inevitable, and, as I showed in the previous chapter, 
Project Sovereign followed), System X would optimise their working conditions, and 
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would even optimise the organisation to create jobs. ALEM 6, as I have suggested, is 
another example of the self-optimising system which controversially and ambiguously 
infringed upon human decision-making. These all stand in stark contrast to the ‘machines 
must be servants not masters’ of GRACE in Chapter Two, but the important point I wish 
to make is that ‘machines must be servants’ was neither ignored nor inverted. Instead, a 
new settlement was found through a cybernetic, government machine philosophy. Both 
provided resources for viewing the telephone system as heterogenous system of humans 
and machines working together to ‘self-optimise’, rather than a hierarchical system of 
executive humans dominating machines (or vice versa).  
 However, this does not mean that hierarchies disappeared altogether. The 
privileging of computer control had negative consequences, as I have mentioned for 
engineering labour. The ISDN also showcases this, in the way its exhibits inscribed 
executive-clerical hierarchies and reinforced them through new modes of surveillance. In 
Chapter Seven, I will further explore, through a case study of the Long Range Planning 
Department, how computerisation in the Post Office, particularly computer modelling, 
had transformative effects on telecommunications surveillance. The ISDN’s stop-start 
development also provides a segue into the next chapter. As ISDN development faltered, 
the Post Office explored alternative modes of achieving the general-purpose information 
network, attempting to secure a national cable television and a national fibre-optic 
network. In the next chapter, I explore this history of transmission technologies, 
investigating how they were used to conjure various visions of the future through different 
metaphors and discourses. Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the UKTTF study was 
successful because it reinforced a pre-existing vision of the future. In the next, I will 
explore how the Post Office used various future visions to guide the development of 
transmission developments and contributed to a nascent information discourse in Britain. 
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6 The Information Highway 
Metaphor and Vision in the Telecommunications 
Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Wired Style: Principles of English Usage in the Digital Age, a dictionary 
created by the digital utopian magazine Wired, the term ‘information superhighway’ 
refers to a range of high-bandwidth digital communication technologies, and was coined 
by the US Senator Al Gore, Jr in 1978 and later popularised by Gore during the 1990s, 
when he was Vice-President for President Bill Clinton.1 The term, as used by Gore, 
referred to a high-speed digital communications infrastructure, and peaked at the 1994 
Superhighway Summit at the University of California, Los Angeles, where Gore outlined 
his and Clinton’s ambition for a national information infrastructure built on the principles 
of competition and private investment, whilst also ensuring open access and avoiding ‘a 
society of information “Haves” and “Have Nots”’. Gore also lamented the unexpected 
usages of the ‘information superhighway’: a high-tech start-up had complained to him 
about the danger of ending up as ‘road kill on the information superhighway’, whilst other 
companies had petitioned him to support their entry into the communications 
infrastructure market, concerned that they would end up ‘parked at the curb on the 
information superhighway’.2 
 Gore’s speech highlights the power of metaphor, and how the choice and usage 
of a particular metaphor can be used to mobilise various approaches to a specific 
technology. The significance of metaphor has not gone unappreciated in the history of 
technology: studies have been undertaken into the nervous system as a metaphor for 
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Victorian telegraph, and into clockwork and the computer as metaphors for government.3 
Historians and analysts of metaphor have taken different positions on metaphor’s function 
as descriptive or performative. 4 In this chapter, I particularly bear in mind Thomas and 
Wyatt’s view that metaphors are normative, ‘used to help the imaginary become true’, as 
I explore how different metaphors were used by the Post Office to articulate its idealised 
roles for various transmission technologies.5 
 In this chapter, I will explore the technological and metaphorical development of 
transmission technologies in the British telephone network. Elizabeth Bruton has shown 
how, since the late nineteenth century, the development of new wireless technologies has 
been an important part of the Post Office’s role as an institution of the state, projecting 
the state as an institutional innovator.6 As I shall show, this resonates with one of the Post 
Office’s early post-war wireless developments: the construction of BT Tower, previously 
known as the Post Office Tower, in central London, which was positioned by the Post 
Office as part of a high-tech, democratic vision of British post-war modernity through the 
metaphor of the tower as a ‘lighthouse’. 
After the Post Office Tower, the ‘highway’ metaphor came to the fore, and I will 
relate it to the Post Office’s vision for an integrated, universal network for information, 
which I explored with the ISDN in the previous chapter. Related to this history, I explore 
the Post Office and BT’s interest in developing a nationwide cable television network, 
and then a national optical fibre network, as ways of achieving a ‘national grid’ of 
integrated voice, video, and data transmission. The ‘national grid’ and ‘highway’ 
metaphors here supported development of millimetric waveguides and optical fibre as 
high-capacity integrated transmission lines, but, with the privatisation of BT, I shall show 
how the highway metaphor was repositioned to reflect BT’s business interests. I thus also 
explore the Post Office and BT’s relationship with its large business customers in this 
chapter and how that relationship influenced transmission technologies in the UK; I do 
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this through a case study of one of the most influential business customers: the City 
Telecommunications Group, representing the Bank of England and large financial 
institutions from the City of London. 
 
Pillar of Progress 
 
Microwave transmission started with the exploration of centimetre-wavelength radio 
waves, ranging from 300 MHz to 100 GHz frequencies, as a potential medium in the 
1930s. These short waves – ‘micro waves’ – were also known as quasi-optical waves 
because of their similarity to light: both travelled in straight lines, lost intensity over 
distance travelled, and required direct line-of-sight. The key technology enabling 
microwave transmission was velocity-modulated tubes, which are used to generate 
microwaves. The first of these, the klystron, was developed around 1930 and, in 1931, 
experiment radio-relay terminals transmitted telephone and telegraph messages across the 
English Channel, during trials conducted by IT&T’s Paris laboratory, met in the previous 
chapter for Alec Reeves’ PCM work. By 1934, the first Anglo-French radio-relay service 
was open, and in the UK, a second commercial link was opened by the GPO in 1937 
between Stranraer, Scotland, and Belfast, Northern Ireland.7 World War II, however, 
interrupted, and it was not until the 1950s that Britain’s microwave network would begin 
to take shape. 
 The first microwave links to open after World War II in the UK were for 
television: in 1949, a London-Birmingham link opened, followed by a link between 
Manchester and Kirk O’Shotts, Scotland, in 1952. However, full-scale microwave 
telephony development only started in 1956, as it was more difficult to multiplex large 
numbers of telephone calls than it was to transmit a single television signal.8 Two new 
types of microwave generators were used here, rather than the klystron, to build the 
microwave relay network: the cavity magnetron and quartz crystal microwave 
oscillators.9 By 1964, microwave telephone links had opened between Manchester and 
Newcastle, Elgin and Kirkwall in Scotland, and from Carlisle to Belfast. However, two 
key nodes – Birmingham and London – had not been served as, owing to their built 
environments and natural geography, it was difficult to provide line-of-sight links to the 
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city centres (Figure 6.1).10 For this reason, two towers were constructed at the centre of 
London and Birmingham. Construction of the Post Office Tower in London began in 
1961, however, it was not a smooth road from ideation to construction. Dame Evelyn 
Sharp, Permanent Secretary for the Ministry for Housing and Local Government from 
1955-1966, wrote to Ernest Marples in 1959 to express her and her ministry’s ‘horror’ at 
the plans for such a ‘particularly conspicuous’ tower.11 Marples’ reply defended the tower 
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Figure 6.1. The British microwave radio-relay network in 1964, showing links already 
constructed and those in development. 
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as a ‘bold and imaginative solution’ to London’s line of sight problems, which had been 
endorsed by the Royal Fine Arts Commission, and would also offer public amenities in 
the form of a revolving restaurant and observation gallery.12 Construction went ahead, 
and the tower was completed by 1964, opening to the public in 1966. 
 The Post Office used the tower’s amenities and visibility to present itself as a 
highly scientific and technological public service. A visitors’ information booklet 
explained how the tower was ‘a symbol of the modern Post Office, a science based 
industry using the most refined techniques in the telephone, teleprinter, television and 
computer communications so necessary for modern society’.13 The presentation of the 
tower as a high-tech symbol also occurred outside the Post Office: the tower appeared in 
Eagle and Swift boys’ comic in 1964. Peter Bowler has noted Eagle and Swift, which ran 
from 1950 to 1969, as part of the growing importance of visual impact in popularising 
science and technology in Britain at this time, in particular through two recurring features: 
the adventures of Dan Dare, ‘Pilot of the Future’, and its cut-away illustrations of 
technological wonders.14 The Post Office Tower featured in both, with Eagle and Swift’s 
May 31st, 1964, front page showing Dan Dare locked in battle with Xel, a dangerous alien, 
at the Post Office Tower, whilst the cut-away illustration showed off the tower’s interior 
and exterior (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).15 
 The Post Office Tower was evidently presented as a symbol of scientific, 
technological modernity, but contextualising it within the history of 1950s and 1960s 
Britain reveals nuances to that modernity. More recently, the Post Office Tower has been 
associated with the ‘white heat’ of Harold Wilson’s Britain, and yet such an association 
is problematic for two reasons: first, as Christopher Goldie notes, the Post Office Tower 
started construction well before Wilson’s 1963 ‘white heat’ speech; second, as David 
Edgerton rightly points out, the post-war period is better characterised by a bipartisan, 
rather than uniquely left-wing, technological enthusiasm.16 In the previous chapter, I used  
‘defiant modernism’ to describe Highgate Wood. ‘Defiant modernism’ correctly pays 
attention to British technological enthusiasm throughout the Conservative 1950s, and so 
                                                 
12 Ernest Marples to Evelyn Sharp, ‘Post Office Tower’, 1959, POST 122/1172, BTA. 
13 ‘The Post Office Tower London’ 1967, HIC W04/06 Buildings/BT Tower/Press cuttings and images, 
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156 
 
the Post Office Tower could adequately be positioned within this trend. However, ‘defiant 
modernism’ is not a perfect frame. It describes projects in which Britain sought world 
firsts: Comet, the first civilian jet airliner; Calder Hall, the first commercial nuclear power 
plant, and so on. The Post Office Tower, however, was neither the world’s first city-centre 
microwave tower, nor was it the tallest, built both later and smaller than similar radio 
towers in Stuttgart and Dortmund in Germany. 
Most crucially ‘defiant modernism’ fails to capture the Post Office Tower’s public 
amenities, which play an important role in revealing the contested modernity of late 1950s 
and early 1960s Britain. Goldie highlights how the publicly-accessible revolving 
restaurant and observation galleries situate the tower within a longer post-war imbrication 
 
Figure 6.2. The Post Office Tower features on the front cover of Eagle and Swift in a sci-fi 
adventure, 1964. 
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of modernity and democratic participatory citizenship. Goldie compares the tower to 
other social democratic projects such as London’s Royal Festival Hall, built in 1951, 
where publicly accessible spaces could generate new patterns of social relations for a 
democratic, modern Britain. However, Goldie also points out that, whilst the tower’s 
public amenities situate it in a social democratic modernity, the barriers created between 
the expensive, reservation-only, restaurant and the observation gallery perpetuated class 
differences. Goldie’s reading is problematic in that, whilst it recognises the important 
social aspect of the tower’s modernity, it takes the technology out, ignoring the tower’s 
role in the microwave network altogether. 
The Post Office’s metaphor of the tower as a ‘lighthouse’, overlooked by Goldie, 
combined the technological and social functions of the tower into a broader, nuanced 
 
Figure 6.3. The cut-away illustration of the Post Office Tower inside Eagle and Swift, 1964. 
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modernity, interlinking technological progress with public service. The brochure for the 
tower’s opening ceremony described the tower as a ‘lighthouse-looking structure’, whilst 
an information booklet for visitors described the tower as a ‘giant lighthouse’.17 A 1962 
press release also described the tower as a ‘modern, slender lighthouse’. In this press 
release, the metaphor was used to describe two aspects of the tower: first, the revolving 
restaurant – both the restaurant and lighthouses revolve; second, an historic linkage was 
made to a Victorian telephone exchange, which, built upon the roof of a courthouse, was 
also described as a ‘lighthouse’.18 So, as lighthouses illuminate paths of progress for 
ships, the ‘lighthouse’ metaphor here, interlinking the tower as an amenity and a 
technological successor to Victorian exchanges, highlighted the Post Office’s public 
service in societal and technological progress. The ‘lighthouse’ metaphor is also 
suggestive of the quasi-optical features of microwaves, and, when combined with the 
connotations of the lighthouse as a navigational instrument of public service progress, 
indicates an extensive entanglement of the tower’s threefold functions: a node in the 
microwave relay network, a symbol of technological progress, and a site of democratic 
modernity. The metaphor used here was thus more than descriptive: it shows how the 
tower was deployed normatively to present the Post Office as a modern organisation. 
However, this focus on the Post Office Tower obscures other important parts of 
the microwave network: the ‘heart’ of the tower, the Birmingham Radio Tower, and the 
nationwide radio mast network. The base of Post Office Tower was home to the ‘heart 
that makes the tower tick’, as it was called in the Post Office Telecommunications 
Journal: three telephone exchanges (Mercury, switching incoming traffic; Tower, 
switching outgoing traffic; and Museum, a tandem exchange linking two hub exchanges) 
and the London Television Switching Centre.19 These exchanges, obscured by the tower 
rising above them, were as important to the microwave network as the aerials at the top 
of the tower, and yet were much less visible. The Post Office Tower was also not the only 
city centre tower constructed: Birmingham Radio Tower was also built as a node in the 
microwave network, and further underscores how these urban constructions were used to 
illustrate the Post Office’s modernity. Birmingham Radio Tower featured in the 
‘Progress’ series of publicity posters previously mentioned in Chapter Two (Figure 6.4) 
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and, like the Post Office Tower, was labelled ‘like a giant lighthouse but instead of 
sending out a beam of light it transmits microwave radio signals’, further embedding 
microwaves’ quasi-optical nature into the lighthouse metaphor.20 Finally, attention should 
also be given to the nationwide infrastructure of smaller microwave relay towers which 
                                                 
20 ‘Birmingham Radio Tower’ 1981, HIC W04/06 Buildings/BT Tower/Construction, BTA; ‘Progress: 
Birmingham Radio Tower’ 1965, TCB 420/IRP (PR) 6, BTA. 
 
Figure 6.4. Birmingham Radio Tower also featured in the ‘Progress’ poster series, previously 
seen in Chapter Two with the Post Office’s Computer Centre. Courtesy of BT Archives. 
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linked cities together. By 1966, there were 120 relay towers, situated at intervals of about 
thirty miles, with an aggregate route length of 2,000 miles.21 
The Post Office Tower’s fate illustrates the passing of the Post Office’s moment 
of high modernity. On October 31st, 1971, a bomb exploded in the tower’s restaurant 
toilets; initially attributed to the Provisional IRA, the bomb has since also been linked to 
the Angry Brigade, a British anarchist collective active from 1970 to 1972. The tower 
was subsequently closed to the public and, after the restaurant’s lease expired in 1980, 
the restaurant remained closed.22 Whilst the tower continued to be used for microwave 
transmission, its closure signalled the beginning of the end for the modern Post Office 
Tower. By the 1990s, the tower had been renamed BT Tower, and BT experienced 
growing criticism for its continuing closure of the tower to the public, whilst using it for 
corporate functions. A 1994 editorial in The Independent criticised ‘the ephemeral fizz of 
public relations receptions’ which excluded the public, whilst a 1995 article in The 
Scotsman, ‘Tower to the People’, laid in heavily, asking ‘how come, 30 years on, nobody 
except corporate fat-cats can get inside it?’.23 Whilst the tower would continue to transmit 
into the 2000s, giving it a healthy forty-year lifespan, by the 1990s, it was clear that the 
Post Office Tower’s original era of democratic modernity was over. 
 
The Super Communications Highway 
 
Even as Britain’s skies were filling with microwaves in the 1960s, the Post Office’s 
attention had already turned terrestrially to a new subterranean transmission medium: the 
millimetric waveguide. However, despite its earthly bounds, the millimetric waveguide 
can also be seen as a direct descendant of microwave transmission. Millimetric 
waveguides are metallic tubes used to direct waves; ‘millimetric’ refers to the waves’ 
wavelength, so extending the development of the centimetre wavelength for aerial 
microwave transmission. The smaller wavelength accentuated the quasi-optical nature of 
the microwaves, and so, where centimetric microwaves could be transmitted through the 
air, millimetric microwaves suffered too much degradation during rainstorms and other 
adverse conditions. The trade-off, however, was that as wavelength decreased, frequency 
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increased, which meant higher bandwidth and greater transmission capacity; metallic 
tubes – waveguides – were thus proposed as a housing and guidance system for 
millimetric microwaves. In the UK, the IEE held the first conference on millimetric 
waveguides in 1959, and a conference report in The Post Office Electrical Engineers’ 
Journal suggested that further research and development work was needed.24 
 The Post Office was not the only organisation to explore waveguide development. 
Bell Labs also undertook a lengthy research and development programme on waveguides, 
which was abandoned by 1973, and STL also conducted some early research into 
waveguides.25 Alec Reeves was the chief figure at STL assessing waveguides, and was 
unconvinced, particularly regarding limitations in waveguide geometry: to avoid signal 
degradation, waveguides needed to avoid significant kinks and tight turns. The significant 
distances between urban centres in the USA meant that waveguides, requiring gentle, 
sweeping curves, were potentially suited for AT&T’s needs; Reeves, however, was 
sceptical that waveguides would be suited to the densely built-up British landscape, and 
so, in 1963, STL abandoned their waveguide project and pursued optical fibre 
transmission instead.26 However, the Post Office continued to pursue waveguide research, 
tempted by the high-capacity millimetric waveguides potential role in the future 
integrated digital information network. 
 Before that, however, I will first explore how the waveguide project intersected 
with the relocation from Dollis Hill. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the need for more 
space, both for manpower and research trials, was the primary motivation for the move. 
The earliest research trial at Martlesham Heath was a 1-mile circular waveguide test, 
undertaken in 1967 by a team of Post Office research staff, working with Professor Harold 
Barlow, a UCL Professor of Electrical Engineering.27  The Martlesham area was also used 
for 14km trial between Martlesham Heath and Wickham Market in 1975. The trial was 
broadly successful, but had required a significant degree of auxiliary infrastructure: a 
special bridge to navigate a river, a purpose-made tunnel for a stream and marsh, and 
‘mirror corners’, using reflective surfaces to bounce the beams at tight angles, were tested 
in segments with unavoidable sharp bends. The waveguide also required mechanical 
tensioning using tensioning equipment installed at both ends: the waveguide had to be 
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held taut to mitigate soil subsidence and overcome the problems of expansion and 
contraction due to temperature changes.28 
 The mixed successes of the waveguide trials, combined with the Post Office’s 
pursuit of waveguide transmission well after STL and AT&T had abandoned it, invites 
the question of why the Post Office continued with the waveguide. The answer is 
complex, and can be explained by three inter-related factors: first, the Post Office’s vision 
for an integrated high-speed digital network, explored in the previous chapter; second, 
and related to the first, is a broader vision of an impending information revolution with 
high bandwidth needs; and third, the Post Office’s views on the time optical fibre 
development would take and the eventual position that optical fibre would occupy in the 
network. The Post Office’s use of a ‘highway’ metaphor for the waveguide is particularly 
revealing of these three factors’ entanglement. 
The waveguide was highly influenced by the UKTTF study on the integrated 
digital network, which I outlined in the previous chapter. The UKTTF’s conclusion that 
the entire telephone network should be digitalised was used to reinforce the privileged 
status of the waveguide as the natural next step for transmission. Digitalisation suited Post 
Office expectations of the future in two ways – first, in the expanding number of 
connections the network would need to provide, and second, in the forms of transmission 
the Post Office expected to carry – and the waveguide was highlighted as a key 
technology for meeting both expectations. The UKTTF report had found that the benefits 
of digitalization would be so strong that it would be economical regardless of transmission 
medium: coaxial copper cable, microwave, or waveguide. However, waveguide was 
specifically highlighted in the study as the most cost-effective and high-bandwidth 
transmission medium available, and the UKTTF’s final report included a recommended 
waveguide layout for 1986, stretching from London to Bristol, and to Carlisle via 
Manchester and Leeds, with onward connections to Cardiff and Glasgow if there was 
enough demand for Viewphone in those cities.29 Viewphone again appears as a symbol 
of the future needs of the integrated digital network, but I will postpone its discussion to 
the next chapter on the Long Range Planning Department, given that department’s central 
role in sustaining the Viewphone future. The UKTTF report also addressed optical fibre, 
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but only as an experimental technology, and did not included it in any forecasts.30 
Millimetric waveguides, already identified as a high-capacity successor to centimetric 
microwaves, were thus seen as an important technology for the integrated digital network. 
 The relationship and relative status of optical fibre and waveguides continued to 
influence appraisals of both mediums through the 1970s. In 1972, a meeting of the 
Managing Director’s Committee for Telecommunications, including Fennessy and 
Merriman, noted that optical fibre research was demonstrating greater potential than 
expected, but predicted that waveguides would still be used in the main trunk network, 
whilst optical fibres were more suitable for the local network.31 In the mid-1970s, Post 
Office publicity and information brochures described waveguides as the ‘big brother’ of 
optical fibres, carrying heavy communications traffic, whereas optical fibres would 
provide lower-capacity transmission for local networks.32 This complementary attitude 
was particularly prominent at a 1976 IEE conference on the millimetric waveguide, where 
Merriman, in the opening address, argued that waveguides ‘will have to be judged – 
against their timeliness and their relevance – or irrelevance – to the spectrum of 
competing or complementary technologies’.33 Merriman gave an overview of potential 
alternatives to the waveguide: coaxial, low-bandwidth but already in extensive use; 
microwave, already exhausting the available frequency spectrum and vulnerable to 
degradation during heavy weather; satellites, only economically viable for international 
transmission; and optical fibre, ‘not yet in a position to compete’ in the trunk network, 
but a promising option for high-capacity local transmission. Merriman concluded that 
waveguides were the clear victor, referencing ‘their extraordinary capability for 
information/bandwidth’.34 
However, complementary relationships between trunk waveguides and local 
optical fibre did not extend to the Research Department, where various research groups 
competed to make transmission breakthroughs. Chris Wheddon recalls significant 
competition: 
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There was then three competing transmission technologies, well four if you include 
satellite, there was coax, there was waveguide, there was optical and there was satellite 
and they were all vying to be top dog … the early days of optical fibres, using the lasers, 
they lasted about five minutes you know, and we were saying “Oh you guys, they can’t 
get it to work for more than a couple of days and it all buggers off!”. So we thought they 
were well, had got their heads in the clouds.35 
Ray Hooper remembered that, at the 1976 IEE waveguide conference, one Post Office 
engineer breached the complementary view of waveguides and optical fibre: 
One of the funniest things I remember, a guy called Dick Dyott, he died a couple of years 
ago but he was something of a character, as they say, and Dick was very good and he got 
up in the meeting and they were talking about comparison between the circular waveguide 
and optical fibre; he got up and said “Well, carry on laying your circular waveguides – 
we can use that as duct for the optical fibres!”. That didn’t go down very well but I thought 
that was hugely funny.36  
Ironically, the vision of complementary transmission methods would later be BT’s 
downfall, as BT attempted to secure a national optical fibre network to fulfil their general-
purpose information network ambition; I will address this in the next section on optical 
fibre and the deregulation of the British telephone network. 
The waveguide philosophy peaked in 1977 with the Post Office board’s approval 
of the first trunk transmission system designed specifically for digital use: a link built 
between Reading and Bristol, linking the South Wales and the West with London. Bristol 
was also an important node for routing international traffic to London from submarine 
cable stations in Cornwall and the Post Office’s two satellite earth stations in Cornwall 
and Herefordshire. Two variants for the link were proposed: first, a waveguide, ready by 
the end of the decade; second, an optical fibre link, which would not be available until 
1983. The Managing Director’s Committee for Telecommunications recommended the 
waveguide variant to the board due to the uncertainty of optical fibre research, which had 
not yet entered development stages, and also because the Post Office, as one of the few 
remaining waveguide pioneers, had the opportunity to showcase its world-leading 
position and create an export market for Britain. The waveguide decision also further 
highlights the high expectations for future transmission needs, especially in video 
transmission: forecasts suggested that only 20% of the waveguide’s capacity would be 
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required over 20 years, but presented this as an opportunity to use excess capacity for 
other transmission types, including video-conferencing.37 The Post Office Management 
Board’s selection of the waveguide link also shows a new perspective on the waveguide-
optical fibre relationship: the Bristol-Reading waveguide was seen as an ‘insurance’ 
against delays in the development of optical fibre.38  
 The Bristol-Reading waveguide project failed, signalling the death of the 
waveguide. The Post Office board, as part of the project’s ‘insurance policy’ status, had 
also decided in advance that Bristol-Reading would be the only waveguide link, expecting 
that optical fibre would come good before other trunk routes required their own 
waveguides. This attitude filtered down to the Post Office’s manufacturing partners on 
the project, Marconi and BICC. Marconi, now uncertain of whether there would be a 
British waveguide market, decided to recoup all waveguide R&D expenditure from the 
Bristol-Reading project, significantly raising the costs for the Post Office. However, it 
was not just the influence of manufacturing which affected the project’s prospects, but 
also the broader downturn in Britain in the 1970s. This had slowed telephone growth 
relative to the UKTTF’s earlier forecasts: the Post Office’s optimistic projections of a 
high-capacity integrated digital network, serving telephony, data, and video over 
waveguides had become excessive after the effects of economic slumps on telephone 
use.39 The combinations of slow telephone growth, faster-than-anticipated optical fibre 
development, and higher manufacturing costs, meant that the Post Office cancelled the 
Bristol-Reading waveguide project in 1978. 
 The waveguide, whilst not a technical success, was, however, a metaphorical 
success. The waveguide had surfaced the Post Office’s first uses of the ‘highway’ 
metaphor, before Al Gore’s 1978 coining of the ‘information superhighway’, and well 
before the metaphor’s 1990s digital utopian popularity. The Post Office, however, was 
not the first user of the ‘highway’ metaphor in relation to communication networks: in 
the 1920s, AT&T used the phrase ‘a highway of communication’ to compare its telephone 
network – a government-sanctioned private monopoly – to the public highways system, 
attempting to persuade its customers, as Marchand capably expresses, of ‘the logic and 
beneficence of a unified system’.40 
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 The Post Office used the ‘highway’ metaphor to communicate the waveguide’s 
high bandwidth and the telephone business’s plans for a general-purpose digital 
information network. The highway metaphor first appeared in the Post Office 
Telecommunications Journal in 1970, where waveguides were described as ‘highways of 
communication’ and ‘super-highways for telecommunications traffic’.41 This continued 
throughout the 1970s: the waveguide, as a ‘high capacity communication highway’, was 
also called optical fibre’s ‘big brother’.42 Publicity for the 1975 Martlesham-Wickham 
Market trial described waveguides as a ‘super-highway’ solution which the Post Office 
had prepared for ‘major telecommunication highways’, and various press notices for the 
Bristol-Reading link called it a ‘super communications highway’, explaining that it would 
carry data, television, videophone, and video-conferencing services for the integrated 
digital network.43 
The highway metaphor took hold in the 1970s because of the Post Office’s plans 
for a high-capacity general purpose information network for voice, video, and data. This 
demonstrates two points: first, the waveguide may have failed, but the Post Office only 
pursued it for so long because of its need for a ready solution to the integrated information 
network. The waveguide may therefore occupy the same position in the Post Office as 
Picturephone did for AT&T. Picturephone was a prototype videophone launched by 
AT&T at the 1964 New York World Fair in its $500 million Picturephone Center. Despite 
this fanfare, Picturephone had a lukewarm reception; AT&T installed booths that year in 
New York, Chicago and Washington, D.C., but had only seventy-one patrons in the first 
six months, and by 1970 nobody was using them. In 1970, the first customer sets debuted 
in Pittsburgh, but over two years only thirty-two sets were sold. By 1978, service had 
ceased. Picturephone was, conventionally, a failure, but Lipartito argues that it was also 
‘a rather successful piece of the technological imagination that guided innovators by 
helping to establish a basic paradigm for information services and technology’.44 
Picturephone successfully embedded visions of an information revolution in AT&T, and 
I would suggest that the waveguide superhighway did the same for the Post Office. 
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Second, the waveguide also shows how the ‘highway’ metaphor was an 
information metaphor before its apparent invention by Al Gore. The Post Office’s view 
that ‘communications highways’ would be used in the future for all types of information 
– telephony, video services, television, and data – predates the ‘information 
superhighway’ metaphor, which is itself arguably even narrower in scope, referring to 
data alone. AT&T had used the highway metaphor earlier, but the Post Office was 
involved in the early years of its most popular variant: the highway as an information 
highway. 
 
Visions for Cable and Optical Fibre 
 
A recurring theme in the previous section was the faster-than-anticipated development of 
optical fibre. In this section, I shall explore the Post Office’s development of optical fibre 
and its intersection with two other developments: the liberalisation and privatisation of 
the telephone system, and the Post Office and BT’s ongoing interest in developing a 
national cable television network as an alternative path to the general-purpose 
information network. I also explore the pressures exerted by the City of London on the 
Post Office and BT’s transmission network, which resulted in BT ending its policy of 
region-neutrality in the transmission network and concentrating resources on London. 
Alongside these histories, I also explore the evolution of the ‘highway’ metaphor within 
BT and its transition from a metaphor for waveguides, then optical fibre, and then the 
ISDN. 
 Optical fibre transmission uses light waves, generated by lasers, to transmit 
communication signals down optical fibres, made of ultra-transparent glass, which guide 
light waves through internal reflections from their interior surface. This means that, just 
as the millimetric waveguide succeeded centimetric microwaves by using increasingly 
higher frequency, shorter wavelength, regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, so optical 
fibre succeeded the waveguide, by using even the higher frequencies of near-visible light, 
and in applying the same principle of using tubes to guide waves. Whilst superficially the 
three transmission methods discussed in this chapter look very different, transmitting 
through the air, metal tubes, and glass fibres, they are all in fact neighbours on the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
 Optical fibre was pioneered at STL in the 1960s; the key figure at STL was 
Charles Kao, a Chinese-born engineer who, in 1969, proving that ultra-transparent glass 
could be synthesised and used for low-loss laser communications, and later won a Nobel 
168 
 
Prize in Physics in 2009 for his pioneering breakthrough. Jeff Hecht has shown that the 
Post Office had a significant influence on Kao’s research: Kao worked for STC, a 
manufacturer and not a network provider, and so needed partners and customers. The Post 
Office, as both a domestic telephone carrier and research organisation, was an ideal 
partner. Its requirements for a local transmission system to complement waveguides set 
the standards which Kao targeted with his research – a degradation of at most 20 decibels 
per kilometre.45 Post Office research staff collaborated with STL, working on new ways 
to synthesise glass fibres, as well as setting benchmarks for optical fibre’s credibility: 
they were crucial for verifying the purity and credibility of glass fibres synthesised by 
Corning Glass in 1970, another breakthrough following Kao’s proof of ultra-transparent 
glass.46  
 These breakthroughs triggered the start of a race through the 1970s and 1980s to 
create practical optical fibres. Important developments at laboratories around the world 
followed, including new fabrication techniques for optical fibre and the creation of small, 
reliable lasers, by 1977 the Post Office had two working trials: a 13km low-bandwidth 
8.448 Mbit/s link and a high-bandwidth 7.25km 140 Mbit/s link.47 These trials were the 
first fibre-optic installations in the British telephone network, and also represent Post 
Office research staff’s pursuit of fibre optic world firsts into the 1980s. In 1979, orders 
were placed with STC, GEC, and Plessey to begin optical fibre installation in fifteen 
routes across Britain.48 Several of these tested experimental low-bandwidth links in 
different environments, such as lakebeds, but three links were high-bandwidth 140 Mbit/s 
cables, including a Reading-London link. Only a year after the cancellation of the Bristol-
Reading waveguide, preliminary tests were taking place to standardise optical fibre 
systems. In the 1980s, the Post Office broke several optical fibre world records: in 1982, 
research staff tested a 140 Mbit/s link over 102km, the longest in the world; the following 
year, the Post Office placed the first order in the world for a commercial optical fibre link, 
running between Milton Keynes and Luton.49 This culminated in 1985 with another 
record – the fastest transmission rate ever achieved over optical fibre, 2.4 Gbit/s over 
32km of cable – and a prize for the research staff – a Queen’s Award for Technological 
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Achievement.50 Hecht labels this period the ‘Fiber-Optic Performance Olympics’, with 
records set and broken around the world on a frequent basis.51 In the British case, 
highlighting these breakthroughs also lends additional context to the Bristol-Reading 
waveguide’s cancellation, illustrating the surprising pace of fibre-optic development. It 
took a decade from Charles Kao’s breakthrough at STL in 1969 to the installation of the 
first trunk network fibre-optic trials in 1979, but less than four years later, BT was 
ordering and installing commercial systems. 
One of the earliest areas prioritised by BT for fibre-optic rollout was the City of 
London financial district. An October 1983 press release from BT proudly announced 
that London would be one of the world’s first cities to get ‘communication highways of 
glass’.52 The press release highlighted the business services provided by optical fibre, and 
described how optical fibre would hook up the City of London and London Docklands. 
Docklands seems incongruous here, but in fact corresponds to another example of City 
prioritisation which I explore in Chapter Eight: from 1984, Docklands was home to 
London ‘Teleport’, a new satellite earth station installed in London specifically to provide 
the City financial district with better international communication links. 
 This prioritisation came after many years of dialogue and lobbying between the 
City of London and the Post Office/BT. In 1968, the Bank of England organised the City 
Telecommunications Subcommittee (CTC), a sub-committee of the Committee on 
Invisible Exports, which had been created in 1968 by the Bank of England and the British 
National Export Council in order to promote the City’s ‘invisible’ exports – financial 
services and associated activities – abroad.53 Initially, the CTC acted as a technical liaison 
and reporting service on behalf of the City to the Post Office, requesting updates on the 
roll-out of various services such as telex and data services, and reporting various technical 
issues.54 However, this changed in 1974: the Subcommittee was enlarged into an 
independent Committee, and gained more representatives from City financial institutions 
in response to ‘the increasing inadequacies of international and domestic services’.55 The 
committee embraced more of a political lobbying mindset, although its focus was still 
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ostensibly on the City’s present and future telecommunications requirements. This 
change had been in the works since 1973, when some subcommittee members began 
lobbying for organisational reform of the Post Office, including privatisation, and the sub-
committee eventually agreed it needed a more formal framework for lobbying the Post 
Office in order to cement London as an international financial centre.56 
 The CTC became more aggressive in its complaints to the Post Office, particularly 
during engineering strikes, although this also formed part of a tacit alliance against 
organised labour: the Post Office had informally let the CTC know that, during strikes, it 
welcomed complaints from the City, as it gave leverage against the Post Office 
Engineering Union.57 However, once the Conservatives came to power in 1979 and 
preparations began for liberalisation, the CTC became much more overt in lobbying for 
organisational change in telecommunications. A paper authored by the Foreign Exchange 
and Currency Deposit Brokers’ Association in August 1979, and used by the CTC, shows 
how the City was already planning on lobbying the government for several changes, 
including: liberalisation of the telephone network, allowing competing networks to be set 
up; liberalisation of customer premises equipment, so terminals such as telephones and 
other machines could be bought from third-party suppliers; a new regulatory authority to 
oversee the Post Office and its successor, BT; and finally, an argument against the 
‘integrated network’, which the City felt was inherently monopolistic.58 
BT responded to City lobbying with the London ‘TeleCity’ concept, proposed by 
Alex Reid, BT’s Director of Business Systems, which fused together several projects 
mentioned throughout this thesis: the ISDN and X-Stream services mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the City optical fibre grid addressed in this chapter, and the London 
Teleport, which I explore in Chapter Seven.59 The London ‘TeleCity’, which Reid fully 
acknowledged had been stimulated by pressure from the City, was announced as a break 
away from the ‘uniformity’ principle which had guided the telephone system previously, 
where geographical regions were treated equally by the Post Office and BT, and would 
instead be replaced by a system where the City was prioritised above all. The London 
TeleCity meant that the City would be the first to receive ISDN, X-Stream services, local 
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optical fibre networks, and would get its own satellite earth station. Such a policy, Reid 
posited, would benefit the City, BT, and ‘the National Economy’.60 
This policy stands in contrast to planning for the microwave network, where the 
most visible users were the BBC and ITA television networks. London was of course the 
most important node in the trunk system, but neither the City’s financial institutions, nor 
specific regions of London, such as the City, featured in any of the planning documents 
mentioned above, such as the UKTTF report. Instead, the BBC and ITA, the new 
independent television agency created in 1954, were the only significant user highlighted 
in plans for microwave network. Waveguide planning never reached the stage where 
specific users were mentioned but, given the first route was planned from Bristol to 
London, and given City users’ dissatisfaction with international telecommunications 
during the 1970s, the Bristol-Reading waveguide, which would carry international traffic 
to and from the Post Office’s submarine cable stations and satellite earth stations, could 
possibly be read as a sign of City prioritisation by the telephone business. 
 The rapid pace of fibre-optic development continued through the 1980s, and, even 
with the shift to prioritising data services and optical fibre in the City, video transmission 
still featured in other ways. By 1989, BT had installed 600,000 kilometres of optical fibre 
in the trunk network, and so turned its attention to the local network.61 BT started a fibre-
to-the-home trial, or ‘FttH’, in 1989 in Bishop’s Stortford, a market town approximately 
thirty miles north of London, and one of the trial’s novel features was the provision of 
broadcast TV and a ‘video library’, which meant that, alongside telephony and data, 
customers could also receive up to thirty TV channels and access a ‘video library’, which 
would allow them to play TV shows and movies stored on a remote data-bank on 
demand.62 This was an advanced trial, but also not out-of-step with the ambitions of the 
time: similar trials were undertaken in Japan, Canada, France, and the USA from the late 
1970s to the early 1990s.63 
 The Post Office’s interest in providing television, along with data and telephony, 
over cable networks stretches back to its early integrated digital network trials in the 
1960s. During these trials, telecom engineers identified that, with more advanced cables, 
it would be possible to provide up to nine television channels, along with voice and data, 
                                                 
60 ‘Telecommunications in the City of London: A Note on the Telecity Studies, 23 October 1980, 
6A403/3, BoE’. 
61 T.R. Rowbotham, ‘Plans for a British Trial of Fibre to the Home’, British Telecommunications 
Engineering 8, no. 2 (1989): 78. 
62 Rowbotham, ‘Plans for a British Trial of Fibre to the Home’. 
63 Hecht, City of Light, 219–24. 
172 
 
over the network; the economics at that point were unfavourable and so a lower 
bandwidth system had been used instead for the trials in Washington, Irvine, Craigavon, 
and Milton Keynes.64 However, in the mid-1970s a review of broadcasting in the UK, the 
Annan Committee, reignited the Post Office’s interest in providing cable TV. 
 Cable TV first appeared in 1951, but had been limited to a supplementary role, 
extending television coverage to areas with limited or no reception.65 In 1974, Wilson’s 
Labour government convened the Annan Committee to make a recommendation on the 
allocation of the fourth and final terrestrial channel with complete coverage across the 
UK; by this point, the rest of the available bandwidth had been allocated to BBC 1, BBC 
2, and the ITA. The Managing Director’s Committee for Telecommunications saw the 
Annan Committee, which only had one technical expert on the panel – Professor Geoffrey 
Sims, Head of the Electronics Department at Southampton University – as an opportunity, 
under the guise of technical advice, to lobby for a Post Office cable television network.66 
The Annan Committee’s remit to investigate the expansion of broadcasting was 
interpreted within the Post Office as an opportunity to expand cable television, and it 
believed that, both technically and politically, it had the right to develop and administer 
a national cable network for television, telephony and data. The Post Office only viewed 
itself as the network provider, leaving ‘operation’ – i.e. broadcasting and programming – 
to actual broadcasting corporations like the BBC and ITA.67 Merriman’s evidence for the 
Annan Committee, submitted on behalf of the Post Office, outlined the Post Office’s 
previous experience in cable provision in its early integrated digital network trials, and 
argued that ‘the transmission of information was PO business’, viewing a national cable 
television network as a means for the ‘integration of a wide range of service options in 
the PO telecomms network’.68 It summarised its evidence with the argument that ‘present 
and future telecoms services, together with TV broadcasts, could most economically and 
conveniently be carried on a single wideband network provided by a single 
administration’, which aligned with its existing philosophy for developing an integrated 
digital network. The Annan Committee, however, elected not to review cable television, 
but, apart from its main recommendation to set up an independent fourth broadcast 
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channel (which became Channel 4 in 1980), also recommended that, if a national cable 
television network was to be created, it should be provided by the Post Office.69 
 This remained the case until a flurry of cable TV reports were produced by the 
Thatcher government in 1982 and 1983. The first report was undertaken by Cabinet 
Office’s Information Technology Advisory Panel (ITAP), and the BT board again lobbied 
the panel, keen to establish a broadband cable network for television, telephony, and 
interactive information services for entertainment, banking, and advertising.70 In the 
short-term, BT envisioned using coaxial cable, but in the medium-term planned to use 
optical fibre, showing BT’s nascent visions for FttH. The BT board was aware that the 
Thatcher government’s liberalising stance meant it was incredibly unlikely that the report 
would recommend the creation of a publicly-owned national cable infrastructure, and so 
BT’s board also accepted that, in the very least, a private venture partnership would be 
necessary, but also suggested that it would be amenable to privatisation – which was still 
not set in stone – if it meant that it would be able to develop a national cable network in 
return.71 
 The ITAP report, released in 1982, was not favourable to BT, recommending the 
expansion and liberalisation of cable TV so customers could receive multiple channels 
and interactive services from private, regional cable TV operators, and only awarded BT 
a limited role in setting technical standards, explicitly rejecting a publicly-funded national 
network operated by BT.72 The ITAP report was, however, only advisory, and so BT 
lobbied the government again as a second official review into cable television, the Hunt 
Review, started. BT board members were particularly critical of the ITAP report’s 
indiscrimination between cable providers and cable operators, arguing that the 
government needed to consider cable TV in the broader context of a national information 
infrastructure: 
Broadband links provided initially for entertainment TV should be seen in the context of 
a national strategy for developing information technology infrastructure; network 
configuration and technologies should be adopted which were capable of carrying 
broadcast TV distribution, TV narrow casting, a wide range of interactive services, two-
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way video switched services and interconnection with national and international 
telecommunication networks.73 
 However, again BT were ignored. The Hunt Review decided against 
distinguishing between cable provision and operation which mean, to the BT Board’s 
lament, that ‘the concept of a totally integrated system would not be achievable’.74 The 
review also neglected BT’s point that a national cable network could be used for 
telecommunications as well as television, and instead recommended that the government 
franchise out regional cable TV systems. In a compensatory gesture, the report also 
recommended that cable TV franchises should not provide telephony, but left the door 
open for data provision. However, as BT had tried to point out to the government, this 
latter recommendation was nonsensical as digital encoding meant it was impossible to 
differentiate between the transmission of voice and data.75 The Hunt Review’s 
recommendations, which effectively repeated the ITAP report, were formalised in a 1983 
government white paper, The Development of Cable Systems and Services.76 Cable 
networks were rolled out as regional franchises, but BT and Mercury’s duopoly over 
voice and data was preserved, restricting the cable networks to television. The 
government permitted BT to participate in consortia bids for cable franchises, and 
successful participated in five: Aberdeen, Coventry, Ulster, Merseyside, and 
Westminster.77 
These reports had not addressed optical fibre networks, and so as BT rolled out 
optical fibre throughout the 1980s, hope still remained to create an optical fibre ‘national 
grid’, serving every household with telephony, data, and video. Several government 
reports in the mid and late 1980s addressed this idea: in 1986, the Peacock Committee, 
ostensibly reviewing the financing of the BBC, recommended that BT ought to be 
permitted to construct a fibre-optic national grid for TV and telecommunications, and in 
1988, two further reports – one advisory, and one representing official government policy 
– were released. The first, ‘Optoelectronics: Building on our Investment’, by the Advisory 
Committee on Science and Technology (ACOST) argued in favour of state funding of a 
national grid, whilst the second, ‘The Infrastructure for Tomorrow’, produced by the 
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Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) concluded that the government should not fund 
a national grid.78 
The DTI’s primary reason was that to do so would promote BT over Mercury, but 
the report is also interesting for how it played the fibre-optic national grid against BT’s 
commitment to the ISDN. The report argued that infrastructure policy should not only 
take competition between firms – such as BT and Mercury – into account, but that it 
should also take competition between technologies into account. The government should 
thus not ‘pin its colours’ on a particular technology.79 The report, turning BT’s own 
ambition for an integrated digital network against itself, drew attention to how the ISDN 
meant that: 
The barriers between services are crumbling (voice, vision and data are indistinguishable 
in digital form; films made for the cinema may receive their first showing on TV or on 
video-cassette). The barriers between delivery mechanisms should also crumble. The 
screen and telephone are oblivious to the technology that lie behind them – as are their 
users! Thus a call to a mobile telephone in the field of a farm might come by a satellite 
from Hong Kong to a Mercury dish, through a BT line onto a cellular radio system.80 
Rendering its view of a competitive marketplace for technologies completely explicit, the 
report argued that by increasing the technologies available to the end user, a wide range 
of business opportunities would arise, allowing the market-place to determine which 
would succeed and which would fail.81 
 The government’s rejection of FttH, amongst other influences, became entangled 
with the BT’s metaphors for optical fibre. The ‘highway’ metaphor did not transition 
smoothly from waveguides to optical fibre – instead, a new term arose: ‘Lightlines’, BT’s 
brand for optical fibre.82 ‘Lightlines’ was launched in 1982 with the completion of the 
London-Birmingham fibre-optic link, and was used frequently over the next few years, 
before ‘highways’ began to mount a come-back in the mid-1980s, with the Nottingham-
Sheffield fibre-optic link announced as a ‘high-capacity, long-distance highway’. The two 
metaphors were eventually fused in 1988 when Lightlines were described as ‘a network 
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of super highways of glass fibres for visual communications’.83 There are several factors 
which I suggest influenced the rise and fall of ‘Lightlines’: the association of the highway 
metaphor with the failed waveguide may still have been problematic in the early 1980s, 
whilst the ‘lightline’ metaphor, conveying how optical fibres work on a more physical 
level than the abstract, information-oriented ‘highway’, may have been seen as more 
informative and educational. ‘Lightline’, as a constructed term, would also have been 
better suited as a brand name for the competitive marketplace, and so the DTI’s rejection 
of a national fibre optic grid may have also contributed to Lightline’s demise. Regardless, 
as the 1980s progressed, the re-appearance of the ‘highway’, used again to convey the 
optical fibre’s high bandwidth, demonstrates that ‘Lightline’ was not connoting the 
desired meanings.   
 There was another, short-lived, metaphor at play in the late 1980s, already 
mentioned above: the fibre-optic network as a ‘national grid’, used in the ACOST and 
DTI reports, and also in press coverage of FttH. The ‘national grid’ was an evocative 
analogy with the United Kingdom’s power network, known as the national grid for much 
of the twentieth century, and clearly attempted to draw parallels with the near-universal 
connectivity of the power network, as well as connoting its public ownership (the 
electricity market was not liberalised and privatised in the UK until 1990). However, with 
the government’s rejection of FttH and the deregulation of the electricity market, the 
‘national grid’ metaphor faded away, and by the early 1990s, when a spate of opinion 
pieces advocating government-funded FttH appeared in The Guardian, it was the 
‘highway’ metaphor which took centre-stage again – this time, ironically referring to Al 
Gore’s free market usage at the 1994 Superhighway Summit.84 
  However, by this point, BT had already transitioned the ‘highway’ metaphor 
away from FttH and applied it to ISDN, which had rolled out nationally, finally achieving 
the decades-long vision of a general-purpose network. BT launched its nationwide ISDN 
service in 1998 under the brand name ‘Highway’, a broadband service which enabled 
customers to surf the internet and use their phone line simultaneously. Highway, 
providing simultaneous voice and data services to its customers, was thus the culmination 
of Merriman’s 1967 vision for a nationwide general-purpose network. 
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However, Highway also showed the influences of liberalisation and business 
markets on BT since both Merriman’s speech and the participatory, democratic Post 
Office Tower. Highway adverts told audiences to ‘find out how the business highway can 
help you work faster’ and to ‘get on the BT highway’.85 A TV advert started with a car 
speeding down a road at night, before it suddenly stops, its headlights illuminating a man 
sitting at his desk, using both his phone and computer simultaneously. The car reverses 
its journey until it returns to its starting point, illuminating the word ‘Drive’.86 The 
advert’s implication was clear: the physical, road-based journey was interrupted and 
reversed by a vision of a businessman making two simultaneous virtual journeys – 
telephonic and computerised. These adverts divorced the highway metaphor from optical 
fibre – and, indeed, all transmission media – altogether, and instead pitted metaphor 
directly against its real-life counterpart, with the message that the virtual, metaphorical, 
highway was superior to the material, physical highway, and that BT, in its new 
competitive condition, was the toll road operator. This highway was not just a highway: 
it was a turnpike, and it could only have been in this new political and economic 
environment that such a metaphor, positioning private telecommunications above public 
roads, would be permissible. This in turn highlights the profound changes in 
telecommunications which had occurred since the Post Office Tower, when the 
‘lighthouse’ metaphor had connoted norms of democratic participatory citizenship. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the development of the transmission technologies used in 
the British telephone network since World War II, and related the metaphors used for 
these technologies to the Post Office and BT’s political and economic context, as well as 
the telephone system’s goal create a high-capacity integrated digital network. 
 The Post Office Tower, in Post Office publicity and sci-fi comics, was part of a 
1960s scientific and technological enthusiasm, but the tower’s public amenities and the 
‘lighthouse’ metaphor show how this enthusiasm, characterised elsewhere as ‘defiant 
modernism’, was interlinked with ideals of democratic participatory citizenship. These 
ideals were replaced within the Post Office by expectations for a high-capacity integrated 
digital network, and the millimetric waveguide, an information ‘highway’, was presented 
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as the technology to turn those expectations into reality. Whilst the waveguide failed, it 
embedded new ways of talking about communications technologies in the Post Office: 
the high modern visibility of technology in artefacts like the Post Office Tower and 
Highgate Wood had been replaced by a nascent information discourse, articulated in the 
vision of an integrated digital network, and reinforced – but ultimately not reified – by 
the failed waveguide. 
 In the 1970s, as the waveguide failed and political opportunity presented itself, 
attention turned to optical fibre and cable television. The former represented an alternative 
means to realise the integrated digital network of voice, data, and video services – ‘the 
transmission of information was PO business’ – and so cable television was added as 
another form of information for the integrated digital network. The telephone business’s 
attempts to secure a nationwide cable network failed, and so optical fibre, which the Post 
Office and BT had taken a worldwide lead in developing, took up the mantle for a 
nationwide information network. After a brief flirtation with the ‘Lightlines’ 
metaphor/brand, the highway metaphor returned to again connote high bandwidth for all 
types of information. However, another metaphor, the ‘national grid’, connoting universal 
access, appeared when a national optical fibre network seemed viable. The ‘national grid’ 
might be considered the ‘lighthouse’ of the 1980s: both referred to long-established 
infrastructures constructed for the public good and available to all. However, where 
‘lighthouse’ enjoyed some success in the 1960s, the ‘national grid’ was clearly not suited 
to its political environment, as the national fibre-optic grid was rejected and the 
metaphor’s real-life counterpart, the electricity network, liberalised and deregulated not 
long after. 
The ‘highway’ metaphor, in contrast, adapted to its environment. As the national 
fibre-optic network was rejected, ironically in favour of BT’s other general-purpose 
network, the ISDN, ‘highway’ instead came to refer to BT’s 1990s nationwide ISDN 
network, marketed to business customers and implicitly positioning privately-owned 
virtual networks over publicly-owned physical networks. This business orientation came 
after growing pressure, from the late 1970s, from financial institutions in the City of 
London, which organised to lobby the Post Office and BT for greater prioritisation, and 
Westminster for the liberalisation of the telecommunications monopoly. This resulted in 
BT ending its ‘uniformity’ policy, and using the City of London, or ‘London TeleCity’, 
as its exclusive region for rolling out new technologies: ISDN, X-Stream services, optical 
fibre, and Britain’s first urban satellite earth station. 
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A recurring feature of this chapter, and the last, is the intersection of transmission 
technologies and the integrated digital network with monopoly and liberalisation. Eli 
Noam has argued that European telephone carriers’ focus on ISDN from 1980 was, in 
part, a defensive effort to preserve control over their networks in the face of deregulatory 
politics, and I would argue that the longer history of integrated digital networks in Britain 
supports this idea of ISDN as a technology of monopoly.87 The general-purpose 
integrated digital network monopolised all types of transmission in order to, as Merriman 
put it, counter the danger of special-purpose networks arising in the future. Merriman did 
not mention monopoly in his speech on ‘information and control’, but the threat of 
special-purpose networks implies competition. Competition was, however, explicitly 
raised, as I referred to in the last chapter, when packet-switching began development in 
the 1970s; Merriman argued to the Post Office’s board that competition from packet-
switched networks potentially obstructed the integrated digital network, and, as the 
domestic demand for data increased, the Post Office felt forced to provide packet-
switching under the threat of deregulation lobbying from its business users. As I showed 
in this chapter, that was also very much the viewpoint of the City Telecommunications 
Committee, in which some members specifically argued that ISDN was anti-competition, 
reinforcing the Post Office’s monopoly over all telecommunications services, and lobbied 
the government to liberalise packet-switched data networks and other services. 
Integration, in the eyes of the City’s financial institutions, meant monopoly. The Post 
Office also appeared aware of as much when lobbying for cable television networks, 
viewing the transmission of all information as ‘PO business’. This resurfaced with 
lobbying for a national fibre-optic network, where ‘national grid’, a metaphor of 
monopoly, was invoked. This metaphor was used to help BT’s imagined network become 
reality, but ultimately failed, although BT finally achieved the general-purpose vision in 
the 1990s with the ISDN, when ‘highway’ connoted new norms of private ownership. 
Imagination is also the subject of my next chapter, a history of the telephone 
business’s Long Range Planning Department, where I explore the contrast between 
imaginative, inventive approaches to the future and computerised, simulated approaches. 
The next chapter returns to the subject of computer control which recurred through the 
last chapter and so, along with this chapter’s greater focus on ‘information’, continues the 
history of ‘information and control’ in the British telephone network. 
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7 The Machine Starts 
Inventions and Predictions of Computer Control and 
Surveillance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine, if you can, a small room, hexagonal in shape, like the cell of a bee … There 
were buttons and switches everywhere – buttons to call for food, for music, for clothing. 
There was the hot-bath button, by pressure of which a basin of (imitation) marble rose 
out of the floor, filled to the brim with a warm deodorized liquid. There was the cold-bath 
button. There was the button that produced literature, and there were of course the buttons 
by which she communicated with her friends. The room, though it contained nothing, was 
in touch with all that she cared for in the world.1 
 
We created the Machine, to do our will, but we cannot make it do our will now. It has 
robbed us of the sense of space and of the sense of touch, it has blurred every human 
relation and narrowed down love to a carnal act, it has paralysed our bodies and our wills, 
and now it compels us to worship it. The Machine develops – but not on our lines. The 
Machine proceeds – but not to our goal. We only exist as the blood corpuscles that course 
through its arteries, and if it could work without us, it would let us die.2 
 
The above passages are from E.M. Forster’s The Machine Stops, published in 1909.3 The 
Machine Stops describes the story of Vashti and her son, Kuno, who live in isolation on 
opposite sides of the world, in rooms where their every need is provided for by a world-
spanning Machine. The Machine is worshipped as omnipotent, but it eventually fails – 
‘the Machine stops’ – and so does their underground society, although a mythical race of 
                                                 
1 E.M. Forster, The Machine Stops (London: Penguin Classics, 2011), 1–6. 
2 Forster, 33–34. 
3 E.M. Forster, ‘The Machine Stops’, The Oxford and Cambridge Review, 1909. 
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surface-dwelling humans survives. The Machine Stops originates from Forster’s concern 
about a modernist, mechanistic philosophy which would erode the human capacity for 
imagination, and is intended as an instrument of prophylaxis: note that the opening line 
is ‘Imagine, if you can’.4 In this chapter, I will explore both imagined and mechanical 
methods for inspecting the future within the Post Office’s Long Range Planning 
Department (LRPD) and suggest that The Machine Stops is helpful in two regards: first, 
in highlighting how modes of exploring the future can performatively beget those futures. 
The Machine Stops intended audiences to use human imagination to beget a humanistic 
future, and I will argue that computer simulation modelled – both literally and figuratively 
– futures of computer control. Second, I will also suggest that The Machine Stops was a 
direct cultural influence on imagined futures narrated J.S. Whyte, the LRPD’s head, to 
counterbalance fears of computer-controlled futures. 
The LRPD has recurred through the last two chapters. The LRPD developed 
ALEM 6, the model used by J.S. Whyte’s Operational Programming Department to 
oversee the modernisation of the telephone network with TXE4 exchanges. The LRPD 
was also the parent department for the UKTTF, which also used modelling to simulate 
the digitalisation of the telephone network. In this chapter, I trace the history of the LRPD 
from its founding in 1966 and involvement in Roy Harris’ Project ADMITS, its 
stewardship under J.S. Whyte until 1972, through its expansion in the 1970s to address 
global futures, and then its re-orientation to free market futures with the creation of BT. 
 This chapter particularly focusses on the intersection of attitudes towards 
computer control with computer modelling. In the LRPD’s earlier years, despite its 
involvement in computer modelling for UKTTF and TXE4 modernisation, both Harris 
and Whyte articulated inventive, imaginative futures of human control, in opposition to 
computerised, technological futures. However, in the 1970s, modelling within the LRPD 
expanded, and was reflexively applied to simulate the future of the whole telephone 
business: computers had thus been placed in charge of the future. Management deployed 
modelling to negotiate the creation of BT and liberalisation of the telecommunications 
monopoly, but it also formed a template for new applications of computer control and 
simulation to electronic surveillance. 
 I undertake this history in three sections: in the first, I explore the origins of the 
Long Range Planning Department, situating it in post-war histories of planning and 
                                                 
4 Paul March-Russell, ‘“IMAGINE, IF YOU CAN”: Love, Time and the Impossibility of Utopia in EM 
Forster’s’ The Machine Stops’’, Critical Survey 17, no. 1 (2005): 56–71; Silvana Caporaletti, ‘Science as 
Nightmare: “The Machine Stops” by E.M. Forster’, Utopian Studies 8, no. 2 (1997): 32–47. 
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futurology, and the department’s development of computer modelling for the UKTTF and 
TXE4 modernisation project. I also explore the attitudes to the future and computer 
control articulated by two senior figures from the department’s early years – Roy Harris 
and J.S. Whyte – and relate these attitudes to debates about automation and 
computerisation. In the second section, I analyse the department’s outward-facing turn, 
as it engaged with global futures of economic and energy crises, and predictions of a post-
industrial revolution. I explore the growing sophistication of the department’s methods, 
particularly as it reflexively applied computer modelling to the telephone business itself. 
In the final section, I explore how computer simulation and prediction became a template 
for predictions about computer control, and follow that up with a history of computer 
surveillance and simulation-as-surveillance in BT. 
 
Imagining Futures of Machines and Men 
 
The LRPD was founded in 1966 to advise telecommunications R&D as the Long Range 
Systems Planning Unit. Its creation came after the McKinsey review of the Post Office, 
which had recommended that more effective direction of R&D by ‘commercially sound’ 
and ‘technologically complete’ plans over a thirty-year timescale was needed.5 The 
Highgate Wood failure, for which the Post Office had attracted criticism in The Sunday 
Times and from the SCNI, also influenced the department’s creation. The Post Office’s 
Director-General, Ronald German, answered the SCNI’s criticisms by pointing out that a 
special new group – the Long Range Systems Planning Unit – had been formed to look 
at the ‘broad brush’ of technological development.6 
However, to fully understand the department’s creation, a longer history of 
planning in Britain, ‘long range planning’, and post-war futurology is required. ‘Planning’ 
was high on the agenda in 1960s Britain: the Conservatives created the National 
Economic Development Council, which I mentioned in Chapter Three, in 1962 as an 
instrument of economic planning, and in 1964, Labour created the Department of 
Economic Affairs to provide long-term planning in contrast to the Treasury’s supposed 
short-termism.7 This bipartisan interest in planning comes against an interest in planning 
                                                 
5 ‘McKinsey and Company: Progress Review with Postmaster General, 23 February 1967, POST 72/906, 
BPMA’. 
6 ‘House of Commons. Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries. Meeting at Post Office Research Station, Dollis Hill, 12 July 1966, POST 122/10345, BPMA’, 
7–8. 
7 Glen O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and Social Planning in 1960s Britain 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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in Britain since at 1930s: in 1931, the think-tank Political and Economic Planning, known 
as P.E.P., was founded amidst a bipartisan interest in scientific, collectivist planning.8 
However, by the 1960s, concerns were voiced over whether Britain’s planning was 
sufficiently long-term: the economist Andrew Shonfield, in his influential 1965 work 
Modern Capitalism, notably criticised the lack of long range planning in Britain.9 
 The focus on long range planning comes against the growth of futurology after 
World War II.10 Long range planning, as a catch-all phrase for business and governmental 
futurology, was popularised by a 1964 report, ‘Report on a Long-Range Forecasting 
Study’, by the American defence and policy think-tank RAND, which outlined the Delphi 
method for producing forecasts of the future.11 The journal Long Range Planning was 
subsequently founded in 1967 amidst the popularity of ‘long range planning’, and various 
futurological techniques were taken up by industry: Delphi was used by General Electric 
during the 1970s, whilst Royal Dutch Shell famously used another technique, scenario 
planning, in the early 1970s to map out strategic responses to potential oil scarcities, 
which were later used during the 1973 OPEC oil embargo.12 The creation of a Long Range 
Systems Planning Unit, which later became the Long Range Planning Department when 
the Post Office was corporatized, thus came during a broader pattern of industrial interest 
in futurology and long range planning. 
 The Long Range Systems Planning Unit was Roy Harris’ institutional home 
during his work on Project ADMITS, which I explored in Chapter Five. Harris wrote the 
department’s founding document, Telecommunications System of the Future, and 
advocated an ‘inventive’ approach to the future.13 The document outlined a series of 
technologies, from videophones to remote computing, for which the department would 
co-ordinate both research and provision; a long-range plan would allow these possibilities 
to be ‘exploited’, whilst also allowing for unexpected demands from telephone service 
users. The assumptions of R&D’s limitless inventive capacity, enshrined within these 
                                                 
8 Arthur Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political “Agreement”’, The 
English Historical Review 79, no. 311 (1964): 285–98. 
9 Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965). 
10 Jenny Andersson, ‘The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World’, The American Historical 
Review 117, no. 5 (2012): 1411–1430. 
11 T. J. Gordon and Olaf Helmer, ‘Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study’ (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 1964). 
12 Gill Ringland, Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future (Chichester; New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1998), 16–21; Ron Bradfield et al., ‘The Origins and Evolution of Scenario Techniques in Long 
Range Business Planning’, Futures 37, no. 8 (2005): 799–800. 
13 ‘Telecommunications System of the Future’ 1967, TCB 662/1, BTA. 
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plans, are perfectly encapsulated by Harris’ sentiment that ‘the prime purpose of planning 
was to invent the future, not to predict it’.14 Harris’ turn of phrase here echoes the 
Hungarian-British electrical engineer Dennis Gabor’s expression ‘the future cannot be 
predicted, but futures can be invented’, which appeared in his 1963 popular science book, 
Inventing the Future.15 Perhaps coincidentally, Harris and Gabor both attended the 
Imperial College information theory symposia in the early 1950s, and Gabor later 
collaborated with the Research Department on computer simulation of human speech 
compression.16 
 The department’s inventive approach to the future is evident in its reports on 
Viewphone, an early videophone trialled by the Post Office in 1969. I briefly addressed 
Viewphone in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, where I drew attention to its recurrent 
appearance in plans for the integrated digital network. The Viewphone was a desk-top 
terminal with a 7” x 5½” screen and loud-speaking telephone for two-way speech and 
vision, and LRPD reports concluded that it would have vast potential in the business 
world as part of a wideband vision/data/fax network – the integrated digital network. It 
was believed that, with rising income, growing business advantages, and the ‘continuing 
advance in technological capability’, it was ‘virtually certain that demand for a viewphone 
service will arise in the future’.17 The Viewphone was a key technology in Harris’ 
Telecommunications System of the Future, and featured in a 1969 promotional R&D 
video, Telecommunications Services for the 1990s.18 
 The LRPD’s visions for Viewphone were heavily influenced by AT&T’s 
Picturephone, which I explored in the previous chapter. Both Picturephone and 
Viewphone reified their respective designers’ visions of future national needs for 
integrated networks of voice and video communication. Picturephone’s failure thus did 
nothing to dent the Post Office’s confidence: the LPRD’s report on Picturephone 
suggested that it had failed not because it was fundamentally flawed, but because the 
public were simply not ready for video telephony.19 The LRPD’s view was that, given 
video telephony’s huge potential and the impending saturation of the normal telephone 
                                                 
14 Harris, Automatic Switching in the UK, 16. 
15 Dennis Gabor, Inventing the Future (London: Secker and Warburg, 1963), 207. 
16 ‘Computer Simulation of Professor Gabor’s Speech Compression System’ December 1966, TCB 
422/21230, BTA. 
17 ‘Long Range Studies Report 8: A Marketing and Technical Appreciation of Viewphone’ 1969, TCC 
252/8, BTA. 
18 Telecommunication Services for the 1990s (The Post Office, 1969), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUcF_OuV19k; ‘Telecommunications System of the Future, 1967, 
TCB 662/1, BTA’. 
19 ‘Long Range Studies Report 11: Picturephone - The American Motivation’ 1969, TCC 252/11, BTA. 
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market, the Post Office could not afford to wait for commercial pressures and public 
demand, and that preparatory work should therefore start immediately.20 Viewphone 
development subsequently continued throughout the 1970s, culminating in a poor trial in 
1976, after which it was quietly shelved.21 These reports on Picturephone and Viewphone 
showcase the LRPD’s inventive approach to the future: its reports concluded that the Post 
Office did not need to wait for externalities like public demand, but should instead create 
futures of video telephony. 
The department’s inventive approach was not just about engineering ingenuity, 
but was also used to articulate ideas about the social ordering of man and machine. J.S. 
Whyte joined the Post Office from Treasury O&M in 1969 to take charge of the LRPD, 
which had been upgraded from the Long Range Systems Planning Unit upon the Post 
Office’s corporatisation in 1969. The department’s shift from a small R&D advisory unit 
a fully-fledged department, headed by another Treasury O&M man like Merriman, is 
perhaps indicative of a growing appreciation within the Post Office for long range 
planning. Whyte, as I have addressed, would go on to become Director of Operational 
Programming, overseeing network modernisation, and would then succeed Merriman as 
Engineer-in-Chief and Board Member for Technology, but for now I will explore his time 
at Long Range Planning. 
Whilst at the LRPD, Whyte voiced concerns, at various future-minded events and 
in a range of publications, about the dangers of machine control. Whyte urged that 
‘machines must not be permitted to erode the dignity of man’, and titled one paper 
Telecommunications in the Service of Man – inviting the question of what the alternative 
might be.22 On a proposed radio-tracking and paging system, Whyte said, ‘We are 
progressively raising serious questions of the invasion of privacy and the community will 
have to make basic decisions about the extent to which it desires to move in this 
direction’.23 Whyte most explicitly articulated his views at a 1969 conference, City in the 
Year 2000, on the future of post-industrial cities, which included eminent speakers such 
as Ray Pahl, sociologist of post-industrial communities; the public health expert 
Alexander Macara, who would go on to chair the British Medical Association; John 
                                                 
20 ‘LRSR 11: Picturephone - The American Motivation, 1969, TCC 252/11, BTA’; ‘LRSR 8: A 
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Dennis Carthy, the biologist and prominent BBC science communicator; and Meredith 
Thring, fuel scientist, mechanical engineer, and future co-author (with Eric Laithwaite, 
the creator of maglev transportation) of the 1977 popular science book How to Invent.24  
Whyte spoke on the future of telecommunications and how it would affect social 
life, narrating a ‘bleak mechanistic prospect’ where automation and communications 
networks would degrade humankind: 
There seems to be no reason in principle why we should not envisage the fully automated 
situation in which the individual need rarely leave his home but merely manipulates the 
knobs and dials and screens around him in order to obtain his education, conduct his 
business, do his shopping and get his entertainment. This bleak mechanistic prospect is 
unacceptable because it pays no regard to the fundamental nature of man, and his 
indispensable need to interact with other men and seek self-fulfilment … If men are to 
have any hope of controlling their own destiny, they must attempt to reduce the gap 
between our explosively growing technological capability and our lack of understanding 
of its social consequences.25 
Whyte’s ‘bleak mechanistic prospect’ bears considerable resemblance to The Machine 
Stops. In both, the main character never needs leave their home because of the knobs, 
buttons, and dials which control their environment, and both have screens through which 
they can communicate. Whyte’s story also expresses similar concerns to Forster’s, as 
Whyte laments the mechanistic prospect’s ignorance of humanity’s need for sociability 
and self-fulfilment. Whyte never explicitly references Forster, but I would suggest a 
connection is likely, beyond the similarity of language and intent: three years earlier, on 
October 6th, 1966, the second series of BBC’s Out of the Unknown premiered on BBC 2 
with an adaptation of The Machine Stops, which featured on the front cover of the Radio 
Times, was praised highly in The Times and awarded first prize at the Fifth International 
Science Fiction Film Festival.26 
Whyte’s motivation to warn of machine-controlled dystopias can be 
contextualised against a longer history of concerns about machine control within and 
outside the telephone business. In Chapter Three I explored how the rollout of GRACE, 
the ‘robot telephone operator’, could be contextualised against post-war concerns about 
automation. However, Whyte’s dystopias were not just about automation: both his 
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concerns about radio-tracking and the ‘bleak mechanistic prospect’ concern the intrusion 
of technology into domestic private life. 
Mechanisation had increasingly been linked with privacy in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Alan Westin’s influential 1967 book, Privacy and Freedom, warned of the 
new, and often technological ways, of invading man’s ‘fundamental’ right to privacy.27 
Devices to monitor and locate individuals, such as the radio-trackers highlighted by 
Whyte, but also CCTV, phone taps, and video telephony were all noted as threats to 
privacy, alongside the newer threat of the computer revolution, which would permit 
surveillance of individuals’ data, held in electronic data banks controlled by computers. 
Westin was subsequently invited to present evidence to the Younger Committee, Britain’s 
first large-scale official study of privacy.28 The Younger Committee’s 1972 report 
highlighted the threats of mass communication and computerised record-keeping systems 
and data banks, underscoring the historical consensus that ‘by the early 1970s the 
computer had become cast as a threat to privacy’.29 Whyte’s concerns regarding privacy 
thus have a common thread with earlier concerns over automation: in both cases, the Post 
Office was responsible for developing technologies intimately linked with societal 
concerns, and so Whyte’s dystopias represent a natural evolution from the labour-driven 
‘machines must be servants’ to the privacy-driven concerns about computers which might 
‘erode the dignity of man’.30 
 There is a somewhat contradictory dynamic here between Whyte’s public 
concerns about machine control, and the Post Office’s various visions and applications of 
computer control: Harris’ plans for an adaptable, dispersed system of computerised 
telephone exchanges, Merriman’s vision of a computer-controlled, self-governing, self-
healing network, and Whyte’s supervision of computer model development for the 
UKTTF and TXE4 exchange modernisation. This latter activity, as I explored in Chapter 
Four, particularly surfaced resistance to computer control as Plessey and GEC both took 
issue with the idea that decision-making had been handed to computer models, even 
though Whyte argued that the model served a purely advisory function. There appears to 
be a tension between Whyte’s fears about the ‘bleak mechanistic prospect’ and his 
development of computer models used to inform Post Office decision-making. In the 
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remainder of this section, I therefore explore two case-studies of the LRPD’s modelling 
activity under Whyte in order to reconcile these two attitudes to computerisation. 
 ALEM 6, the model used to simulate TXE4 modernisation, started out as a three-
part study at the LPRD, ‘A Review of Premature Obsolescence and Depreciation Policy’, 
in 1970. The first study explored how the Post Office should assess depreciation policies 
for premature obsolescence, i.e. determining which equipment was most likely to go 
obsolete ahead of time and, if so, when would be ideal to replace it. The report made the 
fairly self-evident conclusion that assets vulnerable to premature obsolescence should be 
depreciated at a faster rate, but also highlighted the inadequacies of conventional 
accounting techniques for making such assessments.31 The second study took a broad 
overview of various at-risk telecommunications equipment, and concluded that the 
outdated electromechanical Strowger exchanges were the highest priority for 
depreciation.32 
 The third and final study combined the conclusions of the two to apply more 
sophisticated techniques – computer modelling – to simulate the optimal rates of 
depreciation and replacement of Strowger exchanges.33 The model simulated depreciation 
over a thirty-year period, from 1971 to 2000, starting with the present system size and 
calling rate, and setting Strowger exchanges at various levels of historical depreciation. 
The costs for depreciation and replacement were then simulated at varying rates of 
replacement, and every simulation strategy found that replacing Strowger with a 
hypothetical electronic exchange would be economically cost-effective, although a fast 
strategy was favoured. Various assumptions were used in the model – for example, that 
electronic equipment would have a normal life of thirty years, and the model also 
incorporated the UKTTF simulation’s predictions of rapid network expansion – but the 
critical, important, assumption for my purposes here is that the hypothetical replacement 
electronic exchanges had the same cost and traffic capacity as had been quoted to the Post 
Office by STC for TXE4. The model therefore justified a strategy of replacing Strowger 
as quickly as possible, but only on the assumption that Strowger was replaced with a 
hypothetical exchange identical to STC’s TXE4, rather than GEC and Plessey’s Crossbar 
exchange. 
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 These reports, which were still at this point theoretical studies undertaken under 
the auspices of long range planning, were considered by the Managing Director’s 
Committee for Telecommunications in July 1970, which Whyte was invited to attend.34 
The committee noted that the models favoured replacing Strowger as quickly as 
practicable, but requested that Whyte further develop the model to incorporate the feasible 
production of replacement electronic exchanges, the possible reuse of displaced Strowger, 
and the physical constraints of building and manpower availability. It was also requested 
that the next model exclude areas of the network already earmarked for Crossbar 
upgrades, which reinforces the idea that the model assumed that the Post Office would 
choose TXE4, but does also suggest that Crossbar had been simulated in previous studies 
and so had not been entirely ignored.35 The committee also requested that the Operational 
Programming Department liaise with Whyte to examine the potential for using the model 
in practice, showing an early interest in the operational, rather than theoretical, uses of 
the model. 
 A fourth study was thus commissioned to incorporate the requests of the 
Managing Director’s Committee. The new model found that ‘very rapid modernisation is 
the ideal course’, showing that, even with the requested considerations, TXE4 would be 
much more cost-effective than Strowger, based on anticipated maintenance costs.36 The 
study was completed by December 1970 and the Managing Director’s Committee 
subsequently met in January 1971, endorsing the model’s conclusions, and determined 
that the model should be passed onto the Operational Programming Department.37 Whyte 
subsequently delivered a presentation on the model to the Post Office Board in April 
1971, who ‘thanked Mr Whyte for his clear and comprehensive presentation of the 
telecommunications business proposals for exchange equipment’, and approved the 
purchase of TXE4 telephone exchanges for the modernisation of the telephone network.38 
Whyte and his model had made it to the highest levels of the Post Office and contributed 
to one of the corporation’s most important procurement decisions of the 1970s. The model 
was handed over to the Operational Programming Department and, later that year, Whyte 
was appointed Director of Operational Programming. The Post Office published its TXE4 
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modernisation plans in September 1971, in turn triggering the controversy with its 
manufacturers which took place across 1972, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 There are some intermediary points I wish to make before moving onto explore 
further modelling activity in the LRPD. An overview of ALEM 6’s origins shows that, 
from the outset, it assumed that TXE4, or a theoretical exchange identical to TXE4, would 
replace Strowger. In this sense, the model did not have, as Weinstock protested in 1972, 
decision-making capacity – it did not change the Post Office’s base preferences for the 
electronic TXE4 over the electromechanical Crossbar – but the model also built on those 
assumptions and affected how certainly and quickly the Post Office selected and rolled 
out TXE4. The Managing Director’s Committee for Telecommunications and the Post 
Office Board’s reception of the model, as well as the Post Office’s manufacturing 
partners, all show that the model supported a surprisingly fast timeline which caused the 
Post Office, as I showed in Chapter Five, to order TXE4 quickly and in large numbers. 
There are parallels here with Viewphone: in both instances, the LRPD selected a 
technology to ‘exploit’, studied the different ways to develop and roll out that technology, 
and informed Post Office decisions for those technologies, thus inventing its futures 
instead of predicting them. 
This inventive approach was also apparent in another LRPD modelling study, 
albeit a study which bore no fruit. In 1969, the LRPD commissioned a report into 
morphological modelling, which had been developed at the California Institute of 
Technology by Swiss astrophysicist and aerospace scientist Fritz Zwicky, known both as 
the first person to infer the existence of dark matter, and the father of the modern jet 
engine.39 Morphological analysis was not a forecasting model, but rather a problem-
solving approach for technological development. Morphological analysis had five steps: 
1. The problem which is to be solved must be exactly formulated. 
2. All of the parameters which might enter into the solution of the given problem 
must be localised and characterised. 
3. The morphological box or multidimensional matrix which contains all the 
solutions of the given problem is constructed. 
4. All of the solutions which are contained in the morphological box are closely 
analysed and evaluated with respect to the purpose which are to be achieved. 
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5. The best solutions are being selected and are carried out, provided that the 
necessary means are available. This practical application requires an additional 
morphological study.40 
Two key features of morphological modelling are that it works backwards and is 
non-numeric. In most models, input variables are defined and the model runs a simulation; 
with morphological modelling, the problem is defined first, and the model identifies 
conflicts between various input parameters to solve the problem. For example, in 
Zwicky’s analysis of jet engine development, one parameter was travel medium – 
atmosphere, ocean, or subterranean – and another was intake medium – gaseous, liquid, 
or solid. The model would identify conflicts between parameters, such as between 
gaseous intake and subterranean travel. This example also shows that the qualitative 
nature of parameters meant that non-technical, or social, parameters could be introduced. 
Zwicky encouraged this in his books on morphological modelling, and saw it as a major 
asset of his approach: ‘One of the major tasks of morphological research therefore is to 
establish the morphological box of all human values and to recognise their various 
characteristics’.41 
The LRPD undertook a report into morphological modelling shortly after 
Zwicky’s publications. Ostensibly, the Post Office’s interest was only in its technological 
applications, but its potential to use computers to incorporate human values into long 
range planning was seen as instrumental: ‘it represents the beginning of an attempt in the 
field of long term planning to exploit the potential power of a system combining human 
judgement with the ability of the computer to apply rigid logic according to defined roles 
in complex situations’.42 The LRPD’s report proposed the creation of an auxiliary, non-
technical, list of parameters, for modelling alongside technical parameters. A planning 
matrix for data processing also shows how the LRPD embedded its high expectations for 
Viewphone within technical parameters: the prospects of digital speech compression were 
deemed ‘doubtful economic prospects unlikely to improve’ whereas the prospects of 
digital video compression were deemed ‘of possible importance in Viewphone field’.43 
                                                 
40 Fritz Zwicky and Albert George Wilson, New Methods of Thought and Procedure (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1967). 
41 Zwicky and Wilson, 297; Fritz Zwicky, Discovery, Invention, Research: Through the Morphological 
Approach (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 
42 ‘LRSR 21: A Morphological Approach to Telecommunications System Modelling, 1969, TCC 252/21, 
BTA’. 
43 ‘LRSR 21: A Morphological Approach to Telecommunications System Modelling, 1969, TCC 252/21, 
BTA’. 
192 
 
The appearance of Viewphone suggests a reason for the LRPD’s interest in 
morphological modelling. Morphological modelling worked backwards from a defined 
output, and combined non-numeric statements describing technical and social parameters, 
and so it was effectively an alternative, computerised method for ‘inventing the future’. 
Morphological modelling was not taken up – the cost of computerisation was deemed too 
high – but it nevertheless highlights the LRPD’s openness to new methods of planning 
which would preserve its inventive approach to the future. 
 These case-studies show how Whyte’s public warnings of machine control can be 
reconciled with the LRPD’s internal uses of computer modelling. Modelling during this 
period was entirely consistent with the departmental philosophy that the future ‘should 
be invented, not predicted’: the ALEM 6 and UKTTF models were not used to predict the 
future, but instead supported, as I have shown in this chapter and Chapter Five, the Post 
Office’s decisions to roll out certain technologies – TXE4 and digitalisation – across the 
network. In both cases, modelling was used to simulate the financial implications of 
different strategies, not to dictate to the Post Office which technologies to roll out. This 
approach is also consistent with Whyte’s previous history in Treasury O&M, where, as 
Agar has shown, expert mechanisers like Merriman and Whyte undertook extensive 
programs of mechanisation, but did so in carefully-couched language to avoid the 
implication that machines had taken over decision-making responsibilities from 
generalist executives.44 
Whyte’s defence that ALEM 6 ‘cannot of itself come to conclusions or take 
decisions’ perfectly fits this strategy, and I would suggest that Whyte’s warning of the 
‘bleak mechanistic prospect’ was a transmutation of this strategy for the Post Office and 
LPRD. Within the Post Office, Whyte was no longer an office mechaniser, but instead 
part of an organisation that – as had been established by Harris and Merriman in 1967 –
intended to insert computer control throughout the telephone network at a time of 
deepening concern about computers, telecommunications, and privacy. Whyte’s language 
thus changed to reflect these concerns: as Merriman and other Civil Service expert 
mechanisers avoided the implication that government mechanisation would transform 
government into a machine, whilst proceeding to do exactly that, so Whyte explicitly 
combatted the idea that network computerisation would transform the network itself into 
a giant computer. However, as I shall show in this chapter’s final section, computer 
modelling’s capacity for simulation and prediction was extended to the telephone network 
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in the 1980s and beyond. Before that, I will first explore the LRPD’s predictive turn 
during the 1970s, and show how computer modelling was reflexively turned to study the 
Post Office corporation itself. 
 
Competition and Diversity are Ideas of the Future 
 
In the early 1970s, the inventive attitude of the LRPD shifted to a more predictive and 
outward-facing mode of future-making. Where previously the department had invented 
telecommunications futures, it moved to forecasting broader social and economic futures. 
This shift came from two different influences: the first was The Limits to Growth, an 
influential 1972 report published by the Club of Rome, a think tank formed in 1968 to 
draw attention to issues requiring global action.45 Limits was based on a form of computer 
modelling known as ‘system dynamics’, developed by the computer engineer Jay 
Forrester at MIT. Three models were developed for Limits, known as World1, World2, 
and World 3. Forrester’s work formed the direct basis for the World1 and World2 models, 
whilst the Club of Rome’s research team at MIT, headed by management researcher 
Dennis Meadows, refined World2 into World3. The models simulated the interaction of 
five variables – world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production, and 
resource use – and the report concluded, from the World3 model, that there would be an 
‘overshoot and collapse’ of society by the end of the 21st century.46 The Club of Rome 
thus called for a halt to population and economic growth, and its report received 
significant popular attention.47 
The second influence was Britain’s 1973-74 energy crisis, which had resulted 
from an oil embargo by OPEC, the consortium of oil exporting nations, in October 1973, 
and a domestic strike by the National Union of Mineworkers which had slowed domestic 
production of coal. Together, these forced Ted Heath to introduce a three-day work week 
to conserve energy in December 1971. The energy crisis impacted the telephone network 
– the board initiated a Telecommunication Energy Conservation Programme as a result, 
and the LRPD studied the potential for nuclear-powered telephone exchanges in the event 
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of future crisis48 – and was compounded by the economic restraints already placed on the 
Post Office in the early 1970s. This combination of economic restraints, energy crisis, 
and the three-day week meant that telephone growth dropped severely, declining by 50% 
for long-distance calling.49 
The influence of the combined energy and economic crises, and the intellectual 
contribution of Limits, appear in the LRPD’s first Long Range Economic Forecast, 
‘Economic Consequences of Energy Scarcity’. This 1974 report directly responded to 
Limits and explored the potential consequences of the OPEC oil embargo, synthesising 
forecasts from other think tanks and policy units, such as the University of Sussex’s 
Science Policy Research Unit, with the Post Office’s own analyses.50 The report 
emphasised that its main concern was long-term developments, not transient crises, but 
also admitted that ‘short-term events are not, however, entirely irrelevant to the study of 
the longer term. In particular, transient shortages of petroleum products may well 
stimulate early economic, social and technological adaptations which would otherwise 
have come much more slowly through the operation of market forces’.51 OPEC was 
mentioned as a potential cause of such crises. The report dismissed Limits’ gloomy 
predictions of a total collapse to society, but concluded that a long-term energy problem 
was nevertheless likely to occur. The report’s main emphasis was that, to weather this 
inevitable energy problem, more sophisticated long-term planning was needed in business 
and government: ‘our cautiously optimistic interpretation of the situation in the 1990s 
rests on an assumption of far-sighted long term planning by business and government; 
the importance of such planning cannot be stressed too strongly’.52 
 This increased importance of long-range planning crystallised within the LRPD 
as an expansion of futures research. There were further Long Range Economic Forecasts 
on material scarcities, which also explicitly referred to Limits in their conclusions that 
there was no impending crisis, but rather a slower long-term increase in the costs of 
maintaining and expanding resources.53 In particular, the ‘extremely favourable’ long 
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term prospects for aluminium were highlighted, which may have informed the Post 
Office’s experiments with aluminium, rather than copper, local telephone networks in the 
late 1970s.54 The department also expanded its personnel to employ information 
scientists, statisticians, sociologists, and psychologists.55 The LRPD also developed 
collaborations: with the Civil Service Departments of Management Science and 
Operations Research, the LRPD launched and supported the Communications Studies 
Group at University College London, which conducted research throughout the 1970s 
into the effectiveness and impact of advanced forms of person-to-person 
communications, such as teleconferencing.56 The department also had a name change to 
match, becoming the Long Range Intelligence Division (although for brevity’s sake I will 
continue to refer to it as the LRPD).  
Another telling change was the introduction of Long Range Social Forecasts, 
which reveal the Post Office’s continuing expectations for computerisation and an 
information revolution. In these social forecasts, Joan Glover, the department’s 
sociologist, performed quantitative analyses of customer interviews and questionnaires in 
order to predict changes in the world of work and forecast changing attitudes to working 
from home and telecommuting.57 Glover concluded that, in the future, professional and 
managerial workers were more likely to work from home, and that if clerical workers did 
so too, it would likely be under tight remote supervision. Attention was also drawn to the 
role of machines in changing professional structure, with the new century’s work 
characterised as the ‘co-ordination of people and machines to produce knowledge’ in 
contrast to the last century, where ‘people and machines were co-ordinated to produce 
goods’.58 Glover concluded that the distinction between manual and clerical work was 
slowly being eroded, and that this may lead to shifting social status for clerical workers. 
These social forecasts showcase a much more expansive and academic 
orientation. They were situated in academic literature, citing Max Weber, Michael 
Young, Anthony Giddens, Peter Hall, Georges Friedmann and Peter Berger on the nature 
of work, family, leisure, cities, and alienation. They also showed the continuing influence 
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of futurology, citing reports from the Institute of the Future, a futurology think-tank spun 
off from RAND in 1968, and The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next 
Thirty Years, a highly influential futurological text by Herman Kahn and Anthony 
Wiener, the former of whom had worked at RAND and developed the scenario planning 
methodology famously used by Shell.59 
However, perhaps the greatest influence was Daniel Bell’s The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, published in 1973, a year before these 
social forecasts were produced.60 I outlined Bell’s work in Chapter Two and will briefly 
restate it here. Bell argued that society was becoming post-industrial in two ways: first, 
that knowledge, or information, rather than matter, would be the primary resource upon 
which society would operate for economic growth; second, that the computerisation of 
society would transform the world of work. Bell’s ideas about the applications of 
computerisation and telecommunications to work pervade these social forecasts, 
particularly in the idea that automation would re-order class by turning clerical labour 
into the post-industrial society’s equivalent of manual labour. Another noteworthy feature 
of these reports is that the mechanistic threat to privacy and labour was invisible: instead, 
machines were used to remotely supervise clerical staff and re-ordered labour and class 
hierarchies. The broad power of computerisation was increasingly tacitly accepted, 
which, along with the 1970s’ turbulent economic climate and the influence of Limits to 
Growth, partly explains the LRPD’s next change: the reflexive computerisation of 
planning. 
 Computer modelling, as I have shown, had been used previously, but in 1977, the 
department introduced its first corporate model, the Long Range Planning Model 
(LRPM), which simulated the future of the telephone business itself. The model was 
developed in collaboration with the Department of Control and Management Systems at 
the University of Cambridge, and Cambridge’s lead developer, David Probert, was 
subsequently employed as Head of Strategic Modelling to further integrate modelling into 
the telephone business.61 
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The model, like the World models of Limits, was based on Jay Forrester’s system 
dynamics, which had started life as ‘industrial dynamics’, whilst Forrester was at MIT.62 
Forrester was recruited by the MIT School of Industrial Management in 1956 to develop 
a new industrial management programme, and it was during this time that he developed 
industrial dynamics.63 Industrial dynamics was not designed as a tool for specialist 
forecasters, but as a conceptual foundation and heuristic guide for managers to understand 
the industrial systems they managed, through the representation of system variables as 
input-output loops and feedback signals.64 William Thomas and Lambert Williams thus 
argue that industrial dynamics was not a computerised managerial problem-solving 
system, but rather a conscious attempt to develop a pedagogy for managers and 
management students.65 Thomas and Williams point out the critical assumption in this 
approach: the model, as a representation of the industrial system, is also a representation 
of the model builders’ assumptions and ideologies about the system, and so its pedagogy 
can also imbue those assumptions into management. Industrial dynamics was a popular 
corporate modelling methodology: Clarke and Tobias argue that it was the major 
innovation in corporate modelling of the 1960s, and was notably used by the Sprague 
Electric Company, and extensively used in the textiles and leather industries.66 
Reflecting its lineage from industrial dynamics, the LRPM did not predict global 
futures like the World models of Limits, but instead predicted corporate futures. The 
LRPM was written in FORTRAN, about 5,000 statements in length, based on an IBM 
3033 time sharing system, and took about 5-10 seconds of CPU time to execute a thirty-
year forecast.67 It had over three hundred input parameters, which were mapped onto four 
conceptual modules: marketing, which included parameters such as aggregate demand 
and supply; personnel, including, for example, the mobility of Post Office manpower; 
finance, with comprehensive details of current and capital accounts; and last but not least, 
technology, which included prosaic parameters such as equipment volumes, but also 
parameters mapping the rollout of new technologies, such as rate of optical fibre 
development.68 When a simulation was run, a cluster of up to ten parameters would be 
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altered and the effects tracked in up to one hundred and eighty different variables which 
gave a picture of the company’s finances, equipment needs, total manpower, and so on. 
Unlike the predictive forecasts of energy, materials, and social futures, the LRPM 
was intended to stimulate management thinking about a variety of possible futures. 
Probert described how the LRPM was not used to predict a singular corporate future, but 
to generate a range of alternative futures for management to ‘expand our own “mental 
models”’.69 Several types were simulated: the ‘uncontrollable future’, a predetermined 
future for which the model would identify the resources needed to execute short-term 
plans; the ‘designed future’, which simulated ‘considerable freedom in controlling the 
corporate destiny’; the ‘self-fulfilling future’, which assumed that a designed future 
would achieve ‘full implementation’; and finally, the ‘future as a game’, which blended 
the above types to convey to management that the future would in reality be an outcome 
of conflict between various corporations, each attempting to effect its own designed future 
and each influenced by inertia and historical trends.70 The basic premise was that the 
model was not intended to represent or simulate a singular ideal future, but instead inform 
management’s business plans and projections through the ‘generation of alternative 
futures’.71 Nevertheless, in the expansion of computer modelling, from early technology 
strategy to reflexive simulations of the corporate future, envisioning the future had been 
further ceded to computers. 
The model’s development continued with the addition of a new program in 1979, 
the Strategic Control Unit (SCU). The SCU permitted the simulation of corporate crises, 
such as ‘economic recession and severe constraints on tariff increases,’ and the likely 
ability of the corporation to recover from such crises, by ‘spiking’ certain groups of 
policies, called macro-policies.72 The SCU would assign target values to thirteen key 
indicators of corporate performance, and, once the crisis was initiated, the LRPM would 
simulate corporate performance during the crisis, whilst the SCU would prioritise 
normalisation of the thirteen key indicators over other variables. A full run of the 
simulation would thus show the impact of disaster on the corporation and how the 
corporation would fare if certain facets of the business were prioritised over others. The 
deployment of the SCU went beyond mere simulation of crisis and paths to recovery: the 
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SCU was also envisioned as charting paths for managers to follow to recovery during 
disaster.73 
It is this notion – that modelling could not only simulate the effects of future 
crises, but also chart paths to recovery – which is particularly revealing. Modelling had 
become more than a method for simulating alternative futures: it was also a resource to 
consult within those futures to change corporate direction and strategy. This reliance on 
the SCU is shown in Figure 7.1, from a paper published by Probert, where management 
and the SCU are depicted on equal footing, and corporate objectives are determined from 
a dialogue between the two.74 The name ‘Strategic Control Unit’ renders visible the 
contrast between modelled and invented futures: computers had not just been handed 
control over the making of futures, but within those futures also. 
A new model, the Integrated Communications Demand Model (ICDM), started 
development in 1980, in preparation for the creation of BT and liberalisation. The ICDM 
embraced the liberalisation of telecommunications through a greatly enhanced marketing 
module, which simulated market share and competing companies, although not to the 
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Figure 7.1. The relationship between management and modelling. 
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same degree of detail as BT itself was simulated.75 The ICDM could thus simulate the 
effect of changing market share on both BT and its competition, enabling the corporation 
to better chart its passage through the murky waters of the free market. The ICDM is 
superficially a similar concept to the SCU: a way of modelling and charting the 
organisation through an uncertain, turbulent period. However, with the SCU, these futures 
were concerning, composed of disaster and crisis; with the ICDM, the futures of the free 
market and competition were not framed through risk, but through opportunity. This is 
most clearly seen in a visualisation of the model’s predictions of future economic and 
organisational change, captioned with the quote that ‘competition and diversity are ideas 
of the future’ (Figure 7.2).76 The liberalised corporate future was not something to fear, 
but something to leverage. 
 The ICDM played a further important role during liberalisation in educating 
managers about competition and the market. Probert undertook a campaign to use 
modelling to educate middle management on market dynamics; this came at a time when 
BT’s board had expressed concerns about the attitudes of middle management to 
liberalisation and competition.77 In this sense, the ICDM here can be seen as a return to 
Forrester’s industrial dynamics, where modelling was not a tool to predict the future, but 
a pedagogical tool for managers to understand the systems they worked within. Probert 
wrote articles for company magazines and journals, produced brochures, and arranged 
presentations, seminars, and drop-in clinics.78 He also designed the ICDM to be manager-
friendly, with a colour graphics interface and display menu which would allow the 
presentation of simulations ‘in a neat and compact manner which is acceptable to 
management’.79 Coloured curves, bar charts, and numerical values could be manipulated 
in various ways to facilitate a management-friendly output of the model’s analyses; these 
were not seen as gimmicks, but instead as necessary for enrolling managers in use of the 
model. Probert wrote that ‘the extent to which managers are prepared to entertain model-
based approaches is significantly affected by the ‘friendliness’ of the interface’.80 
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Probert undertook this marketing campaign not only to showcase the value of modelling, 
but also to spread the ‘ideas of the future’ – competition and the free market – to middle 
managers: ‘Using the model to demonstrate to a manager the implications of the high 
degree of uncertainty associated with, say, a demand elasticity for a new service can be a 
valuable stimulus to more flexible thinking on the questions of market demand’.81 Probert 
had thus ‘marketed’ the ICDM in more ways than one: first, in the simplistic sense of 
advertising its use to management; second, in the sense that the model had been 
progressively ‘marketed’ from the LRPM and SCU through the incorporation of free 
market principles into its code; and finally, in the sense that the model was used to 
‘market’ management by encouraging the adoption of free market sensibilities. 
 This latter point is particularly important. The ICDM was initially developed as 
an input for the business’s long term financial plans, but there is no evidence it was ever 
used at this level, or by any of BT’s senior management. Instead, what can be found is 
Probert’s reports of using the model to educate middle management about competition 
and liberalisation, which, as I shall show in Chapter Nine, tallies with the wide range of 
tactics used by BT’s senior management to overcome potential resistance from middle 
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Figure 7.2. ‘Competition and diversity are ideas of the future’. 
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management and lower staff to liberalisation. Middle management were particularly 
relied on to enrol their teams in liberalisation, and so I would argue that the ICDM was 
not about whole-heartedly embracing liberalisation, but was instead a technique to 
maintain internal control during a period of profound organisational change. This 
corresponds with the Chandlerian view of the managerial corporation, in which 
managerial strategies were not used to cede control to the market, but instead to develop 
internal strategies and structures to maintain control within the market. Modelling did not 
mean embracing the market, but, as I will suggest in the next section, it had important 
consequences for the futures of computer control in the telecommunications network. 
 
From 1980 to Nineteen Eighty-Four 
 
The idea that modelling was about computer control, rather than the market or other 
externalities, is reinforced by Probert’s hypothetical – but seemingly incomplete – 
ambition to follow up the ICDM with expert systems, rather than further modelling. 
Expert systems – artificial intelligences used to emulate the decision-making capacity of 
an expert – enjoyed a vogue during the 1980s, and Probert saw a common lineage from 
the SCU to expert systems. Probert described that the SCU had incorporated ‘intelligence’ 
into the LRPM, so that the SCU became ‘a substitute user and hence a primitive form of 
expert system’.82 Probert predicted that in the future, all executive managers’ offices 
would come fitted with an expert system for policy analysis, which would replace the 
specialist modeller who the manager would ordinarily have consulted.83 The expert 
system would be ‘essentially a representation of the “mental model” of the specialist’.84 
With enough decision-making experience, these expert systems would eventually come 
to contain mental models of executive managers themselves. 
At first glance, this may seem a curious campaign on Probert’s part, deploying 
expert systems to, in effect, replace his job and the jobs of other specialist modellers 
within BT. However, it also extends the ‘government machine’ strategy which I have 
previously explored with Merriman and Whyte. Probert, using the same language of 
specialists and generalists, planned that specialist modellers, soon to be replaced by 
computers, would instead become generalists by synthesising their ability to educate 
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management on models and expert systems with knowledge from other fields. The 
modeller would need to be an ‘interdisciplinary “non-specialist” spanning fields such as 
operational research, economics, behavioural studies, technology, accountancy besides 
many others’, which would enable the ‘multi-functional corporate planner’ to create ‘the 
corporate synthesis within the long term design’.85 Interdisciplinarity, in this context, was 
an avenue by which the specialist could become a generalist, moving from one managerial 
problem to another. 
Probert’s plan for expert systems highlights two aspects of the computing culture 
within long-range planning and BT. First is that the language of the government machine, 
of mechanisable specialists and executive generalists, still had considerable sway. These 
ideas were not just invoked once, by Merriman in his ‘information and control’ speech, 
but recurrently, by Merriman, Whyte, and even Probert, who had no background in 
government mechanisation. Second is that computer modelling had been positioned in a 
lineage of computerised intelligence and decision-making. Probert spoke about expert 
systems and the SCU in terms of their decision-making capacity, and this uses the same 
language as Whyte’s defence of ALEM 6 that ‘the model cannot of itself come to 
conclusions or take decisions’. Clearly there is a difference between Whyte and Probert’s 
positions, but it should also be noted that one position was a defence of modelling to 
external partners, whereas the other position was a hypothetical future of expert systems. 
Moreover, over a decade had passed between the two arguments, between which, as I 
have shown above, notions of transformative computer control, as articulated by the likes 
of Daniel Bell, had become much more commonplace. 
The commonality between Whyte and Probert is that computer modelling was not 
framed by its subjects – exchange modernisation, corporate planning, competition and 
the free market – but instead by its decision-making capacity, echoing Merriman’s 
description of the ‘self-governing, self-healing’ telephone network. Merriman’s 
description contrasted with the Post Office’s earlier declaration that ‘machines must be 
servants not masters’, and this change intensified with the use of computer modelling in 
long-range planning: a new language surrounding the future took root following the use 
of corporate modelling. In contrast to the idea, in the department’s early years, that the 
future should be ‘invented’, computer models were instead described as ‘scanning’ the 
future. The idea that long-range planning had become an act of observing the future, 
rather than inventing it, also accompanied the re-organisation of the department during 
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the creation of BT. Long-range planning was amalgamated with business planning and 
the Business Planning and Strategy Department (BPSD) was created. The BPSD was also 
given a logo: an all-seeing eye, gazing into the temporal distance (Figure 7.3).86 This 
language and imagery, which had accompanied the expansion of modelling within long 
range planning, suggest that the future, in contrast to its active invention in the early years 
of planning, had been objectified by the gaze of computer modelling. ‘Scanning the 
future’ and the BPSD’s logo were the linguistic and aesthetic realizations of the perceived 
power of computer modelling. Computer modelling, by the creation of BT, entangled the 
idea of computers as intelligent decision-makers, and the idea of computers as predictive 
surveillance machines. 
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Figure 7.3. The Business Planning and Strategy Department’s new logo. Courtesy of BT 
Archives. 
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The idea that computer prediction and simulation constitutes a form of 
surveillance is not new. William Bogard argues that simulation is a form of 
‘hypersurveillant control … the effort to push surveillance technologies to their absolute 
limit. That limit is an imaginary line beyond which control operates, so to speak, in 
“advance” of itself’.87 Simulation, deployed in settings such as military training, 
ecological science, road engineering, and corporate marketing, constitutes surveillance of 
battlefields, ecosystems, traffic, and customers ahead of time, predicting the actions of 
real processes by displacing them with virtual counterparts.88 In this view, the ICDM 
could be interpreted as a way of putting BT’s new competition, such as Mercury, under 
hypersurveillance in order to exert pre-emptive control. Stephen Graham and David Lyon 
have both pointed out, however, that Bogard’s Baudrillardian characterisation of virtual 
processes entirely displacing their actual counterparts, reducing hypersurveillance to 
control by and of signs and symbols alone, is a form of social essentialism, and that his 
analysis insufficiently integrates the idea of simulation-as-surveillance with empirical 
detail.89 
Nevertheless, Graham and Lyon both also find good reason to analyse simulation 
as a form of surveillance. Graham establishes an empirical basis for the concept through 
a range of case-studies: supermarket loyalty cards, when combined with electronic sales 
data, are used to simulate and anticipate consumer spending behaviour; speeding camera 
algorithms on the M1 are used to flash potentially dangerous drivers’ number plates on 
large neon signs; rail stations use ‘smart’ CCTV cameras to warn commuters of platforms 
at risk of over-crowding. Graham concludes, in contrast to Bogard, that the ways in which 
these simulations create complementary virtual selves, and their disconcerting 
applications to corporate and state interests, necessitates an analysis which does not 
divorce actual and virtual, but instead shows how the virtual influences the actual.90 Lyon 
reads simulation-as-surveillance as potentially indicative of a transition from modernity 
to postmodernity. Lyon argues that, in a Weberian mode, surveillance constitutes 
modernity through its facilitation of organisational influence, management and control 
over its subjects, and suggests that the increasing use of simulation, a polycentric, 
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computerised, partially predictive, mode of surveillance, might be construed as indicative 
of a shift away from a centralised, bureaucratic modernity of control over labour, to a 
polycentric, consumerist postmodernity of pre-control over consumers.91 
Lyon’s account is not wholly convincing – it takes more than decentralisation, 
consumerism and computerisation to propose a transition from modernity to 
postmodernity – but he does valuably draw attention to simulation as an ‘idolatrous dream 
of omniperception’ and here, at least, he agrees with Bogard, who characterises 
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simulation as an ‘imaginary of surveillant control’.92 Simulation’s power, in addition to 
the empirical applications which Graham rightly devotes attention to, is also in its 
imaginary allure. Combining this allure with empirical examples, I will now explore 
actors’ interpretations and enactments of computer simulation and prediction as 
surveillance amongst BT’s senior management. 
In November 1980, the BPSD organised a Long Range Strategy Seminar for 
senior management to prepare for liberalisation, competition, and the formal 
establishment of BT.93 The seminar took over two days, and attended by twenty-eight 
senior figures from inside and outside BT (see Table 7.1). This was an important seminar 
for BT and the BPSD, and it highlights the extent to which the computer capacity for 
intelligence, prediction, and observation had become embedded within BT’s senior 
management. 
 An early presentation by Charles May, BT’s Director of Research, placed 
computer intelligence and surveillance centre-stage. May argued that advances in 
computer intelligence would diminish the need for human engineers: 
The tremendous advances in computer power and versatility will be harnessed so that, as 
time goes by, the need for these people – particularly software people – diminishes. One 
rather heretical idea sometimes occurs to me: if computers and control equipment are 
generally getting so cheap and so fast is there any point any longer in trying to program 
them optimally? Couldn’t an intelligent machine program itself well enough?94 
May also explained the benefits computerised surveillance for global tracking of users’ 
whereabouts: 
I believe there are about 6 thousand million people in the world ... I see no problem of 
keeping track of them all so that the international telephone system - already the most 
elaborate and complex thing man has ever created - can find and call anyone in the world 
wherever he may be.95 
A discussion including May, George MacFarlane and Roy Harris discussed the 
potential for a heuristic machine-controlled network which could shape users and predict 
their demands and desires: 
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Although it is argued that technology is only justified if it serves people and that it should 
not be self-perpetuating, the increasing power and complexity of machines shapes 
people’s demand and desires. Human desire for information is not random: the assembly 
and accessing of databases reflects users’ interests and heuristic machines will judge what 
individual users are most likely to want to know.96 
The machine capacity for observation and prediction had transcended modelling and 
entered speculation over the potential for computers to monitor and predict users’ 
information requests, which was further extended to suggest that BT could be ‘involved 
in the selection and manipulation of that information; there is potential for moulding 
society by selecting the contents of the databases’.97 
The negative connotations of predictive computer control over society were not 
ignored. The destruction of human labour by intelligent machines was admitted as a 
‘heretical idea’, whilst ‘ethical problems’ were also noted in using predictive computer 
databases to mould society.98 The dystopian science fictions of George Orwell and H.G. 
Wells were deployed to distinguish BT’s utopias from sci-fi dystopias. Charles May, on 
his global computer tracking proposal, distanced himself from the ‘big brother’ approach 
and argued that, so long as users could opt-out from such a system – a ‘god-given right’ 
that he, ‘as a technologist, would defend to the death’ – it would be permissible to enact 
global surveillance.99 Meanwhile, J.J. Wheatley, BT’s Head Economics Adviser, labelled 
dystopic interpretations of surveillance and computer control as the ‘politics of the 
pessimists’, which lazily deployed cultural references such as the ‘dictatorship of 
technology’ of Wells’ The Shape of Things to Come and ‘the enslavement by the 
information society’ of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.100 
 Superficially, The Shape of Things to Come and Nineteen Eighty-Four seem 
natural touchstones for discussions about the negative consequences of computer control 
and surveillance. However, a closer reading of both reveals that these science fictions 
were distorted in ways which further highlights the internalisation of computers as 
surveillance and control technologies amongst BT’s senior management. 
 In The Shape of Things to Come, published in 1933, the world disintegrates after 
years of heavy bombing during a second world war, and a benevolent dictatorship is set 
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up by the technocratic airmen, who use their control of aircraft, the world’s only surviving 
means of transport, to promote science, laying the path for utopia, which eventually 
arrives in the form a world-state. The Shape of Things to Come is thus neither an 
unambiguous dystopia nor even a dictatorship of technology: the novel follows a Wellsian 
convention also appearing in The War in the Air, The World Set Free and Men Like Gods 
where societal collapse is a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of utopia, and 
moreover, it is not technology which rules the world, but the scientists and technocrats 
which command that technology.101 
 Similarly, the Orwellian framing of surveillance in Nineteen Eighty-Four, as 
David Lyon notes, has its limitations.102 Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Oceania is a violent 
society with a centralised state, neither of which fit the deployment of computerised 
modelling during the liberalisation of telecommunications, which distanced the use of 
modelling, along with its connotations of machine surveillance, from the state. Moreover, 
its modes of surveillance are visible and low-tech – cameras, telescreens, bugging devices 
– in contrast to the invisible and informational modes of surveillance characterised by 
BT’s proposed computer monitoring and data manipulation. As Krishan Kumar notes, 
even Nineteen Eighty-Four’s innovations – telescreens, speakwrite, inkpens – are small 
adjustments of contemporaneous technologies – television, dictaphones, and biros.103 
Charlotte Sleigh argues that Nineteen Eighty-Four’s over-riding message is the utopian 
potential of scientific, empirical observation: Winston Smith, Nineteen Eighty-Four’s 
main character, holds on to his ability to observe empirical truths in the face of state 
propaganda, whilst O’Brien, Winston’s primary antagonist and Inner Party member, 
proudly proclaims that the state shall eventually ‘have no more need of science’.104 As 
Kumar points out, Nineteen Eighty-Four is thus not a simple dystopia, but a message that 
utopia can be attained, or anti-utopia avoided, through scientific, empirical, observation. 
 The Shape of Things to Come was thus misleadingly invoked as a ‘dictatorship of 
technology’ because BT’s senior management had internalised the idea of intelligent 
computer control, whilst Nineteen Eighty-Four was referred to because of its underlying 
theme of empirical observation, which corresponded to the perception of computer 
modelling and prediction established by long-range planning. Wheatley’s reference to the 
                                                 
101 Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 221–22. 
102 David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 
57–80. 
103 Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times, 296. 
104 Charlotte Sleigh, Literature and Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 48–49; Orwell, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, 306. 
210 
 
‘dictatorship of technology’ in The Shape of Things to Come could thus only be made if 
computer control had been tacitly accepted as part of BT’s future. May and Wheatley’s 
selection of Nineteen Eighty-Four for its connotations of informational surveillance, and 
their neglect of its violence and physicality, further highlights how the idea of computer 
observation and prediction had permeated BT’s senior management. In doing so, they 
betray how the connotation of being watched and controlled, with its roots in intelligent 
computer models ‘scanning’ the future, had predisposed them to select cultural icons – 
Wells’ The Shape of Things to Come and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four – which 
thematically mirrored their perceptions of computers as predictive machines of 
observation and control. 
 The computer’s capacity for control and surveillance were also linked to BT’s 
new neoliberal political environment. Wheatley envisioned how computerisation would 
enable the neoliberal state: 
There could be a convergence of computing and communication technology, with “small 
government” aspirations: 
- Small is beautiful 
- Small is cheaper 
- Large is unnecessary 
- Devolution gets government closer to people 
- Small is anti-bureaucratic105 
This vision of political liberalism was also joined by another neoliberal tenet: 
individualism. May’s proposal for a global computer tracking system came in the context 
of his belief that mobile telephony would liberate individuals from ‘the tyranny of the 
local line’: 
I am convinced that the next generation of businessmen - or perhaps the next but one - is 
going to want a truly universal pocket telephone accessible through the nation-wide 
cellular mobile radio scheme I mentioned earlier. This would completely release him 
from this “tyranny of the local line” and enable him to make and receive calls wherever 
he happened to be.106 
This contradictory fusion of computer control and liberation continued as the 
LRPD’s earlier social forecasts of the future of work returned. Work and lifestyles would 
be transformed by the rise of the ‘electronic office’, as ‘new technology will provide vast 
                                                 
105 ‘Into the 21st Century, 1980, TCC 75/1, BTA’, 24. 
106 ‘Into the 21st Century, 1980, TCC 75/1, BTA’, 7. 
211 
 
opportunities for wealth creation and individual self-realisation’, which would restore 
‘the importance of the individual’.107 It is not hugely surprising to see popular neoliberal 
ideas – individualism and small government – articulated at a senior management retreat 
dedicated to preparing for the liberalisation of BT. The creation of BT and the 
liberalisation of telecommunications were direct and popular consequences of neoliberal 
policies, and, as I expand on in Chapter Nine, BT’s senior management had needed little 
convincing of Thatcher’s plans to liberate the corporation from governmental financial 
controls.  
It does seem unusual that BT management saw political, economic, and individual 
liberalism as best achieved through various means of computer control. However, this 
also is not unexpected: various scholars have shown how, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, cyberculture and neoliberalism fused to produce ‘digital utopianism’, an ideology 
that the tenets of neoliberalism – liberal economics, individualism, and a small state – 
were best achieved through digital networked computing, which, through online 
communities and electronic marketplaces, would facilitate individuality and free market 
liberalism.108 Within this discourse, it makes sense that BT’s senior management would 
have viewed computer control as a means of achieving various registers of liberalism, 
although, as I will argue in Chapter Nine, the British vein of digital utopianism, in which 
BT’s privatisation played a significant role, has been an under-appreciated component of 
digital utopianism. However, digital utopianism also dangerously obscures disquieting 
registers of computer control. I previously said that I would show how BT’s senior 
management had enacted computer control and simulation-as-surveillance in both their 
imaginations and in reality: having shown the former, I now turn to the latter. 
 In Chapter Five, I described System X as enacting computer control through 
automatic operator services and automation of engineering labour; but System X also 
enabled unprecedented electronic surveillance of telecommunications users in the United 
Kingdom. A 1998 report to the European Parliament’s Scientific and Technological 
Options Assessment Unit described System X’s dual role in Britain: first, that it would 
route telephone calls, and second, that it would permit telephones to be used as listening 
devices.109 Built into System X from the ground-up was the ability to take phones ‘off-
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the-hook’ and listen to conversations happening nearby the phone.110 System X – which 
was also sold to Russia and China – was directly integrated into the ECHELON network 
used by the ‘Five Eyes’ (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA) party 
to the UKUSA surveillance agreement. The new computer switching technologies 
developed by BT enabled ‘routine’ and ‘indiscriminate’ interception of communications 
data, which, when combined with mobile telephones, provided a ‘custom built mobile 
track, tail and tap system par excellence’.111 Charles May, BT’s Director of Research, 
was thus startlingly prescient when, in November 1980, he speculated that, in the future, 
there would be no foreseeable technical barrier to tracking all six billion people around 
the world – except, in reality, there is no opt-out from ECHELON. 
 BT also deployed simulation-as-surveillance on at least two separate occasions. 
The first instance comes in an experiment that BT Labs conducted with MIT and the 
supermarket chain Marks and Spencer in 1995. BT installed facial recognition software 
in an M&S store which was networked with a database of known shoplifters.112 The 
software would then identify, via CCTV, potential shoplifters, at approximately 90% 
accuracy, and alert store security, who could either monitor shoplifters or remove them 
ahead of any actual crime. The simulation of suspects’ virtual selves was used to target 
their actual selves, and it should be noted that, at only 90% accuracy, one in ten would 
not have prior criminal records, let alone future criminal records. BT also undertook 
further simulation-as-surveillance between 2006 and 2009 in conjunction with the online 
advertising company Phorm.113 BT passed its internet service subscribers’ browsing data 
to Phorm, which analysed customers’ data for keywords; the frequency of certain 
keywords was used to model customers’ future purchasing interests, so BT and Phorm 
could sell individually-targeted adverts on partner websites in anticipation of a customer’s 
purchase. In 2008, it emerged that Phorm and BT had conducted two trials without 
customers’ knowledge or consent, and that this instance of simulation-as-surveillance had 
in fact broken British wiretapping laws.114 BT subsequently broke off its relationship with 
Phorm in 2009, but it is important to note that these instances are merely the publicly-
known episodes, and are also by no means limited in the telecommunications sector to 
BT. In 1995, Mercury used a simulated map of its network to predict, based on past calling 
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data and regional concentration, ‘whether the revenues it gets from its infrastructures 
justifies the costs’, or, as Mercury also put it, ‘The level of information we’re getting now 
has enabled us to question almost all our relationships with customers’.115 In the mid-
1990s, Bell Atlantic in the USA developed a computer simulation for its video-on-
demand system, similar to BT’s FttH trial outlined in the previous chapter, which 
monitored movies watched, predicted future movie rentals and other product interests 
based on viewing history, and targeted individual consumers accordingly.116 These 
examples may all sound familiar because they are the systems upon which the modern 
internet is built: websites like Amazon, Facebook and Netflix all use forms of simulation 
to predict future interests and activities in order to serve up content which keeps 
consumers watching and buying. Simulation is surveillance, and this was a fact which BT 
had been aware of since at least 1980. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have drawn together many parallel threads from the history of the 
telephone network through the lens of the Post Office’s Long Range Planning Department 
and its successor, BT’s Business Planning and Strategy Department. I explored the 
department’s early history, relating its inventive approach to the future, which surfaced 
both in its reports on technologies like Viewphone and its uses of computer modelling, to 
concerns, both within the department and outside the Post Office, about the impact of 
computerised telecommunications on privacy and dignity. In the early 1970s, long range 
planning became more expansive and sophisticated in the wake of global futurological 
reports about societal collapse and energy and economic crises. This was reflected in the 
development of economic and social forecasts, the hiring of new expertise, and uses of 
academic theories, particularly Daniel Bell’s post-industrial society, to understand and 
re-interpret the Post Office’s own plans for a computer-controlled telecommunications 
network. 
 Corporate computer modelling also started development during this period, and 
gradually moved from simulations designed to enhance management’s ‘mental models’ 
of the future to simulations which would take over from management in the event of crisis 
and were used to control middle management responses to liberalisation during the 
creation of BT. The model of computer control demonstrated by these simulations, which 
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were accompanied by the idea that computer models could ‘observe’ the future, 
reinforced ideas about computer control and surveillance in the telephone network. These 
fused with broader ideas about computerisation and neoliberalism to produce a vision of 
the telecommunications network which would monitor and predict telecommunications 
users as a form of liberation. I have suggested that this model of computer control and 
simulation-as-surveillance eventually filtered through to applications of surveillance and 
simulation by BT with System X, Marks & Spencer, and Phorm, and was used elsewhere 
in telecommunications, as evidenced by Mercury and Bell Atlantic’s uses of simulation. 
 This chapter thus speaks to ‘control’ as one of this thesis’ organising concepts. 
Information was not completely invisible in this chapter – reports on Viewphone and 
post-industrial society show that long-range planning also explored information age 
futures – but computer control, both as an instrument of tyranny and of liberation, was 
clearly at the forefront of many of the LRPD and BPSD’s ideas. In a sense, this chapter 
is thus a counterpart to Chapter Five, which focussed on the technological development 
of computer control within the telephone network from Merriman’s ‘self-governing’ 
system and Harris’ Project ADMITS to its reification in System X. In this chapter, I have 
looked at less central applications of computer control – Whyte’s experimental 
obsolescence model, investigations of morphological modelling, the development of 
corporate models, and visions of expert systems and simulation – and contextualised these 
against changing cultural conceptions of computerisation, from privacy fears, to post-
industrial society, and digital utopianism. I opened this chapter with quotes from The 
Machine Starts, Forster’s performative effort to prevent a mechanistic future. I think a 
history of the Long Range Planning Department shows that computer modelling here was 
also performative, computerising the future and in turn begetting computerised futures. 
 As this chapter explored similar themes to Chapter Five, so does the next chapter 
for Chapter Six. In the next chapter, I return to the development of the ‘information 
discourse’, and explore its intersection with the technologies and environments of 
transatlantic communications. 
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8 The Single World System 
Submarine Cables and Communication Satellites from 
the Cold War to the Information Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1988, British Telecom ran an advert to promote their international communication 
services. 1988 was the same year that TAT-8, the first fibre-optic transatlantic cable, was 
laid between the USA, Britain, and France. The advert opens with a shot of an empty 
business office, a desk and chair on the right, and a computer terminal on the left. A 
businessman picks up a Filofax and begins to dial his telephone. The camera pulls out to 
reveal that the shot is coming from outside the businessman’s office window. The camera 
pulls out further until all London – including BT Tower – are in view, and carries on 
pulling out: the UK, Europe, until, finally, Earth, floating in space. A communications 
satellite flies in front of the camera, momentarily obscuring the view of Earth, until the 
camera, quickly, begins to zoom back in – this time, to an office in Manhattan, New York. 
Another businessman picks up his phone and answers the call. A closing title card shows 
‘British Telecom International’, and a voice-over says, ‘It’s you we answer to’ – an 
acknowledgement of British Telecom’s privatisation in 1984, advertised as ‘A public 
company goes public’.1 
 One year later, in 1989, AT&T, the American telephone operator, also ran an 
advert promoting their international communication services. This advert, in contrast to 
BT’s, mentioned TAT-8, with an early sequence early in the commercial showing the 
cable laying. However, using imagery similar to BT, the AT&T advert opened and closed 
with a shot of the earth from space. After the cable-laying sequence, the advert shifted to 
AT&T’s new information services, through which customers could access the ‘worldwide 
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intelligent network’. This sequence was interspersed with images of computers and space 
age motifs, from satellites and earth stations to a NASA-style communications and 
telemetry control centre, culminating with a phone call with the space shuttle. The 
advert’s closing title card contained AT&T’s slogan, ‘The right choice’ – a nod to 
AT&T’s divestiture in 1982, in which the company was broken up into regional telephone 
providers and the American telephone network opened to competition.2 
 These adverts prompt important questions: why, having just laid the most 
significant transatlantic communications cable in thirty years, were BT and AT&T 
deploying satellites and other space-age motifs in their adverts for international 
communications? Why, in both adverts, were satellites and computers juxtaposed? 
Finally, how were the privatisation and divestiture of BT and AT&T entangled with this 
international communications discourse? In this chapter, I will explore how 
communication satellites obscured submarine cables and became part of an information 
age discourse articulated by BT and AT&T. 
In the first section, ‘Conquering the Atlantic’, I will explore AT&T and the Post 
Office’s collaboration on the first transatlantic telephone cable, TAT-1, laid in 1956. In 
the second section, ‘Hostile Environments’, I will look at the history of the Telstar 
communications satellite, operated by AT&T, and Goonhilly Earth Station, the Post 
Office’s earth station built in 1962 to communicate with Telstar. In the third section, ‘The 
Single World System’, I will explore the expansion of satellite communications by 
INTELSAT, the international communications satellite organisation, of which the Post 
Office was the second-largest owner, and focus on the ways in which INTELSAT 
presented communication satellites, particularly in relation to submarine telephone 
cables. Finally, in the fourth section, ‘Cables Orbit Satellites’, I explore the development 
of submarine cables in the 1970s and 1980s, highlighting the influence of satellites and 
environmental pressures on cable development, and then return to the marketing of 
international communications, highlighting the entanglement of communication 
satellites, the information age, and BT and AT&T’s organisational changes in this 
discourse. 
 This chapter also addresses two areas of communications history which have 
received remarkably little attention: the dynamic between submarine communication 
cables and communication satellites, and their environmental histories. The history of 
submarine communication cables has predominantly explored the technical histories of 
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submarine telegraphy before World War II, although John Tully and Nicole Starosielski 
have both recently devoted attention to cables’ environmental histories.3 Starosielski also 
explores the post-war history of cables, mainly in the Pacific, and notes that satellites 
have overtaken cables as a symbol of global communications, although she does not 
explore satellites’ rise to prominence. Likewise, communication satellite histories tend 
not to include submarine cables or satellites’ environment, but rather focus on the early 
history of space communications, including the formation – but not later history – of 
INTELSAT, although Lisa Ruth Rand has recently drawn attention to environmental 
concerns about satellites as ‘space junk’, whilst James Schwoch has briefly explored the 
Cold War interplay of cables and satellites, but only in TV transmission.4 This chapter 
thus explores the dynamic between submarine cable and satellite communications, whilst 
following Helen Rozwadowski and Roger Lanius’ respective calls to pay more attention 
to the history of the ocean and space environments.5 This chapter is therefore not only 
about the rise of the information discourse in the context of transatlantic communications, 
but about how that discourse was built upon increasingly discreet registers of 
environmental control. I will draw attention to these forms of environmental control, 
starting with TAT-1, the first transatlantic cable, where the hazardous undersea 
environment played a significant role not only in the cable’s design, but also in the 
rhetoric articulated about TAT-1 in the UK and the USA. 
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Conquering the Atlantic 
 
On September 25th, 1956, AT&T and the Post Office opened TAT-1, the first transatlantic 
telephone cable. TAT-1 incorporated various new and old techniques for surviving the 
Atlantic environment. The cable route, across the far north of the Atlantic from Oban in 
Scotland to Clarenville in Newfoundland, had to be carefully chosen for both 
infrastructural and environmental purposes: further south were telegraph cables, which 
might disrupt the new cable, and dangerous areas of the sea-bed, susceptible to turbidity 
currents, which were sediment-laden flows of water that could snap cables, as had 
happened following the 1929 Grand Banks earthquake and the 1954 Orleansville, 
Algeria, earthquake. TAT-1 had been enabled, technologically, by undersea repeaters 
developed at Bell Labs. These repeaters, which amplified and extended telephone signals, 
had to both survive the immense pressure at the bottom of the Atlantic, and also work 
reliably – a failure in the repeater could not be fixed. Interestingly, the repeaters used the 
Atlantic environment itself as an input: their metal casings, which were unavoidably 
deformed during the cable-laying process, relied on the immense pressure at the ocean 
floor to pressure them back into the correct shape.6 The Post Office had contributed to 
TAT-1 by designing its shallow-water repeaters, used in the link between Newfoundland 
and the North American mainland, and through the use of Her Majesty’s Telegraph Ship, 
Monarch, the largest cable ship afloat at the time, and the only ship capable of 
transporting the entire length of cable for one direction (TAT-1 was made of two cables, 
one for each direction of transmission). TAT-1’s final novelty, again demonstrating the 
intersection of technology and the environment, was its innovative use of polyethylene 
cladding, used to resist biological attack from marine bacteria, in contrast to previous 
cables’ more susceptible polyvinyl chloride coatings.7 
 These tough environmental conditions formed a major part of AT&T’s publicity 
about transatlantic telephony in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Youth audiences were 
particularly targeted: adverts in boys’ magazines talked about how the sea ‘could make a 
                                                 
6 T.F. Gleichmann et al., ‘Repeater Design for the North Atlantic Link’, The Bell System Technical 
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‘meal’ of telephone cables’ (Figure 8.1) and explained Bell Labs’ ‘experimental ocean’, 
used to test cable specimens in saline conditions.8 Business audiences were also targeted, 
with adverts in American Banker, The Wall Street Journal, and Fortune explaining how 
AT&T’s ‘stormproof’ Atlantic cable would allow them to expand American business 
interests in Europe.9 A series of adverts by AT&T called ‘Tele-Facts’ deployed 
                                                 
8 AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘The Sea Could Make A “Meal” of Telephone Cables’ 1958, Folder 1, Box 32, 
Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, NMAH; AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘Why 
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Figure 8.1. The sea could make a ‘meal’ of telephone cables! Courtesy NMAH Archives Center. 
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militaristic language to portray TAT-1 and, by extension, AT&T, as ‘conquering the 
Atlantic’; this militaristic tone pervaded many of AT&T’s TAT-1 adverts.10 The same 
adverts which ran in American Banker and Fortune explained how TAT-1 would be of 
‘far-reaching value in national defense’, whilst articles in Bell Telephone Magazine 
compared TAT-1 to Cold War projects like the Distant Early Warning Line and the 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.11 
 These Cold War geopolitical concerns were particularly evident in the trilateral 
negotiations for TAT-1 between the USA, Britain, and Canada. TAT-1’s route, which 
had been drawn up by AT&T and Post Office officials, also fulfilled a British goal of 
strengthening UK-Canadian communications and allowing an extension of the ‘all-red’ 
Commonwealth communications route to reach New Zealand via Canada and the 
Pacific.12 This was initially problematic for the USA, which had two security concerns: 
first, regarding the cable landing in Canada, rather than the USA, and second, over the 
plans for the Post Office, rather than AT&T, to design and contract out construction of 
the shallow-water Newfoundland-Nova Scotia section.13 The USA’s proposed solution to 
the first issue was to staff the cable stations on Canadian soil with American AT&T staff, 
which Canada in return expressed concerns over, both on security and commercial 
grounds, fearing that it would pave the way for the commercial expansion of US 
telecommunications into Canada.14 This subsequently caused concerns for the UK, where 
Foreign Office and Post Office officials worried that Canadian intransigence would cause 
the US to decide to lay a cable directly to France instead.15 The resulting compromise was 
that Canadian sections would be operated by Eastern Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
a Canadian AT&T subsidiary, the Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation 
would take a 10% minority stake in TAT-1, and that the Post Office would design the 
                                                 
over New Stormproof Cables’ 1956, Folder 2, Box 24, Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising 
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Newfoundland-Nova Scotia section but that, in return, the next transatlantic cable, TAT-
2, would run from the USA to France, to avoid concentrating traffic through the UK.16  
An AT&T publicity film for TAT-2, laid in 1959, further shows the entanglement 
of US Cold War geopolitical concerns about Europe with these cables’ environments. 
The film opens with scenes of waves crashing on rocks and emphasises the cable’s 
victories over the ‘many-mooded sea’, going on to describe battles against the wind, cold, 
and icebergs, before concluding that the cable ‘should do much to bring many nations 
closer together, both politically and economically, and contribute significantly to the 
defence needs of the free world’ and was ‘man’s newest memorable victory over distance 
and the sea’.17 This film captures how the cable’s environments were crucial to a 
discourse emphasising the importance of extending US military and economic influence 
into Europe; the early transatlantic telephone cables could thus be positioned, from the 
US perspective, in John Krige’s trend of ‘consensual hegemony’, describing the USA’s 
use of scientific and technological projects in the early Cold War to aid European 
reconstruction and serve its Cold War defence interests.18 
 In Britain, TAT-1’s environmental dimensions were instead used to emphasise 
the British scientific and technological ingenuity which had made TAT-1 a ‘world first’. 
At the cable’s opening ceremony, Charles Hill, the Postmaster-General, highlighted the 
engineering prowess and patient research behind the cable, whilst the Post Office’s 
official souvenir booklet emphasised British oceanographic knowledge and 
manufacturing skill.19 Gordon Radley, by then Director-General, spoke on the BBC radio 
Home Service program Science Survey in September 1956 about TAT-1 as a ‘significant 
scientific achievement’.20 Radley described the cable resting in the ‘perpetual darkness 
and ooze of the sea bed’, evoking another passage which highlighted the environment of 
submarine communication cables, Rudyard Kipling’s ‘The Deep-Sea Cables’: ‘There is 
no sound, no echo of sound, in the deserts of the deep, Or the great grey level plains of 
ooze where the shell-burred cables creep’.21 However, where Kipling’s poem portrayed 
cables as a globally unifying force, transcending their environment, Radley’s talk, and 
                                                 
16 Barnett to Little, ‘Secret: From Washington to Foreign Office’; Kelly et al., ‘A Transatlantic Telephone 
Cable’, 128. 
17 Cable to the Continent (AT&T, 1959), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqRj3lvvg7Y. 
18 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, 
MA; London: MIT Press, 2006). 
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other Post Office publicity for TAT-1, can instead be positioned within ‘defiant 
modernism’.22 TAT-1, a collaborative project, is, at first glance, not an ideal example of 
defiant modernism, which refers to uniquely British projects. However, the Post Office’s 
emphasis on British contributions to TAT-1, a project enabled by AT&T-developed deep-
sea repeaters, reveal the defiant aspect of this discourse. Just as defiant modernism 
highlights British emphasis on ‘world firsts’ amidst Britain’s perceived international 
decline, so the Post Office’s emphasis on its contributions to TAT-1, which had been 
enabled by American innovation, also took on a defiant tinge. 
 
Hostile Environments 
 
In the early 1960s, space-based communications took off, and the rhetoric deployed in its 
support by AT&T and the Post Office were similar to the discourses deployed in support 
of TAT-1, although new attitudes to space as an environment and zone of Cold War 
conflict also began to appear. In the USA, this occurred with the launch of AT&T’s 
Telstar satellite, whilst in Britain, this happened with the Post Office’s construction of 
Goonhilly Downs, Britain’s first satellite earth station. 
 Telstar, launched in July 1962, was the first satellite to relay telephony and 
television across the Atlantic, from AT&T’s earth station in Andover, Maine, to British 
and French earth stations at Goonhilly Downs, Cornwall, and Pleumeur-Bodou, Brittany. 
Bell Labs’ initial investigation into satellite telephony came in 1955, but its R&D 
programme began in earnest in 1959, and AT&T entered an agreement with NASA: 
AT&T would design and construct an active communications satellite, and NASA would 
launch it.23 The satellite itself was roughly spherical, composed of seventy-two facets, 
covered in sixty solar cells and three mirrors, which aided satellite tracking from Earth. 
The satellite weighed 170lb and contained a single, one-way amplifier, capable of 
transmitting a full-band signal one way, or two narrow-band signals two ways (for 
example, a one-way television signal, or a two-way phone call). Telstar’s purpose was 
not only to prove the viability of satellite communications, but also to gain an 
understanding of the space environment, particularly the Van Allen radiation belt 
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surrounding Earth, discovered by James Van Allen at the University of Iowa in 1958, 
using data from the Explorer 1 and Explorer 3 satellites.24 
 AT&T situated its space activities alongside transatlantic telephone cables in its 
publicity. After its early experiments in space communications in the late 1950s, AT&T 
ran a widely-published series of adverts with the header ‘From Beyond the Sky to Beneath 
the Seas’ in military and science magazines (Figure 8.2), juxtaposing the sea and space 
environments to demonstrate the breadth of AT&T’s accomplishments.25 The adverts’ 
appearance in military magazines further demonstrates the imbrication of transatlantic 
communications and Cold War military interests. TAT-1 and Telstar were also used as 
recruitment tools in college advertising: one poster described how ‘Between Outer Space 
and the Deep Sea There’s a Wide Range of Opportunity in the Bell Telephone 
Companies’, whilst another explained how ‘progress in the Bell System’, amongst other 
things, ‘swims’ and ‘orbits’.26 
 The Telstar experiment also interlinked the hazards of the space environment with 
the growing environmental awareness of the 1960s, which raised concerns about 
American militarisation of the space environment after the Telstar experiment. Telstar, as 
mentioned above, had not just been launched as a communications satellite, but also, as 
AT&T publicity explained, a ‘space laboratory’, ‘operating in the unknown environment 
of hostile radiation and micrometeorite dust’, and so sent back data about the space 
environment to Bell Labs.27 The day before Telstar launched, the USA detonated Starfish 
Prime, the largest man-made nuclear explosion in outer space, part of a series of high-
altitude nuclear weapons tests called Operation Fishbowl. This detonation energised the 
Van Allen belt, and this extra radiation damaged transistors on Telstar, causing it to fail. 
 The failure of Telstar and seven other satellites, including Ariel I, Britain’s first 
satellite, caused by Starfish Prime, highlighted the hazardous environment of space and 
fed environmental concerns about the damage American military programs were doing to 
outer space. John McNeill and Corinna Unger have noted the inter-relationship between 
Cold War militarism and the rise of environmentalism, calling environmentalism ‘a child 
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of the Cold War’, but what is especially relevant is how space communications, and the 
concept of space as an environment, played a role here.28 Lisa Ruth Rand has argued that 
Telstar’s failure, and its linkage by the media with Operation Fishbowl, constituted a 
‘proto-environmentalist’ moment;29 Toshihiro Higuchi has also argued that Operation 
Fishbowl stirred Cold War environmental insecurities, and Jacob Hamblin has shown 
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Figure 8.2. Telstar and TAT-1: ‘From beyond the sky to beneath the seas’. Courtesy NMAH 
Archives Center. 
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how nuclear weapon detonations in space were not just about weapons testing, but also 
about investigating environmental transformation.30 
This entanglement of militarism and environment was also evident in other early 
approaches to space communications. In 1961, MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory began Project 
West Ford, an attempt to create an artificial ionosphere in outer space which 
communication signals could be bounced off. The artificial ionosphere was created by 
placing 480 million copper needles into orbit to act as a reflective antenna, and so reduce 
the US military’s reliance on undersea cables – in 1959, the US Navy had boarded a 
Russian fishing trawler in the North Atlantic, suspected of deliberately cutting 
transatlantic telephone and telegraph cables owned by AT&T and Western Union.31 
Project West Ford was protested in the both Britain and the USSR, and eventually came 
under criticism within the USA as well. British radio-astronomers, such as Bernard 
Lovell, were concerned with how the needles might affect radio astronomy, whilst in the 
USSR, Pravda attacked the USA with the heading ‘USA dirties space’, calling the needles 
‘space junk’.32 In the USA, The New York Times argued that the USA had no unilateral 
right to influence the space environment.33 Telstar’s failure was linked in newspaper 
articles to Operation Fishbowl’s potential damage to the space environment, and Van 
Allen criticised the military tests, which used data from Telstar to study the explosions 
before its failure, for projecting a ‘sinister’ air around the programme.34 Whilst AT&T 
thus initially positioned Telstar alongside TAT-1 as a high-tech link to Europe, another 
technology conquering its environment to effect US Cold War aims, Telstar escaped its 
rhetorical frame and instead represented tension between the American space and military 
programmes and the emerging environmental movement. 
 Goonhilly Downs Earth Station, like Telstar, was also initially situated alongside 
TAT-1, before experiencing environmental challenge. Goonhilly, and satellite earth 
stations in general, are an important part of this history given their relative neglect in 
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satellite histories, which tend to focus on the cosmic and not the terrestrial.35 Satellite 
communications is more than satellites in space: it is also a vast, material, terrestrial 
infrastructure composed of, by now, hundreds of earth stations around the world. Earth 
stations are thus important nodes in communication satellite infrastructure, and for the 
Telstar experiment, three earth stations in three different countries were required. 
 Goonhilly Earth Station was built by the Post Office in 1962 on Goonhilly Downs, 
an isolated, elevated plateau on the Cornish peninsula with broad sightlines. The Post 
Office pursued a unique direction for the design of Goonhilly: the first antenna, Antenna 
One – also known as ‘Arthur’ – was the world’s first satellite communication antenna 
with a parabolic design. The antenna was designed by Charles Husband, the engineer 
behind Jodrell Bank’s Lovell Telescope, the world’s largest steerable radio telescope, 
which had also used a parabolic design, and had been the world’s first satellite ‘dish’.36 
The Post Office proudly touted Antenna One’s parabolic design as a uniquely British 
design concept which did not need environmental protection, in contrast to AT&T’s 
Andover, Maine, earth station, which utilised a ‘horn’ antenna that required protection 
from the environment by a distinctive ‘golf ball’ protective radome.37 Goonhilly’s dish 
was mobilised as part of Post Office publicity, featuring in the Progress poster series 
which has appeared throughout this thesis (Figure 8.3).38 The Post Office later proudly 
touted how the British parabolic design became the template for subsequent earth stations 
around the world, and in so, Goonhilly, as with TAT-1, is another example of ‘defiant 
modernism’. Goonhilly, however, was not a complete success: initial communication 
with Telstar failed because a component had been accidentally inverted, which disrupted 
the Post Office and Britain’s image of technological sophistication. The Prime Minister, 
Harold MacMillan, demanded an explanation from the Post Office, which explained both 
the simple error behind Goonhilly’s failure, and also that Goonhilly had cost a quarter as 
much as the French earth station and had demonstrated Britain’s expertise in antenna 
construction.39 
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The expansion of space communications brought concerns about interference in 
the radio spectrum, which would have consequences for Goonhilly. As international 
satellite communication developed, and telephone companies developed domestic 
microwave networks for domestic communication (as discussed in Chapter Six), the radio 
spectrum became increasingly congested and wireless communication susceptible to 
interference. Mitigating interference had been an early priority for Telstar: AT&T’s  
Andover earth station had been duplicated and exported to France at considerable cost for 
 
Figure 8.3. Goonhilly also appeared in the ‘Progress’ poster series. Courtesy of BT Archives. 
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the French earth station at Pleumeur-Bodou, in order to standardise and ensure the 
replicability of communications.40 This strategy suggests that earth stations, whilst 
neglected nodes in satellite communications, also have much in common with scientific 
laboratories, which have also been highlighted as standardised settings permitting the 
‘export’ and replication of scientific knowledge around the world. Strategies to mitigate 
interference with scientific instruments is not a new phenomenon: Agar has highlighted 
various strategies of spatial organisation and control taken to control interference for 
Jodrell Bank, while Cahan has outlined the architectural and political techniques used to 
reduce interference at the Physikalische-Technische-Reichsanstalt, the Imperial German 
metrological laboratory founded in 1887.41 
By the 1970s, interference meant that Goonhilly could no longer serve as Britain’s 
only earth station. The Cornish peninsula had been ideal for transatlantic satellites, but 
south-east facing aerials, pointed at Indian ocean satellites, proved susceptible to 
interference from French microwave networks across the channel. By 1974, it was 
difficult for Goonhilly to maintain a reasonable connection with Indian Ocean satellites, 
as the low angle of inclination needed to transmit from the UK to the Indian Ocean 
satellite meant that signals passed straight through the French atmosphere (Figure 8.4).42 
Britain’s second earth station, Madley, therefore opened in 1978, and its northern, 
inland position in Herefordshire had better sightlines and was protected from interference 
not only from the continent, but also Goonhilly, which continued to work until 2008. The 
fate of Goonhilly and construction of Madley demonstrates earth stations and, indeed, all 
wireless communication stations, are not only susceptible to interference, but also 
producers of it, and this is important for an historical and environmental analysis of the 
radio spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum is an invisible environment which 
intersects with the spatiality of communications infrastructure and other scientific and 
technological institutions such as radio telescopes and metrological laboratories; by 1968, 
this was already such a concern that an article in AT&T’s Bell Telephone Magazine 
described the spectrum, in which AT&T had invested a significant amount with its 
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domestic microwave network, as a ‘natural resource’ being ‘polluted’.43 A history of 
Goonhilly and Madley shows that not only was the natural environment important to their 
function, but also the electromagnetic environment, and suggests that further work is 
needed in this field.  
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Figure 8.4. Interference between Goonhilly and French microwave relay stations. Courtesy BT 
Archives. 
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The Single World System 
 
Telstar showed the viability of satellite communications, and so attention turned to global 
satellite systems, which ultimately took form in the INTELSAT ‘single world system’. 
INTELSAT had a profound organisational and discursive influence on the development 
and presentation of international communications by the Post Office/British Telecom and 
AT&T from the late 1970s. However, before I explore that influence, I will first address 
INTELSAT’s organisation and rhetoric for international communications. 
 The USA spearheaded the creation of INTELSAT as a satellite system with global 
access and Cold War objectives. Soviet success with Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin had left 
the USA lagging in the space race, and the Kennedy administration saw a global satellite 
system as a way to gain prestige, catch up to the USSR, and align neutral developing 
nations in the Third World with the USA. Hugh Slotten notes that, on this latter point, the 
USA needed to match the USSR in an ‘ideological struggle for the minds of men in these 
countries’.44 Transmitting television and propaganda from the USA across the world 
through a global satellite system was seen as a powerful weapon for American foreign 
policy. The USA thus started negotiations with foreign governments to gather a 
consortium of nations to invest in and support the global system. The 1962 
Communications Satellite Act created COMSAT, a publicly-traded corporation which 
represented the USA in these negotiations, and the courtship of foreign governments 
began.45 
 In the UK, the Post Office had to negotiate its commitment to submarine cables 
with the growing support for a single global satellite system. Nigel Wright and Hugh 
Slotten have both demonstrated that the Post Office’s early interest in satellites came from 
its desire to create a complementary Commonwealth satellite system which would 
interlink with cables, rather than a single global system.46 There was also potential for a 
European satellite system, which the Post Office were reluctant to invest in given that it 
would have to pay both purchase costs for the European launcher, developed by ELDO, 
the European Launcher Development Organisation, and also development costs, as the 
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launcher was still in development. The Foreign Office foresaw political problems with 
both Commonwealth and European systems, and, given the Americans’ head-start on 
satellite development, convinced the Post Office that participation in the American 
system represented the best option for British industrial, telecommunications, and 
Commonwealth interests. The Commonwealth were enrolled in this strategy through the 
Commonwealth Conference on Satellite Communications in 1962, which recommended 
that the Post Office, in conjunction with Canada, should undertake exploratory talks with 
the USA, although the Post Office was still keen to emphasise its preference for a 
complementary cable and satellite system at the meeting.47 European interests coalesced 
through the Conference of European Postal and Telecommunication Administrations, 
which agreed not to establish a regional satellite system in opposition to the USA, 
although the European Conference on Satellite Telecommunications, CETS, was 
established for long-term planning. Through concerted negotiations by COMSAT and the 
American State Department, groundwork for a single global satellite system had been laid 
by 1963. 
 However, a significant opportunity to voice further opinions came in 1963, at the 
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, organised by the International 
Telecommunications Union. Slotten has already addressed the USA’s use of the 1963 
conference to secure frequency allocations for the single global system, to strengthen ties 
with its European allies, and to undertake ‘missionary’ work, promoting technical 
assistance programs, with potential Third World supporters.48 
Two of the Post Office’s noteworthy contributions came from a paper describing 
Goonhilly and a proposed resolution regarding the inter-connection of satellites with 
other transmission systems.49 In the first, the Post Office again touted Goonhilly’s unique, 
parabolic, unprotected antenna, and described another unique feature: its use of computer 
prediction, rather than automatic tracking, for the steering aerial. Goonhilly demonstrates 
an early example of the Post Office’s interest in computer techniques, and its computer 
used orbital data to predict satellite movement, so that the antenna would not need to be 
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steered to acquire satellites as they appeared over the horizon. The Goonhilly computer 
proved useful at the conference, and was used, via Telex, to calculate degrees of 
interference between different radio-communication services, which was another 
opportunity for the Post Office to deploy Goonhilly to emphasise its technological 
prowess.50 The Post Office’s resolution also highlighted its commitment to undersea 
cables and an inclusive satellite system. The resolution argued that the time-delay and 
Doppler frequency shifts associated with satellite transmission necessitated an 
interconnected system which provided various transmission routes, such as undersea 
cables, to mitigate these issues. This resolution, as well as the continuing commitment by 
countries such as France to its cable networks, meant that the USA eventually did concede 
and sharing criteria were put in place for satellite systems to interconnect with terrestrial 
services. 
 In 1964, INTELSAT was finally established through an interim agreement, to be 
formalised in 1971. The USA, through COMSAT, owned half, whilst the other half was 
jointly owned by major partners from Europe and around the world, including Canada, 
Japan and Australia. The Post Office, as Britain’s representative, was the second-largest 
single shareholder behind the USA, with an 8.4% ownership share.51 
Reflecting its goals and organisation as a ‘single world system’, INTELSAT was 
associated with a globalising liberal democratic Cold War discourse though the 1960s 
and 1970s, and emphasised satellites as superior and environmentally transcendent 
compared to submarine cables. ‘One world’ discourses of various valences proliferated 
through the 1960s. In 1962, the media theorist Marshall McLuhan, in The Gutenberg 
Galaxy, popularised the term ‘global village’, but it is often overlooked that McLuhan’s 
term was, at best, ambivalent, and at worst, an expression of serious concern about the 
impact of global communications on mankind. McLuhan described the global village as 
‘a single constricted space resonant with tribal drums’,52 and warned that: 
Instead of tending towards a vast Alexandrian library the world has become a computer, 
an electronic brain, exactly as in an infantile piece of science fiction. And as our senses 
have gone outside us, Big Brother goes inside. So, unless aware of this dynamic, we shall 
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at once move into a phase of panic terrors, exactly befitting a small world of tribal drums, 
total interdependence, and super-imposed co-existence.53 
Humankind’s forays into space also fed this growth of ‘one world’ discourses. The writer-
entrepreneur Stewart Brand, amongst many others, seized on the first photos of Earth 
from space as a call-to-arms for his environmentalist magazine, Whole Earth Catalog.54 
Before the stabilisation of a specific INTELSAT discourse, the first INTELSAT satellite, 
Early Bird, was caught up in a McLuhan-esque ‘communications explosion’ discourse. 
Early Bird appeared on the front cover of TIME magazine, directly beaming an unsettling 
jumble of geometric shapes, designed to convey the view of space communications as ‘a 
maze of reflections of one thing to another’ and ‘the somewhat frightening prospect of 
man’s new capability to store a mass of information and, on signal, send it to anywhere 
in the world’ (Figure 8.5).55 
 However, by the end of the 1960s, the INTELSAT discourse had stabilised into a 
rhetoric of communication satellites as agents of global peace and unity, with registers of 
liberal democratic capitalism and the highly-anticipated information revolution. An 
advert by Hughes, Early Bird’s manufacturer, explained that with the satellite, ‘The future 
looks bright. It includes increased world trade and better understanding between 
nations’.56 A COMSAT fact sheet explained how satellites would ‘increasingly handle 
even more futuristic chores’ such as data exchange and facsimile, whilst at the Early Bird 
inaugural address, President Lyndon B. Johnson proclaimed that the Early Bird service 
‘brings closer together lands and people who share not only a common heritage but a 
common destiny’.57 Two years later, in 1967, at the launch of the second INTELSAT II 
satellite over the Pacific, Johnson invoked similar rhetoric, describing that satellites 
would make space ‘a zone of peace, devoted to the purposes of all mankind’, whilst Rosel 
Hyde, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, described how the satellite 
would improve ‘the flow of knowledge and commerce across new high-capacity 
highways of communications’.58 
This discourse peaked at the signing of the official INTELSAT accords in 
Washington in 1971 with the contributions of science-fiction author Arthur C. Clarke. 
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Clarke had originally proposed the geosynchronous satellite system which INTELSAT 
used in a 1945 article in Wireless World, and as such his fame and predilection for grand 
predictions were regularly invoked about INTELSAT. At the accords’ signing, Clarke 
explained his belief that ‘communication satellites can unite mankind’ and informed the 
signatories that they had ‘just signed a first draft of the Articles of Federation of the 
United States of Earth’.59 In a 1971 article for Popular Science about the new INTELSAT 
IV series of satellites, Werhner von Braun, the famed German-American aerospace 
engineer, wrote that INTELSAT would establish what ‘Arthur Clarke, prophetic writer 
on space, has called “mankind’s first nervous system,” which will “link together the 
whole human race”’.60 The same quote was used in the INTELSAT III series press 
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Figure 8.5. TIME magazine’s cover, ‘The Communications Explosion’, May 14, 1965. 
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handbook, and Clarke also wrote a guest editorial in Bell Telephone Magazine, in which 
he linked communication satellites with computers, suggesting that, whilst the enormous 
channel capacity of satellites may not be needed for a billion simultaneous human 
conversations, they would certainly be needed for computers, ‘which are becoming more 
talkative than their human creators’.61 
The large capacity of communication satellites, as well as the fragility of undersea 
cables and satellites’ apparent environmental transcendence, became key features of an 
INTELSAT discourse which proclaimed the superiority of satellites over submarine 
cables. Wernher von Braun’s article, mentioned above, touted the superior capacity of 
INTELSAT IV compared to the ‘puny’ capacity of the ‘most sophisticated transatlantic 
cable’, whilst a COMSAT brochure entitled ‘New Communications Era’ explained how 
the ‘archaic’ cable system was no longer necessary and how Early Bird nearly doubled 
the capacity of a transatlantic cable, at less than a fifth of the cost.62 Submarine cables’ 
fragility was also emphasised: in June 1965, COMSAT seized on the failure of the 
Canada-to-England transatlantic cable, CANTAT, to petition the USA’s Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) for temporary replacement service via Early Bird, 
and quickly publicised Early Bird’s rescue of transatlantic communications.63 The same 
occurred three years later, when COMSAT publicised how INTELSAT satellites had 
carried their heaviest ever load of Atlantic traffic after two transatlantic cables had been 
damaged.64 An INTELSAT educational booklet explained how satellites were superior to 
cables both as agents of global peace and understanding and as a medium for the many 
new types of communication that were being developed.65 In particular, it perpetuated the 
notion that satellites could escape the environment, the ‘inherent limitations’ of terrestrial 
communication’, whereas terrestrial communications, in the environmental degradation 
of radio communications or the intrinsic, fragile, materiality of cables, could not.66 These 
ideas were also articulated outside INTELSAT and COMSAT: Aviation Week reported 
INTELSAT IV’s capacity of 3,000-9,000 circuits in comparison to the 750 of the most 
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recent transatlantic cable, whilst TV Guide drew together the supposed differences in 
capacity and environment in an article about the growing demand for international 
communications.67 TV Guide simultaneously emphasised the superior capacity of 
INTELSAT and the environment of submarine cables with the rhetorical question, ‘Meet 
that demand with undersea cables? They’d drown in an ocean of words. But satellites can 
handle it’. Cables had been submerged, both literally and figuratively, whilst satellites 
were presented as a capable and transcendent technology. 
 
Cables Orbit Satellites 
 
The INTELSAT system and communication satellites had a significant influence on the 
development of transatlantic cables and international communications. In this section, I 
will outline three ways in which this occurred: first, in an organisational mirroring of the 
INTELSAT system through the North Atlantic System Conference; second, in the 
invocation of satellites and other space age motifs in BT and AT&T’s promotion of 
international communications; and third, in the deployment of a similar unifying 
discourse to that articulated by INTELSAT, with a greater emphasis on computerisation 
and free enterprise capitalism. Before that, however, I shall explore the Post Office’s 
appraisals of submarine cables and communication satellites, and the various techniques 
deployed during the 1960s and 1970s to protect and maintain undersea cables in the ocean 
environment. 
 From INTELSAT’s early days, the Post Office researched and monitored the 
proficiency of both satellites and submarine cables. In 1968, five reports comparing 
satellites and cables were produced.68 One paper addressed noise performance, 
concluding that cable circuits had marginally better performance, whilst satellites were 
more susceptible to rain and atmospheric conditions causing bursts of noise. One 
compared propagation conditions, whilst another addressed the fallibility of earth 
stations, noting that a satellite TV broadcast from Germany had been cancelled because 
the German earth station’s radome had been covered in snow, and that radome repairs 
had also been responsible for putting Andover and Pleumeur-Bodou out of action for 
extended periods. The final paper compared satellites and cables’ relative secrecy, 
concluding that submarine cables offered better prospects, but it was also noted that in 
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the future, satellites with highly direction aerials could illuminate only a few square miles 
around the earth stations, increasing security. Donald Wray, the Deputy Director of 
Engineering, and the Post Office engineer who had planned Goonhilly, dryly noted that 
if ‘the Red Chinese started building an earth station in Cornwall their activity would not 
pass unnoticed’. However, Wray’s overall analysis of the reports was conclusive, noting 
the advantages cables had over satellites: greater secrecy, simplicity, life-span, 
transmission time were simple advantages, whilst the relative complexity and manpower 
requirements of earth stations over cable stations was another. The Post Office’s Joint 
Submarine Systems Development Unit (run with Cable & Wireless) also noted that 
satellites were less susceptible to malicious and electrical interference, but pointed out 
that, in the event they were damaged, cables could be repaired, whereas satellites could 
not.69 
 By 1976, eight cables crossed the Atlantic – six in the TAT series and two in the 
CANTAT series – and various techniques were developed to protect and repair these 
cables. In 1970, the Post Office used a ‘sea-plough’, developed by AT&T, to bury 80 
miles of TAT-3 off the Cornish coast.70 The shallow continental shelf was where 
submarine cables were most vulnerable to damage from fishing trawlers, and so was 
where most protection effort was focussed. Into the 1970s, new methods for accessing 
cables for maintenance were pursued. In 1970, I.R. Finlayson, the Post Office’s 
Submarine Superintendent, commissioned a report from a marine consultant, Lieutenant 
Commander Lovell Smith, on the viability of a diving unit to repair submarine cables 
whilst on the sea-bed.71 Finlayson also collaborated with the Marine Technology Support 
Unit at Wantage Research Laboratory, part of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority, on commissioning underwater habitats which submarine cables could be 
pulled into for repair.72 The diving unit was never established, and submersible habitats 
were apparently never deployed, but the Post Office’s interest in these strategies 
highlights the powerful incentives to devise new ways of quickly repairing damaged 
cables. One successful strategy was the use of submersibles: in the early 1970s, the Post 
Office used mini-submarines called ‘Pisces’ to bury and repair cable, and later in the 
1970s, a consortium of North Atlantic telecommunications companies, the North Atlantic 
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Cable Maintenance Agreement, which included the Post Office and AT&T, pooled funds 
to purchase two unmanned submersibles, known as SCARABs, for submarine 
maintenance work.73 Another project, developed by the Post Office, was a new grapnel 
for cutting deep sea cables and bringing them to the surface for repairs. By 1979, 
Martlesham Heath had developed the ‘cut and hold grapnel’, which was able to 
simultaneously cut a cable and then immediately lift it for repairs. The grapnel could work 
at depths of 5,000 fathoms, had a sonar surveillance system, and used a built-in power 
source to provide hydraulic operation. This new grapnel reduced grapping time by a third 
and total repair time by just over a fifth, was heralded as a leap forward in cable repair, 
and quickly found customers abroad.74 
 The corporations laying these North Atlantic cables transformed their 
organisational alliances in the late 1970s, mirroring the INTELSAT organisation in order 
to legitimise cable planning. The technical and diplomatic considerations which 
influenced cable planning, as well as the benefits of pooling resources – already 
demonstrated by arrangements such as the North Atlantic Cable Maintenance Agreement 
– meant that, in 1977, the Post Office hosted the first North Atlantic Systems 
Conference.75 The conference met in Eastbourne, was attended by telephone 
administrations from Western Europe and North America, and was ostensibly 
transmission-neutral, claiming to be about all communication links across the North 
Atlantic – both satellites and cables – which is apparent in the meeting’s name: the North 
Atlantic Systems Conference. As such, it was not just telephone administrations which 
were invited to attend, but also representatives from COMSAT and INTELSAT. 
However, the conference contained an ulterior motive: re-establishing cables’ place in 
transatlantic communications. In 1976, AT&T and the Post Office, along with CTNE, the 
Spanish telephone administration, held meetings regarding the development of the next 
round of transatlantic cables, TAT-7 and TAT-8.76 AT&T had found it difficult to secure 
FCC approval for transatlantic telephone cables, given the USA’s commitment to 
communication satellites, and the security of the COMSAT-INTELSAT diplomatic and 
legal instrument. The telephone companies thus conspired to give transatlantic telephone 
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cable planning greater weight in the FCC’s eyes, and the result was the North Atlantic 
Systems Conference, which earned legitimacy by claiming system neutrality and having 
COMSAT and INTELSAT as participants. Somewhat too late, COMSAT’s 
representative realised that the conference was, in his words, an attempt to 
‘INTELSATIZE the cable planning process to achieve a comparability with the satellite 
process in the eyes of the US government’.77 However, by this point, plans for TAT-7 
had been approved, the groundwork for TAT-8 laid, and agreements made by the North 
American and European telephone companies for further conferences in the series. 
 In 1978, TAT-7, the last analogue, coaxial cable in the TAT series, was laid, and 
ten years later, in 1988, TAT-8, the first transatlantic digital, fibre-optic cable, was laid. 
TAT-8 was a joint venture between the newly-privatised BT, the newly-divested AT&T, 
and France Telecom, created in 1988 in preparation for privatisation in 1998 in 
accordance with EU law. The cable cost ~£225 million, of which British Telecom 
contributed £34 million, the second largest share. The cable’s novelty lay not just in its 
new transmission medium – optical fibre – nor its new transmission mode – digital – but 
also its use of an underwater branching unit on the continental shelf off the British coast. 
This meant that the cable provided links from the USA to both Britain and France, as well 
as a cross-channel fibre-optic link.78 TAT-8 could carry 40,000 simultaneous telephone 
calls – an almost ten-fold leap over the 4,200-circuit capacity of TAT-7, and an over 
three-fold increase from the most recent INTELSAT series, INTELSAT V, which could 
carry 12,000 calls.79 
 However, by 1988 submarine cables had not just organisationally imitated 
satellite planning, but had also been almost completely obscured by communication 
satellites in an ‘information age’ discourse. Satellites had been linked with the 
information age as early as the 1960s. Lewis Bohn, an analyst at Herman Kahn’s Hudson 
Institute, identified communications satellites as a developing ‘information technology’ 
in 1968, whilst Edwin Parker, a Stanford economist, interlinked communication satellites 
as a ‘key information technology’ with Daniel Bell’s concept of the ‘post-industrial 
society’.80 Donald Lamberton, the Australian economist, edited a special issue of Annals 
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of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1974 on ‘The Information 
Revolution’, and similarly positioned satellites within an industrial transition.81 
Lamberton explained that ‘new information technology, for example computers and 
satellites, symbolise the movement of society into a new industrial revolution: the 
information revolution’. In the 1980s, this linkage of satellites and the information age 
would be deployed within BT and AT&T’s discourse about international 
communications. 
 BT’s inter-linkage of communication satellites and the information age 
particularly targeted business customers, and underscored the influence privatisation and 
liberalisation had on the telephone company. After privatisation, BT created British 
Telecom International to oversee and market international communications. The BTI 
television advert mentioned at the start of this chapter notably juxtaposes satellites, 
computers, and business, all in the same year that TAT-8 launched. This marketing angle 
was also present in prior BTI publicity, which also borrowed from the ‘one world’ 
discourses associated with communication satellites. In 1984, an advert informed BTI 
customers that international communication was ‘uniting the business world’, whilst a 
1986 advert announced that international video-conferencing was a business’s ‘short cut 
to the global village’, recasting McLuhan’s ambivalence into a free-enterprise market-
oriented opportunity.82 Another 1986 advert publicising global data communication links 
as ‘The Information World’.83 These adverts thus show the various overlaps of global 
communications and the information age. 
The clearest linkages of satellites, business, and the information age come in two 
developments: the creation of the London ‘Teleport’, and BT’s SatStream variant of its 
X-Stream services. London Teleport, which I previously addressed in Chapter Six, 
opened for service on February 1st, 1984 in London Docklands, to bring ‘high-speed 
telecommunications to the fingertips of the City’, using the City’s new optical-fibre 
network.84 The name ‘teleport’ connotes the instantaneous, dematerialised qualities 
attributed to global communications, suggesting the popular sci-fi ‘teleporter’ device, 
such as Star Trek’s transporters. However, such space age implications were unnecessary, 
as BT publicity explicitly announced that the teleport was ‘bringing space-age 
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communications to the heart of London’.85 The business orientation of the teleport was 
further reinforced by BT’s emphasis on its videoconferencing capabilities, offering ‘the 
busy executive the ability to conduct real time, face-to-face meetings without the need to 
commit valuable time and resources to travel’.86 
SatStream, part of BT’s X-Stream services, also highlighted the intertwining of 
satellites with business services.87 I have already addressed the X-stream services in 
Chapter Four, but here I want to particularly focus on SatStream, an international service 
which allowed customers to connect directly to a European satellite through small dishes 
installed on their buildings’ roofs. SatStream thus bypassed both earth stations and global 
satellites, instead permitting European businesses to deal with one another directly. The 
satellite here thus took on a new form, marketed towards the free enterprise needs of the 
1980s rather than the centralised Cold War needs of the 1960s and 1970s’ ‘single global 
system’, and formed an ‘integral part of British Telecom’s network market strategy’ as it 
searched for new business and attempted to remain competitive in the wake of 
privatisation.88 
A similar process can be seen in AT&T’s publicity, which also interlinked global 
communications and the space age with the information age and the economic trends of 
the 1980s. In 1982, AT&T’s monopoly over the American telephone network was 
divested: AT&T’s regional subsidiaries were broken up into regional Bell operating 
companies, also known as ‘Baby Bells’, whilst AT&T remained as a long distance and 
international operator. The telephone network was also opened to competition from 
companies such as MCI.  AT&T’s advertising in the 1980s reflected its loss of domestic 
local telephony, instead presenting itself as ‘The Knowledge Business’ and emphasising 
that, through its international services, ‘Bell Brings the World Closer’.89 International 
services were linked with the information age in a series of adverts addressing divestiture: 
in one, AT&T’s CEO of Overseas Services, Morris Tanenbaum, explained that AT&T’s 
global network was ‘the foundation for the information age’. Here, this parallels the 
AT&T TV advert described at the beginning of this chapter, in which AT&T promoted 
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its ‘worldwide intelligent network’.90 In a 1986 advert, ‘Issues of the Information Age: 
Promises Kept, Promises to Keep’, which ran in the Wall Street Journal, AT&T explained 
how international communications was key to achieving a worldwide ‘Telecommunity’, 
a ‘vast global network of networks, the merging of computers and communications’.91 
However, one advert in particular, which ran in 1991, highlighted, like AT&T’s 1989 
TAT-8 commercial, how this merging of global communications and the information age 
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Figure 8.6. The message in a bottle floats in space, not on the ocean. Courtesy of NMAH 
Archives Center. 
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was also supported by invoking satellites and the space age. The 1991 advert bore the 
slogan ‘We’d like to be the first to say hello’, and depicted a message in a bottle (Figure 
8.6).92 However, underscoring the importance of the satellite age to the information age 
discourse, and outer space’s victory over the sea, the bottle was not afloat on the ocean, 
but instead in space. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter can broadly be divided into three stages: in the first, transatlantic 
communications – TAT-1 and Telstar – were pioneered by the state and state-sanctioned 
monopolies of the Post Office and AT&T; in the second, Cold War interests motivated a 
greater deal of state involvement, resulting in the INTELSAT system; in the third, 
corporate direction resurfaced with TAT-8, London Teleport, and SatStream. In each 
stage, different discourses predominated and surfaced, or obscured, the environment in 
different ways. In the first period, TAT-1 and Goonhilly were, in the UK, entangled with 
a discourse of ‘defiant modernism’, emphasising British – and Post Office – technological 
proficiency, whilst in the USA, AT&T highlighted TAT-1 and Telstar’s hazardous ocean 
and space environments to accentuate its contributions to the projection of US military 
and economic interests abroad. In the case of Telstar however, this rhetoric escaped its 
discursive box and became entangled with a growing environmentalist mode of thinking 
which problematized the American approach to the space environment. 
In the second period, the communication satellite became a symbol of global 
togetherness, whilst practically working as an instrument of US foreign policy. I showed 
how the conflict between the American commitment to satellites and British and French 
commitment to cables played out both in public, with INTELSAT and COMSAT’s 
publicity campaign in the late 1960s and 1970s emphasising cables’ fragility and 
satellites’ environmental transcendence, and in private, with Britain and France favouring 
their own international communications agendas at the 1963 Extraordinary 
Administrative Radioconference. 
Finally, in the third period, I demonstrated the stabilisation of the satellite as a 
symbol of global communications, the effects of this on North Atlantic cables, and the 
entanglement of international communications and the ‘information age’. North Atlantic 
cable planning was ‘INTELSATIZED’ to mirror satellite planning, in a successful 
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attempt to move forward with TAT-7 and TAT-8, but, as the publicity campaigns of BT 
and AT&T from the 1980s showed, the cable had disappeared from the public eye. 
Instead, the satellite, which had been presented as an ‘information technology’ since the 
1960s, was juxtaposed with computers and free enterprise to perpetuate the idea of a new 
‘information age’. London Teleport and SatStream materialised the shift in satellite 
infrastructure from the state-based, centralised earth stations of the 1960s and 1970s to 
the corporate, distributed, private earth stations and small dishes of the 1980s. 
However, there are also commonalities through these three stages. At each stage, 
international communication was presented in the USA as an opportunity to project 
American business interests abroad, and, whilst the INTELSAT ‘single world system’ 
declined relative to international fibre-optic links, another idealistic ‘single world system’ 
–  that of the information age as an era of free enterprise and rapid, global communications 
links between computers and satellites – remained in its wake. This single world system 
was perpetuated by corporations adjusting to their own new positions in liberalised 
markets, although this should not be read as an embracing of those ideals, but rather a 
strategy to maximise their own competitiveness in the public eye and thus maintain their 
positions as market leaders, built on their former state-sanctioned monopolies. I therefore 
hope to have shown in this chapter that, on a transatlantic stage, the intertwining of 
neoliberal politics, business interests, and international communications was displayed 
through the lens of a satellite. 
In this chapter, I have mainly focussed on ‘information’, although the struggles 
for control over transatlantic communications, both organisationally and 
environmentally, have also played an important role. In the next chapter, I turn my 
attention to the intersection of the information discourse with British politics in the 
privatisation of BT, and the strategies of internal control deployed by BT to prepare its 
staff for the transition for public to private, as I explore the history of BT’s privatisation. 
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9 The London Ideology 
Constructing the Privatisation and Information 
Movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In September 1992, Margaret Thatcher delivered a speech, ‘The Principles of 
Thatcherism’, in Taiwan and Seoul, South Korea, in which she outlined the core features 
of Thatcherism: liberty, monetarism, enterprise, privatisation, justice, defence, and 
sovereignty. Thatcher called privatisation ‘one of Britain’s most successful exports’ and 
boasted that it had both trebled the number of individual shareholders in Britain and ‘put 
a stop to the idea that inefficient management would always be subsidised by the 
taxpayers’.1 These two dimensions – managerial efficiency and individual share-
ownership – are the axes along which the privatisation of BT is near-universally drawn. 
In contrast, the relation of BT’s privatisation to the technological system it shaped and 
was shaped by is conspicuously absent. This is even more perplexing considering the 
major emphasis given by the Thatcher government to information and communication 
technologies, and the global significance which these particular technologies were 
appointed during the 1980s. 
Another feature curiously neglected in Thatcher’s speech and many accounts of 
privatisation (as I shall address below) is the liberalisation of the telephone monopoly in 
1981. Liberalisation, as I pointed out in Chapter Three and as it has featured in subsequent 
chapters, was a significant moment for the shape and orientation of the British telephone 
system; by ‘liberalisation’, I mean the end of the telephone monopoly and its opening up 
to competition, which, as has been evident throughout this thesis, had numerous effects 
on BT’s activities, such as Martlesham Enterprises, X-Stream Services, ISDN, London 
                                                 
1 Margaret Thatcher, ‘The Principles of Thatcherism’ (Taiwan, 1 September 1992), 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108301; Margaret Thatcher, ‘The Principles of Thatcherism’ 
(Seoul, South Korea, 3 September 1992), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108302. 
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TeleCity, SatStream, and London Teleport. Of course, liberalisation did not only involve 
BT – it also involved the numerous companies which were permitted to enter the 
telecommunications market in the UK, not least Mercury, which would become BT’s 
primary competitor, as the only other company licensed to provide an alternative public 
telecommunications network. However, as I pointed out in Chapter Three, Frank Webster 
has argued that Mercury was only ever a public telecommunications operator in name: 
Mercury, like BT after liberalisation, prioritised lucrative business traffic, particularly in 
London and Birmingham, which formed the centres of its ‘figure of eight’ network, 
linking London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Bristol. However, where BT had a 
national network to attend to, Mercury was instead free to choose its own priorities, which 
meant that by 1990, after eight years of protected duopoly, Mercury had less than 10% 
market share and yet was earning 30% of total nationwide revenue from bulk customers.2 
Webster thus argues that Mercury shows how liberalisation was less about competition, 
and more about the business-orientation of telecommunications in Britain.3 This chapter 
addresses liberalisation and privatisation in the context of BT, but Mercury merits a full 
history as a unique example of the de novo creation of a technological system in a 
liberalised, and yet protected, duopolistic environment, where the system was free to set 
its own priorities, in contrast to the momentum of BT’s existing network. 
However, despite liberalisation’s significance, it is unusually invisible in 
Thatcher’s own account of her management of the state-owned industries. This chapter 
thus poses two questions: what roles did liberalisation and privatisation play in shaping 
the British telephone system, and what was the relationship between these processes and 
the broader 1980s enthusiasm for information technology and an ‘information 
revolution’? I will answer these questions by exploring perspectives and experiences from 
BT’s privatisation in two sections, addressing privatisation externally and internally to 
BT, and paying attention to the articulations of technology throughout. In the first section, 
I explore external dimensions, looking at the politics of BT’s privatisation and its broader 
reception, whilst in the second, I look at the internal dimensions, addressing the 
experiences of management and staff, as well as exploring the technological 
developments addressed in previous chapters in more detail in relation to privatisation 
and liberalisation. 
                                                 
2 Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 173. 
3 Webster, 173. 
247 
 
Before that, however, I will outline a brief chronology of liberalisation and 
privatisation, and address accounts of BT’s privatisation.4 As covered in Chapter Three, 
Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry, announced in July 1980 that he would 
restructure the Post Office and relax the state’s telecommunications monopoly over 
customer premises equipment (CPE) and value-added network services (VANS). In 
November 1980, the British Telecommunications Bill was published and preparations 
went underway for the separation of posts and telecoms. In April 1981, the Beesley report 
was published, recommending not only the full liberalisation of VANS and licensing of 
private telephone line providers, but also that rival operators should also be able to set up 
competing telephone networks with BT. In November 1981, the liberalisation of CPE 
provision was hastened so that full CPE liberalisation would be completed by July 1983 
and in February 1982, Mercury, BT’s first competitor, was licensed. Later that year, in 
July 1982, a government white paper, The Future of British Telecommunications, was 
published, proposing the sale of 51% of BT and the creation of a new independent 
telecommunications operator, OFTEL. In February 1983, the government removed BT’s 
right to install the first telephone in new telephone line installations and two months later, 
in April 1983, Mercury launched in the City of London (note here the prioritisation given 
to business and financial institutions in the liberalised British telecommunications 
system). In July 1983, a new British Telecommunications Bill was drawn up in response 
to the July 1982 white paper, which had been reintroduced after Thatcher’s successful 
second general election. In November 1983, the government announced that Britain 
would have a duopoly system for public telephone networks, composed of BT and 
Mercury, until 1990. The next year, the 1984 Telecommunications Act passed, paving the 
way for the June 1984 creation of OFTEL, Britain’s new telecommunications regulatory 
agency, and the November 1984 share issue for BT. BT’s share issue was the largest share 
issue ever, amounting to almost £4 billion, and so BT became a private company, 
although the state still owned a 49% minority stake. The process which had begun in July 
1980 completed in October 1985, as OFTEL formalised Mercury’s rights to interconnect 
with BT’s network (this had previously been negotiated directly between Mercury and 
BT), allowing any Mercury customer to call any BT customer, and vice versa. 
Most scholarship on BT’s privatisation situates it politically, rather than 
technologically, and relates it to an ideological shift within Thatcherism, from 
privatisation as a tool for increasing efficiency, to privatisation as a method for increasing 
                                                 
4 Here I have been greatly aided by the succinct overview of this period by Cento G. Veljanovski, Selling 
the State: Privatisation in Britain (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 191. 
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popular share-ownership. Richard Stevens notes that, in 1981, the main objectives of 
privatisation were relieving pressure on the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) 
by relocating publicly-owned industries to the private sector, and this is indeed a recurring 
theme in histories of BT’s privatisation.5 BT desperately needed to borrow to finance 
investment in the telephone network, and so the PSBR restrictions became a major 
motivation for privatisation. Stevens argues that BT’s sale, which was unexpectedly 
successful, was responsible for a distinctive change in the presentation of privatisation, 
from the economic emphases on the PSBR, managerial inefficiency, and competition, to 
the ideological emphasis on share-owning democracy.6 Kenneth Morgan takes a broadly 
similar line, arguing that the privatisation of BT was not about technological advance or 
spurring efficiency, but that it was driven by PSBR restrictions and the goal of a share-
owning democracy.7 There is a slight contradiction here, in that the borrowing limited by 
the PSBR was necessary for technical investment, but Morgan makes a useful distinction, 
important throughout this chapter, in separating out the different motivations for 
privatisation – technical advance, efficiency, the PSBR, share-owning democracy – as 
each became more and less relevant at different stages of the longer liberalisation and 
privatisation process. 
These histories also emphasise BT’s privatisation as an important plank of 
Thatcherism. Privatisation, until BT, was a relatively minor industrial policy; before BT, 
there had been nine privatisations (not including subsidiary corporations, such as British 
Airways’ International Aeradio), and the largest sale had been the £627m tender offer for 
Britoil in November 1982, over six times smaller than BT’s share offer.8 Bishop and 
Thompson argue that the unexpected popularity of BT’s privatisation transformed 
privatisation into a central feature of the Conservative policy – the share issue was 
massively oversubscribed with 2.25m applications receiving shares.9 Veljanovski notes 
that Britain privatised harder and faster than anywhere else in the world, and sees BT as 
especially pivotal in the acceleration of that movement; he also presents privatisation as 
                                                 
5 Richard Stevens, ‘The Evolution of Privatisation as an Electoral Policy, c.1970–90’, Contemporary 
British History 18, no. 2 (2004): 56–61. 
6 Stevens, 61. 
7 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Nationalisation and Privatisation’, Contemporary Record 2, no. 4 (1988): 34. 
8 David Parker, The Official History of Privatisation: Volume 1, The Formative Years 1970-1987 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 180–81. 
9 Matthew Bishop and David Thompson, ‘Privatisation in the UK: Deregulatory Reform and Public 
Enterprise Performance’, in Privatisation: A Global Perspective, ed. V.V. Ramanadham (London; New 
York: Routledge, 1993), 6–7. 
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primarily oriented towards disciplining the nationalised industries, supporting broad 
private ownership, and generating an entrepreneurial society.10 
Monica Prasad locates BT’s privatisation as one of three ‘pillars’ of Thatcherism, 
alongside the 1981 monetarist tax budget and the sales of council houses. Prasad argues 
that privatisation was Britain’s particular flavour of free market neoliberalism, compared 
to deregulation, for example, in the USA, and argues, like all the scholars above, that 
BT’s privatisation was initially not ideological, but instead motivated by a need to raise 
capital.11 Prasad argues that the success of BT’s privatisation radicalised Thatcherism, 
transforming it into a moral movement oriented around ‘popular capitalism’ and 
‘property-owning democracy’.12 David Parker, in his official history of privatisation, also 
reinforces the PSBR and efficiency narrative, and identifies privatisation’s success as a 
transformative moment for popular capitalism, but unlike above accounts, distinguishes 
between popular share-ownership as a results of privatisation’s success, and its role prior 
to privatisation. Parker shows that the flotation of BT was anticipated as so large that 
alternative sources of finance were required, and so individual shareholders were tapped 
into as a new market, ideologically compatible with Thatcherism.13 These histories all 
make clear that BT’s privatisation was a pivotal moment for Thatcherism, originating a 
popular capitalist ideology, but it remains to be seen how this was interlinked with the 
growing popularity of information technology and information age discourses in the 
1980s. 
Histories of utilities have approached privatisation from a more technological 
angle, although BT’s privatisation is less extensively addressed, and the role of 
technology is still unsatisfactory. Robert Millward casts the long history of utility 
regulation in the West in four phases: first, broad support for free market initiatives in the 
dawn of infrastructure; second, municipally-owned infrastructure; third, state ownership 
of infrastructure; fourth, free-market privatisation.14 Millward relates these transitions to 
technological change: private enterprise railways demonstrated the capacities of the free 
market; local and regional electricity networks favoured municipal enterprise; the post-
war dependence on oil and natural gas encouraged state solutions; and the growth of ICTs 
in the 1980s – particularly the opportunities for competition in ICT services – incentivised 
                                                 
10 Veljanovski, Selling the State, 1–2, 8–9. 
11 Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets, 99–102. 
12 Prasad, 103, 131–35. 
13 Parker, The Official History of Privatisation: Volume 1, The Formative Years 1970-1987, 254–55, 291–
94. 
14 Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and 
Transport, 1830-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7. 
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free market privatisation and competition. Millward’s phasing is problematic – it is 
heavily generalised and some explanations, particularly the post-war relevance of oil and 
natural gas to state-owned infrastructure, feel quite weak. However, his work is 
interesting for his argument that BT’s liberalisation was more significant than its 
privatisation, noting that BT’s privatisation was the only major telecommunications 
operator privatisation until the 1990s, whereas liberalisation and deregulation became 
more established trends in the 1980s.15 Judith Clifton, Pierre Lanthier, and Harm Schröter 
follow Millward’s phasing and take pains to expand out the dimensions for his transitions 
to include military, political and social pressures.16 However, they do agree that 
technological change in telecommunications, which meant lower sunk costs and greater 
potential for network services, made competition easier, incentivising regulatory change 
as natural monopoly and economies of scale no longer applied; here they highlight BT’s 
privatisation as an ambitious programme which subsequent regulatory change in 
telecommunications sought to emulate.17 
Synthesising these accounts, two points emerge: first, the privatisation of BT was 
hugely significant both for Thatcherism and broader regulatory change for 
telecommunications; second, that privatisation can be framed not just within the rise of 
popular capitalism, but within the intertwining of neoliberal deregulatory movements and 
ICTs. The utility history perspectives are somewhat undercooked in their 
conceptualisation of ICTs and the free market – there is a lingering sense that ICTs are 
viewed as intrinsically market-oriented – but the larger and more important fact to note 
is that, whilst support for a share-owning democracy has faded, the information age 
ideology persists. BT’s privatisation thus needs to be fully considered from this 
perspective. 
 
Pillar of Thatcherism 
 
There are two areas I will explore in the external framings of BT’s privatisation: first, the 
government’s enacting of privatisation, paying special attention to the mutual shaping of 
technology and policy and the role of privatisation within the Thatcher government’s 
broader attention to information technologies, and situating these against the canonical 
                                                 
15 Millward, 244–54. 
16 Judith Clifton, Pierre Lanthier, and Harm Schröter, ‘Regulating and Deregulating the Public Utilities 
1830–2010’, Business History 53, no. 5 (2011): 661. 
17 Clifton, Lanthier, and Schröter, 663. 
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popular capitalism and efficiency narratives of privatisation. Second, I will also address 
wider perceptions and consequences of BT’s privatisation, both in the UK and more 
broadly. 
 The question of whether BT should be broken up into regional companies shows 
one way in which technology influenced policy. Thatcher, drawing on those recurring 
themes of information and control, favoured a similar regional reorganisation to AT&T’s 
break-up into ‘Baby Bells’, as she believed it would provide more information on 
performance – through comparison between regional networks – and that local 
monopolies would enable greater local control.18 Patrick Jenkin, the Secretary of State for 
Industry, was less open to regionalisation, believing that BT did not have the management 
apparatus to oversee the break-up, arguing that it could damage rural interests, and 
pointing out that BT’s network, unlike AT&T’s, was nationally integrated and so less 
amenable to regionalisation.19 Jenkin and Thatcher were both also agreed that, much to 
Thatcher’s vexation, regionalisation would delay privatisation and so the idea was 
abandoned primarily for that reason.20 Nevertheless, this policy-making episode, despite 
its failure, is fascinating for two reasons: first, it surfaces a conflict between the telephone 
system’s long-standing goal of integration and universality, which I primarily explored 
in Chapter Five, and the deregulatory goal of regionalisation; second, contra to the 
consensus narrative, Thatcher’s interest in local monopolies’ capacity for local control 
shows her lack of ideological commitment to competition. 
 Security concerns also highlighted the tension between ideology and technology. 
William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, expressed concerns from July 1980 that any 
regulatory change in telecommunications would compromise the nation’s security 
apparatus: at that point, the Post Office was carrying out telephone interception on behalf 
of the police, Customs and Excise, and the Security Service, MI5.21 Whitelaw’s initial 
concern was about a potential inquiry into the monopoly from the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission jeopardising these special intelligence-gathering services; 
Whitelaw’s fears never materialised as the government blocked the inquiry, fearing it 
would pre-empt deregulatory policy initiatives. However, Whitelaw conceded that he 
would inevitably have to accept ‘degradation’ and risk to the nation’s intelligence 
                                                 
18 M.C. Scholar to Jonathan Spencer, ‘British Telecommunications: Regionalisation’, 9 November 1982, 
PREM 19/1100, TNA. 
19 Scholar to Spencer. 
20 Scholar to Spencer. 
21 William Whitelaw to Margaret Thatcher, ‘Telecommunications Monopoly’, 7 July 1980, PREM 
19/562, TNA. 
252 
 
gathering capacity in the face of the ‘overriding political and economic case’ for 
competition.22 Here then, in contrast to regionalisation, competition was mobilised to 
serve the broader goal of organisational change for BT; in a sense, this reinforces that 
competition was not the ultimate ideological goal for Thatcherist industrial policy, but 
rather another rhetoric that could be invoked when useful. 
 Liberalisation and privatisation also intersected with telephone exchange supply 
and manufacturing. In July 1980, Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Industry, 
argued to Thatcher that liberalisation should be gradual, as opening manufacturing 
markets too fast would mean a dangerous influx of imports from abroad; instead, Joseph 
argued for a three-year phased introduction to competition in order to allow British 
manufacturers to prepare.23 The manufacturers were also concerned: D.H. Pitcher, the 
Managing Director of Plessey, lobbied Number 10 in 1980 to broaden liberalisation to 
include BT’s monopoly over equipment maintenance, arguing that otherwise BT could 
favour its own equipment over maintaining competitors’ equipment.24 This lobbying 
continued with Arnold Weinstock lobbying Joseph to give BT access to private finance 
and escape the PSBR in order to further fund System X procurement. Weinstock was still 
bitter about losing out during the TXE4 modernisation process ‘on the basis of unreliable 
output from a computer study of the economic case’, and argued that private finance 
would allow BT to move past its prior modelling-induced ineptitude.25 
In the end, more pressing concerns about international competition and the 
political desire to grow the domestic IT manufacturing base ended up working against 
Weinstock. In 1982, BT notified GEC, Plessey, and STC that, with the government, it 
had decided to narrow down System X procurement to just one supplier, which would 
guarantee that supplier a revenue stream to grow its manufacturing base, resist 
international competition, and market System X abroad.26 By September 1982, the final 
terms had been agreed: the American-owned STC backed out altogether, Plessey became 
the prime development contractor, BT withdrew from System X development altogether, 
procurement was divided between Plessey and GEC to prepare both for domestic and 
                                                 
22 Whitelaw to Thatcher. 
23 Keith Joseph to Margaret Thatcher, ‘Telecommunications Monopoly’, 1 July 1980, PREM 19/333, 
TNA. 
24 D.H. Pitcher to John Hoskyns, ‘Post Office Monopoly’, 19 November 1980, PREM 19/562, TNA. 
25 Arnold Weinstock to Keith Joseph, ‘Post Office Switching Systems and Liberalisation’, 16 March 
1981, PREM 19/875, TNA. 
26 J.S. Whyte to J. Samson, W.D. Morton, and D.H. Pitcher, ‘Organisation and Prospects for System X’, 
18 May 1982, PREM 19/876, TNA. 
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international competition, and fully competitive procurement would start from 1985.27 
This aspect of liberalisation supports Schiller’s thesis, covered in Chapter Two, that the 
expansion of ICTs in the early 1980s was nationalistic, with states seeking to develop, 
expand, and privatise the domestic ICT sectors in order to become internationally 
competitive.28 
 Competition, liberalisation, and privatisation had also been articulated by 
government actors within a growing discourse about the opportunities provided by 
information technologies and services. Keith Joseph’s July 1980 announcement of 
liberalisation outlined a vision of information and communication technologies as 
inherently competitive and providing immense opportunities for domestic markets – 
opportunities too great to be left to one organisation alone – and this continued with 
proposals for privatisation.29 In May 1982, Patrick Jenkin, Joseph’s successor, first 
proposed the privatisation of BT as both a way of raising equity for BT outside the PSBR, 
by selling 25% of the state’s stake, and as a way of encouraging enterprise and the 
expansion of ICTs, asserting that ‘I believe that this Bill will prove to be the most lasting 
legacy of Information Technology Year’.30 From the very start, privatisation was 
entangled with political understandings of information technology. A subsequent white 
paper, The Future of Telecommunications in Britain, announced government plans to 
privatise BT, entangling notions of government control with the emancipation of 
technology.31 The white paper outlined that PSBR restrictions meant the ‘need to free BT 
from traditional forms of government control’, which would be replaced by ‘the most 
liberal [IT regulations] in the world’; it was further explained that ‘competition and the 
advent of new technology are stimulating BT to respond to market opportunities’. Here, 
competition was matched by information technology as an equal market pressure for BT. 
 The Thatcher government’s announcement of 1982 as IT-82, a national 
Information Technology Year, was also used to interlink BT’s privatisation with IT, the 
market, and competition. Thatcher, speaking at an IT conference at the Barbican in 
December 1982, further expanded on the government’s liberal economic approach to 
information technology, arguing that IT required ‘free enterprise’ – which she noted 
would soon include the privatised BT – and ‘competition’, and explaining that IT had 
                                                 
27 Kenneth Baker to Margaret Thatcher, ‘System X’, 29 September 1982, PREM 19/877, TNA. 
28 Schiller, Information and the Crisis Economy, 2–7. 
29 ‘Telecommunications’ 21 July 1980, HC Deb Vol 989 cc29-40, Hansard. 
30 Patrick Jenkin to Leon Brittan, ‘Future Policy on Telecommunications’, 12 March 1982, PREM 
19/875, TNA. 
31 The Future of Telecommunications in Britain, Cmnd. 8610 (London: HMSO, 1982). 
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thus necessitated the end of BT’s monopoly and the creation of Mercury.32 Kenneth 
Baker, the Minister for Information Technology, in a speech to the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science, contrasted the dystopic visions of the ‘Electronic State’ 
in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 with the opportunities 
that micro-electronics and information technology in the ‘post-industrial society’ would 
provide for greater personal freedom, the retreat of the state, and privatisation.33 Baker 
did not explicitly reference the privatisation of BT, but portrayed privatisation as a key 
weapon against the Electronic State: ‘We should enhance the opportunities of private 
ownership for what the State owns it has to control. The State will provide much, the 
Electronic State could provide more, but it would exact a price in terms of personal 
freedom’.34 
Information and control were here interlinked again with privatisation and the 
neoliberal state; in Baker’s vision, information technologies offered either dystopia or 
utopia, and it was only through weakening state control – and implicitly strengthening 
corporate control – that dystopia could be avoided. As with the Long Range Strategy 
Seminar in Chapter Seven, Baker’s use of science fiction is particularly revealing: neither 
Huxley’s Brave New World nor Orwell’s 1984 are particularly good models for the 
electronic state; the former is characterised by domination using psychological 
conditioning and reproductive technology, and the latter, as I showed in Chapter Seven, 
by primarily (but not exclusively) low-tech surveillance techniques. However, by 
invoking these fictions, both of which feature strong states, Baker reveals the great extent 
to which information technology had become ideologically entangled with the retreat of 
the state. For Kenneth Baker, Britain’s Minister for Information Technology, and as with 
J.J. Wheatley, BT’s Head Economics Adviser, in Chapter Six, information and 
communication technologies had become a pillar of the neoliberal state. 
This casts a new light on the consensus view that privatisation, popular capitalism, 
and share-holding democracy were ideological outputs of BT’s privatisation, in which its 
unexpected success showed an appetite for individual share-ownership and fuelled an 
ideology of emancipatory, individualistic ‘financial consumerism’.35 There are two points 
I wish to make which re-frame this history. First, as Parker has argued, and as discussed 
                                                 
32 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech Opening Conference on Information Technology’ (The Barbican Centre, 
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33 Kenneth Baker, ‘Towards an Information Economy’ 7 September 1982, T 471/45, TNA. 
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above, individual share-ownership actually had its origins in the need to find alternative 
sources of capital for BT’s flotation.36 From early 1984, individual share-ownership had 
been identified as a strategy for this purpose; a February 1984 report by Barclays 
Merchant Bank for Thatcher’s Cabinet proposed targeting individual investors to raise 
capital, whilst also noting that such a policy might be an opportunity to ideologically 
develop a ‘share-owning democracy’ in Britain.37 Ironically, given that Barclays pointed 
out that the ‘traditionalism’ of the City had previously discouraged wider share 
ownership, this report shows how Barclays Merchant Bank – itself a large financial 
institution – helped to shape BT’s privatisation. This was reinforced in a July 1984 
memorandum from John Redwood, Director of 10 Downing Street’s Policy Unit, to 
Thatcher, emphasising that the main aim of the share issue should be to sell to individual 
investors for two reasons: first, the size of the sale demanded additional markets; second, 
as a way of coercing British financial institutions to invest.38 Redwood argued that the 
key to getting these institutions to invest was to create the illusion that the government 
could sell substantial stakes in BT to other markets; overseas financial institutions were 
politically out of the question, and so individual investors became key. 
Herein lies the origins of individual share-holding in BT’s privatisation: not an 
unexpected success, but a crafted strategy from the start, influenced by and designed to 
influence the large financial institutions of the City. Indeed, in the actual BT share offer,  
domestic financial institutions were the largest shareholding group, buying 47% of 
available shares, ahead of individual shareholders’ 39% and the 14% sold overseas.39 As 
Amy Edwards has argued, Thatcherism was never really about popular capitalism or 
wider share-ownership, but ‘financial capitalism’ instead; Edwards shows how the 
privatisation of BT was initially popular, but individual investors either quickly offloaded 
shares, incentivised by discounted pricing schemes, or became rapidly uninterested in 
further investments.40 Hence, as Parker writes, ‘“popular capitalism” was always more 
political rhetoric than economic reality’, and it did not reverse the trend of growing 
concentration of corporate ownership within powerful financial institutions.41 
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The second point I wish to make is that the emancipatory discourse of individual 
share-ownership has significant commonalities with the political framings of information 
technology before and during privatisation. The histories of privatisation and ‘popular 
capitalism’, which take centre stage in accounts of BT’s privatisation, have obscured the 
more significant discursive importance of privatisation. Popular capitalism has fallen by 
the wayside, but the ideology of ‘digital utopianism’, critically labelled the ‘Californian 
ideology’ by Barbrook and Cameron, has persisted, and here I want to highlight the 
significance of BT’s privatisation to the ‘Californian ideology’.42 Barbrook and Cameron 
define the Californian ideology as a belief in the emancipatory potential of new 
information technologies, enabling a libertarian society characterised by freedom of 
expression; they highlight the emergence of these ideals from the engagement of West 
Coast counterculture with emerging information technologies and cyberculture and these 
ideals’ fusion with neoliberal information technology policies designed to revive Western 
economies. This fusion produced a vision of IT as not just enabling individual freedoms, 
but also entrepreneurialism and, by extension, the privileging of the ‘electronic 
marketplace’, competition, deregulation, and the reduced power of the nation-state. This 
ideology, as I have shown, was pervasive through the privatisation of BT, from Baker and 
Thatcher’s IT-82 speeches to Jenkin’s belief that IT-82’s greatest legacy would be BT’s 
privatisation. 
Baker’s IT-82 speech confirms the politics of BT’s privatisation as an early locus 
for digital utopian ideologies. Baker called the ‘free flow of information’ a necessary 
condition for a liberated information society, greater personal freedoms and private 
ownership, and the retreat of the state;43 in this sentiment is an expression which 
resembles and yet predates WIRED founder and cyberculture guru Stewart Brand’s 
maxim that ‘information wants to be free’, which has since become one of the rallying 
calls of digital utopianism.44 However, the expression ‘free flow of information’ has its 
own longer history as a key term in late 1970s and early 1980s economic and industrial 
policy. Herbert Schiller describes the ‘free flow of information doctrine’, a policy 
programme supported in the USA and Britain, by international organisations such as the 
OECD, and transnational companies such as Coca-Cola and IBM, as an openness to 
‘transborder data flows’ which were necessary for many transnational companies, 
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especially banks and airlines, to operate across multiple countries.45 Remaining closed to 
the free flow of information would mean that these companies, which brought jobs and 
investment, would not be able to operate on British soil. The ‘free flow of information’ 
started as a policy of deregulated trans-border data flows, but, as shown by Baker, also 
became associated with broader registers of liberalism. 
Of course, not all in Britain felt this way about the liberating capacities of 
information technology. Tony Benn decried the microchip as ‘tyranny in the form of 
liberation’, and yet the broader context for this quote shows how even in opposition, 
information technology had become entangled with liberalisation.46 In 1982, Benn 
featured in a film, New Technology, Whose Progress?, which attacked IT-82 as endorsing 
job destruction and de-skilling through micro-electronics. Benn believed that micro-
electronics were being used ‘to remove decision-making from the worker and increase 
management control’, and yet still saw information technology as having an emancipatory 
capacity, arguing that these technologies ‘can give people a sense of freedom’.47 What is 
important to note here is that this film, and Benn’s arguments, were not anti-technology, 
but anti-politics, and against a specific register of liberalisation. ‘Tyranny in the form of 
liberalisation’ was not an attack against the idea of information technology as 
emancipatory – Benn’s arguments about IT giving people ‘a sense of freedom’ show that 
is not the case – but rather, an argument against the neoliberalisation of information 
technology’s emancipatory capacity. Even on the left, therefore, information technology 
was attributed liberating qualities, despite opposition to neoliberal interpretations of those 
qualities. 
This was also the case with how BT’s privatisation – the first major privatisation 
of a state telephone administration – was analysed outside Britain: for many, privatisation 
was not about share-owning democracy, but about the information technology revolution. 
Tom Forester’s 1987 popular science book The High-Tech Society referred to the 
privatisation of BT, along with the break-up of AT&T and the 1985 Japanese deregulation 
of NTT, as necessary moves to market access, required to realign the telecommunications 
industry for the IT revolution.48 This became the European consensus as well: a 1994 
European Commission report, ‘Europe and the Global Information Society’, prepared by 
Martin Bangemann, the Commissioner for the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
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under Jacques Delors, staunchly advocated privatisation as a necessary condition for 
spreading the information revolution throughout Europe; as the report announced, this 
would be a ‘market-driven revolution’.49 Others took more critical views: Herbert 
Schiller, writing in 1984, was deeply critical of the privatisation and deregulation of 
telecommunications, viewing the entanglement of IT and privatisation as a new strategy 
for solidifying corporate and financial power.50 Frank Webster, writing more recently, 
and as I addressed in Chapter One, has also highlighted the role BT’s liberalisation and 
privatisation played in empowering corporate capitalism.51 The crucial feature of all these 
perspectives, both positive and negative, is that the privatisation of information and 
communication technologies, in contrast to the individualistic, libertarian tone to the 
Californian ideology, is oriented towards privileging and positioning large corporations 
to take advantage of the ‘information revolution’. This is yet another commonality with 
the popular capitalism discourse: whilst superficially, both were about emancipating 
individuals, beneath the surface, it was large corporations and institutions which were 
empowered. 
It is thus important to also understand how privatisation was enacted within the 
corporation itself. BT is important here on two levels: first, in how staff negotiated 
privatisation, and second, in how the larger technological system was reconfigured for 
private enterprise. As Wendy Larner and Nina Laurie point out, it is the technocrats within 
these organisations who enacted privatisation strategies and techniques, and yet there has 
been surprisingly little attention to these groups.52 
 
The Power Behind The Button 
 
Privatisation within BT can be studied along several lines. First, I will explore the ways 
management and staff enacted privatisation on several levels, from the views of senior 
management and the Board, through to the strategies of resistance and acceptance 
undertaken by ordinary staff. Second, I will study how BT marketed privatisation to 
potential customers through its ‘The Power Behind the Button’ advertising campaign, 
before finally concluding by reflecting on how privatisation featured in the technological 
developments addressed in previous chapters. 
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 Senior management at BT were quite amenable to privatisation. In April 1982, 
George Jefferson, BT’s Chairman, wrote to Patrick Jenkin to explain that he was being 
pressured by the Post Office Engineering Union (POEU) to take a stance against 
privatisation, but that he was also keen to explore any options which would remove BT 
from the PSBR restraints.53 This did not mean that Jefferson and the board were 
unequivocally in favour of privatisation: a later letter to Jenkin explained that the Board 
would prefer the government to defer privatisation until liberalisation had been completed 
to avoid further strain on management and staff, pointing out that, ‘This organisation has 
been a Civil Service/Public Corporation for the past seventy years, and this has naturally 
been a major factor in shaping staff attitudes. Such ingrained attitudes take a long time to 
change’.54 Nevertheless, as soon as it became clear that privatisation would proceed after 
the 1983 general election, the Board started an internal communications campaign to 
persuade staff of the benefits of privatisation. 
 This internal campaign on privatisation’s benefits also presented information 
technology as a necessary pillar of liberalisation. In July 1982, Patrick Jenkin held a Q&A 
with senior BT managers in which he explained that Britain ‘cannot afford to keep BT 
trammelled by the mesh of bureaucratic controls at a time when technological and 
commercial developments really set this organisation at the centre of our electronic 
future’.55 The board circulated Jenkin’s message to all managers so that they could 
communicate these explanations to staff and ‘calm any exaggerated fears’.56 The board 
also emphasised that privatisation would not mandate any job losses – although, as I have 
shown in Chapter Five, forecasts from the System X rollout showed that there would be 
job losses in any event. Communiques in this style continued in the run up to privatisation, 
with staff informed that competition would provide a positive pressure to stimulate BT 
and reminded that, with the Conservative victory in the 1983 general election, any 
industrial action against privatisation would be seen as defying the will of the electorate.57 
 This, of course, did not stop all staff, and POEU industrial action against both 
privatisation and interconnection between the Mercury and BT networks caused 
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headaches within BT and government. The July 1982 announcement of privatisation, and 
BT’s agreement of interconnection terms with Mercury in November 1982, brought 
POEU action on two grounds: anti-privatisation action, consisting of work-to-rule on 
international traffic, and anti-Mercury action, in which BT engineers refused to 
interconnect lines with Mercury’s network and undertake maintenance on equipment used 
by Mercury and its owners, Cable & Wireless, BP, and Barclays.58 This last action – the 
refusal to undertake maintenance for Mercury’s owners – had put the POEU on shaky 
legal ground, and so was only announced in name only; BT engineers continued to 
maintain these customers’ equipment to avoid anti-union legal action. After industrial 
action started, the board held a crisis meeting in April 1983 with the POEU, in which 
union leaders emphasised their grievances that the government had unexpectedly 
liberalised international telecommunications alongside domestic, allowing Mercury to 
enter international telephony; BT’s board were also vexed by this decision, having 
operated under the assumption that they would remain the sole carriers of international 
traffic from the UK, but were unable to persuade the POEU to cease action.59 Industrial 
action thus continued and, by October 1983, BT had suspended 2,000 engineers. 
Industrial action also took shape in the form of local resistances: at Martlesham, BT 
research engineers banded together to produce anti-privatisation material, such as a badge 
featuring Buzby, the telephone service’s mascot, with the slogan ‘Save Buzby from the 
Vultures’ (Figure 9.1).60 In Manchester, the POEU successfully lobbied the Labour-
controlled city council to temporarily block planning permission for Mercury to install 
rooftop microwave transmitters, on the grounds of possible health risks from microwave 
radiation, and in complete disregard of both Manchester’s City Planning Officer’s advice 
and the Post Office and BT’s long history of using microwave transmission in city 
centres.61 
 However, not all BT staff were quite so resistant to privatisation, and the 
government’s targeting of individual shareholders formed a significant part of BT’s 
internal strategy for involving staff in privatisation. Drawing inspiration from the growth 
of employee shareholding in early privatisations of Britoil, British Aerospace, and 
Amersham International, the potential for employee shareholding in BT had been 
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identified by November 1982 and by January 1983 was seen as a ‘highly desirable’ 
strategy for involving staff and bringing the unions onside.62 Kenneth Baker and Cecil 
Parkinson, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, were also both influential supporters 
of employee shareholding in BT, meeting with George Jefferson in June 1983 about 
employee share-ownership.63 Baker was such a staunch supporter that later in 1983 he 
inquired if BT could offer staff £600 loans to buy even more shares during the issue, to 
which Jefferson responded with appreciation for Baker’s enthusiasm, but declined on the 
grounds that BT might get in trouble over legal and tax implications, as well as the moral 
argument that they should not encourage staff to get into debt.64 
Regardless, BT still set a UK record for employee share-ownership, with 10% of 
shares reserved for BT staff and pensioners.65 There were three different offers for 
privatisation: first, all employees were given a free gift of fifty-four shares; second, a 2-
for-1 matching offer for investments of up to £100.10, which bought 77 shares, tripling 
that to 231 shares total; third, each employee could apply for up to 1,600 shares at a 10% 
discount.66 The first and second offers combined were known as the ‘blue’ offer, which 
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Figure 9.1. BT Research Engineers’ anti-privatisation badge featuring Buzby. 
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gave employees the option to buy 285 shares, worth approximately £450, for only £100, 
whilst the third offer was known as the ‘red’ offer. BT set up a special internal 
communication programme to persuade employees to buy shares, including setting up 
350 employees as ‘shareholding liaison officers’ to run seminars, distribute briefing 
materials, and hold practice sessions for filling out dummy blue and red forms.67 Internal 
computer control over employees was also used to enhance BT’s employee share-holding 
persuasion strategy: BT’s first computerised central register of all employees, PRISM, 
was given to Hill Samuel Registrars, the administrators of the employee share scheme, to 
build a central register for direct mailing about employee share-ownership.68 BT’s scheme 
was considered a great success, with 96% of staff applying for shares, ignoring union 
directives. A little over 222,000 out of 238,000 staff – over 93% - applied for the 54-share 
gift, and 84% took the matching offer option, whilst a much smaller proportion – just over 
25% – applied for the red offer.69 
Individual share-ownership was also a recurring feature in oral histories with 
former research staff. Dennis Wheeler remembers that, as a manager, he had ‘to give 
presentations, and monthly meetings, and I did try and talk them all into doing it at one 
point, you know, “You’ve got to do this”’.70 Dennis also raised the specific terms of the 
share-ownership schemes, recalling that ‘you almost couldn’t lose your money, which we 
didn’t… Well, I might have done by now, but you could hardly lose your money, and I 
remember saying to other people, “For goodness sake, get on to this sharesave scheme 
because they’re giving you money, just do it”’.71 Thomas O’Brien attributed staff’s 
acceptance of privatisation to the ‘goodies’ offered along with privatisation, remembering 
that ‘there were a lot share options and goods like that so, yeah that sort of, people were 
happy with that, you know, you almost made a few hundred over night because of share 
options!’.72 Colin Whitlum similarly related the smoothness of privatisation to the share 
schemes: 
When we did privatise actually it went smoothly, very smoothly indeed, and in fact a lot 
of people made a lot of money out of it I think, because the shares when they did sell, 
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they got an offer to buy the shares at a very reasonable price and then they went up, a lot 
of people made a lot of money.73 
Jeanette Higgins recalled the excitement associated with investing for the first time: ‘I got 
shares, sharesave schemes, things like that, so it was kind of a bit exciting … I’d never 
been a shareholder before so it’s just interesting’.74 
Tracking share prices, and the money made – and lost – on those shares also 
featured. Chris Wheddon remembers that BT’s development of a car-phone with speech 
recognition ‘put 10p on the share price’,75 but more prominent was Dennis Wheeler and 
Jeanette Higgins’ recollection of BT shares’ £15 peak and subsequent collapse in the 
dotcom crash. Jeanette remembered that shares ‘went all the way up to £15 and then 
down, down, down, that was the highest it went ever as one of the dotcom companies’.76 
For Dennis, the dotcom crash – BT shares peaked in the summer of 2000 and then lost a 
third of their value over the following year77 – wiped a huge amount of value off his 
shares: 
I’ve got a portfolio of BT shares which I lost £40,000 on because when… now when what 
happened? There was a time when they were worth £15 a share they collapsed to £5 a 
share so I lost £10 a share on 4,000 shares, so on paper I lost £40,000.78 
Dennis still owns his portfolio of shares, which he checked before our oral history 
interview, telling me that ‘I’ve noticed today have absolutely bombed! Gone below £4 a 
share for the first time ever, but yeah that was the main thing I think I got out of the 
privatisation’.79 As addressed earlier in this chapter, Amy Edwards and David Parker have 
both pointed out the larger failure of Thatcher’s ‘share-owning democracy’, but it is clear 
from these oral histories that this movement still played a significant role in negotiating 
privatisation for BT’s employees and persists to this day – in only memories for some, 
but for others, still in their portfolios. 
 However, BT did not only have to convince its employees to invest, but also the 
wider public, and did so through its widespread ‘The Power Behind The Button’ 
marketing campaign. This campaign, undertaken on behalf of BT by Dorland 
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Advertising, attempted to convince individuals to invest in BT based on the corporation’s 
technological sophistication, particularly tapping into the growing information 
technology vogue.80 The £16m campaign kicked off in Spring 1984 with a significant TV 
presence, and went through three phases.81 In the first phase, potential investors were 
shown BT’s range of information technologies, including optical fibre, System X, and, in 
another demonstration of the popular iconography of the satellite, Goonhilly Earth 
Station. High technology, the information revolution, and BT’s size, scale, and 
sophistication were all key features of this phase. The second phase addressed the social 
anxieties surrounding privatisation by emphasising the social role of the telephone – here 
the push-button telephone handset was a pervasive image (Figure 9.2), intended as a 
reassuring reminder of the mundane social technologies of the home, as opposed to the 
abstracted infrastructure of System X and optical fibre.82 The third phase returned to the 
information revolution, emphasising BT’s R&D activities and financial services, such as 
the City Business System used by money dealers to place global telephone calls and 
transactions.83 The TV advert for the latter closed with, ‘Helping London stay at the heart 
of the world’s financial markets, British Telecom is the power behind the button’.84 The 
campaign concluded by returning to a familiar symbol of both BT’s longer history and 
the hegemonizing rhetoric of the information revolution: Goonhilly Downs’ satellite 
aerial dishes.85 
My point here is that this campaign did not revolve around denationalisation, 
around the opportunities of efficiency and competition to be gained by relocating public 
enterprise into the private sector, but instead around information technology and, 
furthermore, did not tap into the ‘popular capitalism’ rhetoric of entrepreneurial financial 
consumerism, but instead played up BT’s size, strength, and sophistication. The implicit 
and overt message about BT and information technology in this campaign was thus that 
the power did not lie with the individual user-shareholder, in front of the button, but with 
the corporation and technology behind it. 
 The narrative of the information revolution, and of the importance of privatisation, 
is further challenged by the histories of BT’s technologies. As I have shown throughout 
this thesis, the technologies underpinning the 1980s telecommunications network have 
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much longer histories. System X has its origins in the Post Office’s fusion of cybernetics, 
information theory, and the government machine, and the computer modelling of 
exchange procurement and digitalisation remained utterly discreet. Optical fibre 
development started in the late 1960s and its presentation as an ‘information highway’ 
borrowed not only from the failed waveguide project, but also from longer notions of 
communications as a ‘highway’. Goonhilly, as previously mentioned, was an icon of 
British defiant modernism during the 1960s, and was only reconfigured as an icon of 
information technology through the convergence of the INTELSAT discourse and 
information age rhetoric during the late 1970s; this reconfiguration was itself misleading 
Figure 9.2. Phase Two of ‘The Power Behind The Button’. Courtesy of BT Archives. 
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as submarine cables began to reassert their dominance after the North Atlantic Systems 
Conference in 1977. 
These technologies were of course reshaped during the 1980s, but this shaping 
reveals further complexities to these histories of liberalisation and privatisation. After 
liberalisation, BT’s ‘X-Stream’ services were all oriented towards business customers as 
BT faced competition in the City from Mercury. The Lightlines campaign started in late 
1980 and the City was again prioritised as the first public optical fibre links in the UK 
were laid down to network London’s financial institutions. It was a similar story with 
international communications as well, as London Teleport opened in October 1984 to 
specifically enhance the City’s international communication links via cable and satellite. 
These were all drawn together by London TeleCity, which ended the uniformity principle 
and privileged the City of London over the rest of the country. 
Internally, futurology and computer modelling within the telephone service had 
been reshaped during the late 1970s and early 1980s to reflect BT’s new competitive 
environment, used as a tool to prepare managers for liberalisation and acting as a model 
for a predictive, watchful, telephone network, simulating and shaping its customers. 
These developments show that it was liberalisation, rather than privatisation, which had 
a far greater impact in reorienting the technologies developed by BT towards new 
directions and markets; however, as I asserted above, in relation to the historical novelty 
of the ‘information age’, it is also important to bear in mind the much longer historical 
roots that these technologies have in the state-ownership of the telephone system, which 
cannot be overlooked amidst the attention-grabbing re-orientation of BT towards business 
and financial interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I opened this chapter by posing two questions: what roles did liberalisation and 
privatisation play in shaping the British telephone system, and what was the relationship 
between these processes and the broader 1980s enthusiasm for an ‘information 
revolution’? In exploring answers to the first question, I have shown how liberalisation 
played a more significant role than privatisation in orienting various ongoing 
technological developments towards the business and financial communities, but have 
also emphasised the longer historical basis to these projects. I have also addressed the 
role of individual share-ownership in privatisation and argued that, counter to traditional 
historical narratives, this role was relatively minor and, indeed, was in large part shaped 
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by and oriented towards large financial institutions; however, I have also pointed out that 
this episode, whilst historically exaggerated, was nevertheless important within BT for 
resolving staff antipathy to privatisation, and its legacy lasts to this day amongst former 
BT staff. 
 In addressing the second question, regarding the role of BT’s privatisation within 
the wider popularity of ‘information revolution’ discourses since the 1980s, I have 
explored the British political discourse about BT’s privatisation, and its international 
reception and influence. I have situated my analysis in reference to Barbrook and 
Cameron’s thesis that the digital utopianism originated in a fusion of 1970s California 
counterculture and cyberculture with New Right neoliberal and libertarian politics, and 
shown that BT’s privatisation also combined these views of information technology, 
emancipatory individualism, and free market economics. I have argued that this happened 
in ways that predates certain aspects of digital utopianism – such as Stewart Brand’s 
maxim that ‘information wants to be free’ – and which also shows that various ideologies 
previously attributed by other historians to BT’s privatisation – competition, efficiency, 
free markets, entrepreneurialism, and individual share-ownership – can instead also be 
situated within various registers of the Californian ideology’s fusion with Thatcherism. 
 I also argued that BT’s privatisation influenced the development of this discourse 
beyond Britain. BT’s privatisation was not patient zero for the Californian ideology, but 
it was certainly one of the early major vectors for this way of thinking, and combined 
information technology with corporate power in ways which Barbrook and Cameron 
neglect. I showed how privatisation – particularly the example of BT’s privatisation – 
was interpreted as a pre-requisite of the information revolution both in American popular 
science and European policy-making, and that critical analyses of information technology 
interlinked privatisation with the ‘information revolution’ almost immediately after BT’s 
privatisation. In particular, these critical analyses have drawn attention to how the 
privatisation of information technologies has been used to cement market and corporate 
power, and this resonates with the history of privatisation which I have outlined above: 
the longer liberalisation and privatisation of BT has undoubtedly shaped Britain’s 
telecommunications system to be more attentive to large corporate and financial 
customers, and, as the first major telecommunications privatisation in the world, has set 
a global example. 
The privatisation of BT fused the Californian ideology with a political and 
corporate infatuation with the City of London financial centre. Given the ways that 
analysts such as Schiller, Webster, Castells and Harvey have all drawn attention to the 
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deep entanglement of information technologies with financial institutions and corporate 
power, I would argue that the privatisation of BT transmuted the Californian ideology 
into a ‘London ideology’. The London ideology, seen in the principles of IT-82 as 
ostensibly similar to the Californian ideology’s technologically-enabled individualism, 
entrepreneurialism, competition, and small state, has in practice merely re-oriented 
telecommunications from the needs of the state to the needs of the private sector. Margaret 
Thatcher called privatisation ‘one of Britain’s most successful exports’, but I would 
suggest that she was being too modest: denationalisation and individual share-ownership 
have been out-stripped by the London ideology’s privatisation and financialization of 
telecommunications across the Western world since the 1990s. 
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10 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I opened this thesis with James Merriman’s 1967 assertion that ‘the concepts of 
information and control are fundamental to any telecommunications system’. As I have 
argued in Chapter Five, ‘information’ here spoke to both Merriman’s concerns that 
specialist information networks would grow to compete with and threaten the Post 
Office’s monopoly, and his plans for an integrated network which would distribute all 
forms of information. Merriman retired from the Post Office in 1976, whilst the ISDN 
was still under development, but his career in retirement highlights how significantly the 
political economic environment around him had changed since 1967. Merriman went on 
to become Chairman of the National Computing Centre and, in 1982, was commissioned 
by the Thatcher government to write a report on the uses of the radio frequency spectrum 
in anticipation of the decommissioning of frequencies used for outdated 405-line 
television broadcasting. The Merriman Report, as it became known, recommended 
preserving approximately one-third of the spectrum used for defence purposes – perhaps 
reflecting Merriman’s wartime work on wireless – but made two further interesting 
recommendations: first, that the economic importance of the radio spectrum for new 
diverse uses by information technology meant that new users should be given greater 
opportunities for access compared to existing users; second, that, as an extension of this, 
regulation of the radio waves should transfer from the Home Office to the Department of 
Trade and Industry.1 
 This last recommendation was immediately accepted by government and, whilst 
the Merriman Report itself was quite cautious on new mechanisms for allocating 
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frequencies, the government seized upon this opportunity to introduce market 
mechanisms by commissioning a report in 1985 by CSP International (now part of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) into managing the spectrum via price mechanisms. Several 
reports in The Guardian criticised this as the ‘privatisation’ of the air waves, and cast the 
Merriman Report as creating the scope for this new unwelcome advance of market forces 
into the public domain.2 In 1987, the government officially accepted CSP’s 
recommendations that spectrum allocation take place through commercial sales, rather 
than allocating them on a first-come, first-serve basis, as had previously been the case.3 
By 2000, this had evolved into spectrum auctions for the mobile phone industry, 
the first of which raised £22.5 billion. The auctioning of tranches of the radio frequency 
spectrum in Britain – a quintessentially neoliberal policy reflecting the view that markets 
must be created4 – thus has a lineage from Merriman. I am not saying that the Merriman 
Report was at all responsible for this policy – to do so would ignore Merriman’s own 
caution about such radically new ways of allocating the spectrum, as well as overlook the 
crucial rise of the neoliberal policy-making view of markets over the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s – but my point is that a line can be traced from Merriman’s 1967 view of 
information’s versatility as threatening competition to his 1983 recommendation that the 
radio spectrum was an important economic resource for diverse information technology 
applications, which in turn provided further incentive for the Conservative government 
to pursue a way of using the market to allocate the spectrum, and opened the path to the 
current auction format. 
 These themes of information, privatisation and neoliberalism, along with control, 
have been central to this thesis. I have aimed to uncover the historical processes which 
linked and shaped the British telephone system as both central to the enacting of the 
neoliberal state and the British political and cultural understandings of the ‘information 
age’. In Chapter One, I suggested that Paul Edwards’ concept of mutual orientation – 
identifying the moments in history where micro, meso, and macro trends orient one 
another – would be helpful in writing micro and meso histories of information and control, 
                                                 
2 Peter Large, ‘After Jaguar, North Sea Oil and British Telecom, the Government Has Found Something 
Else to Privatise. No, Not British Airways but British Air Waves.’, The Guardian, 29 March 1985; Peter 
Large, ‘Even Air Waves Are up for Sale’, The Guardian, 18 November 1986; Peter Large, ‘“Sell off Air 
Waves and Buy in Software”’, The Guardian, 3 April 1987. 
3 Large, ‘“Sell off Air Waves and Buy in Software”’. 
4 E. D. Melillo, ‘Spectral Frequencies: Neoliberal Enclosures of the Electromagnetic Commons’, Radical 
History Review 2012, no. 112 (1 January 2012): 147–61. 
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the subjects of so many macro theories of society.5 I have spent most of this thesis 
addressing micro and meso histories, and so here I will point to moments where these 
histories have oriented and been oriented by macro trends. First, I will recount my 
arguments so far, and then I will reflect on how these histories inform, and are informed 
by, macro theories of information and control. Finally, I will outline avenues for further 
research and conclude this thesis. 
 
Defiance, Compliance/Discretion, and Digitalism 
 
This thesis’ chapters have been organised in parallel, rather than in series: most start in 
the mid-1950s and end in the late 1980s or early 1990s. In this section, rather than repeat 
the thesis’ parallel structure, I will recount my arguments chronologically, through which 
I aim to identify broader trends and speak to one of this thesis’ broader goals of 
understanding how the British telephone system interlinked and was implicated in the 
dual appearances of the ‘information age’ and neoliberalism. 
 A repeating trend across this thesis is Robert Bud and the Science Museum’s 
‘defiant modernism’ – the national technological triumphalism and search for ‘world 
firsts’ in late 1950s and early 1960s Britain.6 I have suggested that many of the Post 
Office’s projects align with this trend. I showed how the national prestige of achieving a 
‘world first’ motivated development of Highgate Wood in the face of clear design issues, 
and also suggested that the Post Office Tower could represent defiant modernism, 
although with reservations which I shall turn to shortly. I cast TAT-1 and Goonhilly 
Downs as both defiantly modern: for the former, in the Post Office’s defiant emphases on 
British engineering ingenuity in a collaborative project; in the latter, in Goonhilly’s 
environmentally-resilient design, which used the same design concepts as Britain’s 
prestigious Jodrell Bank. 
However, defiant modernism does not capture everything from this period. Most 
obvious are the fears about automation in the late 1950s which surfaced around GRACE, 
the Post Office’s ‘robot telephone operator’. The Post Office’s internationalism also 
evades capture, in its collaboration on Telstar, and in the influence of American corporate 
research campuses on Martlesham Heath. The ideals of circulatory, redistributive 
democracy which informed the Post Office Tower’s viewing gallery and revolving 
                                                 
5 Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, 213–15. 
6 Bud, ‘Penicillin and the New Elizabethans’. 
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restaurant, and in the influence of new towns, government dispersal, and new universities 
on Dollis Hill’s relocation, are also missing. Also overlooked is the technocratic 
managerialism of British government and the Post Office, seen in the Post Office’s 
computer centres, the growth of marketing research, the hiring of McKinsey’s, and the 
interest in long-range planning and futurology. 
For the late 1960s and 1970s, Sumner and Agar’s concepts of compliance and 
discreet modernism are helpful. Sumner argues that, in British computing, complying 
with international computing systems in the 1960s and 1970s made defiant modernism 
harder to sustain.7 Agar’s discreet modernism describes a long twentieth-century trend of 
opaque governmental computing projects.8 However, this discreet modernism became 
more obvious in the 1970s: the ALEM 6 model breached discreet modernism, and the 
ensuing controversy was resolved by re-establishing the model’s discretion. Discreet 
modernism is perhaps also visible in J.S. Whyte’s ‘bleak mechanistic prospect’, which I 
suggested was a public recalibration of Treasury O&M discreet modernism for the Post 
Office and for telecommunications, in which it became a denial of the computerisation of 
decision-making, privacy, and dignity. 
Compliance featured in several Post Office projects: integrated digital network 
development was enveloped by ITU standard-setting, and growing data needs meant that 
the Post Office had to follow broader trends and develop packet-switching networks. 
Compliance with INTELSAT and FCC transatlantic communications policy restricted 
North Atlantic cables until cable planning was ‘INTELSAT-IZED’. The waveguide also 
shows the consequences of defiance, or non-compliance: touted as a technology for the 
information revolution and as a uniquely British project with export potential, it became 
redundant due to economic depression and slow telephone growth in the 1970s. The City 
of London also increasingly fought the Post Office’s non-compliance, lobbying for 
packet-switching and dismissing the integrated digital network, which it viewed as 
monopolistic; the Post Office was aware that if it did not serve the City, it would anger a 
pro-liberalisation lobby. 
As with defiance, compliance and discretion are imperfect frames; they do not 
capture the Post Office’s aborted attempts to secure a national cable TV network, the 
outward turn of long-range planning, or the increasing reflexivity of computer modelling, 
of which the latter two were responses to economic and energy crises. The ‘controlled 
chaos’ of Martlesham Heath also does not fit, although there are two points to make here: 
                                                 
7 Sumner, ‘Defiance to Compliance’. 
8 Agar, The Government Machine, 424–30. 
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first, Martlesham Heath’s traditional aesthetic was an explicit response to the perceived 
instabilities of society, and so can be compared to the expansion of long-range planning 
and reflexivity of computer modelling, which were both also responses to societal 
instability. Second, Martlesham Heath village’s design carefully screened technology, 
from the bans on TV aerials and caravans, to the landscaped concealing of the research 
centre. This is a form of discretion, albeit different to Agar’s, and I would suggest that 
keeping technology discreet during the 1970s was perhaps part of a broader unease with 
technology and technological systems, responding to issues such as the three-day week, 
and the highly-politicised, troubled Concorde and Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor 
projects. 
Unlike defiance, compliance, and discretion, there is no version of British 
technological modernism which captures much of the telephone system’s activity in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. Agar argues that discreet modernism disappeared as government 
IT became more transparent in the 1980s, and Sumner suggests a partial return to defiance 
in Thatcherist IT policy.9 In this section, I will later propose a new modernism – ‘digital 
modernism’ – to describe the neoliberal information aesthetic of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
but first I want to explore in more detail the important historical changes underlying this 
aesthetic, as they speak to the entanglement of technological change in the telephone 
system with the rise of neoliberalism in Britain. 
As I have established at various points through this thesis, the privatisation of 
British Telecom was a hugely important moment for Thatcherism: it served to support an 
industrial policy emphasising information technology’s market power, and its success 
sustained the privatisation movement in Britain, as well as firing the starter gun for the 
deregulation and privatisation of telecommunications around the world. However, as I 
argued in the previous chapter and at various other points through this thesis, 
liberalisation was the more important change for the telephone system. In the late 1970s, 
the pressures of impending liberalisation shaped decision-making in the telephone 
system, such as the orientation to the needs of the City of London in the creation of 
London TeleCity and London TelePort. 
However, a crucial finding of this thesis is that the spectre of competition has a 
longer history with roots in Post Office engineers’ and management’s interpretations of 
information theory. In 1968, Merriman articulated how the versatility of information, 
which was understood as capable of synthesising all forms of communication into digital 
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data streams, also threatened competition: the rise of specialist information networks 
would threaten the Post Office’s monopoly. From this point, several important 
developments started – System X, the ISDN, computer modelling, and the waveguide – 
all of which, in various ways, served the Post Office’s goal of creating a high-capacity, 
general-purpose, integrated information network which would preserve the Post Office’s 
monopoly. 
System X, as a digital system of computer control over information flows, 
provided a versatile ‘family’ of telephone exchanges which enabled the integration of 
various types of traffic – international, local, trunk, and data – into one series of telephone 
exchanges, as opposed to the Post Office/BT having to purchase distinct exchanges for 
distinct traffic forms. Furthermore, as I have shown in Chapters Five and Seven, System 
X also buffered the power of technical labour and provided an important role for BT in 
the electronic surveillance state. The ISDN provided the technical standard for the 
integrated digital network and, despite lagging behind the development of packet-
switched networks, its rise in the 1980s was used by BT to defend against a regional 
break-up and its incorporation of multiple information forms into the telephone network 
meant that information was effectively more monopolised, rather than liberalised. 
Computer modelling, in both the Long Range Planning Department and Operational 
Programming Department, reinforced the Post Office’s invented futures of monopoly 
power, used by J.S. Whyte to justify TXE4 purchasing and, with UKTTF, the viability of 
a high-capacity nationwide information network. By the 1980s, the perceived predictive 
power of computer modelling was used by David Probert to educate middle managers 
about the opportunities provided by liberalisation, whilst also acting as a template for 
predictive electronic surveillance. 
The waveguide, whilst a technical failure, was similar to the UKTTF model in 
that it sustained the idea of an information revolution, which underpinned the 
monopolising developments outlined above. This dissonance, between the promise of a 
diverse, competitive information revolution (which, as mentioned above, had evolved 
from information’s threat of competition in the 1960s) and a monopolising system behind 
the scenes, continued with the ‘highway’ metaphor which the waveguide introduced: 
BT’s ‘Business Highway’ privileged market-oriented privatised information 
infrastructure, but was actually an advert for the ISDN, a monopolising technical standard 
with origins in ‘government machine’ visions of a state information network. This 
dissonance between aesthetic and actuality is why I propose ‘digital modernism’ to 
describe the technological aesthetic of the late 1970s and 1980s. Digital modernism 
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describes the appearance of digital technologies promoting one set of things – 
competition, diversity, flexibility, freedom – whilst effecting, in the case of BT, the 
preservation of technological control within BT, and the reorientation of control to large 
businesses and financial institutions. 
Digital modernism’s superficial aesthetic of the freedom, flexibility, and diversity 
has been apparent throughout this thesis. X-Stream marketed ‘the flow of digital 
information through the network’, whilst System X would apparently create jobs and free 
engineers to apply their creative talents elsewhere. The ‘highway’ metaphor, particularly 
with fibre-optic ‘Lightlines’ and the ISDN ‘Highway’, connoted high-speed, lightness, 
and instantaneity, whilst London TeleCity was marketed as liberating the City for the 
benefit of the national economy. London Teleport’s name connoted instantaneity and 
virtuality, whilst SatStream’s decentralised small-dish rooftop aerials enabled faster 
international information flows and business transactions. Kenneth Baker and Margaret 
Thatcher captured this aesthetic in their speeches on IT, describing the opportunities for 
competition, flexible enterprise, and personal freedom provide by information technology 
and the ‘free flow of information’. This was also summarised well by J.J. Wheatley, BT’s 
Head Economics Adviser, at the Long Range Strategy Seminar, where he argued that the 
convergence of computing and communications would enable the small, anti-bureaucratic 
state, and by David Probert, who suggested that computer modelling would realise 
competition and diversity as ‘ideas of the future’. 
However, these digital technologies merely reoriented control, rather than 
dispersing and decentralising it. Inspired by cybernetics, information theory and the 
government machine, the Post Office pursued an integrated, self-governing network. 
System X’s automation of operator services and engineering labour shifted control away 
from customers and engineers; BT board’s knowledge of System X-induced redundancies 
later materialised in the 1990s with Project Sovereign. Computer modelling was used to 
control managerial responses to liberalisation, and embedded ideas of computerised 
surveillance, resulting in experiments where BT used simulation to influence customers 
ahead of themselves. London TeleCity ended BT’s uniformity principle, prioritising the 
City, and London Teleport, a prime example of digital modernism’s instantaneous 
aesthetic, served the City with a purpose-built satellite earth station. The ISDN captures 
this reorientation of control best: it was a contributing factor preventing BT’s 
regionalisation and was seen by both the Post Office and the City as a monopolising 
technology. The government’s rejection of universally-accessible nationwide cable TV 
and optical-fibre monopolies in part reflected the prior existence of ISDN, which, along 
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with the London fibre-optic grid and X-Stream services, was turned by BT towards the 
City, and ISDN was marketed in ways which reinforced hierarchies between executive 
and clerical labour, showing the lasting influence of the government machine. 
I have not called this ‘informational modernism’ for two reasons. First, 
information technology has broader definitions, inside and outside this thesis. LEAPS and 
the Kensington Computer Centre are two information technologies from the 1950s and 
1960s, and others have argued that both the state and technology have been informational 
for far longer than the last few decades.10 This derives from the looseness of ‘information’ 
as a descriptor, which leads into my second reason. Post Office engineers’ broad 
interpretations of information theory in the 1950s laid the foundation for the Post Office’s 
pursuit of a digital information network. Information’s true power in the Post Office was 
in its status as a flexible, broadly-defined imaginary, rather than a concrete artefact. In 
contrast, digitalisation was a concrete technological change which happened from the late 
1960s and which permitted ‘digital modernism’. 
I should also explain what is modernist about ‘digital modernism’. Here, I 
conceive of modernism as a specific attitude to technology, as seen in interwar ‘heroic 
modernism’, appealing to the ‘machine’ as an image of rationality for working and living 
in response to this period’s disasters, the ‘reactionary modernism’ of elite Weimar and 
Nazi reconciliations of mechanical technology with German romantic nationalism, and 
the defiant and discreet modernisms previously addressed throughout this thesis.11 
Despite digital modernism’s appearance at a time conventionally associated with 
postmodernity, I deliberately do not call it ‘digital postmodernism’. This is because it 
bears much more resemblance to the other modernisms I have presented – forward-
looking, hegemonic, with close connections to the state – than the ephemerality, 
fragmentation, anachronisms, and ambivalent attitudes to technology of postmodernism. 
Digital modernism does not capture all the important developments in this thesis. 
Adastral Park was more important for its physical co-location of residences, research, and 
industry, and the corresponding invocations of historicity which supported this. The 
history of cable TV also shows how fragmentation and regionalisation was supported 
over monopolisation. Finally, I have also argued that the space age and environment both 
had important intersections with the 1980s aesthetic of international communications; this 
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is important to acknowledge, as ‘digital modernism’ runs the risk of obscuring its own 
longer history. It is also important to emphasise that digital modernism is not digital 
utopianism: the latter describes, as with the Californian ideology, or the London ideology, 
a belief system, whilst the former describes those ideologies’ aesthetics and the 
dissonance between aesthetic and reality. Digital modernism is intended as a helpful 
frame for the technological aesthetic of the late 1970s and 1980s, whilst also recognising 
the processes behind that aesthetic. In that spirit, I now turn to address information and 
control as the two guiding concepts for this thesis. 
 
Information 
 
I argued in the previous section that digital, rather than information, technologies 
mattered, and that information was more powerful rhetorically. In this section, I will point 
out how information age theories insufficiently capture digital technologies’ significance 
and information’s power by reference to the British telephone system. 
 I earlier criticised Castells’ insufficient conceptualisation of information 
technology’s history and his deterministic networking logic.12 I have shown that, rather 
than a 1970s technological revolution, digitalisation and computerisation of British 
telecommunications originated in the 1950s with cybernetics, information theory, and the 
‘government machine’. I also argued that, whilst optical fibre development accelerated in 
the 1970s, it has a lineage from millimetric waveguides and microwave transmission in 
the incremental expansion of electromagnetic frequencies available for 
telecommunications. The Thatcher government’s rejection of national cable TV and 
optical fibre networks also shows a denial of the networking logic, as does computer 
modelling which shows that more attention is needed on the tools used for planning 
networks, rather than any technological logic within the network. Finally, the interactions 
of transatlantic communications with Cold War politics and the ocean and space 
environment – something neglected by Castells and practically every other information 
age scholar – are also historically important. Digitalisation’s concentration of information 
into single networks is perhaps the closest approximation to Castells’ networking logic, 
but I have also shown the contingencies of digitalisation and, with BT’s liberalisation and 
privatisation, its re-orientation to corporate, business and financial interests. 
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 Herbert Schiller highlighted the growing significance of information and 
communication technologies from the late 1970s, as national administrations sought ways 
to remain competitive in a ‘crisis economy’.13 This was supported by the Thatcher 
government and BT’s plans to reduce System X procurement to one supplier, in order to 
prepare that supplier for international markets; however, here there are also historical 
parallels with 1960s industrial policy, seen in, for example, the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation’s consolidation of the British computing industry into ICL.14 Schiller also 
argued that liberalisation of telecommunications reinforced the private sector, and I 
supported this point in showing the City’s lobbying of BT and BT’s subsequent attention 
to the City with London TeleCity, Teleport, ISDN, and so on. I also showed the role 
played by financial institutions in lobbying for liberalisation and privatisation, and the 
orientation of BT’s flotation to securing financial institutions as shareholders. However, 
Schiller, like Castells, is too inattentive to the longer history of information technology, 
and, as I critiqued his neglect of state involvement in ICT development in Chapter Two, 
so this thesis has shown how state philosophies, such as the government machine, 
informed digitalisation, which in turn reinforced monopoly power. Schiller and Castells 
both buy too easily into the novelty of ‘information’ and neglect the discourse which has 
supported its appearance. It is this discourse which reveals information’s true power in 
the telephone system. 
 Ronald Kline has shown the construction of the information age, and this has been 
information’s true importance for the British telephone system: a constructed ideal which 
telephone engineers strived for.15 I showed how, in the 1950s, information theory 
informed visions of a universal information network, which were reinforced by 
cybernetics and the government machine general-purpose philosophy. This ideal 
sustained the pursuit of integrated digital networks, Viewphone, waveguides, cable 
television and optical fibre, whilst slowing packet-switching. I also showed how UKTTF 
modelling supported the information vision, whilst satellites, a Cold War communications 
technology, were enveloped by the information discourse. Daniel Bell, another 
information theorist I addressed in Chapter Two, was also invoked in support of the 
information ideal: the LRPD built from his post-industrial society to forecast the 
computerisation of work and home life, and Kenneth Baker also invoked the post-
industrial society in his speech to the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
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to support visions of an information society. These applications of information all 
reinforce my point that information, for the actors in this thesis, was more important as a 
discursive imaginary, rather than as a concrete transition.  
 
Control 
 
I wish to make a similar point with regards to control: whilst control theorists are more 
useful than information theorists in identifying important changes for the telephone 
system, they are less helpful when it comes to analysing the discursive importance of 
‘control’ to telephone system engineers. I will first explore how control theories have 
informed my analysis, and then highlight the ways in which they fail to capture the 
discursive importance of control to the telephone system. 
 First, on control and postmodernity: Deleuze, the postmodern scholar, and 
Harvey, the scholar of postmodernity. Neither theorist has provided ways to fully 
appreciate control in the telephone system, although that is partly a limitation of this 
thesis, and suggest further research below to address this. Electronic control over 
employees and users has mixed support for Deleuze’s society of control:16 simulation-as-
surveillance and System X’s mobile track, tail and tap system show remote, mutable, 
instantaneous forms of control over users, but LEAPS and PRISM, the two employee 
databases from 1957 and 1984 respectively, suggest more incremental, rather than 
revolutionary, computerisation of staff control. In contrast, the change from rigid patterns 
of spatial control at Dollis Hill – car parking passes and strict working hours – to the 
flexible work arrangements of contracting, consultancy, and zero-hours contracts at 
Martlesham support Harvey’s connection of flexible accumulation and changing 
experiences of time-space.17 Harvey, however, is less helpful in understanding how 
technological change has produced the condition of postmodernity beyond ‘time-space 
compression’. As I have shown, time-space compression was not the explicit goal of 
telephone engineers, who were instead informed by cybernetics, information theory, and 
the government machine for System X and the ISDN, the Cold War and space age for 
transatlantic communications, and by information discourses for Viewphone, the 
waveguide, and satellite development. There are, however, changes which reinforce 
Harvey’s view that the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s demanded greater attention to 
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time-space compression: the City of London’s increasing pressure on the telephone 
business from the mid-1970s supports this view. 
 Beniger has been helpful in showing the longer history to technologies of control, 
but is less useful in understanding the digitalisation philosophy, temporal expressions, 
and political-economic change. System X and digitalisation show how new technologies 
to control information flows were developed, and the City’s emphasis on these 
technologies supports Beniger’s view of control over information flows as crucial to 
control over commodity flows.18 However, the origins of these technologies in 
cybernetics and information theory, and particularly the state-oriented government 
machine, are not easily situated within control over information and commodity flows. 
Computer modelling could be cast as another control technology, in its facilitation of 
planning and control over digitalisation and exchange modernisation, although Beniger 
is less helpful in appreciating how modelling’s relationship to surveillance. 
Environmental control and cultural expression also sit uneasily within Beniger’s control 
revolution: Beniger neglects environmental control entirely, and the invocations of 
tradition and heritage at Martlesham Heath do not easily fit into Beniger’s analysis of 
control over production, distribution, and consumption. Finally, the political economy of 
control is insufficiently detailed by Beniger, who argues that techniques of control have 
contributed to increasingly centralised political and economic control, but does not 
expand on this point. 
 Giddens’s allocative and authoritative control is more helpful in identifying 
political-economic shifts.19 State regulation meant that telephone system had limited 
allocative control, as shown in governmental regulation of manufacturing relationships 
and national cable networks. However, it also apparent that liberalisation and 
privatisation did not drastically change this, as the state still exerted allocative control 
over the fibre-optic national grid, and foreign states and international organisations, 
through the FCC and INTELSAT, still influenced transatlantic communications. ISDN 
was thus an important technology of allocative control, as it helped BT preserve a pseudo-
monopoly over information services. The relationship between allocative and 
authoritative control helps understand computerisation better: System X and modelling, 
as ‘self-optimising’ system technologies, exerted allocative control over traffic 
regulation, integrated digitalisation, network planning, and manufacturing relationships, 
and subsequently became authoritative forms of control. System X, in automating director 
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inquiries, shifted ‘initiative’ from the user to the computer, and computer modelling was 
used to plan and predict customers, and to control internal responses to liberalisation. 
Giddens is thus helpful in showing that neoliberalism was a limited change to allocative 
control, and that focussing on the political-economic ownership of the telephone system 
alone can obscure the relations between allocative and authoritative control. 
 Franklin has perhaps been the most insightful theorist in his framing of control as 
a late capitalist episteme, built on digital technologies, which reduces humans to inputs 
and outputs.20 Franklin’s insight into digitality’s obfuscation of its material consequences 
is echoed in transatlantic communication’s environmental history, and his 
characterisation of control’s cybernetic rendering of humans into machine systems of 
input, output, and self-optimisation is particularly evident with System X, computer 
modelling, and simulation-as-surveillance. Franklin’s emphasis on the importance of 
digitalisation is also a key finding of this thesis, but his stress on the digital metaphor-
fantasy overlooks the importance of the information fantasy, which I addressed in the 
previous section. Finally, Franklin’s view of digitalisation is too singular, extending its 
apparent logic of capitalist control across numerous digital technologies. As I have shown 
through this thesis, digitalisation was a historically contingent process which did shape 
financial institutions in the City of London, but was also shaped by them. 
These theorists are still unhelpful in understanding why ‘control’, as a concept, 
was so important to actors within the telephone system. Control, both explicitly and 
implicitly, clearly dominated engineering thought. Foremost was Merriman’s 
‘information and control’, which manifested the ‘self-governing, self-healing, self-
optimising’ system. Automation, and machines as ‘servants not masters’, had surfaced 
earlier control concerns, and System X development was subsequently framed as an 
autonomous, self-controlling system which could take ‘initiative’ from users. Modelling 
also raised control issues, in controversy over modelling’s ‘decision-making ability’, and 
the ‘Strategic Control Unit’, from Cambridge’s ‘Department of Control and Management 
Systems’, as a technology for ‘controlling the corporate destiny’ and preventing an 
‘uncontrollable future’. This evolved with predictions of intelligent expert systems, and 
of computers and control equipment programming themselves, to explore the possibility 
of heuristic machines judging users and controlling information access. 
However, it is important to recognise that ‘control’ is not without issue as a core 
interpretive theme for this thesis: the historical actors in this thesis did not all subscribe 
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to a cybernetic vision of control, domesticated by the British government machine. It is 
important to disentangle the various notions of control used by actors across this thesis in 
order to analyse how important and useful the cybernetic government machine version of 
control is. 
A different version of control which has also recurred across this thesis is that of 
external control of the telephone system, which became a problem for different parties at 
different points. In the 1960s, this was an issue for Tony Benn, who felt that the telephone 
system’s status as a division of the Post Office, itself a Civil Service department, was 
restricting telecommunications management’s freedom. During the 1970s, senior 
managers and board members at various times rankled over the continued control which 
government exercised over the Post Office, particularly during periods of price restraint 
and the industrial democracy experiment. Meanwhile, members of the City of London’s 
Telecommunications Committee increasingly took issue with the Post Office’s 
monopoly, viewing its efforts to create an integrated digital network as too far an 
extension of monopoly power. Another control which is at first glance of an entirely 
different sort, but also speaks to the perceived power of state institutions, is Christopher 
Parker’s ‘controlled chaos’ in the development of Martlesham Heath new village. For 
Parker, Martlesham Heath was a rejection of the state’s control over new town 
developments, and so his efforts at an aesthetic of ‘controlled chaos’ served to show the 
possibility of handing control to the private sector. 
Control in managerial planning should also be distinguished from Merriman’s 
meaning in ‘information and control’. The planning initiatives seen in the Operational 
Programming Department’s use of ALEM 6 to justify TXE 4 purchasing and the Long 
Range Planning Department’s UKTTF study, whilst computerised, clearly speak to a 
different kind of control than cybernetic informational feedback loops; rather, they are 
conventional plans, laid out by management, which used computers as an additional 
source of credibility (in the case of ALEM 6, with near-disastrous results). However, it is 
equally difficult to discern the influence of a Fayolian sense of managerial control: one 
must remember that, as I discussed in Chapter Two, for Fayol, planning, as long-term 
forecasting, and control, as the monitoring of outputs, are quite different activities. Fayol, 
whilst almost invisible as a historical influence, nevertheless provides a useful 
clarification of the differences between planning and control which means that the 
planning activities in the Post Office which have been so important to this thesis should 
not be superficially read as yet more ‘control’. 
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That said, in the case of the LRPD, there is a clear overlap with Merriman’s 
cybernetic meanings also – Probert’s introduction of Jay Forrester’s cybernetic system 
dynamics to the Post Office whilst he was a consultant from Cambridge’s Department of 
Control and Management Systems show how extensively cybernetic versions of control 
had taken hold. This particular mode of understanding the world was influenced by 
cybernetics, as a theory of control, and met with the government machine, a frame for 
general-purpose and special-purpose control, and so cast the telephone system as itself a 
system of control, motivating the pursuit of control through universal, intelligent 
machines. There were layered, sometimes conflicting, versions of control in the Post 
Office and the historical importance of each kind should not be devalued, but in terms of 
some of the most significant changes this thesis outlines – namely the developments 
which stemmed from Merriman’s ‘information and control’ speech, such as System X, 
the ISDN, and the ‘information highway’, which negotiated privatisation and 
liberalisation in a way which preserved monopoly power within BT – it was the fusion of 
cybernetic control with the government machine which were at the heart of these changes. 
 
Further Research 
 
It is thus clear that this thesis provides only a partial, limited history of control, exploring 
its immediate origins, connotations, and influences within the British telephone system. 
The first avenue for further research I therefore suggest is a history of ‘control’. Control 
is evidently important, both for actors and analysts, and yet its history is unclear. Hughes 
has pointed to control as part of a growing inter-war ‘language of systems’, and this 
appears to have accelerated during and after World War II; control was an integral part 
of the cybernetics discourse and made its way into the engineering lexicon in the Post 
Office.21 Finally, control entered academic discourse, amongst analysts like Giddens, 
Deleuze, Beniger, and Webster, and more recently with Franklin. Unpicking this term’s 
history would provide a context for these analysts’ theories as well as this thesis. 
 A second area is telecommunications users, which would provide several 
important angles not addressed in this thesis. Deleuze and Harvey’s insights into the 
micro-scale of control and the experiences of time-space compression respectively have 
not been fully addressed, and user histories can engage with these views. As Edwards 
points out, Fischer’s history of telephone users in early-twentieth century America 
                                                 
21 Hughes, Networks of Power, 368; Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 18–26. 
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confounds the alienation view of technology and modernity, and so a history of British 
telecommunications users may also problematise these macro theories.22 
This has been an extensive, but not exhaustive, history of the British telephone 
system since the 1950s. I called this thesis Information and Control because information 
and control were important to the actors in this history, and because they are important to 
scholars who analyse history. Information dominates theories about an information 
society, but for telecommunications engineers, information was a vision to realise, not a 
law by which society operated; realising this would helpfully re-orient debate to 
investigate information’s power over both actors and analysts. Control, in contrast, was, 
for telecommunications engineers, the law by which society operated, and computer 
control, alongside a host of other types of control – environmental, organisational, spatial, 
temporal – were all deployed in service of the information vision. Telephone engineers 
built a control system because they perceived a control society; in this understanding of 
society, there is less difference between engineers and scholars than the latter would think. 
Realising that must be the first step to a history of control. 
 
                                                 
22 Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, 202; Fischer, America Calling. 
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